Sweden’s Defence Policy
2016 to 2020

The most important priority in the defence bill covering the period from 2016 to 2020 is to increase the operational warfighting capability of the Armed Forces and to ensure the collective force of the Swedish Total Defence.

It is vital that Sweden’s defence and security policy rests on a broad political consensus. To that extent, the Social Democratic Party, the Moderate Party, the Green Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats have agreed on a bill to parliament on the Swedish Defence covering the years 2016 to 2020. The guiding principles for this agreement have been the two reports by the Parliamentary Defence Commission “Choices in a globalised world” (2013) and the “The Defence of Sweden – a stronger defence for an uncertain time” (2014).

The five political parties agree that a follow-up on the policies proposed in the defence bill will be conducted. The Minister for Defence will convene a group consisting of representatives from the five political parties with the mission to review the implementation of the defence agreement.

This defence agreement is also based on reports presented by the Swedish Armed Forces. The agreement also includes a budgetary framework as well as the intent to launch a long-term review of the procurement plans.

**The core of Sweden's defence and security policy**

The Defence Commission conclusions set the objectives for Sweden’s current defence- and security policy. The core objectives are the protection of life and health, ensuring the functioning of society, protection of our basic values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Sweden's defence and security policy ultimately aims at preserving Swedish independence and autonomy. Swedish sovereignty, rights, interests and our fundamental values shall be protected. Our security policy aims at preserving our freedom of action and defending against political, military or any other kind of pressure. The protection of Swedish sovereignty and territorial integrity is a prerequisite for achieving the above mentioned objectives. Swedish security policy is part of the resources that Swedish society has to face the threats and challenges to our security. Thus, Sweden’s current defence and security policy covers a large part, but not all, of the broad perspective of security.

Security is built in solidarity with others. Sweden’s defence- and security -policy aims to prevent war and the rise of threats to Swedish, Nordic, Baltic and European security.
Sweden gives support to the United Nations (UN) in order to contribute to global peace, security and development. Through its membership in the European Union (EU) Sweden assumes joint responsibility for the security of Europe and the ability of the EU to promote peaceful and democratic development. Sweden’s cooperation with NATO allows the Swedish Armed Forces to develop military capabilities and, by contributing to qualified international crisis management operations, Sweden contributes to building security together with partners.

International defence and security co-operation, in particular Nordic and Baltic co-operation, strengthens the security in our part of world. A strong transatlantic link is crucial for Europe's security. It is in Swedish interests to maintain and further deepen the bilateral relationship with the United States. The deepening of bilateral co-operation with Finland is critical. The co-operation with Finland will cover operational planning and preparations in order to be able to defend the territorial integrity of the respective countries, including the right to self-defence as proclaimed under the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The Swedish government will commission an expert whom, based on an independent perspective, will prepare a report on various forms of cooperation and/or membership with countries and organisations, as well as the advantages and disadvantages for Swedish defence and security policy, both current and future. The analysis should not evaluate the fact that Sweden is not a member of a military alliance. It will include, for example, the relationship to the Nordic States, Nordic-Baltic and bilateral Swedish-Finnish co-operation, as well as the transatlantic link, UN, EU, OSCE and NATO. The analysis aims to clarify the broad approach to our security and to contribute to the deepening of the dialogue and understanding in our country on these issues. A written report will be presented to government within a year of the launch.

In its report, the Defence Commission outlined the deteriorating security situation in Europe, particularly in light of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Since the report, developments in the region have continued to worsen. The Defence Commission proposed a number of measures/actions for the Swedish Armed Forces. These included amongst others: a new system for the basic training of squad leaders, soldiers and sailors; upgrades of air defence capabilities; a reorganisation of the land forces into two mechanised brigades; increased presence in the Baltic Sea and on the island of Gotland; increased quality of home guard units; efforts to reinvigorate civil defence; a modern psychological defence; enhanced cyber capabilities and long range precision strike capability.

