Main elements of the Government bill
Totalförsvaret 2021–2025

Total defence 2021–2025
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This document is a translation carried out by the Ministry of Defence of the main elements of the Government bill “Totalförsvaret 2021–2025” (Total Defence 2021-2025).


This document follows the structure and table of contents of the Government bill “Totalförsvaret 2021–2025”, and starts with Chapter 4 (Policy Focus).
8.3.1 Basic training with conscription .................................................. 115
8.3.2 Employed personnel ................................................................. 117
8.3.3 Home guard and contract personnel ........................................... 118
8.3.4 Gender equality ........................................................................ 119
8.3.5 Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency becomes Swedish Defence
Recruitment Agency ........................................................................ 119
8.4 Changes in the peace time organisation ......................................... 122
8.5 Defence acquisition ....................................................................... 126
8.5.1 Essential security interests ......................................................... 128
8.5.2 A strategy for defence acquisition .............................................. 128
8.5.3 The market for defence materiel ................................................ 129
8.5.4 Defence materiel exports and export support activities .............. 130
8.5.5 European Defence Fund ............................................................. 130
8.6 Research and development ........................................................... 131
8.7 The Armed Forces’ need for support from civil defence ................. 132
8.8 The Swedish Armed Forces’ support for society ............................. 134
9. Civil defence ................................................................................... 136
9.1 A strengthened civil defence .......................................................... 136
  9.1.1 Civil defence support for the Swedish Armed Forces ................. 139
  9.1.2 Starting points ........................................................................... 140
  9.1.3 Responsibility, management and coordination in civil defence .... 141
  9.1.4 Psychological defence ............................................................... 141
  9.1.5 Supply preparedness and the role of the industry in civil defence 142
  9.1.6 Protective security ..................................................................... 143
  9.1.7 Municipalities, regions and county administrative boards ......... 144
  9.1.8 The supply of personnel in civil defence .................................... 145
  9.1.9 Voluntary defence organisations .............................................. 146
  9.1.10 Individual preparedness contributes to a sustainable and resilient
society ................................................................................................. 147
  9.1.11 Research and development ..................................................... 147
9.2 Safeguarding the most important societal functions ........................ 147
  9.2.1 Public order and safety ............................................................... 149
  9.2.2 Protection of the civilian population ........................................ 152
  9.2.3 Healthcare ................................................................................. 153
  9.2.4 Food and drinking water ........................................................... 158
  9.2.5 Financial readiness ................................................................. 162
  9.2.6 Transport ................................................................................. 163
  9.2.7 Energy supply ........................................................................... 165
  9.2.8 Electronic communications and post ........................................ 168
10. Cyber defence ............................................................................... 170
11. Foreign intelligence and military security services ....................... 173
  11.1 A strengthened and developed foreign intelligence capability and
military security service ................................................................. 173
11.2 Signals intelligence legislation should be reviewed..............................174

12. Voluntary defence organisations......................................................176

13. Entry into force and transitional provisions....................................178

14. Consequences ..................................................................................179

15. Legislative comments.........................................................................180
4. Policy Focus

The security situation in Sweden's neighbourhood and in Europe has deteriorated over time. An armed attack against Sweden cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled out that military measures, or the threat of suchlike, may be used against Sweden. A security crisis or an armed conflict arising in our neighbourhood would inevitably have an impact on Sweden as well. Total defence capabilities (military and civil resources combined) should therefore be strengthened.

In the budget bill for 2021, the Government proposes that SEK 5 billion is added to military defence in 2021. In the same bill, the Government stated that the increase in appropriations for military defence of SEK 5 billion annually from 2022 to 2025 inclusive, which was announced in the budget bill for 2020, remains in place, in addition to previously made decisions. After further consideration, the Government believes that in addition to this, the economic framework for military defence should increase by SEK 1 billion in 2024 and a further SEK 1 billion in 2025. This means that in total a further SEK 3 billion will be added by 2025, in addition to what was previously announced. A further SEK 13 billion will be added between 2024 and 2030 by means of a prolongation of the economic framework in 2025. In comparison with the economic framework for military defence in 2021, which follows from the Government's proposal in the 2021 budget bill, the economic framework will increase by SEK 5 billion in 2022, SEK 10 billion in 2023, SEK 16 billion in 2024 and SEK 22 billion in 2025, in addition to the appropriations decided before 2019. The economic framework for 2025 is prolonged from 2026 onwards. As the funding is added, subsequent years will be subject to price and salary recalculation. The economic effects of the additional funding on expense area 6 Defence and on society's emergency readiness will be presented in the 2021 spring fiscal policy bill.

In accordance with the 2021 budget bill, additional appropriations for civil defence will be SEK 1 billion in 2021, SEK 1.5 billion in 2022, SEK 2.5 billion in 2023, SEK 3 billion in 2024 and SEK 3.8 billion in 2025. Together with the funds provided in the 2018 budget bill, the sum of appropriations for civil defence in 2025 amounts to SEK 4.2 billion, as proposed by the Defence Commission (Ds 2017:66).

Sweden's total defence must be designed and dimensioned to withstand an armed attack on Sweden, including acts of war on Swedish territory. The total defence averts war by possessing such strength, composition, command, readiness and endurance that it deters attempts to attack, control
or otherwise exploit Swedish territory. Thus, a strong total defence serves a preventive purpose as well as preserves peace. The starting point for the planning of total defence should be the ability to handle for at least three months a security crisis in Europe and Sweden’s neighbourhood which causes serious disruptions to the functionality of society, as well as war during part of this time.

Sweden’s security policy remains firmly in place. Sweden is not a member of any military alliance. At the same time, Sweden builds security together with others. A security policy characterised by solidarity is the foundation of Sweden’s defence and security policy. It is a Swedish interest to safeguard and strengthen solidarity and integration within the EU, and to maintain a peaceful, stable and predictable neighbourhood, anchored in European and Euroatlantic structures. Threats against peace and our security are best averted jointly and in cooperation with other countries.

Sweden’s membership of the EU constitutes the most important platform for our unilateral declaration of solidarity and solidarity-based security policy. The transatlantic link is crucial to Europe’s security. Sweden has a responsibility for promoting security in our part of Europe. Together with other states and organisations, Sweden actively contributes to promoting security in our neighbourhood. Ultimately, Sweden, within the framework of the solidarity-based security policy, alone and together with other states and organisations, should be able to defend Sweden against an armed attack. The Swedish unilateral declaration of solidarity comprises EU members as well as the Nordic countries. Sweden will not remain passive if another EU member state or a Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to take similar action if Sweden is affected. Sweden must therefore be able to both give and receive civil and military support.

Within the framework of Swedish security policy, bi- and multi-lateral defence and security cooperation will continue to deepen. International defence cooperation contributes to strengthening national defence capability, as well as the capacity to act together with others, and serves an important security policy purpose. Defence cooperation with Finland holds the highest priority and is further deepened. Cooperation with Finland also comprises planning and preparation for the assertion of each country’s territorial integrity. Cooperation with different countries located in, or with other engagements in, our neighbourhood is of particular importance since it contributes to the stability of our neighbourhood. Sweden’s international
defence cooperation and national defence efforts constitute the two pillars on which Swedish defence policy rests.

The Swedish unilateral declaration of solidarity, the Nordic declaration of solidarity, and bilateral and regional defence cooperation of which Sweden is a part, do not encompass any mutually binding defence obligations. Nordic cooperation is a complement to existing cooperation within the EU and NATO.

Sweden’s ability to give and receive military and civil support is crucial to creating a real possibility to act together and in a co-ordinated fashion in the event of crisis or war. Sweden should as far as possible develop operational planning together with Finland and coordinate operational planning with Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and NATO. The trilateral operational defence cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden shall be implemented in accordance with the letter of intent concluded in September 2020.

This bill mainly covers the period 2021-2025, but also includes an overall focus for the period 2026-2030. This strengthens the predictability and long-term viability of, among other things, the economic conditions for the agencies’ planning. The proposed development represents a significant increase in the capabilities of both military and civil defence within the next five and ten years respectively.

In the field of military defence, the endurance of the wartime organisation will be strengthened and a better balance between combat and support units will be achieved. The number of wartime units in the wartime organisation is being increased. The armed forces' wartime organisation shall be able to operate together, which means that the capability of conducting joint operations, with the support of civil defence, needs to be developed.

For geographical, readiness and training reasons, peace time organisational units should be re-established. This bill proposes that organisational units are re-established in Arvidsjaur, Gothenburg, Kristinehamn, Uppsala, Falun and Sollefteå, with a training detachment in Östersund. Since it is proposed that the number of personnel in the wartime organisation is increased, the number of conscripts carrying out basic training must also be gradually increased to 8,000 by 2025. Defence intelligence capabilities and Sweden’s cyber defence capabilities are further strengthened.
Participation in international military operations, with mandates based on international law, is an integral part of Sweden's solidarity-based security policy and contributes, among other things, to strengthening Sweden's security. The Swedish Armed Forces as a whole shall be able to be organised for war and all wartime units shall be able to begin to perform their wartime duties within one week of the decision on heightened alert and general mobilisation. Within this framework, parts of the wartime organisation shall have a higher level of readiness. It should be possible to meet an attack even if it is a surprise attack and it should be possible to perform mobilisation during an ongoing attack.

The capability to carry out operations with other countries and organisations should be strengthened and is important for developing competence in the wartime organisation. Cooperation between Swedish and Finnish units is of particular importance.

Civil and military defence reinforce each other. In order to safeguard the balance in total defence, it is important that civil defence is also given priority and continues to develop. Sweden's ability to cope with heightened alert and ultimately war needs to be strengthened on a broad front. An important part of this work is to strengthen civil defence.

It is particularly important that work to strengthen resilience in the most important societal functions is further developed and deepened. Safeguarding the most important societal functions includes maintaining necessary supplies. This normally means a lower level of ambition than in a normal peacetime situation. Work has begun but now needs to be further intensified. Efforts to increase resilience, especially in order and safety, protection of the civilian population, healthcare, food and drinking water, financial readiness, transport, energy supply and electronic communications and post, need to be further developed and strengthened.

