# Family background and school performance during a turbulent era of school reforms 

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#### Abstract

Summary ■ In the 1990s, Swedish education policy took several steps towards more decentralization and more room for parental school choice. The decade was also a turbulent one in other respects, with high unemployment and major cuts in school budgets. We study the relationship between pupils' school performance and their family background during this period of time. We use large register-based data sets and employ the grade average at age 16 as our measure of school performance. We use two alternative measures of the association between grades and family background. The first measure-the grade correlation between siblings born within three years of time-is a broad one and captures family as well as community factors shared by siblings. The second- the relation between grades and parental earnings-is narrower. Surprisingly, we find that both relationships were remarkably stable over this turbulent period of time.


JEL classification: I2, J24, J62.
Keywords: Family background, school performance, intergenerational mobility, educational policy.

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# Family background and school performance during a turbulent era of school reforms 

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Equality of opportunity has been a major goal for Swedish education policy for a long time. Although the concept of equality of opportunity is complicated and may deserve a deep philosophical discussion, our pragmatic interpretation of Swedish public-policy discussion is that the equality of opportunity norm is violated if citizens' life chances depend on factors they cannot influence themselves. One way to illustrate the public's notion of equality of opportunity is to adhere to the popular expression: "Children's life chances should not depend on the size of their parents' wallets". This expression has been used by politicians from the left to the right wing of the political spectrum and appeals to many people's notion of equity. Thus, if we are interested in education policy, we could argue that the stronger the relationship between a measure of parental income and educational achievement, the less equality of opportunity there is.

In our view, one can also trace an even broader view of the equality of opportunity norm in Swedish education policy. Irrespective of parents' financial resources, an important goal has been to equalize the educational quality among students in different parts of the country and among students who go to different schools in the same municipality.

The goal of equality of opportunity motivated many education reforms during the last century. ${ }^{1}$ The comprehensive school reform (grundskolereformen), which was implemented in the 1950s and 1960s

[^1]and kept all pupils in the same school system with a common nationally decided curriculum until the age of 16 , was motivated in this way. Free college studies and universal financial support to college students are other examples of educational policies with the same motivation.

Maybe even more strongly, this goal was reflected in Swedish education governance. For a long time, governance of primary and up-per-secondary schools was very centralized and parental school choice strongly restricted. Although the municipalities ran these schools, the central government financed them and did so with detailed instructions as to how schools should use available resources. Further, the policy was restrictive towards private schools. Thus, the compulsory school system through the 1980s could be described as a purely public one, with placement of pupils in the closest school.

With this historical background in mind, the subsequent changes in Swedish education policy during the 1990s must be considered as quite substantial. One major step was taken during the first years of the decade when the municipalities gradually got full financial responsibility for primary and upper-secondary education; the process was completed by January $1^{\text {st }} 1993$. The earmarked money from the central government to the municipalities disappeared, so the room for differences in municipalities' spending on education to affect school quality and thus outcomes increased.

Two changes in 1992 gave parents more choice. A voucher system required municipalities to satisfy parents' school choice, subject to space limitations. But residing close to a school (the residence principle, närhetsprincipen) remained the main principle for allocating students to primary schools. So if pupils residing close to a particular school filled all slots, the other parents' choices would not be given any weight. The second change in 1992 required municipalities to fund private schools. In 2001, four percent of the primary-school pupils attended private schools, an increase from less than one percent in 1990. The 2001 numbers were particularly high in some municipalities in the Stockholm area; 17.6 percent in Lidingö and 17.0 percent in Sollentuna. In Gothenburg, it was 11.7 percent. See Skolverket (2001).

The turbulence of the 1990s was magnified by the severe macroeconomic downturn in the first part of the decade, due to which tax revenue fell sharply, with budget cuts in municipalities' school budgets as a consequence. The average pupil-teacher ratio increased from close to 11 to around 13 . Some recent research suggests that pupils
with a poor family background could suffer more from bigger school classes than pupils from more well-to-do families, cf. Krueger (1999). The high unemployment also implied economic stress for the parents.

What happened to the relation between family background and educational attainment during this turbulent period? That is the issue we would like to address in this study. However, to examine this issue as early as in 2003 is not easy. Those primary-school pupils, who were affected by the changes in the 1990 s, have not yet completed their education. And even further, they have not yet entered the labor market so it is too early to examine how they will ultimately be affected in terms of labor market achievement.

To be able to conduct a study so early, we will instead focus on school performance. More specifically, we use grade averages for each cohort of 16-year old pupils, who completed primary school (grundskolan) during the period 1988-2000. Our use of grade averages is governed by data availability; we would have preferred to use standardized test scores but such data are not available. However, grades at the end of Swedish primary school are also illuminating for our purposes. First of all, these grades are used for entrance to upper-secondary school (gymnasiet). The competition to get into the most attractive up-per-secondary schools increased during the decade, so grades are important per se for these pupils. Second, Sweden has a national grading system with quite clear criteria for grading, so skills and grades should be quite strongly correlated. We describe the grading system in more detail below, where we also deal with the problem caused by a change in the grading system in the period of our study.

We have two separate approaches to studying the relationship between pupils' grades and their socio-economic background. The first approach captures a broad notion of equality of opportunity. We use sibling correlations instead of parent-child relationships. The virtue of this approach is that siblings (who grew up together) get similar outcomes, not only because they share the same family background (both "nature and nurture"), but also because they shared the same neighborhood, including the peers and the schools that were available where they grew up. A sibling correlation is therefore a broader measure of the impact of family and neighborhood conditions on child outcomes than is the relationship between child outcome and parental socio-economic status only. For example, if municipalityspecific factors got a stronger impact on school performance during the 1990s, it will show up in a sibling correlation but not necessarily in
the relationship between children's grades and their parents' income. The same applies to parents' ability (and willingness) to choose school for their children. If this ability becomes more important over time, it will also show up in the sibling correlation. We estimate sibling correlations in grade point averages for closely spaced siblings and do this analysis for siblings belonging to cohorts born within three calendar years; we use partly overlapping cohorts born 1972-74, 1973-75 and so on until 1982-84.