The defence bill now presented to parliament, states that the Swedish Armed Forces, with other parts of the Swedish society, alongside political, diplomatic and economic means, constitutes a threshold against armed attack, or the use of military force to exert pressure on Sweden. A credible military capability to defend against armed aggression contributes to a peace and our political freedom. Our security policy also requires a
defence force that is able to work alongside others. The Swedish Declaration of Solidarity requires that we must be able to provide as well as receive support, civilian and militarily.

Through its geographical position in the Baltic Sea, the island of Gotland is of a vital strategic importance for Sweden, as well as for the Baltic Sea region as a whole. Gotland is important for sea lanes and air routes to and from the Baltic States. It is a Swedish strategic interest to have a permanent military presence on the island. A Swedish military presence in and around Gotland will have a stabilising effect for the entire region.

Swedish Defence Policy for the years 2016 to 2020 must be based upon the declining security environment in Europe. In line with the Defence Commissions conclusions, Swedish defence policy requires a new focus. Thus, a renewed regional focus will be a priority, with the emphasis on national defence and planning for wartime scenarios. This renewed regional and national focus will also require an updated Total Defence Concept able to cope with present day challenges and threats. Ultimately, the Swedish Defence should be able, with its available resources, to face an armed attack. The policies proposed cannot, however, be viewed in isolation, but must be considered in a wider Baltic Sea, European and global context.

**Enhancing the operational capability of the Armed Forces**
The defence budget for the years 2016 to 2020, will be based on the June 2014 announcement of budgetary increases, amounting to approximately 7 billion SEK (Government Resolution 12 and 15). The announced increase was based on the Defence Commissions analysis.

The Swedish Armed Forces have suggested some reallocations of the announced funding for the period of 2016-2020. These suggestions are included in the funding for the period. This includes a reallocation of 1.3 billion SEK from the funding of international missions to the funding of training and readiness.

An increased defence budget is fundamental, particularly in light of the deteriorating security situation, but also to address the need to increase warfighting capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces. To that extent, the political agreement means that this defence bill will add approximately 10 billion SEK extra to the Armed Forces the period of 2016-2020 in addition to the previously announced increases. This means that the budget of the Armed Forces will receive approximately 17 billion SEK extra compared to the previous period. Thus, this defence bill sets a new trend in Swedish defence spending. For the first time in more than two decades, the Swedish government has decided on a substantial increase of the defence budget. Total defence spending over the next five years will be 224 billion SEK.
Defence funding 2016-2020 (million SEK)
Armed Forces including increases for Defence Intelligence

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1. Including previously announced increases and inflation adjustments
2. Additional funding for the respective years is presented in current prices and will, once included in the Defence appropriation, be subject to inflation adjustments.

The additional funding will mitigate the financial costs of tax changes regarding the employment of young persons as well as increased costs for infrastructure. These costs are expected to be approximately 1.7 billion SEK for the period.

The budgetary increases will allow for reinforcements, such as:

- A renewed regional focus, emphasising national defence and planning for wartime scenarios.
- Substantial investment in the basics of the defence force such as personal equipment for our soldiers, communication/CIS equipment, radar systems, trucks, and other materiel and logistics for the Armed Forces. Other priorities include increased training and exercises.
- An additional motorised battalion.
- The re-establishment of permanently based regular army units on the island of Gotland, including a mechanised company, an armoured company and command and control components.
- Upgraded main battle tanks and infantry combat vehicles, and new self-propelled mortars for the mechanised battalions.
- Additional bridge layers.
- New anti-tank weapons.
- Providing the Home Guard with four mortar platoons.
- Upgrading two Gävle-class corvettes.
- Air defence capabilities, including further investments in JAS39 with Meteor, as well as new short and medium range surface to air missiles.
- An additional reinforcement of anti-submarine warfare capability.
- Investments in recruiting and the sustainment of soldiers.
- A renewed civil defence.
- Active cyber capabilities

The Total Defence Concept
The security situation, in Europe as well as globally, has deteriorated over the past few years. Therefore, the need for a Total Defence is once more evident. The Swedish Total
Defence consists of military defence as well as civil defence. Thus, the Total Defence should be based on common planning guidelines, from the government to appropriate authorities.