Civil defence shall be capable of protecting the civilian population, ensuring the most important societal functions, maintaining the necessary supplies, contributing to the capabilities of military defence in the event of armed aggression or war in Sweden's neighbourhood, maintaining society's resilience to external pressures and contributing to strengthening the will to defend, contributing to strengthening society's capacity to prevent and deal with severe pressures on society in peace time, and contributing available resources to the capability to participate in international peacekeeping and
humanitarian efforts. Investments to strengthen protective security and cybersecurity are also part of the initiative.

The development of civil defence will require action by a wide range of actors, including government agencies, municipalities and regions, individuals, industry and NGOs. The implementation of the defence policy focus is the responsibility of society as a whole and an issue that affects all policy areas. Also, the proposed move towards increased military capabilities requires that civil defence has the ability to provide support to the Armed Forces in the event of heightened alert.

Environmental and climate considerations should be integrated into the work on total defence issues, including national goals, the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030 with the global sustainable development goals.

The proposed strengthening of total defence capabilities will entail the need for increased activity and substantial investment in, among other things, materiel and infrastructure. The security policy developments and the defence policy focus on increased capabilities in total defence underline the need for a rapid and efficient response to the decisions that will need to be taken at different levels in order to implement the policy focus.

Military defence involves large sums of money and it is crucial that there is clear parliamentary transparency in the defence economy. The forthcoming inquiry with the task of developing a long-term materiel supply strategy shall have parliamentary endorsement such as a parliamentary reference group. Specific frameworks, which are set by the Riksdag according to the Government’s proposals, shall be introduced for combat aircraft and underwater capabilities.

After the 2022 election, the Defence Commission will be given the task of starting work prior to the defence resolution in 2025. The Defence Commission shall evaluate the realisation of the 2020 defence resolution by means of a review in 2023 in order to ensure that the reinforcement and cost development are in phase with the Riksdag's decision on direction and economic framework.

The Government will return to the Riksdag with the 2024 budget bill to ensure that the implementation of the defence resolution continues as planned and with proposals on how the planning framework for the period
2026-2030 will be managed. The Defence Commission shall submit proposals for the planning framework before this.

The definitive decision regarding the defence resolution period 2026-2030 is made on the basis of the Defence Commission's proposal in the defence resolution 2025. If the economic framework is increased in the years 2026-2030, the Defence Commission's report (Ds 2019:8) shall be implemented in its entirety and the funds shall be used to implement the following measures. From 2021, the agencies shall be instructed to plan for the possible implementation of all of this. Given an increased economic framework, the following measures shall be planned for:

1. The entire wartime organisation shall be fully organised by 2030.
2. The parts of the Swedish Armed Forces' report on 15 November 2019 that are not covered by the economic framework now proposed shall be reversed.
3. The Air Force shall be supplied with more missiles.
4. Replacement of, among other things, radar systems for the sensor chain shall be brought forward.
5. The capability to base air combat forces on dispersed bare bases shall be strengthened.
6. The helicopter units shall be given mobile bare base units.
7. Amphibious units shall be strengthened materially with additional new assault craft.
8. Modern portable air defence shall be procured for the army.
9. The divisional capabilities of the army shall be enhanced with an engineer battalion and a logistics battalion.
10. Engineer companies shall be added to lay bridges over larger rivers and modern bridge materiel shall be procured.
11. Communications and electronic warfare units shall be brought forward.
12. The logistics function shall be reinforced.
13. Sustainability in war shall be strengthened by the acquisition of additional medicines, fuel and necessary spare parts etc., as well as trucks and ammunition.
14. Additional new equipment for soldiers will be provided and new firearms will be procured for all soldiers.
15 More modern and heavier equipment will be procured for the home guard.

16 Voluntary defence organisations shall be further strengthened.

17 The Roads and Hydraulic Engineer corps and the Building and Repair readiness shall be re-established.

As the Defence Commission states, the Government notes that the external developments that have taken place over the last two decades have shown the difficulty of identifying early signals of changes in the security situation and taking the necessary decisions on strengthening defence capabilities.

The effects of climate change are increasingly tangible. In addition to disruptions in socially important activities and its impact on human life and health, climate change affects relationships within and between states and can thus have security policy implications.

The 2015 defence resolution meant that a decades-long trend of declining defence spending and weakened capabilities of both military and civil defence could be reversed. A broad majority in the Riksdag supported a defence resolution that put the national defence dimension back into focus. The resolution meant a priority to increase the operational capability of the wartime units, to deepen and broaden Sweden's international defence policy cooperation and to resume planning for civil defence.

At the same time, the reconstruction of military and civil defence capabilities requires considerable financial resources, as well as a long-term approach in areas such as planning, infrastructure, investment and supply of personnel. In order to cope with changes in the international situation, therefore, a credible total defence capability must be maintained over time. Experiences from the defence resolution period that is now ending show that it takes a long time to build up military and civilian defence capabilities.

With the focus that is proposed in this bill, significant steps will be taken towards ensuring a credible defence capability over time.
5. Security Policy

The purpose of Sweden's security policy is to guarantee the country's independence and self-determination, safeguard sovereignty, Sweden's interests and fundamental values and ensure Swedish freedom of action in the face of political, military or other pressure. Contributing to a safer global environment and a stable neighbourhood increases Sweden's security.

This section describes and analyses the development of security policy with a focus on those countries, organisations and regions that have a particular impact on Swedish security and defence policy. Sweden's strategic military position and thematic security issues are also discussed. In sections 5.2–5.4, the Government describes the direction of security policy, including Sweden's international defence and security policy cooperation and international military initiatives.

It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions at a global, regional or national level regarding the security policy implications of the Covid-19 pandemic. It can be noted that both the health and the economic consequences are extensive. The pandemic can be expected, both directly and indirectly, to affect security and defence policy conditions and cooperation for a relatively long time to come.

5.1 Developments in security policy

5.1.1 The European security order

The European security order refers to all the rules and principles, binding in international law as well as subject to political obligation, which together form the foundation of Europe's security and therefore its prosperity. These include basic rules that territory must not be acquired by force and respect for each state's sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to decide its security policy independently and without interference. The European security architecture usually refers to its organisations and institutions, the most important of which are the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe.

The European security order is based on the UN Charter and is further developed in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990, together with the other political commitments negotiated within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later the OSCE. This rules-based European security order is based on a comprehensive concept of security which has
come about in consensus between European states, including Russia, as well as the United States and Canada. The architecture in the military field includes the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (originally adopted in 1990, last updated in 2011) and the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the USA and the Soviet Union. The Open Skies Treaty allows for the performance of reciprocal overflights by observation aircraft and constitutes an important confidence-building measure. The agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, on restricting nuclear weapons (the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, SALT and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START), as well as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), have also been important for armament control efforts in Europe.

Undermining of the European security order

The European security order is fundamentally challenged, as are the standards, cooperation and institutions that are the foundations of European security. The comprehensive concept of security, the multilateral rules-based international order, including international law and the common commitments on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, is increasingly being called into question.

Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine shows that Russia is violating the European security order and that Russia is prepared to use military means to achieve political objectives. This action represents a violation of the basic principles and the rules in international law on which the European security order is based. Russia has called for the European security order to be revised and for more than a decade has actively undermined the OSCE’s efforts to strengthen human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the organisation’s work on monitoring elections has been questioned by Russia. In order to maintain the status and integrity of the security order, it is necessary to demand accountability for violations of the security order.

Importance of the European security order for small states

It is crucial that the sovereignty and political freedom of action of all states are upheld. If the sovereignty and freedom of smaller states to make their own political choices is curtailed, a special category of states is created with the status of so-called fringe or buffer states. This is unacceptable and would
represent a great success for Russian ambitions to restrict freedom of choice of security policy for countries close to Russia.

Comments have been made recently that the present security order is no longer fit for purpose and needs to be updated. Sweden has stressed in the OSCE and other formats the importance of not renegotiating, undermining or replacing the present principles and commitments. Each state has an obligation to ensure that violations of international law are not normalised. This also applies to the OSCE’s principles. As chair of the OSCE in 2021, Sweden will have a particularly important role in this work. The principle of indivisibility of security, which means, among other things, that security within states is closely linked to security between states and that no state has the right to spheres of influence, is central and must be maintained. This means that regionalisation of security in Europe, such as the establishment of separate regimes for the Baltic Sea region with different degrees of sovereignty and security for different countries, must be counteracted.

5.1.2 Developments in Sweden's neighbourhood

Geographically, Sweden's neighbourhood includes the Baltic Sea region and the inlets to the Baltic Sea, the Skagerrak and Kattegat, the Arctic area, the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the northern parts of the North Atlantic. Apart from the Black Sea region, the Baltic Sea region is the part of Europe where Russia's interests most clearly challenge other European countries and the United States. This situation is expected to remain for the foreseeable future. The security situation in Sweden's neighbourhood and in Europe has deteriorated over time. Sweden's neighbourhood is increasingly characterised by a greater presence of military forces and increased military activity. At the same time, Russia also employs non-military force against other states.

The security deterioration in Sweden’s neighbourhood is a consequence of Russia's actions. The Russian military presence along Russia’s western border and in the Arctic has been strengthened. Many of the Russian military measures have tangible signal effects for security policy. For example, Russia conducts annual strategic exercises, as well as a large number of smaller exercises. Furthermore, several major Russian military exercises have been initiated since 2013 without prior information or warning. These exercises have been described by Russia as contingency checks, which, according to the Vienna document, do not require the invitation of foreign observers. Russia has opposed any modernisation of, for example, the Vienna document that would increase military predictability and transparency.
Russian combat aircraft have repeatedly performed aggressive and provocative approaches to other states' warships and military aircraft, as well as to military establishments and installations in Sweden's neighbourhood. The purpose of such action may be to send a security policy signal to neighbouring countries and the outside world that Russia will defend its interests. Another specific purpose is judged to be to react to the American presence in the Baltic Sea and thereby question the Baltic Sea's status as an open sea. Another type of Russian action is denying access to international waters and air territories due to test operations and firing exercises, in a way that has caused a nuisance to civil and military marine and air traffic. That Russia and the United States have left the INF Treaty after Russian breaches of agreements is another factor that has a negative impact on the security policy situation.

Russia is using a range of measures to exert pressure on and influence EU and NATO member states in the region. These pressures and attempts at influence, often referred to as hybrid threats, are ongoing. Russian rhetoric has been sharpened in relation to Sweden. Senior Russian representatives have repeatedly warned that Swedish membership of NATO would force Russia to take responsive measures. More recently, Russian representatives have also criticised Sweden's and Finland's cooperation with NATO, arguing that this too forces Russia to take response measures. False claims about the content of Sweden's partnership with NATO have been made in the context of the Russian attempts to influence.