The second approach captures a narrower notion of family background by estimating the relation between grade averages and parental earnings ("parents' wallets"). We do such an analysis for 13 cohorts of pupils born 1972-1984 who graduated from compulsory school at the age of 16 between 1988 and 2000. We do separate analyses for father's and family earnings, as well as for boys and girls.

The paper proceeds as follows. We describe the data in section 1. Then, we present the sibling-correlations results in section 2. We continue with the analysis of the relation between grade averages and parental earnings in section 3. Finally, in section 4, we focus on the bigcity areas where privatization went further than in the rest of the country. Section 5 summarizes and discusses our main findings.

## 1. Data

All our data stem from registers held by Statistics Sweden. The basis for the specific data set that we use is a 20 percent random sample of each cohort born in Sweden in 1972-1984. By eliminating foreign born from our working data set, we deliberately abstain from focusing on the school-performance differentials between Sweden-born and foreign-born children. The immigration issue has been a very hot one in Sweden during the period of our study, and the influx of refugee immigrants was high in the early 1990s. ${ }^{2}$ As a consequence, a rising number of pupils were born abroad over the period. If we were to find a changing relationship between family background and school performance among all pupils in Swedish schools, the change may not be attributable to the school reforms. Due to our focus on the school reforms, we find it more pertinent to investigate whether the relationship between family background and school performance among Sweden-born pupils changed over the period.

[^2]In order to study family relationships, the random sample described in the previous section has been merged with other family members from Statistics Sweden's register data sets. First, we use a population register (flergenerationsregistret) to identify biological parents and siblings. Second, we use census data from 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 to identify the resident parents and siblings. In most, but not all, cases the resident parents and siblings are also the biological ones. For all children defined in this way, we used another register to obtain the grades when graduating from compulsory school at the age of 16 in ninth grade. For all parents, we used other registers to obtain background variables like parental age, death, earnings, and some other variables.

### 1.1. Grades

Starting with the graduates in 1988, Statistics Sweden collects information for all pupils in Swedish primary schools in a special data set (Arskurs 9 registret). The normal graduation age is 16 years, so the 1972 cohort was the first to be covered by this data source. ${ }^{3}$ This register contains data on grades in specific subjects and our task is to define a useful grade-point-average to be used as the basic outcome measure in our study. We then had to take some restrictions into account. First, some subjects, like Math and English, are offered at different levels of study and the same grades are used at each level. Because there is no straightforward way to compare grades received at different levels of study, we decided not to use these grades. Instead, we used the grades in Swedish, Science, and Social science, which are three subjects studied at the same level for all students. Together, they represent quite broad skills and a significant part of the curriculum. Indeed, 48 percent of all study time in primary school from grade 1-9 are allocated to these three subjects.

Although we would have preferred to use results from coherent national tests, which are comparable over time, we would argue that a grade average based on these three study subjects is a relevant outcome that is of interest per se from the perspective of equality of opportunity. First, as already mentioned in the introduction, the entrance to upper-secondary studies has been based on the overall grade

[^3]average during the whole period of our study; and our three chosen subjects represent a significant part of this overall grade average. The entrance requirements have varied among fields of study at the uppersecondary level, so the choice set is larger for those with good grades. Second, because the competition among specific upper-secondary schools increased during the 1990s and choice among these was based on the grade average, having good grades became even more important during the period of our study. Anecdotal evidence and newspaper reports suggest that pupils in the last years of primary school became increasingly eager to get good grades during the 1990s in order to have good options for their choice of upper-secondary school. Thus, parental resources, reflected by e.g. earnings, might have become more important as well.

It is natural to consider, however, how accurately grades measure basic skills in the Swedish system. During most of the period of our study, Sweden had a national relative grading system. The grades ranged from 1 to 5 , and the goal was that the national average should be 3.0 with standard deviation 1 . Thus, the national fraction at each specific grade level should be predetermined. To guide teachers and school leaders in their grading, national achievement tests were undertaken. These tests were constructed by the National Board of Education (Skolöverstyrelsen). They were given in Math and Swedish in $9^{\text {th }}$ grade and in English in $8^{\text {th }}$ grade.

With the implementation of the new curriculum in the school year of $1995 / 96$, the relative grading system was replaced in favour of a new criterion-referenced system (malrelaterat betygsystem). ${ }^{4}$ The grades in this new system have four levels: $I G$ (not pass), $G$ (pass), $V G$ (pass with distinction) and $M V G$ (pass with special distinction). The skills required to get a certain grade were pre-specified, and all teachers and schools were supposed to grade according to these pre-specified skills. National tests have been done since the introduction of the new grading system as well. They are done in Math, English and Swedish in $5^{\text {th }}$ and $9^{\text {th }}$ grade.

Despite the national tests, there is some room for teachers and schools to deviate from the nationally determined standards in the grading of their pupils. A clear indication is that the national average in the previous relative grading system was in general .2-. 3 units above

[^4]the intended average 3.0. However, such grade inflation does not necessarily imply that the correlation between basic skills and grades is lower than it would otherwise have been the case.

Another concern for us is that the new competition among schools-private as well as public-introduced by the school reforms in the 1990s could have made schools more eager to raise grades to look attractive to prospective pupils and their parents. Although it is likely that schools' grading behaviour have been affected by the reforms, it does not necessarily follow that the correlation between grades and basic skills has been reduced.

With these concerns in mind, we have to do our best with the data at hand. In order to get comparable estimates for the whole period, we have to transform the grades to a common unit that is comparable over time. To do so, we started out with the 20 percent random sample of each cohort born in Sweden. We conditioned on having grades reported in the register. Then, we ranked all pupils in each subject and attached a percentile rank to each specific grade level. For example, in 1972, those with a 4 in Swedish ranked from percentile 63.6 to 93.4 so we attached the percentile $(63.6+93.4) / 2=78.5$ to this grade. Each pupil in our analysis was then assigned a percentile value in each subject according to his or her grade in that subject. Then, we computed an average of the pupil's three percentiles. In so doing, we attached the same weight to Swedish, Science and Social science.