The need for psychological defence adapted to present day conditions has also been identified. Psychological defence seeks to maintain our open and democratic society with freedom of expression even during extraordinary conditions. It must apply to peacetime conditions as well as in case of a raised alert, and ultimately during war. The objective is to uphold our fundamental values. This will improve the ability of Swedish society to withstand pressure from a potential opponent.

Hybrid warfare and propaganda represents a wide range of activities that can be used in peace and in war. Sweden must be able to identify and meet such threats as well as to be able to counter propaganda campaigns.

Cyber defence capabilities are an important part of the Swedish Defence. Vital systems must be protected from attack. This also requires the ability to carry out active operations in the cyber domain.

In order for Sweden to respond to changes in our security environment and to be able to pursue an independent foreign and defence policy, we must have a strong intelligence capability.

The Swedish Defence Intelligence Authorities consists of the Swedish Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Defence Materiel Administration and the National Defence Research Agency. The deterioration of the security situation clearly highlights the need of a strong Swedish capability to collect, process, analyse and produce intelligence. The capabilities of Swedish Defence Intelligence will be reinforced.

With its local focus, the Home Guard is important for the capability of the Swedish Defence as well as for popular support of the Armed Forces. The voluntary defence organisations provide important resources both for the Total Defence concept as well as for the ability to cope with peacetime crises. The voluntary defence organisations also provide necessary skills and expertise and they have the opportunity to contribute to the Total Defence concept, and hence, contingency measures.

**Military Defence**

The Swedish Armed Forces should on their own as well as together with our partners, both within and outside Swedish territory, be able to defend Swedish security. This will be done by:

- asserting Swedish sovereignty and protecting our sovereign rights and our national interests;
- preventing and managing conflicts and wars, by protecting Sweden’s freedom of action from the political, military or other types of pressure and, if required defend Sweden against incidents and armed aggression; and,
- protecting society and its functionality by supporting civil authorities.

The main task of the Swedish Armed Forces is explicitly to maintain availability of capabilities in peace and maintain readiness for a raised alert or war. This is essential to prevent conflicts, and to protect Sweden’s freedom of action against political, military or other kinds of pressure. Ultimately, it is needed to protect Sweden against an armed attack.

The Armed Forces shall promote our security; protect sovereign rights and national interests on our territory, as well as in our region. The Armed Forces will assert Sweden’s territorial integrity by monitoring the territory to detect and reject violations. Furthermore, the Armed Forces shall protect Swedish sovereign rights and national interests outside Swedish territory in accordance with international law. The Armed Forces should be able to monitor sea areas and airspace in the regional vicinity.

In addition, the Armed Forces will assist other agencies and civil society as needed. The Armed Forces will provide this support with existing capabilities and resources. The Armed Forces will not be designed or organised for the task of providing support to civilian authorities in for the management of serious accidents and peacetime emergencies. This does not exclude, however that particular actions, such as pre-planning and training can be done in order to maintain a high degree of readiness to act with the available resources. The Armed Forces should to a larger extent be able to provide support to the rest of society.

Taken together, these tasks set the ambition for the capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces. The Armed Forces should be able to perform its tasks on their own as well as together with other agencies, countries and organisations.

A long-term study will be commissioned to evaluate the overall procurement of materiel and logistics, in addition to the measures taken related to the investment planning for the Armed Forces.

Civil Defence
Planning for the civil defence should be resumed and implemented. Civil defence should, with existing resources, initially prioritise the ability to support the Armed Forces during raised alert or war.

The civil defence consists of tasks that make it possible for society to function in a situation of raised alert. Thus, civil defence is not an organisation. Its tasks are being performed by government agencies, municipal authorities, county councils, private companies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The primary tasks concern the
protection of the population, ensuring critical societal functions and to support the Armed Forces. The total defence therefore requires a broad commitment and support in the community.