EU and NATO members in Sweden's neighbourhood have responded to Russian action through measures in a variety of areas, including sanctions regimes, closer cooperation and initiatives to increase military capabilities. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the target of at least two per cent of Member States' GDP being allocated to defence expenditure by 2024, according to agreed NATO accounting principles, was adopted. The ability to respond to so-called hybrid threats, such as advocacy campaigns and cyber attacks, is also becoming increasingly important for states in the region. Cooperation to identify, prevent and respond to such threats has intensified in both the EU and NATO, as well as in the cooperation between the two organisations. NATO members decided at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 to establish an enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic states and Poland. This means that a rotating, multinational battle group is maintained in each country. The alliance already conducts airspace surveillance with military aircraft over the Baltic states within the framework of Baltic Air Policing (BAP).
Russia

The Government stated in the 2015 Defence Policy Bill that Russian action against Ukraine had consolidated the image of a state leadership with an increasing ambition to build Russia into a major power with control over as much of the former Soviet Union as possible. This ambition was judged to continue to be the central guiding principle of Russian foreign policy under the present leadership. It was further stated that the Russian action had reinforced the impression that Russia was prepared to violate international law, valid agreements and established European principles in order to assert its interests, even if this led to sharp negative reactions from the outside world and weakened the Russian economy. Five years later, the Government, like the Defence Commission, finds that this assessment continues to be valid. In important respects, it has been further reinforced by Russia's actions and by the statements made by the Russian leadership. Examples include the Russian breach of the INF Treaty, the use of a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in 2018 and the poisoning of opposition politician Navalny in 2020, the blocking of marine traffic to the Sea of Azov and the attempt to infiltrate the computer network of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that Russian foreign policy actions and Russian warfare are based on a coordinated use of all resources at the country's disposal to achieve set goals and complicate countermeasures by other states. Sweden is pursuing a two-track policy towards Russia, which involves condemning Russian violations of international law while remaining open to cooperation in areas where there are common interests.

Russia's driving forces

The Government, like the Defence Commission, notes that over the past decade, and especially since 2014, the Russian leadership has acted in a way that many analysts have perceived to be contrary to the interests that the outside world has presumed that Russia should have, such as international reputation, economic growth and concern for the welfare of the population. Russian actions have therefore often been perceived as irrational.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the Russian leadership is expressing a geopolitical and partly conspiratorial view of the world. Influence in different geographical regions is seen as a zero-sum game. Relations with the West have defined Russian security policy for much of the country's history. In recent years, Russia has increasingly chosen...
to adhere to a tradition of defining Russia as opposed to the West. In Russia, the West is often portrayed as a unified player which, under the leadership of the United States, is considered to be striving to achieve a weak Russia. Russian representatives have on several occasions expressed the view that the West aims to replace the present Russian leadership and that this could be done by staging a so-called colour revolution. Russia consistently expresses the view that the democratic demonstrations against authoritarian leaders that have led to political upheavals in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have been orchestrated by the West. The West is also accused of trying to attract countries in Russia's vicinity into NATO and the EU and of thwarting Russian-led integration projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This world view is taken as a pretext for making the restoration of Russia's great power status the most important task of the Russian state, which also justifies the view that Russia should surround itself with a sphere of influence in which it has privileged interests in other states.

**Domestic politics**

The Government, like the Defence Commission, notes that the world view described above is used to legitimise the current Russian leadership's continued hold on power. It has also been used in many ways to justify the restrictions on human rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression and political freedom, which have occurred in Russia since the turn of the millennium. Gradually, these values have been subordinated to the interests of the state, as defined by the Russian leadership, even though in its rhetoric Russia continues to claim to respect them. Since 2012, there has been a sharp deterioration in respect for human rights. Today's Russian political system is both authoritarian and repressive. Expressions of discontent are allowed within certain limits. A certain degree of freedom of expression, including on the internet, and limited political opposition activities are tolerated. However, the Russian leadership has made it clear in words and deeds that it is prepared to go a long way to prevent popular protests and the emergence of a political opposition that could seriously challenge the leadership's continued hold on power. The few independent media that exist are circumscribed. This means that there are no organised channels for systematic political accountability or any substantial counter-forces in the Russian society against the current rulers.

There is a close interaction between domestic policy developments in Russia and its foreign policy actions, in which the officially painted pattern of threats legitimises what de facto means a shrinking space for democracy and
a sometimes aggressive foreign policy. Russian decision-making, especially on key foreign and security policy issues, takes place in a narrow circle around the president. This means that Russian decision-making takes place quickly and has on several occasions surprised the outside world.

Economy
In recent years, Russia seems to have had the key priority of reshaping the Russian economy and structuring government finances so as to reduce dependence on the outside world. Since 2014, Russia has, among other things, made a determined effort to replace imports with domestic production, what is known as import substitution. The share of oil and gas revenue in the federal budget has fallen from 60 per cent to 46 per cent in a few years. The share of oil and gas revenues in GDP amounts to around 10 per cent and is therefore significant but not dominant.

A further component of efforts to reduce dependence on the outside world has been a tight fiscal policy. This has led, among other things, to Russian central government debt amounting to only about 15 per cent of GDP and to a budget surplus in 2018 amounting to about 2.5 per cent of GDP. The hopes that the economic consequences of Russia's aggressive actions would lead to a change in policy have so far not been fulfilled.

Military development
The trend of prioritising defence expenditure over other expenditure, without much consideration for economic development, has prevailed since the current defence reform started in 2008. Since the start of the defence reform in 2008, Russian military capabilities have been significantly strengthened: from being able to deal with a local war to being able to start a regional war. Russia's military freedom of action has increased, partly by increasing the number of units of ground forces, nominally by nearly 50 per cent from 2011 to 2019. At the same time, the capability of other defence commands and independent branches of the armed forces has been greatly strengthened. The increased capability is the result of the supply and modernisation of weapons systems etc., intensive exercise activities, as well as increased readiness and consequent combat capability. Warfare in Ukraine and Syria has also contributed to improved joint warfare capability between the services and the branches of the armed forces. This growth in capability is mainly taking place in the European part of Russia, especially in the western military district including Kaliningrad. All in all, the long-term and purposefully implemented Russian defence reform indicates that defence
efforts have the highest political priority. The structure of the Russian armed forces also gives a clear indication of the type of conflict the Russian leadership believes it must prepare for.

There is much to suggest that Russia's military capabilities will continue to increase in absolute terms throughout the next ten-year period. This is partly due to resources already having been invested in, inter alia, materiel and the defence industry, and partly due to the introduction of new materiel and the conducting of extensive exercise activities. The sharp increase in Russian defence spending in 2005–2015 and the increased exercise activities will continue to yield returns over the next 15 years. In addition to joint defence operations, Russian exercises increasingly also include civilian and military agency resources with tasks in what is known as the state's military organisation. Russia is thus creating the conditions for a broader societal effort in an intergovernmental conflict. All in all, the armed forces are evolving from an ability to be used primarily for conflicts in Russia's immediate vicinity towards an ability to also conduct out-of-area operations. Through military action in Syria, Russia has demonstrated, among other things, an ability to sustainably conduct military operations over time in areas far from Russian territory.

Russia has the world's largest and most diversified nuclear arsenal. Strategic nuclear weapons play a central role in Russian security policy, as is manifested both nationally and internationally. Russia also prioritises so-called tactical nuclear weapons for regional deterrence, among other things, to compensate for perceived deficiencies in conventional military capabilities. The assessment of regional nuclear capability is complicated by the fact that many nuclear weapon missiles have a dual-use capability - they can also carry a conventional warhead. Russia began a major modernisation of its nuclear weapons in the 1990s and today there are no nuclear warheads manufactured during the Soviet era left in Russia. This has been made possible by Russia's maintaining industrial infrastructure for the production of nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons and weapons-carrying systems. Russia reserves the right to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons if the existence of the Russian state is threatened. The Russian debate also mentions the use of tactical nuclear weapons for preventive purposes. Developments in the last year, in which new nuclear weapons systems have been deployed, suggest that the role of nuclear weapons will continue to increase. This development could lead to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons in Sweden's neighbourhood.
The political system and its consequences

An overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the primary focus of Russia's foreign and security policy will remain. There is much to suggest that, in the coming years, the Russian leadership will continue to pursue its interests and coordinate the means at its disposal. In this context, the Russian political leadership is judged to be prepared to disregard both international law and world opinion, as well as Russia's long-term economic development in order to achieve geopolitical objectives. The unlawful annexation of Crimea is an example that indicates this. Russia is also expected to continue its efforts to dominate the countries in its vicinity, in particular the former Soviet republics. This includes exploiting unresolved conflicts, for example in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Donbas, or creating new conflicts. Russia, under its present leadership, can also be expected to use economic, political and diplomatic pressure to achieve its objectives.

Alleged external threats can be used for domestic political purposes. Similarly, developments abroad can be used to advance Russian positions.

The trend for Russia to use a broader and more coordinated arsenal of means of applying pressure is expected to continue. The Russian leadership has shown that it is prepared to use subversive methods and outright military force to influence political decisions in countries far from Russia, such as Syria. Increased military capabilities, increased militarisation of society and increased political willingness to use military means and other antagonistic means of power to achieve political objectives lead to the assessment that Russia may use military force in other places and on a larger scale than has happened so far. It cannot be ruled out that this may also occur against members of the EU and NATO or other countries. Russia can be expected to continue to increase its influence not only in its vicinity but also globally.

The Arctic

Developments in the Arctic are of global importance. As Arctic sea ice decreases due to climate change and larger sea areas become available for shipping and raw material extraction, outside interest in the region is also growing. This could lead to rising tensions. Developments in the Arctic are also affected by the global security situation, which is characterised by instability and is difficult to predict.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic has been a region characterised by peace, stability and cooperation. The eight Arctic states (Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Russia and the United States) have a
special responsibility for development in the Arctic. The Arctic Council is
the main multilateral regional meeting format and the core of cooperation in
the Arctic region. The main focus of the organisation is on environmental
issues and sustainable development. The Council's mandate does not cover
security policy and military issues. The Ilulissat Declaration, signed by the
five coastal states in 2008 and reaffirmed by all Arctic states in 2018,
establishes a shared commitment to preserving the Arctic as a peaceful and
stable region.