The grade information in Science and Social science is more detailed than so. For some 80 percent of all students, both Science and Social science consist of four sub-fields with separate grades. ${ }^{5}$ For these students, we used this additional information by first ranking the pupils in each of the four sub-fields, then computing the average rank in the four sub-fields and finally computing the average of the three main subjects. ${ }^{6}$ This additional information about sub-field grades is useful since it generates more variation in the final grade average.

[^5]
### 1.2 Parental earnings

We use annual earnings from work (arbetsinkomst). Statistics Sweden has constructed this earnings variable from employers' compulsory reports to tax authorities. Self-employment earnings are included, so there are no missing values for persons running their own business. Further, some earnings-related social-insurance benefits are included, namely sickness pay (both own sickness and child's sickness) and pa-rental-leave benefits. Because mothers more than fathers use parentalleave benefits and sickness pay to take care of a sick child, we do not get missing values on mother's earnings only because of such absenteeism. During the period that we study, sickness and parental leave benefits replaced 80-90 percent of foregone earnings. Unemployment benefits and training stipends for unemployed program participants are not included in the annual earnings measure.

Although it appears to be a straightforward task to estimate the relationship between pupils' grade average and their parents' earnings, there are some tricky choices involved in defining the samples and the variables. First, we must take a stand on the definition of parents. In the first place, we use information about the biological father. But if there is no information about him, we use the (earliest) resident father in the census household if there is earnings information about such a person. We apply the same principle for mothers, even though it should be noted that it is much less common to live with a nonbiological mother than with a non-biological father.

We follow the approach in the new economics literature on intergenerational income mobility and focus on long-run earnings (see Solon 1999). In our main analysis, we measure parental earnings as the average of two earnings observations when the child is aged around 5 and 10 respectively. ${ }^{7}$ We first take the log of real annual earnings and then we compute the average of these two logged values. ${ }^{8}$ In case one of these earnings observations is missing, we only use one such observation.

Swedish register information offers no information on working hours to construct full-time equivalent earnings, so our annual earn-

[^6]ings measure also reflects variation in hours of work. The lower limit on annual earnings in the data source is SEK100 ( $\approx$ USD 12). Because we use the logarithm of annual earnings, the results might be very sensitive to such low observations. We have settled for using a lower earnings limit at SEK10,000 (year 2000 price level) and treat observations below this level as missing.

We use two alternative parental earnings measures. First, we use father's earnings. Second, we use family earnings simply defined as the sum of the father's and mother's earnings. The latter is a quite crude measure of the household consumption standard, and in future work, we will try to improve this measure by considering household size.

## 2. Sibling correlations in grades

### 2.1. Definitions

We start with the broader measure of socio-economic background, the sibling correlation. The familiar (Pearson) correlation coefficient measures the strength of the linear relationship between two variables, which in our application are grade averages for two siblings. Intuitively, it is easy to imagine that the more important that factors that siblings share are, the higher will the correlation be. And these factors could come from the family as well as from the neighborhood where they grew up. With some technical apparatus, one can also show that the sibling correlation measures the fraction of variation in the variable of interest (in our case the student's grade) that can be explained by the factors that siblings share (see e.g. Solon, 1999). Note that in this context, it is the sibling correlation that has this interpretation, not the squared correlation (the familiar $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ - statistic.) For example, previous studies have estimated brother correlations in long-run earnings to around .20 for Sweden, so 20 percent of the variation in long-run earnings for men are due to factors shared by brothers. ${ }^{9}$

The broad interpretation of a sibling correlation makes this statistic like an omnibus measure of the importance of childhood conditions. Although this is an appealing property of the measure, two other properties must be kept in mind when it is used in a specific study.

[^7]First, siblings can be defined in different ways and some sibling types share a more common background than others. For example, identical twins share the same genes and most likely also a more common environment than most other sibling types. We use full biological siblings, who were born within three calendar years of time, so the results should be interpreted in light of this definition. For our purposes, it is crucial to apply the same definition for the whole period covered. Second, those who are the only child of their biological parents cannot be taken into account in a sibling correlation study. We do not believe that this is a serious limitation, though. As a sensitivity analysis, we have done the parent-child analysis of the subsequent section separately only for those who have siblings and the results for this group were qualitatively the same when we used the whole sample.

To sum up, in the sibling correlation estimations we use the following definitions and sample restrictions:

- We use biological full siblings only.
- We use siblings born within three calendar years. The first group was born 1972-74, and then we use partly overlapping groups born 1973-75, and so on until 1982-84.
- We require that the siblings lived together in a census at the age of around five years. The reason we cannot have a stricter requirement in this respect is that we get the residential information from census data, and the latest Swedish census was done in 1990 when our youngest cohort was six years old.

Some families have more than two siblings, which raises some technical estimation issues. From the point of view of statistical estimation efficiency, it is appealing to use all information to get as precise estimates as possible. It is not straightforward, though, to determine the weight that should be attached to the additional information provided by such families. ${ }^{10}$ In our case, there were few families with three children or more born during the three-year time period, so we decided to treat each pair in such families as individual observations.

[^8]
### 2.2. Descriptive statistics and results

We report both descriptive statistics for the samples that we use and the results in Table 1. The mean grade is defined as the average percentile rank for those in the sibling sample. They are ranked according to the random sample of the population of Sweden-born, so the numbers tell us whether those who have closely aged siblings are different than the rest of the population. It turns out that their average percentile grade rank is very close to 50.0 . More important, there is not any drift in the mean and standard deviation of the grade so it is hard to see that the sibling groups have become different during the period. The data also show the well-known pattern that girls have higher grades than boys. Note that the sample sizes for brothers and sisters do not add up to those for all siblings; the reason is that the sample of all siblings also contains families with both a boy and a girl.