The civil defence should:
- protect the civilian population,
- ensure the most important societal functions and,
- contribute to the ability of the Armed Forces in an armed attack.

**Military Units**

All parts of the Armed Forces that have assigned tasks during a raised status of alert or in war will be organised as units and will be included in the order-of-battle of the Armed Forces.

The single and most important goal in the upcoming defence bill is to increase the operational warfighting capability of the military units and the overall operational capability of the Swedish total defence. This requires that the capabilities are ready to be used in peacetime as well as in raised alert and war. The defence will be used in peace, crisis and war.

Military units that are organised and prepared to face an armed attack will serve as the basis for solving tasks in peacetime, such as safeguarding territorial integrity and the participation in international crisis management operations. Such units must be manned, equipped and trained. All units will have duties in peace time, as well as in times of raised alert or war. The ability of the units to maintain their warfighting capability is fundamental. Maintaining their warfighting capability refers to how well the military units as a whole can solve their tasks immediately after mobilisation in the case of a raised status of alert. Contingency requirements mean that all units with their existing war fighting capability should be able to mobilize within a week after a decision of to raise the status of alert.

All parts of the Armed Forces that have assigned tasks during a raised alert or in war will be organised as units and will be included in the order-of-battle of the Armed Forces. All units will be given operational requirements regarding their warfighting capabilities. The order-of-battle of the Swedish Armed Forces consists of standing units, reserve units and units in the Home Guard. In addition to the order-of-battle there is a pool of personnel and equipment roughly equivalent to four mechanised battalions with no assigned readiness but with the ability to be activated within three years of a governmental decision and depending on additional funding. An additional pool of personnel is also being maintained. Swedish units should be able to fight in Swedish climate conditions including winter conditions. No units or garrisons will be disbanded.
In order to quickly reinforce the Swedish Defence it is necessary to implement measures to improve the preconditions for the units to fulfil their requirements. Planning for mobilisation of the entire force as well as mobilisation exercises will be conducted, as well as controls and exercises in order to improve the readiness of units. Exercises and controls are essential in order to identify and rectify flaws in the system affecting the efficiency as well as the capacity to mobilize the full force of the Swedish Armed Forces.

**Special priorities**

**Basic requirements**

In order to increase the warfighting capabilities of the units, special priority is to be given to addressing the basic requirements of the units in areas such as such as personal equipment, communications equipment, ammunition, trucks, new anti-tank weapons and so on. Training and exercises will increase substantially in order to provide advanced joint exercises as well as to exercise all units in their wartime tasks during the period of 2016-2020. These investments are necessary to increase the warfighting capabilities of the Armed Forces.

**Reinforcements of the Defences of Gotland**

A Battlegroup Gotland will be organised in 2018. The Battlegroup will consist of a standing Mechanised Infantry Company and a reserve Armoured Company. In addition the Light Infantry Battalion will be reorganised to be able to be transported by air, allowing it to rapidly reinforce strategic areas including Gotland. Regional Command and Control assets for Gotland is being organised within existing Command and Control structures. The Home Guard on the island will be reinforced. It is important that frequent exercises with air defence assets on Gotland will be conducted and training and exercises will increase on and around the island.

**Anti-submarine capabilities**

Anti-submarine capabilities are important in order to, amongst others, maintain Swedish territorial integrity. A number of measures will be taken to strengthen these capabilities as soon as possible. Increased training and exercises as well as a greater redundancy in ship crews will increase anti-submarine capabilities. The five Visby-class corvettes will be joined by two Gävle-class corvettes that will undergo midlife upgrades providing them with anti-submarine capabilities including sensors and command and control systems. Seven smaller patrol boats will be modified, including with anti-submarine weapons, and four will be rebuilt into buoy-monitoring boats, thus increasing the number of anti-submarine platforms compared to previous planning. New mobile sensors will be taken into service and mine-systems will be kept operational to ensure sensor functionality of anti-submarine capabilities.
The development of the services

**Land Forces**

The bulk of the land forces will be organised in two Brigades able to fight a high-intensity conflict against a qualified opponent. The land forces will be expanded with one Motorised Battalion, two Brigade Reconnaissance Companies and the Mechanised Battlegroup Gotland. The Light Infantry Battalion will be reorganised in order to be transportable by air. The land forces will primarily be manned by reserves complemented by personnel serving under the law of national service. To ensure sufficient availability in peace-time, two Mechanised Battalions and one Motorised Infantry Battalion will be standing units with a high number of professional personnel.