At the same time, the overall security context has deteriorated in the light of
military reestablishment and an assertion of sovereignty by several states in
the Arctic. This development is led by Russia, which is conducting a wide-
ranging build-up of its military capabilities. This is done partly for the
protection of its own territory and partly to create opportunities for power
projection.

The main Russian priorities include the protection of the country's bases on
the Kola Peninsula and the nuclear submarine based second-strike capability,
as well as the protection of industrial and population centres such as
Moscow and St Petersburg. Much of Russia's energy extraction (from oil and
gas deposits) also takes place in the northernmost parts of the country. In
recent times, Russia has also more clearly expressed a desire to control
shipping through the Northern Sea route (which makes up the bulk of the
Northeast Passage). Russia has on a number of occasions in recent years
officially questioned Norway's interpretation of the Spitsbergen Treaty.

Other states have begun to react to the Russian actions, including the United
States, which has increased its military investment in the area. The
reestablishment of the United States Second Fleet, with operational areas
including the North Atlantic, and the presence of an American aircraft
carrier in the Norwegian Sea for the first time in twenty years during the
Trident Juncture 2018 exercise are examples of this. States with no direct
depth, and strategic
geographical links to the Arctic, in particular China, are also increasing their
presence and resources in the region, currently with the focus on economic
and research-related cooperation.

All the Nordic countries are Arctic states and a conflict that affects any of
them will affect Sweden. Northern Europe, including the Arctic region,
constitutes a strategic military setting. The maritime areas between
Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands are strategically important for
both NATO and Russia, given their importance for the protection of NATO's reinforcement transports across the North Atlantic in the event of a conflict in Europe.

5.1.3 Developments in Europe

In view of the deterioration in the security situation which has taken place over time, several European countries are stepping up their focus on defence, increasing their defence spending and increasingly focusing on national defence. In the wake of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, uncertainty and unpredictability have increased. The border restrictions that have been imposed have led to a discussion on the EU's ability to deal with cross-border crises. The crisis has also caused a global economic downturn and there are uncertainties about how the defence economy is affected in most European countries. The pandemic has also resulted in extensive disinformation and advocacy campaigns, as well as restrictions on human rights in some countries.

The Nordic region

For Denmark, NATO membership is the basis for the security and defence policy. Denmark holds an opt-out from European Union policies in relation to security and defence, meaning that the country does not participate in the formulation or implementation of the union's decisions or activities within the Common Security and Defence Policy. After the Cold War, the Danish armed forces were mainly focused on international operations. However, in light of the deterioration of the security situation in its neighbourhood and in Europe, Denmark has embarked on a reorganisation of its defence. The focus is increasingly on collective defence and the neighbourhood, including in the Baltic states where Denmark is one of the framework nations for MND-North in Adazi, Latvia. Denmark, through the national community, is responsible for defending Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The defence decision 2018–2023 breaks the downward trend in defence spending.

The Finnish armed forces are mainly governed by three principles: territorial defence of the whole of Finland, the provision of military personnel through universal conscription, and military nonalignment. Over the next few years, Finland will acquire a number of large materiel systems, including new warships and combat aircraft.

At the same time as Finland strengthens its national defence, international defence cooperation is intensifying. The EU is the most important security
policy cooperation for Finland, and Finland is one of the main proponents of enhanced defence policy cooperation within the Union. In official documents, Finland notes the possibility of applying for membership of NATO, the so-called NATO option. A well-functioning partnership with NATO is therefore given great importance, as is international interoperability. Finland ensures that there are no practical obstacles to the possible membership of NATO. Finland has in recent years concluded some ten bilateral peacetime cooperation agreements with other countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and has joined multilateral cooperations such as the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which also includes Norway and Denmark, and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The most far-reaching defence cooperation exists with Sweden.

Iceland has a strategic location in the North Atlantic that is of great importance for NATO's reinforcement transports from the United States to Europe. It does not have its own military defence and relies on its membership of NATO and a bilateral defence agreement with the United States dating from 1951. Icelandic airspace is monitored periodically by flights from other NATO countries under Icelandic Air Policing. Since 2006, the United States has had no permanent military presence in Iceland and the Keflavik base, but has in recent years increased its presence, including through American support for NATO airspace surveillance. Both Iceland and the United States have made infrastructure investments in recent years with the aim of improving the conditions for host country support.

Norway's security and defence policy is based on NATO membership. In addition, bilateral relations with the United States and the United Kingdom are of great importance. The United States Marine Corps has pre-stocked materiel in Norway for a brigade battle group, including tanks, and periodically has joint exercises with the Norwegian armed forces. The British presence is also significant. The Norwegian armed forces are intended to act as a conflict-restraining threshold and are an integral part of NATO's collective defence. Due to the deterioration in the security situation in its neighbourhood and in Europe, the Norwegian armed forces are being converted from international operations to national defence. Defence capabilities are primarily focused on the northern areas, where Russia's military activities have increased since 2014 to a level not recorded since the Soviet era.
**Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland**

NATO membership, the transatlantic link and EU membership form the foundations of Estonia’s, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s security policy. NATO’s collective defence guarantees and the Baltic state defence plan, the US presence in Europe, the deployment of Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltic countries and Poland, and Baltic Air Policing (BAP) are therefore of central importance to these states. Following Russian aggression against Ukraine and the unlawful annexation of Crimea in 2014, all the countries have prioritised their defence efforts to territorial defence within the framework of NATO. They are also actively working to strengthen and deepen EU cooperation.

Poland gives priority to NATO membership and the bilateral partnership with the United States for its security. Poland has proposed a permanent expanded American troop presence in the country and wants to see an increased American military presence in the region. The American troop presence in Poland has been increased under an agreement reached in September 2019. Today, the United States has a significant number of soldiers in Poland, including within the framework of the EFP. In August 2020, the US Secretary of State and the President of Poland signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The agreement means that the American military presence in the country is planned to increase. Poland is restructuring and modernising its armed forces to strengthen their operational capabilities.

**France, the United Kingdom and Germany**

The leading European countries in the field of defence and security policy are France, the United Kingdom and Germany. These states are central to maintaining the European security order. France and Germany have close defence and security policy cooperation, which was last confirmed by the Aachen Treaty in January 2019. Franco-German cooperation, cooperation between France and the United Kingdom, as well as NATO and EU cooperation bind the three states together. All three countries are restructuring their armed forces and increasing their focus on collective defence.

After the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, France is the only nuclear power in the EU and the only EU Member State to hold a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Africa and the Middle East remain key areas of French foreign and security policy and France has permanent bases and ongoing operations in both regions. Islamist-motivated
terrorism is regarded as the most acute threat. At the same time, France has been contributing to NATO's airspace surveillance in the Baltic states since 2004 and with contingents to the multinational military presence in the Baltic countries. The French armed forces continue to be under strain from countering terrorism both within France and in Africa and the Middle East. France, together with Germany, is a driving force in developing security and defence policy cooperation within the EU. As far as France is concerned, military capability, the objective of European strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty and defence industry aspects are at the forefront of enhanced cooperation. At the same time, France stresses the importance of the transatlantic link, the role of NATO in collective defence and that there is no intention to create parallel structures to NATO. French representatives point to the country's dependence on the United States for performing operations in Africa. Bilateral military cooperation between France and the United Kingdom is central to both countries, including in the field of nuclear weapons. The EI2 cooperation format was launched by France in September 2017 and 13 European countries, including Sweden, have joined. The letter of intent states that the participating states intend to develop a common strategic culture in order to meet the challenges facing Europe. France's statements on re-establishing a strategic dialogue with Russia have sparked debate recently. The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) is expected to achieve full operational capability in 2020.

NATO is central to the United Kingdom's security and defence policy. The country is a driving force in NATO's modernisation and adaptation to a changing pattern of threat. The United Kingdom is seeking a more even burden sharing within NATO and is critical of the concept of European strategic autonomy. Since 2014, the United Kingdom has strengthened its security policy engagement in Northern Europe, both bilaterally and within the framework of NATO. Through its responsibility for a battle group in Estonia, participation in exercises in the Baltic Sea region and commitment to the defence of Norway, the United Kingdom is of great importance for the stability of Sweden's neighbourhood. The United Kingdom also contributed to Icelandic Air Policing in 2019. In parallel with the strong support for NATO, the United Kingdom also uses other forms of cooperation, such as the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force in which Sweden participates. The United Kingdom is also the initiator of the Northern Group dialogue format. Following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, non-EU states account for 80 per cent of NATO's total defence spending. The United Kingdom is continuing to adapt its armed forces in order to further strengthen its contribution within the
framework of NATO's collective defence. The ability to demonstrate a military presence globally increases significantly when the two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers become operational in the 2020s. The United Kingdom's nuclear capability is already submarine-based. They play a role both nationally and within NATO. The United Kingdom has strengthened its ability to detect and respond to hostile state activities through its so-called Fusion Doctrine.

Germany, by virtue of its economy, large population and geographical location, has an important role to play in both EU and NATO cooperation. Maintaining the cohesion and ability to act of these organisations is a fundamental security policy interest for Germany. For some years now, the country has also assumed greater security policy responsibility than before, particularly in EU cooperation. Germany considers that NATO should focus on deterrence and collective defence, while the EU should strengthen its ability to deal on its own with crises and conflicts in the European neighbourhood beyond the EU’s external borders. Since Russia's unlawful annexation of Crimea, Germany has begun a reorientation and reinforcement of the German armed forces. There has been a greater focus on collective defence and engagement in the Baltic Sea region within the NATO framework, as well as equipping and training existing units.