Our main interest is in the estimated correlations. For all siblings, they are very close to .50 . The estimated standard errors are around .01 , so a 95 percent confidence interval has a width of around . 04 . By the property of the sibling correlation, it follows that around half of the variation in the mean percentile rank of grades is attributed to factors shared by full siblings who are born within three years. The magnitude of the brother and sister correlations is somewhat higher, generally in the range .55-.60. It is not surprising that same-sexed siblings share more family and neighborhood factors than all siblings.

Finally, and most important, the sibling correlations have been remarkably stable over time, the range is from .537 for those born 1972-74 to . 494 for those born 1981-83. These two estimates are significantly different from each other at conventional levels. So if there is any change at all over the period, there is a decline rather than an increase in the importance of background. It turns out, however, that it is the first estimate that deviates by being higher than the subsequent ones, and if one omits the first estimate, the stability is quite striking. One could argue that most reforms (and the macroeconomic shock) appeared later, so any effects from these events should appear later in the period that we cover.
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|  | All siblings |  |  | Brothers |  |  | Sisters |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cohorts | Correlation (std err) | Mean grade (std dev) | \# of pairs | Correlation (std err) |  | \# of pairs | Correlation (std err) | Mean grade (std dev) | \# of pairs |
| 72-74 | $\begin{gathered} .537 \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .50 .4 \\ (24.3) \end{gathered}$ | 7469 | $\begin{gathered} .587 \\ (.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45.7 \\ (24.2) \end{gathered}$ | 2139 | $\begin{gathered} .615 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 54.9 \\ (23.6) \end{gathered}$ | 1801 |
| 73-75 | $\begin{gathered} .516 \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 50.6 \\ (24.2) \end{gathered}$ | 6883 | $\begin{gathered} .582 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45.9 \\ (24.6) \end{gathered}$ | 1861 | $\begin{gathered} .577 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 55.2 \\ (23.7) \end{gathered}$ | 1777 |
| 74-76 | $\begin{gathered} .497 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 51.0 \\ (24.3) \end{gathered}$ | 6812 | $\begin{gathered} .556 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 46.6 \\ (23.8) \end{gathered}$ | 1903 | $\begin{gathered} .573 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 55.5 \\ (23.7) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 1747 |
| 75-77 | $\begin{gathered} .525 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 50.7 \\ (24.4) \end{gathered}$ | 6221 | $\begin{gathered} .554 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45.4 \\ (23.8) \end{gathered}$ | 1703 | $\begin{gathered} .612 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 55.7 \\ (24.1) \end{gathered}$ | 1613 |
| 76-78 | $\begin{gathered} .520 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 50.4 \\ (24.7) \end{gathered}$ | 6014 | $\begin{gathered} .586 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45.5 \\ (24.8) \end{gathered}$ | 1647 | $\begin{gathered} .595 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 55.8 \\ (23.8) \end{gathered}$ | 1573 |
| 77-79 | $\begin{gathered} .503 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 50.4 \\ (24.3) \end{gathered}$ | 6341 | $\begin{gathered} .537 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 46.0 \\ (24.2) \end{gathered}$ | 1759 | $\begin{gathered} .594 \\ (.020) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56.0 \\ (23.5) \end{gathered}$ | 1669 |
| 78-80 | $\begin{gathered} .504 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 50.6 \\ (24.4) \end{gathered}$ | 6652 | $\begin{gathered} .561 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45.7 \\ (23.9) \end{gathered}$ | 1821 | $\begin{gathered} .603 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 55.8 \\ (23.7) \end{gathered}$ | 1688 |
| 79-81 | $\begin{gathered} .500 \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 50.5 \\ (24.2) \end{gathered}$ | 7202 | $\begin{gathered} .588 \\ (.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 46.5 \\ (24.0) \end{gathered}$ | 1933 | $\begin{gathered} .575 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 54.9 \\ (23.1) \end{gathered}$ | 1837 |
| 80-82 | $\begin{gathered} .506 \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 50.8 \\ (23.7) \end{gathered}$ | 6929 | $\begin{gathered} .571 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 46.6 \\ (23.6) \end{gathered}$ | 1966 | $\begin{gathered} .589 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 55.8 \\ (23.2) \end{gathered}$ | 1731 |
| 81-83 | $\begin{gathered} .494 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 51.1 \\ (23.6) \end{gathered}$ | 6869 | $\begin{gathered} .570 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 46.3 \\ (23.1) \end{gathered}$ | 1935 | $\begin{gathered} .560 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56.4 \\ (23.0) \end{gathered}$ | 1736 |
| 82-84 | $\begin{gathered} .500 \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 51.3 \\ (23.3) \end{gathered}$ | 7339 | $\begin{gathered} .540 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 46.2 \\ (22.1) \end{gathered}$ | 2010 | $\begin{gathered} .597 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56.5 \\ (23.3) \end{gathered}$ | 1847 |

We have examined how robust these findings are by experimenting with other spacing intervals for siblings, namely two and four years. The general impression of stability remains, although the estimates for the more closely spaced siblings are somewhat higher, and the estimates for the more widely spaced siblings are somewhat lower. Further, we asked ourselves if the results could have been affected by twin births becoming more (or less) common over time. The reason why such a pattern could be a concern is, of course, that twins share more genetic endowment and more environment than other full siblings. We could not find any such trend in the prevalence of twins. Further, the results did not change when we eliminated twins from the estimations.