The land forces will consist of two Brigade Headquarters, two Brigade Reconnaissance Companies, five Mechanised Battalions, two Motorised Battalions, one Light Infantry Battalion, one Mechanised Battlegroup Gotland, two Artillery Battalions, two Air Defence Battalions, two Engineer Battalions, One Ranger Battalion, one ISR Battalion, one Security Battalion, one MP Battalion, one Life Guards Battalion, one CBRN Company, one Heavy Transport Company and 40 Home Guard Battalions.

During the period, the land forces will receive equipment on the personal- squad- and platoon-level, trucks, artillery, self-propelled mortars, additional bridge-layers, anti-tank weapons, new ground based short-range air defence systems and additional ammunitions. Upgrades of combat vehicles 90 and main battle tanks with their designated command and control will be initiated for the main part of the mechanised units. A new ground based medium range air defence system will be acquired for one of the two Air Defence Battalions. The other Battalion will receive the new system after the period. All main battle tanks will be brought into service in the mechanised battalions and the Battlegroup Gotland. This reorganisation will significantly increase the number of main battle tanks in the units compared to the present organisation.

The Home Guard provides a large and important part of the land Forces. With their availability, their numbers and their geographical positions they are of vital importance for the defence of the Swedish territory, including the protection of base areas for the naval and air forces as well as for protection of critical infrastructure and other important objects. The Home Guard will receive increased capabilities including the addition of four mortar platoons and battalion level command and control assets.

**Naval Forces**

The core of the naval units consists of seven corvettes, four submarines and seven mine-clearance vessels. In the period the naval forces will maintain five Visby-class corvettes, five Koster-class mine-clearance vessels, two Spårö-class mine-clearance diver vessels, one Gotland-class as well as one Södermanland-class submarine. Midlife upgrades will be done on two Gävle-class corvettes and two Gotland-class submarines. Service life extension will be done on seven patrol boats, four patrol boats will be refitted as sonar...
buoy boats and two Stockholm-class corvettes will be refitted as patrol ships. During the period, acquisition of a new anti-ship missile as well as a new light torpedo will begin. It is especially important that the sea version of the Helicopter 14 system will become operational. An increase in the number of crews as well as increased training and exercise will allow for more sustainability and more time at sea for the naval ships. Support from the Armed Forces to the National Defence Radio Establishment with strategic SIGINT will be maintained by the acquisition of a new SIGINT vessel.

It is important that the capability and availability of the naval forces are upheld even during periods with high needs of materiel overhauls. The Amphibious Battalion will be focused on its maritime tasks. Construction of two new submarines will begin in the period.

The naval forces will consist of two Surface Warfare Flotilla Staffs, two Corvette Squadrons, two Mine-clearance Squadrons, two Support Squadrons, one Mine-clearance Diver Squadron, and one Submarine Flotilla staff, one Submarine Squadron, one Amphibious Battalion, one Patrol Boat Company and one Naval Base.

Air Forces
The air forces will consist of four Air Wings with six Fighter Squadrons (JAS 39C/D), one Air Transport Squadron, one Air Combat Control and Air Surveillance Battalion and one Helicopter Wing. The peacetime fighter training establishment will be reorganised to be able to serve alongside the other fighter squadrons in case of war, bringing the number of fighter squadrons to six. An adjustment of the number of fighter squadrons due to the future introduction of JAS 39 E will be considered in the future and is dependent on the possible decision to acquire an additional ten JAS 39 E fighters. Such a reorganisation will only be considered once the existing number of fighter aircraft merits a reduced number of squadrons. The capability to disperse the fighter squadrons within their regular bases as well as between alternate bases will be improved.