**Eastern Partnership countries**

Developments in and around the six countries in the EU's Eastern Partnership – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – are of great importance for the security of Europe, and therefore of Sweden. The ability of the Eastern Partnership states to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity is crucial. Conditions and developments in these countries differ significantly. As far as democracy and human rights are concerned, the situation is particularly problematic in Azerbaijan and Belarus. Common to all Eastern Partnership countries is that, to a greater or lesser extent, they are exposed to or influenced by Russia's efforts to dominate its neighbours. Belarus is formally part of a union state with Russia and has a strong economic dependence. The armed forces of the countries are closely integrated, including joint air defence. The popular protests in Belarus continue and are met with escalating violence by the regime. The EU and Sweden believe that the Belarusian people have the right to elect their leaders in free and fair elections. The widespread popular protests and the international community’s criticism of the regime in Belarus following the falsified presidential elections in August and subsequent violence by
authorities have put the incumbent President, Aleksandr Lukashenko, in an increasingly tight situation. As a result, Lukashenko has moved even closer to Russia, partly by having been granted financial assistance and partly by expressing a willingness to deepen cooperation within the union state. Actors other than Russia, such as China, Turkey and Iran, are also increasing their influence in the region. All states in the region are subject to significant influence through hybrid activities from different parts of the Russian state and private Russian actors. The intensity and orientation of these impact attempts vary. Not least, the impact of Russian state-controlled media, which presents the messages that the Russian leadership wants to convey, is large in most of these countries. In Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko has replaced local staff in the state-controlled media with Russian personnel, with some local staff joining the strikes and protests against Lukashenko following the falsified presidential election.

**Georgia and Ukraine**

Georgia and Ukraine have reached the furthest of the Eastern Partnership countries in terms of democracy and human rights. Although there has been some improvement in recent years, Georgia's relationship with Russia remains marked by the 2008 war. Russia still does not comply with the six-point agreement negotiated with the help of the EU in 2008 and Russia has recognised the two Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Russia has a significant military presence in the form of military bases in both regions. The regions are in all important respects dependent on and controlled by Russia. Georgia thus lacks control over a considerable part of its territory.

In Ukraine, since the start of aggression in 2014, Russia has taken control of territory representing about 7 per cent of its land area, an estimated 15 per cent of its population and a significant part of Ukraine's economic potential. The unlawful annexation of Crimea and the Russian de facto control of large parts of the Donbas region have had wide-ranging consequences for Ukraine. According to UN figures from February 2020, between 13,000 and 13,200 people have been killed so far, over 29,000 have been injured and some 1.4 million have become internal refugees. The consequences for the Ukrainian economy have been serious and far-reaching. This is partly due to Russia's direct aggression and partly to its economic pressure and the difficulty of access to the important Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Both in Crimea and in the parts of Donbas that Russia controls, there are
widespread and serious violations of human rights. In Crimea, Crimean Tatars are particularly vulnerable to repression.

The Black Sea region
Beside the Baltic Sea region, the Black Sea is the part of Europe and its vicinity where Russia's interests most clearly confront those of the West and NATO. A major reason for Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 – in addition to preventing a Ukrainian rapprochement with NATO – was probably to ensure control of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The Black Sea fleet and its presence in Crimea are of great importance for Russia's ability to influence the strategic military situation in the region.

Also, the Black Sea, like the Baltic Sea, plays an important role in Russia's energy exports. The Russian maritime presence in the Mediterranean and as a supply line for the Russian presence in Syria also play an important role in transport via the Black Sea, Bosphorus and Dardanelles. For the same reason, Turkey has a strategic role for NATO in the region.

Since 2014, Russia has gradually strengthened its military presence in all domains in the Black Sea region. The unlawful military presence in Crimea fulfils a similar function as Kaliningrad does in the Baltic Sea region. Through a substantial presence with advanced modern reconnaissance and control systems (e.g. S-400 anti-aircraft systems, Bastion coastal missile systems, submarines with sea and ground-target missile systems, ground combat units), Russia has increased its ability to disrupt and restrict access by other actors to areas near and across the Black Sea.

The Western Balkans
The Western Balkans comprise Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. All six countries in the Western Balkans are either candidate or potential candidate countries to the EU. The reduced political attention on the Western Balkans on the part of the EU and the United States since the efforts of the 1990s and early 2000s has allowed other actors to strengthen their political and economic interests in the region. Russia and China in particular, but also Turkey and several Gulf states, are active in the region. Russian action has led to destabilisation and aims to divide the cohesion of the EU and NATO, as well as to counter the countries' integration into the EU and NATO. This has been expressed, inter alia, by the Russian opposition to the resolution of the name issue of North Macedonia and Russian involvement in the 2016 attempted coup in Montenegro. Russia's relationship with the Bosnian-Serbian leadership in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is hindering the country’s NATO membership and, indirectly, the rapprochement with the EU, is very strong. Serbia is Russia's main partner in the region and the relationship includes military cooperation and high-level political contacts. Joint efforts to counter a resolution of the Kosovo issue are a central part of this cooperation.

Russia has a strong media presence in the region that contributes to the spreading of disinformation. Russia also finances local parties. Using small means, it is thus possible to have a large impact.

**Turkey**

Turkey has the ambition to strengthen its role as a regional and international security policy player. Following the 2016 coup attempt, power in Turkey has been further concentrated on the president, while the rule of law and respect for human rights have been severely weakened and balancing functions eroded. Freedom of expression and space for the civil society have been severely curtailed. Politicians, academics, journalists and human rights defenders have been detained without any clear evidence being presented. The peace process with the Kurdistan labour party PKK, which has been marked by the EU as a terrorist organisation, was suspended in 2015. This has been followed by widespread conflict. The situation in south-east Turkey continues to be closely linked to developments in the region, not least in Syria and Iraq. Turkey is a candidate country for the EU, but accession negotiations have effectively come to a complete halt. The tensions in the eastern Mediterranean over the Cyprus issue, exploration for and exploitation of oil and gas, the conflict in Libya, as well as the migration issue complicate the EU relationship. In November 2019, the EU adopted a sanction regime because of Turkey's drilling operations in the eastern Mediterranean. NATO membership has played a central role in Turkish foreign and security policy since the 1950s, and the Turkish armed forces are numerically the second largest in the alliance. Relations with the United States have been marked in recent years by several difficult issues, in particular American support for Kurdish groups in Syria. Turkey's military invasion of northern Syria has been condemned by the EU. The operation is contrary to international law and has also made the fight against Daesh more difficult. In parallel, Turkey's exchanges with Russia have increased, including in foreign policy, energy supply and armaments imports, which has also had implications for relations with the United States and NATO. For example, the United States has suspended cooperation with Turkey on the
F-35 combat aircraft as a result of Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system.

5.1.4 North America
The transatlantic link is crucial for Europe's security. This is particularly true in terms of military capabilities, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition, there is a reliance on American technology to ensure the development of military capabilities in many European countries. The transatlantic link has also been of historical importance in balancing the interests of the larger Western European states internally and externally.

The United States of America
American foreign, security and defence policy, and a strong and predictable American commitment to maintaining international norms, remain decisive for Europe's security and stability, and as a consequence of this for the security of Sweden. It is therefore important for Swedish and European security that the United States remains committed to multilateral institutions and cooperation.

Support for NATO membership is well anchored in both chambers of Congress as well as within the military establishment. The United States currently accounts for a very large proportion of NATO's combined capabilities. The debate on burden-sharing in NATO has been ongoing for some time and with the negative developments in security, and the present presidential administration, American pressure on member states has increased further. The United States has expressed strong expectations that NATO members will honour their commitment to increase defence spending. This would result in a slightly more balanced share of the burden. The United States also expects other allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to take greater responsibility for their own defence.

It can be noted that the United States’ allies and partners in Europe, through their economic, military, historical, demographic and cultural ties, are countries that continue to be close to the United States. However, the United States and the EU have taken different positions on several global issues, and the implementation of American foreign policy has sometimes been marked by unpredictability. The United States and Europe nevertheless share fundamental values and interests in a global perspective.

Following Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the United States increased its engagement in European defence through increased economic
efforts and through an expanded military presence, including within the framework of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). A review of the American military presence in the world is being conducted in accordance with the 2018 US National Defence Strategy. The headquarters of the American military forces in Europe, the United States European Command (USEUCOM), as well as the headquarters of the US Special Forces in Europe are being relocated from Stuttgart in Germany to be co-located with the NATO military headquarters in Mons in Belgium. The American headquarters for Africa will be relocated either to another location in Europe or to the United States.

Increasingly, the presence in Europe will be covered by rotation of units from the United States. This includes personnel from the reactivated Army Headquarters for Europe, V Corps, stationed in Kentucky.

The 2017 National Security Strategy singles out China, along with Russia, as the United States’ main challengers. China's growing political, economic and military weight, combined with its rapid technological development, mean that the United States sees China as the main geopolitical challenger. Militarily, a large focus is placed on the situation in the South China Sea. At the same time, the United States seeks to respond to China's strategic investments and technological advances, which in the long term are perceived to pose a major threat to American national security, both unilaterally, in particular through trade barriers, and also through cooperation with allies and like-minded states. The management of the conflicting interests of the United States and China and the conflict over trade are complicated by the mutual economic dependence and, in some respects, common security policy interests. In its relationship with Sweden and the EU, the United States stresses the importance of agreeing on issues of military, economic and political perseverance towards China. Important areas of cooperation that are often highlighted concern the handling of, for example, Chinese investment proposals aimed at infrastructure or high-tech companies. China's increasing interest in the Arctic as a commercial and security policy arena as well as the risks associated with technological development, such as the imminent deployment of 5G networks, are also highlighted.

So far, the United States Congress has responded to Russian aggression with sanctions, the most extensive of which were introduced after the unlawful annexation of Crimea and the military aggression in eastern Ukraine. In recent years, individuals and companies involved in the interference in the
2016 US presidential election have also been sanctioned. The sanctions have focused in particular on activities in the energy and financial sectors. The United States has also taken strong action in support of the United Kingdom following the 2018 neurotoxin attack. Having played a subordinate role for a number of years, the image of Russia as a capable adversary is once again prominent in the United States Congress. This position is expected to continue to form the basis of the American view of Russia.