## 3. Grades and parental earnings

### 3.1. Models and parameters of interest

Consider the following simple regression model:
$G P A_{i}=\alpha+\beta \log P E_{i}+\varepsilon_{i}$,
where GPA is the grade point average of pupil $i$ as defined above and standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one, $\alpha$ is the intercept of the regression equation, $\log P E_{i}$ is the logarithm of parental earnings with associated coefficient $\beta$, and $\varepsilon_{i}$ is an error term. The regression coefficient $\beta$ will then tell us by how much the standardized grade point average is expected to change due to a proportionate change in parental earnings, e.g., if $\beta=0.4$ (as in some results below) a ten percent increase of parental income will increase the standardized grade point average by approximately .04 . A .04 standard deviation change in the grade distribution, in turn, represents the move from the median in this distribution to the $52^{\text {nd }}$ percentile. ${ }^{11}$

The regression coefficient in (1) is one of our measures of the relation between school performance and parental earnings. It could, however, be argued that a complementary measure should be employed to study the evolution over time in the relationship if there is a
${ }^{11}$ These numbers rely on the assumption that GPA is normally distributed, a reasonable assumption in our data.
trend in earnings inequality. Suppose (as is the case in our data for fathers) that earnings inequality increased over time. In that case, a certain relative change implies a shorter move in the earnings rank than if the distribution had remained constant. If the grade average is related to relative positions in the income distribution rather than to relative income differentials, one would expect the regression coefficient to fall over time in response to rising income inequality. One could therefore also examine the regression coefficient in a transformed version of model (1) that instead uses parental income standardized by its standard deviation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G P A_{i}=\alpha+\beta *((\log P E) / S T D)_{i}+\varepsilon_{i}, \tag{*}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $S T D$ is the standard deviation of $\log P E$, and $\beta^{*}$ the standardized regression coefficient.

A standardized regression coefficient of .2 (which is close to what we get) implies that a one standard deviation difference in the parental earnings distribution moves the pupil .2 standard deviations in the grade distribution. Such a change can be typified by a change from the median to the $84^{\text {th }}$ percentile in the earnings distribution being associated with an expected change from the median to the $58^{\text {th }}$ percentile in the grade distribution.

Both the standardized and the unstandardized coefficients are informative, but address different questions. So we report both coefficients. Note also that the square of the standardized regression coefficient measures the fraction of the variation in grades that is explained by the variation in the parental income variable-it is equivalent to the familiar $\mathrm{R}^{2}$-statistic. Finally, we stress that we do not claim either $\beta$ or $\beta^{*}$ to be purely causal parameters. Although parental earnings probably to some extent causally affect children's school attainment, our purpose is to descriptively relate pupils' grade average to a measure of family background that is easy to understand and consistent over time.

### 3.2. Descriptive statistics and results

We first report some descriptive statistics in Table 2. The sample size declines over time from around 20000 pupils in 1972 to around 17000 in 1984. This decline is consistent with the Swedish fertility patterns over this period of time. The gradual increase in father's and
mother's age is also consistent with fertility patterns. Note also that fathers are, on average, 2.5-3.0 years older than mothers at the birth of the child. Regarding the earnings variables, it should be noted that the standard deviation of log earnings increases over time. Thus, the distinction between the standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients is important when we interpret the estimated coefficients. Finally, the sample observations reveal that there are some missing observations when we use family earnings and some more when we use father's earnings. Nonetheless, the non-response is quite low.

The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 3a (both boys and girls) and separately for boys and girls in the identically organized Tables 3 b and 3 c . There is a clear downward trend in the coefficients for unstandardized parental earnings. This is true for both genders and for the genders separately. The interpretation of this decline is that a given percentage parental earnings differential is associated with a shorter move in pupils' grade distribution.

The gradual increase in earnings inequality, in particular father's earnings, reported in Table 2 implies that the standardized coefficients could have evolved differently from the unstandardized ones. The results reveal that this is indeed the case. We find the stability of the estimated standardized coefficients striking. True, a very close look at the numbers shows that the estimates for father's standardized earnings are somewhat higher in 1972-73 than in the last two years. But the magnitudes are only in the order of .02 , which is statistically different from zero at conventional levels, due to the good precision of the estimates. If, instead, the first two cohorts are neglected, it is the stability that is most striking. The interpretation is that a given move in the parental earnings distribution is associated with about the same move in the grade distribution during the whole period of our study.

We also note that we cannot see much of a gender difference in these intergenerational relations; the estimated coefficients are about the same for boys and girls. On the other hand, the coefficients for family earnings are somewhat higher than those for father's earnings, suggesting a separate role for maternal earnings.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

| Year of <br> birth | Father's <br> age at <br> birth of <br> child | Mother's <br> age at <br> birth of <br> child | Log <br> father's <br> earnings | Log <br> family <br> earnings | \# of obs. <br> with <br> valid <br> grade <br> informa- <br> tion $^{\text {a }}$ | \# of obs. <br> with <br> valid <br> father's <br> earn- <br> ings | \# of obs. <br> with <br> valid <br> family <br> earn- <br> ings |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 2}$ | 29.1 | 26.4 | 12.186 | 12.483 | 20064 | 19807 | 20009 |
|  | $(5.8)$ | $(4.8)$ | $(.417)$ | $(.405)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 3}$ | 29.3 | 26.5 | 12.172 | 12.539 | 20072 | 19620 | 19986 |
|  | $(5.7)$ | $(4.8)$ | $(.470)$ | $(.441)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 4}$ | 29.3 | 26.6 | 12.162 | 12.526 | 20338 | 19891 | 20247 |
|  | $(5.7)$ | $(4.9)$ | $(.469)$ | $(.449)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 5}$ | 29.5 | 26.7 | 12.155 | 12.515 | 19053 | 18678 | 18962 |
|  | $(5.6)$ | $(4.8)$ | $(.456)$ | $(.435)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 6}$ | 29.7 | 27.0 | 12.144 | 12.507 | 18128 | 17796 | 18045 |
|  | $(5.5)$ | $(4.8)$ | $(.461)$ | $(.441)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 7}$ | 29.9 | 27.2 | 12.132 | 12.500 | 17931 | 17648 | 17856 |
|  | $(5.6)$ | $(4.8)$ | $(.464)$ | $(.431)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 8}$ | 30.2 | 27.5 | 12.205 | 12.617 | 17076 | 16577 | 16985 |
|  | $(5.6)$ | $(4.9)$ | $(.503)$ | $(.467)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 9}$ | 30.5 | 27.7 | 12.197 | 12.607 | 17717 | 17234 | 17634 |
|  | $(5.7)$ | $(4.9)$ | $(.503)$ | $(.469)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 0}$ | 30.6 | 27.9 | 12.191 | 12.603 | 17985 | 17554 | 17901 |
|  | $(5.6)$ | $(5.0)$ | $(.494)$ | $(.462)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 1}$ | 30.8 | 28.0 | 12.133 | 12.554 | 17514 | 17142 | 17428 |
|  | $(5.7)$ | $(5.1)$ | $(.511)$ | $(.466)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 2}$ | 31.0 | 28.2 | 12.109 | 12.526 | 17302 | 16947 | 17221 |
|  | $(5.7)$ | $(5.0)$ | $(.514)$ | $(.481)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 3}$ | 31.2 | 28.3 | 12.073 | 12.488 | 17011 | 16603 | 16922 |
|  | $(5.7)$ | $(5.1)$ | $(.538)$ | $(.501)$ |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 4}$ | 31.3 | 28.5 | 12.191 | 12.617 | 17029 | 16481 | 16907 |
|  | $(5.7)$ | $(5.0)$ | $(.550)$ | $(.509)$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. ${ }^{a}$ The subset of the cohort with valid grade data in the register. ${ }^{b}$ This is the subset of those with valid grade information who also have valid paternal earnings observations. It is the sample sizes in the regressions reported in Table 3a. ${ }^{c}$ This is the subset of those with valid grade information who also have valid family earnings data. It is the sample sizes in the regressions reported in Table 3a.