The Defence Commission suggested that the number of JAS 39E should increase from previously planned 60 to 70. Final delivery of the 60 JAS 39E will take place in the mid-2020s. The increase to 70 aircraft is dependent on a new decision to acquire these aircraft. Such a decision can wait until a later time. The availability of the fighter aircraft over an extended period of time is of special importance. The availability should allow for an increase in total flight hours, in turn contributing to the safe-guarding of air combat capabilities during the rearmament from JAS 39C/D to JAS 39 E.

Parts of the peacetime establishment of the air forces have previously not been organised as units with task in case of a raised alert or war. Thus the air forces will be reorganised into four Air Wings providing a high availability in peace as well as a high readiness in case of raised alert or war. The Air Wings maintain ground based services in peace and war and are responsible for dispersal, including to alternative bases. The Four Air Wings allow a flexible use of existing air bases. Investments in the bases will provide
increased opportunities to disperse. This will increase the survivability of the air forces in case of war.

Existing tactical air transport aircraft (TP-84) will be maintained during the period. The Swedish Armed Forces are studying the possibilities of future acquisition of new tactical air transport aircraft.

The Helicopter Wing will operate three types of modern helicopters. The Helicopter units will give special attention to supporting the naval forces with anti-submarine capabilities as well as to supporting the land forces with tactical transport. The support to the Police authorities will continue.

**Joint Forces**

The new focus on preparing to face an armed attack will gave considerable impact on for the joint forces, not least in the areas of logistics and command and control. The focus of the land Forces on high intensity warfighting at the Brigade level means that the logistics and command and control units should be adjusted accordingly. Parts of the joint logistics and the command and control units will be transferred to the land forces in case of activation or mobilisation in order to perform tactical tasks within the Brigades.

The joint forces will consist of the following units, one Armed Forces Headquarters, four Regional Headquarters, one Communications Battalion, one Command and Control Battalion, one Electronic Warfare Battalion, one Armed Forces Logistics (FMLOG), two Logistics Battalions, one Technical Battalion, one Movement Control Company, two Medical Hospital Companies, two Medical Support Companies, one Special Operations Group and 19 Depot Units.

All parts of the Armed Forces peacetime establishment with tasks to perform in case of raised alert or war will be organised as units. Depot units are organised throughout the country to provide support on local level and to support the activation or mobilisation of the full force. These Depot Units will also provide complementary training of the other units. All personnel working at the peacetime establishment but not assigned to other units will have an assignment at the Depot unit. All parts of the peacetime establishment and all employed personnel with tasks during raised alert or war will thus be organised for war service.

**Long-term defence material procurement**

The Defence commissions proposed the acquisition of another 10 JAS 39E, in addition to the 60 JAS 39 E that are currently planned for. The Defence commission also recommended procuring a third new submarine as well as a long-range precision strike missile. A decision on these recommendations will be taken in the early 2020s.
The Armed Forces presented a list of priorities of necessary procurement actions. This list was included in the previous procurement plan, but subsequent decisions on procurement or funding have not yet been taken for all items according to the plan and timetable of June 2014. Several of these measures dealt with upgrades and enhancements of existing defence equipment. As already noted, the operational war fighting capability of the Swedish Armed Forces, during the period 2016-2020, must be prioritized. While some of these measures do not directly increase the operational capacity in the period 2016-2020, it may still be of great importance for the Swedish Armed Forces' overall capability during the 2020s:

- lifetime extension of the corvette Gävle Class from the mid-2020s to 2030,
- the acquisition of new transportation boats to the Home Guard units,
- integration and acquisition of light torpedo on the helicopter 14,
- upgrade of the fixed sensor chain, and,
- new radio equipment to the Home Guard units.

In addition, there is a need for additional procurements and/or upgrades and enhancements in the period from 2021 such as:

- training aircraft,
- combat vehicles,
- transport aircraft,
- minesweeping vessels,
- fixed telecommunications networks, and
- anti-ship missiles.