North Korea and Iran are also identified as threats to American interests. In particular, the United States has highlighted the threat posed by North Korea's long-range ballistic missiles, which are believed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. They pose a direct threat not only to South Korea and Japan, but also to the United States’ bases and territory, including the American mainland. The United States has taken countermeasures, for instance by increasing the ability to intercept ballistic missiles launched from North Korea. Missile defence systems in South Korea have been strengthened. The mutually harsh tone, accompanied by strong American sanctions in addition to the already strict UN sanctions regime, was tempered during 2018 and 2019 with meetings between the president of the United States and the North Korean leader. However, the hope of an improvement in relations has not materialised. The United States has identified Iran as one of the most pressing security threats, both for the United States and for key allies. The United States sees Iran as the largest funder of international terrorism with the aim of combating American influence in the Middle East as well as that of American partners such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. The American decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reinstate the previous American sanctions against Iran, which was taken with broad cross-party support, has further worsened relations between the countries. The American action has been criticised by the EU, which has also opposed the United States’ interpretation of the implications of the agreement. The United States has announced further sanctions against Iran, saying it is prepared to discuss a new agreement, while underlining that it expects Iran to live up to the JCPOA and that all actors will comply with the American sanctions. Islamist-motivated terrorism is considered to continue to pose a serious security policy threat to the United States.

The United States’ military development

The United States continues to have a dominant conventional military capability with global reach. At regional and sub-regional level, however, this
superiority is challenged by several factors. These include the extensive military rearmament of China and Russia, other actors' adaptation of their tactical behaviour and the spread of technology to both states and non-state actors. The 2018 National Defence Strategy states that the United States’ military advantage has decreased in recent years, which has resulted in a need for the United States to strengthen its defence capabilities. The focus is on restructuring the armed forces in order to be able to defeat a qualified opponent. Readiness and availability as well as the possibility of simultaneously deploying larger units have been prioritised. A key factor in this transition is also to achieve a capacity for continuous renewal where new technology, often developed in the civil sector, is translated into new military capabilities to meet the advanced technology of future adversaries in higher levels of conflict.

The American development of military technology continues to trend towards long range strike capabilities. The ability to operate with precision at long distances and on territory controlled by adversaries, including the use of unmanned weapons systems, remains important in American military strategy. America's nuclear arsenal has a relatively high average age and is undergoing modernisation. The 2018 American Nuclear Posture Review states an increased level of ambition to meet Russian capabilities in sub-strategic nuclear weapons, thereby remedying assessed deficiencies in American deterrence. The intention in the short term is to address this with low-yield warheads on submarine-based strategic missiles, and in the longer term through the development of submarine and aircraft-based nucleararmed cruise missiles. These measures are a continuation of the modernisation of nuclear weapons that began in the 2010s. The 2019 Missile Defense Review notes that the missile threat has increased and become more complex since the previous review nine years ago. The American missile defence system aims to protect the American homeland and defend allies and partners from regional missile threats. These are assessed to emanate mainly from Iran, North Korea, Russia and China. The review proposes, among other things, strengthening existing capabilities and developing new technologies, including space-based sensors. The space arena has been a separate defence command since 2019.

Canada

Canada's defence policy changed in 2017 and resulted in a major strengthening of the defence budget. According to announced plans, spending will be increased by about 70 per cent from 2016-2017 to 2026-
2027. Canada needs to replace large parts of its defence materiel. The investments needed include more than 20 new ships for the navy, 88 combat aircraft for the air force and new artillery, new combat vehicles and new anti-aircraft capabilities for the army. Investments are also being made in capabilities to enable operations in the Arctic. The new defence policy highlights priority for international efforts, NATO cooperation and bilateral engagements. Canada's most important partner countries are the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Canada is in many ways committed to Europe's security, not least through NATO membership, but also through contributions to EU civil crisis management operations. As part of NATO's enhanced forward presence (EFP), Canada has command responsibility for the battle group in Latvia. Canada initiated aid to Ukraine at an early stage following Russia's unlawful annexation of Crimea. The support is both comprehensive and long-term, including through the bilateral operation Unifier, launched in 2015. Several other countries, including Sweden, are participating in the operation.

5.1.5 The Middle East

Over the past decade, the Middle East has undergone a series of upheavals that have resulted in a deterioration of the security situation and made future developments difficult to assess. The hopes of the Arab Spring for greater freedom, equality and democracy have not been fulfilled. Instead, repression has increased in many countries, ethnic and religious conflicts have intensified, and geopolitical rivalries have deepened. As a result of civil wars, internal divisions or external interventions, several states in the region have weakened or completely collapsed.

The events of the last decade have brought about changes in the balance of power in the Middle East. American engagement has gradually declined and become less predictable. The rivalry between regional players such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey has increased, while Russia and China have gained more influence. China's and to a lesser extent India's economic interests in the Middle East are growing. The countries' dependence on energy from the Middle East may have an impact on alliances and strategic cooperation in the region in the longer term. The heightened tension between the United States and Iran has contributed to increasing tensions in the region. The situation escalated in early 2020 after the attack on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard leader Soleimani. The EU has sought to allay tensions and help maintain the JCPOA. The growing rivalry within the Middle East has also had serious consequences. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have intervened militarily in
several conflicts in the region, which has led to military rearmament, not least in the Gulf states. Political and economic pressure has had negative consequences for the stability of, for example, Lebanon, while the involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia exacerbated the armed conflicts in Syria and Yemen. The conflict in Yemen has fuelled sectarian violence and led to the strengthening of al-Qaeda and Daesh. The war in Syria has been going on since 2011, claiming hundreds of thousands of lives and forcing more than 13 million people to flee. The Russian military intervention since 2015 has played a decisive role in turning the development of the armed conflict in favour of the Assad regime. The regime is on the verge of consolidating territorial control of the country by military means. However, the regime's reluctance to reach a long-term political solution to the conflict, combined with its increased repression and abuse of the population, risks making the conditions for sustainable peace in Syria more difficult. The instability in the country can be expected to persist for the foreseeable future. Russia's role in Syria remains extensive, including militarily.

In Iraq, levels of violence have decreased since Daesh was pushed back. However, the security situation remains fragile and the risk of new conflicts remains. The development of the relationship between Kurdish rule in the north and the central government in Baghdad is important for Iraq's future stability. Following the escalation in early 2020, the risks of further destabilisation of Iraq have increased. Internal divisions and the influence of external actors are crucial to developments. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to pose a major security policy challenge with potentially widespread regional repercussions.

5.1.6 Asia

China

China's rapid development and strengthened role is the overriding change in the regional security dynamics of Asia. It is also one of the most significant changes on a global scale in recent decades. China seeks to gain international influence in a way that reflects its strengthened position of power, which affects the existing international order.

China is effectively a one-party state without general and free elections. Political opposition is not permitted, and human rights are restricted. Domestically, China has moved in an increasingly authoritarian direction. The central role of the party is being emphasised and the repression of dissidents and of certain ethnic groups, such as the Uighurs, has worsened.
The judiciary is not independent, and the party is expanding its control over all sections of society. The Chinese state is increasingly using electronic surveillance and advanced technology as a means of monitoring and control.

**Economy**

China is the world's largest trading nation, the world's leading oil importer and the world's third largest economy after the United States and the EU. It is Sweden's largest trading partner in Asia and one of the ten states that Sweden trades most with globally. The Chinese economy is undergoing a shift from export-driven growth to a focus on domestic consumption. Continued economic growth is a prerequisite for many of the goals set by the communist party. A sharper economic slowdown would be expected to result in major consequences, both for China and for the world economy. China is a major power in research, development, innovation and high technology. In some high-tech areas, such as e-commerce and telecommunications, Chinese companies are world leaders. In order to gain access to markets, technologies and brands abroad, Chinese companies are increasing their foreign investments more than any other actor. This has made China the world’s second largest source of direct foreign investment after the United States. The new Silk Road, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was launched in 2013 with the stated main objective of expanding infrastructure in China and abroad. The BRI has become a central element of Chinese foreign policy.

**Military development**

China is a rapidly growing military power and is increasingly influencing global military developments. Over the past ten years, China’s defence spending has grown fastest of all the major countries of the world. Today, only the United States spends more on defence than China. For five years now, a reform of China's armed forces has been ongoing. In individual areas, China already has a leading technological capability. However, the lack of operational experience means that China's overall military capability is difficult to assess. In the South China Sea in particular, the country has shown both interest and readiness to carry out military operations, through the deployment of military installations on islands and reefs in the area, including artificial ones.

China is developing its defence capabilities in all arenas to increase its capacity to carry out operations far beyond its vicinity, including through the acquisition of aircraft carriers and long-range missile systems. Armament is
especially marked within the navy, and China has the goal of having four operational aircraft carrier groups by 2035. The Chinese air force is undergoing rapid modernisation and the Chinese missile troops have extensive access to advanced missile systems with different ranges. The capability of China's strategic and sub-strategic nuclear arsenal is difficult to assess. Qualitative Chinese nuclear capability increases consist, above all, in the development of a strategic submarine fleet and technology that enables multi-warhead missiles that can be aimed at different targets. Cyber and space are other priority areas for development.

China has both the economic capacity and the political will to increase investment in defence in the foreseeable future, even if its economic growth were to slow further. China has thus in a short time developed a military capability that can challenge all actors including the United States in East and Southeast Asia.

China's defence and security policy cooperation is limited to bilateral and multilateral partnerships such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and defence cooperation with Russia and Pakistan. China is not part of any alliances and has not entered into binding defence guarantees with any other countries. China has gradually increased its military contribution to UN-led peacekeeping operations, which increases military contact with other countries.

**Foreign policy and trade policy**

China's claims in the South China Sea clash with the claims of neighbouring countries and the security interests of the United States. These disputes mainly exist between China and the Philippines and China and Vietnam, but Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei also make certain claims in the South China Sea. These countries base their claims on the rules of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), according to which a coastal state has the right to establish an economic zone of up to 200 nautical miles. The Philippines has initiated legal action against China regarding China's claims to historical rights in the area and Chinese actions. In 2016, an arbitration tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea reached a ruling that contradicted Chinese claims. Several incidents have occurred over the years between Chinese vessels, including coast guard vessels, and Vietnamese and Philippine fishing vessels in the area. In the East China Sea, China is also challenging Japan's control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu archipelago. There are also territorial disputes with India. At the same time, other major Asian countries, including India, Japan,
Indonesia, Australia and South Korea, must consider the fact that China is their largest trading partner.

Relations between Russia and China have strengthened outwardly in recent years. The countries are increasingly behaving in a coordinated manner in the UN and other international contexts. In the military field, cooperation is already extensive, in terms of both military industry and joint exercises. In the summer of 2017, China participated for the first time in a military exercise in the Baltic Sea, through an exercise with the Russian navy, and in autumn 2018, Chinese troops participated for the first time in an exercise on Russian soil. However, underlying imbalances between the countries mean that questions can be raised as to how close and trusting Russian-Chinese cooperation is actually in a position to become.