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Table 3a. Regression coefficients, regressions of grade and parental earnings (boys and girls)

| Cohort | Stand. grade, father's earnings | Stand. grade, family earnings | Stand. grade, standardized father's earnings | Stand. grade, standardized family earnings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1972 | $\begin{gathered} .542 \\ (.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .630 \\ (.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .226[.051] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .255[.065] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1973 | $\begin{gathered} .494 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .575 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .232[.054] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .253[.064] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1974 | $\begin{gathered} .472 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .551 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .221[.049] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .247[.061] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1975 | $\begin{gathered} .470 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .572 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .214[.046] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .249[.062] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1976 | $\begin{gathered} .464 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .552 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .214[.046] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .244[.060] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1977 | $\begin{gathered} .480 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .605 \\ (.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .223[.050] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .261[.068] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1978 | $\begin{gathered} .448 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .541 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .225[.051] \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .253[.064] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1979 | $\begin{gathered} .428 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .519 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .215[.046] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .243 \text { [.059] } \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1980 | $\begin{gathered} .443 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .570 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .219[.048] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .263[.069] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1981 | $\begin{gathered} .424 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .569 \\ (.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .217[.047] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .265[.070] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1982 | $\begin{gathered} .410 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .550 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .211[.044] \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .265[.070] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1983 | $\begin{gathered} .391 \\ (.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .542 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .210[.044] \\ (.008) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .271[.074] \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1984 | $\begin{gathered} .374 \\ (.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .474 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .206[.042] \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .242[.058] \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ |

Note: Standard errors within parentheses, $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ within brackets.

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Table 3b. Regression coefficients, regressions of grade on parental earnings (boys)

| Cohor | Stand. grade, father's earnings | Stand. grade, family earnings | Stand. grade, standardized father's earnings | Stand. grade, standardized family earnings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1972 | $\begin{gathered} .573 \\ (.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .663 \\ (.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .239 \text { [.057] } \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .268 \text { [.073] } \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1973 | $\begin{gathered} .509 \\ (.020) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .597 \\ (.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .239[.058] \\ (.010) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 263[.070] \\ (.009) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1974 | $\begin{gathered} .523 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .602 \\ (.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .245[.061] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 270[.073] \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1975 | $\begin{gathered} 488 \\ (.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .590 \\ (.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .222[.050] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .256[.067] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1976 | $\begin{gathered} .487 \\ (.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .567 \\ (.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .224 \text { [.050] } \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .250[.062] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1977 | $\begin{gathered} .500 \\ (.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 628 \\ (.023) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .232[.055] \\ (.010) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .271 \text { [.076] } \\ (.010) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1978 | $\begin{gathered} 462 \\ (.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .566 \\ (.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .232[.055] \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .264 \text { [.070] } \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1979 | $\begin{gathered} 453 \\ (.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .532 \\ (.022) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .228 \text { [.053] } \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .249[.061] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1980 | $\begin{gathered} .454 \\ (.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .596 \\ & (.022) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 224 \text { [.049] } \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .275[.075] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1981 | $\begin{gathered} .408 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .539 \\ (.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .209[.045] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .251[.066] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1982 | $\begin{gathered} .412 \\ (.020) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .548 \\ (.021) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .212[.047] \\ (.010) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .263[.074] \\ (.010) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1983 | $\begin{gathered} .378 \\ (.019) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .509 \\ (.020) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .203[.044] \\ (.010) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .255[.071] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1984 | $\begin{gathered} .364 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .460 \\ (.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .200[.044] \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .234 \text { [.060] } \\ (.010) \end{gathered}$ |

Notes: Standard errors within parentheses, $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ within brackets.

Table 3c. Regression coefficients, regressions of grade on parental earnings (girls)