The above-mentioned procurement challenges must be managed in order to ensure the operational capacity in the long-term. There is a need to assess and ensure that there is an overall strategic balance and prioritisation of necessary defence equipment procurements from 2021. Therefore, this defence bill will set up a study, to assess and develop a procurement plan for defence equipment. This study will focus on finding ways to increase the operational war fighting capability by prioritising necessary procurements beyond 2020. The study shall also take into account the current defence procurement plan. The study will be completed by 2018 and thus form a basis for the government and the Defence Commission’s continued work ahead of the defence bill for the period after 2021.

**Recruitment and retention of soldiers**

Recruitment and retention of soldiers and personnel, in order to man all units, are vital factors for maintaining Sweden’s defence and security needs. The entire Swedish society has a role to play when it comes to the Total Defence of Sweden. Overall societal support is ultimately of crucial importance for Sweden's defence capabilities. This support is primarily achieved through the involvement and commitment of the Swedish population. The manning of soldiers and indeed all personnel of the Armed Forces plays
an important role in engaging participation among the Swedish population. The Swedish Armed Forces needs extensive support from the whole society in its task to defend the country.

The Swedish Armed Forces military units are to consist of two types of personnel categories: full-time personnel, (professional officers and squad leaders, soldiers and sailors – labelled as GSS/K) and reserve personnel (reserve officers and squad leaders, soldiers and sailors – labelled as GSS/T). However, in addition, there are squad leaders, soldiers and sailors who do not have an employment with the Armed Forces, but are obliged by law to compulsory service in a unit in case of raised alert or war. These individuals have previously been conscripts or are former employees of the Armed Forces. In war, there will also be civilian employees of the Armed Forces obliged by law to serve in the units.

Recruitment and staffing of full-time personnel is working according to the Armed Forces planning, though early dropouts are cause for concern. However, recruitment of reserve squad leaders, soldiers and sailors (GSS/T) have proved to be problematic. A significant portion of the positions in units in this category is still staffed by the old recruitment conscription system. It is important that efforts to recruit GSS/T continue.

The dependence of conscripted personnel in order to fully man all units will remain throughout and beyond the period of 2016-2020. Thus, there is in practice a third category of personnel serving in case of raised alert or war. Taking note of this fact, this bill introduces a new personnel category consisting of squad leaders, soldiers and sailors that are not currently employed by the Armed Forces but who have either been conscripts or formerly been employed by the Armed Forces. This category is called GSS/P.

The basic military training will be changed in order to allow individuals who have completed basic training, to be assigned to a unit immediately after the training. Basic training should comprise 9-12 months (4-7 months for the Home Guard).

A well-functioning system for reserve officers is important. This system will be used to fill positions that primarily require service in rehearsal exercises and when a unit is activated or mobilized. Reserve officers, like other reserve personnel, are a cost effective way to man the Armed Forces. The guiding principle for the reserve system should be the warfighting needs of the units. Initial training of tactical reserve officers shall be conducted through in-house training and education for those who already have or will acquire a civilian academic degree. This is the most cost efficient way to quickly strengthen the reserve system. This training should begin as soon as possible.

There are, however, challenges in the recruitment and retention of personnel, which means that there is a continuous need for reform. The recruitment and retention of personnel should be analysed furthered. A study will be commissioned to suggest a
sustainable manning system serving the needs of the Swedish total defence. This study shall include an analysis of the Danish and Norwegian systems, combining both a voluntary as well as a conscript system.

Our veteran policy aims to provide personnel serving in international missions and their families support and assistance proportionate to the risks and stresses to which they are exposed. The Veterans Inquiry report, (SOU 2014: 27), submitted a number of proposals concerning the development of Swedish veteran policy. There is a strong and popular support for our veterans. It is necessary that we shoulder responsibility for our veterans. The report was presented during the first half of 2015. The government is currently studying how the commission's proposals can be implemented.