China's increasing global ambitions are also being expressed in the Arctic, and the approach to strengthening its presence follows the pattern in other parts of the world. The military dimension of China's actions in the region is limited thus far, but China is gradually building up naval forces with a global reach, including submarines.

The EU is China's largest trading partner. In practice, however, China focuses on bilateral relations, especially with the larger countries. A number of EU member states and non-EU countries are included in the so-called 17+1 cooperation with China. The Government, like the Defence Commission, stresses the importance of the EU being united in its relations with China, based on the EU strategy of 2016 (written communication from the Government 2019/20:18, committee report 2019/20:UU4, written communication from the Riksdag 2019/20:118). Chinese investment in sensitive strategic areas is increasingly being questioned and some EU countries have stopped investments from China for security reasons. Awareness has been raised in Europe about China's use of advocacy methods abroad, as well as Chinese intelligence gathering, including through hacking. Under China's intelligence law, all Chinese citizens, organisations and companies must cooperate with the intelligence services. The far-reaching civil-military integration, known in China as civil military fusion, means that private Chinese companies must share their technology with the country's armed forces.

Other issues related to technological development include, for example, fifth generation mobile networks (5G). China provides extensive state support for
research and development, as well as standardisation development. While the state provides export subsidies to domestic suppliers, access to the Chinese market for foreign companies is restricted. This raises concerns that operators around the world will ultimately have few alternatives to using Chinese-made infrastructure. There are concerns that the Chinese intelligence services may use this infrastructure and other technologies for intelligence gathering. In order to manage the risks, Australia, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden and the United States have taken specific measures to protect their 5G networks. Similarly, investment protection mechanisms and stricter rules for procurement and the export of sensitive technologies are being prepared and introduced in many places. There is therefore a risk that geopolitical developments will also have consequences in, for example, trade policy.

Developments in other parts of Asia

Security policy developments in Asia are very much dependent on the development of relations between a number of key actors. Of particular importance are relations between China and the United States and its allies, as well as between China and India. India sees itself as a great power with GDP growth that is expected to remain the fastest among the world's major economies in the years to come. All in all, India's growing role in the global system and the development of relations with the United States, China and Russia will affect security policy developments not only in Asia but also globally.

India is implementing an ambitious defence modernisation. The country has the world's fourth largest defence budget and is the world's largest importer of defence materiel. A large proportion of this is imported from Russia. In view of China's investment in an ocean-going fleet, with a potential significant military presence in the Indian Ocean, India is prioritising its naval capabilities. India is also developing its defence capabilities in space and in the air. All in all, this increases the country's capabilities for action far beyond its immediate region. Relations between India and Pakistan have long been poor. Since both states have nuclear weapons, a full-scale armed confrontation could have disastrous consequences, both in Asia and globally.

Pakistan's domestic political development has a significant impact on stability in the region, in particular through relations with the neighbouring countries Afghanistan and India. The country has a long-standing close relationship with China, which has recently shown a renewed strategic interest in Pakistan, including in the field of defence. Pakistan and the
United States’ military cooperation remains significant, although the American administration has frozen part of the military support, calling for stronger action against militant groups.

Japan plays a key role in the balance of power in Asia. Japan is one of the world's largest economies, a neighbour of China and a close ally of the United States. The cornerstone of Japan's security and defence policy is the bilateral security agreement with the United States, the main content of which is a defence guarantee covering all territories administered by Japan. The alliance with Japan is crucial to the United States’ military presence in the region. Japan's defence and security policy is changing. The main driving force behind this is what Japan perceives as an increasingly uncertain security policy situation in the region. Japan considers North Korea to be its main immediate security challenge, while Japan sees China as the main challenge in the longer term. Relations between Japan and China continue to be strained, both for historical reasons and because of China's actions and territorial claims. Japan seeks to improve relations with Russia, partly in order to resolve the conflict over the northern territories.

The long-standing tensions over the divided Korean peninsula continue. Security policy developments revolve around North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The country is believed to be capable of possessing long-range ballistic missiles that pose a direct threat not only to neighbouring countries such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the American mainland. The alliance with South Korea is important for the United States’ military presence in the region. South East Asia is a central arena for the major powers and their interests as well as for other, smaller actors in the region. China's disputed claims in the South China Sea and its growing economic and political influence are key challenges. The ASEAN countries' ability to act jointly is hampered by the fact that some of them have very close ties to China. In recent decades, defence spending has increased sharply in the region. The uncertainty surrounding the long-term political commitment and military presence of the United States is a factor that countries take into account in their decision-making, including in relation to China. The Philippines' rapprochement with China has raised questions about the alliance with the United States.

The conflict in Afghanistan has hit the country hard and has also affected its neighbours. The international military presence in Afghanistan currently consists of a NATO-led training and advisory mission, the Resolute Support
Mission (RSM), as well as a bilateral American operation known as Operation Freedom's Sentinel.

Afghanistan has been the largest recipient country for Swedish aid since 2013. Sweden has made a political commitment to contribute SEK 8-8.5 billion in development cooperation during 2014-2024. The focus of the aid is on democracy, human rights and gender equality, as well as on education and economic development.

Between 2002 and 2014, Sweden contributed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which helped the Afghan government maintain security in the country. Since 2015, Sweden has been contributing to NATO's training and advisory mission Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

In an agreement between the United States and the Taliban movement in February 2020, the United States stated that it would gradually reduce the foreign military presence. This also has consequences for Sweden. Intra-Afghan peace negotiations began in September 2020.

5.1.7 Africa

North Africa is characterised by internal political conflicts and tensions between countries. The exception is Tunisia, where developments are moving in a more positive, democratic direction. Since the Arab Spring, the region has been hit by increasing cross-border crime, violent extremism and terrorism. The conflict in Libya and developments in the country will continue to have an impact on the stability of the region. Ethnic, regional and religious groups aspire to power and the country is characterised by violent political conflict. The security situation in Egypt is characterised by an ever-present threat from terrorist groups, while the Government's actions are increasingly curtailing the space for its own population and civil society. Algeria and Morocco play important roles in the international fight against violent extremism, while the countries' differences over Western Sahara affect regional stability and cooperation. China is an increasingly active player in a number of African countries. Russia is also strengthening its presence in the countries of North Africa, not least in Libya, where Turkey's influence has also increased. The EU has called for an end to all foreign interference in the conflict in Libya.

The security situation in the Sahel remains very worrying, especially the situation in Mali and Burkina Faso. Several of the countries in the region are among the poorest and most vulnerable in the world. A military coup took
place in Mali in August 2020. However, it is too early to assess the longer-term implications for the security situation in Mali and the region. The region is characterised by weak states, humanitarian crises, inequality and unemployment. The situation is a breeding ground for radicalisation, violent extremism and organised crime, which is exploited by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Daesh and Boko Haram. Climate change is exacerbating the security situation in the Sahel, including in the Lake Chad region. Intensified proliferation of weapons and the movement of jihadist and rebel groups are occurring between the regions. Migrants travel through the Sahel towards Libya, Algeria and Morocco on their way to Europe. Instability in Mali, Burkina Faso and northern Nigeria has spillover effects and affects the security situation in the region and in Europe.

The Horn of Africa continues to be marked by a number of unresolved and interconnected conflicts. The Al-Shabaab terrorist group continues to pose a significant security threat in Somalia and also performs complex attacks in neighbouring countries, notably Kenya. The geopolitical situation of the region brings about a large external presence and influence, particularly from the Gulf.

The EU's security-related interests have become increasingly linked to Africa, directly or indirectly. The EU has a number of civilian and military crisis management operations in the Maghreb, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In 2018, the EU launched a new partnership with Africa with a focus on sustainable investment and employment and in 2020 a new EU-Africa strategy will be developed covering a range of policy areas. In 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the EU and the African Union (AU) to support long-term cooperation between the parties in the field of peace and security.

5.1.8 International organisations

The EU

The importance of the EU's common foreign and security policy, which aims to protect the interests of the member states globally, is increasing in an international situation in which the rules-based international order is called into question. In recent years, a number of steps have been taken to deepen the EU's foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, with a view to strengthening the EU member states’ military and civilian capabilities and ability to act. The entry into force of Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union and the solidarity clause in Article 222 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union mean that the member states take joint responsibility for Europe’s security in a spirit of solidarity. The Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy adopted in 2016 sets out a vision for joint action with the aim of strengthening the EU as a global foreign and security policy actor and ensuring Europe's security. Both defence cooperation and cooperation on civilian crisis management are in an implementation phase.

Matters of national security and defence are fundamentally the responsibility of each member state, as stated in Article 4.2 of the EU Treaty. This does not prevent member states from, in various ways, developing cooperation in the field of security and defence within the EU.

Established in December 2017, the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) provides a legal framework for cooperation in the field of defence, based on the EU Treaty. Sweden, as well as a further 24 of the EU's 27 Member States, participates in PESCO. These States have agreed to establish and participate in joint projects on a voluntary basis. The states have also made a number of binding commitments to improve the military capabilities of the participating states. Commitments within PESCO shall be implemented over time and the states shall annually report on the work of living up to these in a so-called National Implementation Plan. In 2017, the European Commission presented the European Defence Fund (EDF) to support defence research and development.

Another defence initiative that has been established is the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which is a compilation of information on member states' defence efforts. In 2017, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was also established, to improve strategic level planning and conduct of EU military training missions, as well as to contribute to increased civil-military cooperation. Work is under way on a new structure for financing security instruments outside the EU budget, the European Peace Facility (EPF). In recent years, the EU has also stepped up its work on military mobility. The new Commission has also set up a Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space.

In order to improve EU-NATO cooperation, the organisations signed a joint declaration on enhanced cooperation in 2016. At the NATO Summit in July 2018, a new joint declaration was signed focusing on seven concrete areas for cooperation including hybrid and cyber threats. EU cooperation is
also being developed in the civilian field, for example through the European Pact for Civilian Crisis Management, developed under Swedish leadership.

The EU has recently pursued the issues of climate and defence with renewed commitment. During the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, the EU has so far maintained its presence in mission areas and areas of operation, albeit with a reduced presence to ensure the health of its personnel. Much of the discussions in the field of defence have touched on the importance of countering actors’ attempts to use the pandemic to promote their agenda through disinformation, propaganda, and other hybrid threats. In this context, the importance of EU-NATO cooperation has been especially highlighted.