| Cohort | Stand. grade, <br> father's earn- <br> ings. | Stand. grade, <br> family earnings. | Stand. grade, <br> standardized fa- <br> ther's earnings | Stand. grade, <br> standardized family <br> earnings |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 2}$ | .515 | .601 | $.214[.050]$ | $.243[.063]$ |
|  | $(.023)$ | $(.024)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| 1973 | .476 | .560 | $.224[.053]$ | $.247[.065]$ |
|  | $(.021)$ | $(.022)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| 1974 | .414 | .496 | $.194[.040]$ | $.223[.053]$ |
|  | $(.021)$ | $(.021)$ | $(.021)$ | $(.009)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 5}$ | .450 | .551 | $.205[.045]$ | $.239[.061]$ |
|  | $(.022)$ | $(.022)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 6}$ | .447 | .546 | $206[.047]$ | $.241[.064]$ |
|  | $(.022)$ | $(.022)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 7}$ | .457 | .567 | $.212[.049]$ | $.244[.063]$ |
|  | $(.022)$ | $(.023)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 8}$ | .430 | .516 | $.216[.049]$ | $.241[.063]$ |
|  | $(.021)$ | $(.022)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 9}$ | .397 | .510 | $.200[.043]$ | $.239[.063]$ |
|  | $(.020)$ | $(.021)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 0}$ | .444 | .548 | $.219[.053]$ | $.253[.070]$ |
|  | $(.020)$ | $(.021)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 1}$ | .422 | .586 | $.220[.050]$ | $.273[.079]$ |
|  | $(.020)$ | $(.022)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 2}$ | .423 | .562 | $.217[.049]$ | $.270[.075]$ |
|  | $(.020)$ | $(.021)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 3}$ | .407 | .580 | $.219[.050]$ | $.291[.086]$ |
|  | $(.020)$ | $(.021)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.010)$ |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 4}$ | .377 | .490 | $.207[.044]$ | $.248[.062]$ |
|  | $(.020)$ | $(.021)$ | $(.010)$ | $(.011)$ |

Notes: Standard errors within parentheses, $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ within brackets.

Finally, we interpret the results in terms of the explanatory power of parental earnings. As shown within brackets in the tables, the equations' R-squares are in the range .04 to .05 for father's earnings and .06 to .08 for family earnings. These numbers are low compared to the sibling correlations around .50 , suggesting that parental earnings are not the major factor that generates similar outcomes for (closely spaced) siblings. Now, it could be argued that the log-linear functional form used in our estimations tends to underestimate the explanatory power of parental earnings. So, we also estimated more flexible functional forms. Indeed, the R-squares increased somewhat when we added a squared term for earnings, but they did not exceed .10 for any
of the earnings measures. ${ }^{13}$ In an additional analysis, we also added six dummy variables for parental education, using data from Statistic Sweden's special education register. The R-squares almost doubled, suggesting that education per se could be more important than earnings for children's outcomes. Nonetheless, the R-squares did not exceed .15 , which is far from the estimated sibling correlations around .5. Further, the R-squares were quite stable.

These findings leave us with an interesting challenge for future research: what is it that (a) is shared by siblings but (b) is uncorrelated with parental long-run earnings and education that makes siblings get quite similar grades?

## 4. What happened in the big-city areas?

It could be argued that we do not see much change in the relationships at the national level because a major policy change like the introduction of private schools only affected a few percent of all pupils during the period of time we study. But, as mentioned in the introduction, such schools became particularly popular in the big-city areas, especially Stockholm and Gothenburg. Thus, it could be that family background became more important in these areas.

We estimated both sibling correlations and the intergenerational equations separately for the big-city area (defined as Stockholm county plus Gothenburg municipality) and the rest of the country. We report the sibling correlations in Table 4 and the intergenerational equations in Table 5. Our main conclusion is that the evolution over time is not different in these two parts of the country. The sibling correlations in Table 4 are less precisely estimated for the two regions, particularly for the big-city area. The standard error is around .025 , so 95 percent confidence intervals for single years are quite wide. Nonetheless, the results do not suggest that the big-city areas had an evolution of this statistic that differs from the rest of the country. The same basic conclusion applies to the results from the intergenerational equations in Table 5.
${ }^{13}$ For both earnings measures, the linear and quadratic terms had positive coefficients, suggesting that the grades become increasingly sensitive to earnings differentials at the top of the distribution.

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Table 4. Sibling correlations (all siblings by region)

| Cohorts | Correlation(std err) <br> Stockholm + Gothenburg | \# of pairs | Correlation(std err) Rest of the country | \# of pairs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 72-74 | $\begin{aligned} & .557 \\ & (.021) \end{aligned}$ | 1434 | $\begin{gathered} .532 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | 6035 |
| 73-75 | $\begin{gathered} .529 \\ (.023) \end{gathered}$ | 1322 | $\begin{gathered} .513 \\ (.012) \end{gathered}$ | 5561 |
| 74-76 | $\begin{gathered} .507 \\ (.024) \end{gathered}$ | 1300 | $\begin{gathered} .494 \\ (.012) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 5512 |
| 75-77 | $\begin{gathered} .513 \\ (.026) \end{gathered}$ | 1110 | $\begin{gathered} .527 \\ (.012) \end{gathered}$ | 5111 |
| 76-78 | $\begin{aligned} & .530 \\ & (.024) \end{aligned}$ | 1153 | $\begin{gathered} .518 \\ (.012) \end{gathered}$ | 4861 |
| 77-79 | $\begin{aligned} & .560 \\ & (.023) \end{aligned}$ | 1228 | $\begin{gathered} .489 \\ (.012) \end{gathered}$ | 5113 |
| 78-80 | $\begin{gathered} .497 \\ (.023) \end{gathered}$ | 1373 | $\begin{gathered} .506 \\ (.012) \end{gathered}$ | 5279 |
| 79-81 | $\begin{aligned} & .510 \\ & (.023) \end{aligned}$ | 1509 | $\begin{gathered} .498 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | 5693 |
| 80-82 | $\begin{gathered} .529 \\ (.023) \end{gathered}$ | 1371 | $\begin{gathered} .500 \\ (.012) \end{gathered}$ | 5558 |
| 81-83 | $\begin{gathered} .491 \\ (.024) \end{gathered}$ | 1372 | $\begin{gathered} .494 \\ (.012) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 5497 |
| 82-84 | $\begin{gathered} .515 \\ (.023) \end{gathered}$ | 1444 | $\begin{gathered} .496 \\ (.011) \end{gathered}$ | 5895 |

Note: Stockholm includes all municipalities in Stockholm county, whereas we only include Gothenburg municipality.

Table 5. Regression coefficients, regressions of grade on earnings (by region)

|  | Stockholm + Gothenburg |  | Rest of the country |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cohort | Stand. grade, standardized father's earnings | Stand. grade, standardized family earnings | Stand. grade, standardized father's earnings | Stand. grade, standardized family earnings |
| 1972 | $\begin{gathered} .222 \\ (.014) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .260 \\ (.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .227 \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .257 \\ & (.008) \end{aligned}$ |
| 1973 | $\begin{gathered} .239 \\ (.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .241 \\ (.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .230 \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .259 \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1974 | $\begin{gathered} .233 \\ (.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .257 \\ (.014) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .217 \\ (.008) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .246 \\ (.008) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1975 | $\begin{gathered} .218 \\ (.014) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .250 \\ (.015) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .212 \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .250 \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1976 | $\begin{gathered} .231 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .247 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .209 \\ & (.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} .245 \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1977 | $\begin{gathered} .236 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .272 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .217 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .258 \\ (.008) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1978 | $\begin{gathered} .228 \\ (.016) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} .245 \\ (.016) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} .223 \\ (.009) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} .255 \\ (.009) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1979 | $\begin{gathered} .229 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} .251 \\ (.015) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} .209 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .241 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1980 | $\begin{gathered} .213 \\ (.015) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .267 \\ (.015) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .219 \\ (.009) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .263 \\ (.008) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1981 | $\begin{gathered} .233 \\ (.015) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .253 \\ (.015) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .208 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .269 \\ (.009) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1982 | $\begin{gathered} .204 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .253 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .212 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .268 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ |
| 1983 | $\begin{gathered} .225 \\ (.015) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .258 \\ (.015) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .200 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .273 \\ (.009) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| 1984 | $\begin{gathered} .209 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .235 \\ (.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .199 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .239 \\ (.009) \end{gathered}$ |

Note: See Table 4.

## 5. Conclusions

We have studied how the relationship between Sweden-born pupils' grade average at the age of 16 and their family background evolved during the period 1988-2000. This was a period of a severe macroeconomic crisis, cuts in school budgets and several school reforms that, among others, allowed private schools and more parental choice. We employed two summary measures of the relationship between pupils' grade average and their family background, namely (i) the "broad" sibling correlation measure that captures all factors-family as well as neighborhood factors-shared by siblings, and (ii) the more narrow correlation between grade average and parental earnings. To
our surprise, we found that both measures were strikingly constant over this turbulent period of time. They were also basically constant in the big-city areas, where more privatization took place and the room for parental choice increased more than in the rest of the country.

Although the results suggest that events like those that took place during the 1990 s may not be as important for intergenerational associations as many (including ourselves) have believed, we stress that we have not studied the causal impact of neither the reforms nor the economic crisis on the relations. One cannot rule out that the coun-terfactual-no school-reforms and budget cuts and no economic cri-sis-would have implied a weakening of the relations. One candidate explanation for such a weakening effect is public daycare. If children from poor families benefit more from such daycare than other children, the extension of this program for the cohorts we study could have contributed to weaker relations between family background and school achievement.

Further, we have deliberately focused on Sweden-born pupils only, and therefore abstained from the problems associated with ethnic segregation among Sweden-born and the new waves of immigrants who came to Sweden during the period. ${ }^{14}$ Also, we have only looked at one link between family background and educational attainment, namely school performance at the end of compulsory school. A complete analysis of the relation between family background and educational attainment must also take into account the subsequent choices of upper-secondary and university studies.

Another caveat is the time dimension of our study. Those who are concerned about the policy reforms from the equality of opportunity point of view could argue that it takes longer for deleterious effects to appear. In particular, the impact of more private schools could take longer to materialize.

Finally, we note some quite obvious extensions of our work. The data contain information about school and municipality of the pri-mary-school graduates. Although the sibling correlation, which captures family and neighborhood factors shared by siblings, was quite constant over the turbulent period, it might be that the impact of the specific municipality, school, or even the class unit increased over time. There are alternative research strategies available to look at such
${ }^{14}$ See Dryler (2001) for such an analysis.
effects in some more detail. Gustafsson et al. (2000) estimate intraclass correlations and find that they increased for cohorts 1972-1979. Another approach would be to follow Solon et al. (2000), and estimate school and municipality correlations and compare these with the broader sibling-correlation measure. It would be surprising if such big policy changes as those in Sweden during the 1990s could take place without making the municipality and the school more important than they used to be.

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[^1]:    * Financial support from Jan Wallander's and Tom Hedelius' research fund is gratefully acknowledged. Further, research grants from FAS, NOS-S, SCHOLAR and the Spencer foundation covered the costs for collecting the data set that we use in the study.
    ${ }^{1}$ See Erikson and Jonsson (1993, ch. 1), who looked into the political motivations for school reforms over a long period of time.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ See, e.g., the special issue of Swedish Economic Policy Review, 2000:2.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ In our data, about 97.3 percent of each cohort graduated at the age of 16 (i.e., during the calendar year when they became 16 years old), about 2.3 percent at the age of 17 and about .4 percent at the age of 15 .

[^4]:    4 The implementation of the new curriculum for grades 1-7 took place in the school year 1995-96, 1996-97 for the $8^{\text {th }}$ grade, and 1997-98 for the $9^{\text {th }}$ grade.

[^5]:    ${ }^{5}$ The sub-fields of Science are Biology, Chemistry, Physics and Technology. Grades in Technology are not included for all years. The sub-fields in Social science are Geography, History, Religion and Civics.
    ${ }^{6}$ Technically, we had to rank all pupils in the sub-fields. Thus, for pupils with "block-grades" only, we attached their block-grade to each sub-field and then ranked all pupils in the sub-field.

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ In some respects, it would have been more natural to measure earnings at a later age, but then some fathers would have been old enough to be retired with missing earnings observations as a consequence.
    ${ }^{8}$ Because we use earnings from two different years, we use the consumer price index to deflate nominal earnings into the value of earnings in a single year, in our case in year 2000 real earnings.

[^7]:    ${ }^{9}$ See Björklund et al. (2002).

[^8]:    ${ }^{10}$ Compare the discussion in Solon et al. (2000).