The EU member states have agreed on a common Russia policy. The EU's response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine includes, among other things, economic sanctions against Russia, entry bans and frozen assets for a range of natural and legal persons, and a non-recognition policy regarding the unlawful annexation of Crimea.

The United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020 has implications for the EU's common security and defence policy, as the United Kingdom's military capabilities are of great importance to the EU. However, the United Kingdom has officially stated that its commitments to European security remain firm, not least through its NATO membership.

**The UN**

The UN has the central role in the multilateral rules-based international order. The UN Security Council has been given the main responsibility by the member states for the maintenance of international peace and security. The permanent members’ right of veto creates challenges for the UN to act in accordance with its mission. The UN's peacebuilding efforts are an important instrument, the multidimensional nature of which, with both military and civilian components, contributes to guiding countries from conflict to sustainable peace. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the UN has been working extensively to strengthen its capacity to lead and implement peacekeeping military operations. The Secretary General's decisions on reforms involve a series of initiatives on, among other things, functionality, leadership, capacity development, mandate formulation, security and effective transitions to other peacebuilding activities. The aim is to adapt UN peacekeeping activities to today's conflict environments, to provide effective
protection of civilians and to create the conditions for political solutions and long-term peacebuilding.

**NATO**

NATO collectively maintains security guarantees within the alliance and is the clearest manifestation of the transatlantic link. A state's right to individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack constitutes a fundamental principle of international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter. This principle is the starting point for the defence commitments laid down in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Since 2014, NATO has taken steps to improve the ability to rapidly conduct operations under Article 5 and strengthened the military presence, mainly in the territories of the eastern members. NATO has established, among other things, a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), in the form of a multinational brigade.

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) was decided on, which involves the grouping of four multinational battle groups on a rotating basis in the Baltic countries and Poland. In addition to the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States, which each have overall responsibility for a battle group and its primary support units, other NATO members also contribute special functions. NATO members have also agreed to strengthen society's resilience in a number of areas, such as food supply, energy supply and transport. This is also an important starting point in strengthening crisis preparedness and civil defence at national level. The NATO Summit in Brussels in 2018 decided, among other things, on the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI). NRI is an initiative to increase NATO's readiness. The objective is for NATO to have 30 army battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat ships ready for operation within 30 days or less by 2020.

In parallel with the increased presence in the eastern member states, NATO is strengthening its role in counter-terrorism and promoting security and stability in the south, including in the Black Sea region and in the Mediterranean area.

Within NATO, civil preparedness work has been a support for military operations in wartime, but also in the case of natural disasters and major accidents. However, building resilience is essentially a national responsibility. During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, NATO has so far focused on
maintaining its own defence and deterrence capabilities and monitoring possible security policy implications. However, the Alliance has contributed coordination of logistics and transport.

NATO was enlarged for the eighth time when North Macedonia joined the alliance in 2020.

As a result of Russian action, the importance of the alliance's nuclear dimension has increased again. Within the framework of NATO's joint responsibility for nuclear capability, the United States intends to update the present armament. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has decommissioned all nuclear weapons systems except the strategic submarine fleet and thus lacks nuclear capabilities outside the strategic deterrence. In addition to strategic submarines, France also has nuclear-armed airborne cruise missiles.

OSCE

The OSCE is the world's largest regional security organisation with 57 participating states in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and North America. The OSCE works to promote security and stability in the region based on a broadly defined approach to security that covers military arms control as well as human rights, the rule of law and democracy. For some time now, however, the OSCE's basic principles and security concepts have been threatened and challenged, mainly by Russia’s actions. In addition, human rights and democracy, which are a foundation for the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept, are increasingly being called into question. Despite the strongly opposing views, since 2014 the OSCE has played a central role in monitoring developments in Ukraine through the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), which plays an important role in informing the organisation about the situation regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, thereby contributing to accountability. The OSCE also plays a key role in managing the confidence- and security-building measures of the European security architecture. The modernisation of the Vienna Document, the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) are key issues for the OSCE to address in this area. The United States’ decision to leave the Open Skies Treaty is a cause for concern.
### 5.1.9 Sweden's strategic military position

**The Government's assessment:** Sweden and its neighbourhood are part of a strategic military setting. An operation area may cover large parts of northern Europe and adjacent sea areas. Sweden will inevitably be affected if an armed conflict or war arises in Sweden's neighbourhood. In such a situation, an armed attack against Sweden cannot be ruled out. The purpose of such an attack could be to occupy part of Swedish territory for military purposes or to deny other parties access to Swedish territory.

A major conflict could start with an attack on Sweden. An attack may also aim to prevent Sweden from directly or indirectly assisting another party in the conflict. Sweden does not in itself therefore have to be the main target of the aggressor.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** The Government outlined in the bill Defence Policy Direction – Sweden's Defence 2016-2020 (Government bill 2014/15:109) points of departure regarding Sweden's strategic military position. The Government stressed, among other things, that, in addition to political, economic and other means, military force remains a regularly used instrument for states and other actors to achieve their objectives. For virtually all the states of the world, the maintenance of their own military forces is a core task and a means of safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity including in peacetime. Military force is often used in combination with other means to influence the opponent in the ways deemed necessary. In addition to the direct result, the display of military capabilities or the threat of military violence has signal effects. In essence, the Government believes that what was stated in the bill is still valid.

The Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8) notes that the strategic military situation depends on the ability and will of the major powers and our neighbouring countries in combination with conditions of military geography. The Defence Commission assesses that the situation has deteriorated in recent years, partly as a result of political developments in Russia and because Russian military capabilities have increased. Russia already has a great military capability compared to its neighbouring countries. In absolute terms, Russian military capabilities are expected to continue to increase over the next ten years. Russia’s undermining of the European security order continues. The Government shares this assessment.
At the same time, the United States has stressed the importance of European NATO members increasing their own defence efforts and complying to a greater extent with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty on member states' responsibility for their own defence and its funding. As the security situation has deteriorated, efforts of most European NATO members have also increased, with progressively improved capabilities as a result. American presence, which was withdrawn in the early 2010s, has been re-established or regularly performed in Europe on a rotational basis since 2015. Military exercise activities have increased, including at higher unit levels. For example, some heavy materiel has started to be stored on site again, as the transport of such equipment is particularly demanding and takes a long time to complete. All in all, however, the Defence Commission judges that Russia's relative military strength advantage in Sweden’s neighbourhood will remain over the next few years.

Furthermore, the Defence Commission points out that developments so far do not seem to have resulted in a corresponding capability reinforcement in the West. Despite the efforts initiated, the armed forces of European NATO members rely heavily on American resources to be able to act in a high-level conflict. The defence of the Baltic states lacks operational depth on land and the ability to perform or to protect reinforcement operations to the Baltic Sea region would be of great importance in the event of a conflict in Sweden's neighbourhood. To the extent that American units are not present in Europe, for logistical and geographical reasons, reinforcement with use of airborne forces would normally be most rapid, followed by naval forces, with army forces taking the longest amount of time.

If the North Atlantic sea routes between North America and Europe are disrupted or closed, the possibility for the United States and NATO to defend the eastern and northern member states, including the Baltic states, will be considerably hampered. It would also be difficult if United States and NATO bases and staging areas in the Nordic countries were to be occupied or otherwise neutralised. Sweden will, as the Defence Commission notes, inevitably be affected if a security crisis or armed conflict occurs in its neighbourhood.

Sweden and its neighbourhood are part of a strategic military setting. An area of operations may cover large parts of northern Europe and adjacent sea areas. In the event of a major conflict, it cannot be excluded that Sweden would also be attacked. The purpose of such an attack could be to occupy part of Swedish territory for military purposes and to deny other parties
access to Swedish territory. Geographical areas of military importance could be occupied for the deployment of long-range weapons systems. Areas could also be occupied to prevent retaliation by third parties and to break our resilience. As far as the resources of the American armed forces are concerned, these are largely intended for, and may need to be used in, geographical locations other than Europe.

As regards geographical areas of particular relevance, the Defence Commission notes that the Stockholm area, Gotland, south-eastern Sweden, the Öresund region, the West Coast with Gothenburg, western Svealand and parts of Jämtland and Norrbotten Counties are strategically important for the defence of Sweden in the event of a crisis or war. Other places could also be important as basing and concentration areas etc. for the Swedish Armed Forces' combat units. The Defence Commission also recalls that the protection of the country's leaders is crucial for the defence of Sweden as well as the ability to maintain links to the west. The Government shares the Defence Commission's view.

As mentioned above, the purpose of an armed attack on Sweden may be for the attacker to use Swedish territory for its own military purposes or to deny another state access to Swedish territory. A major conflict could start with an attack on Sweden. An attack may also aim to prevent Sweden from directly or indirectly assisting another party in the conflict. Sweden does not in itself have to be the main target of the aggressor.

An armed attack on Sweden may begin with an initial strike on base areas, command nodes and other critical civilian and military infrastructure. An initial strike could be carried out with cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, attack aircraft and network attacks, as well as through sabotage and the liquidation of key personnel. Advocacy operations to disrupt the ability to make decisions and the willingness to defend will be part of warfare. In direct connection with an initial strike, important areas could be occupied for the deployment of long-range weapons systems. Areas could also be occupied to prevent retaliation by third parties and to break our resilience. Surprise and misdirection can be expected to be an important part of the operation. If Sweden is attacked, parts of the Swedish territory will suffer from intensive combat activities with major consequences locally and regionally.
5.1.10 Thematic security issues

**Hybrid threats**

For some years now, attention has been focused on how different means, in peace, in heightened alert and ultimately war, can be used to deliberately disrupt the functionality of societies or influence public opinion, decision-makers and democratic processes. These means are characterised by the fact that there is usually no unambiguously identifiable responsible state actor. The degree of antagonistic influence may be different from what is commonly associated with regular state-led military activity. Although military means can be used selectively, by proxy, concealed or with deniability, the means referred to are often such that they are also components of normal civilian activities in society. Digitalisation, centralisation and technological dependencies bring vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an antagonist. Nor need it be obvious that events, such as disinformation, damage to infrastructure, supply disruptions or gradual changes in any respect, constitute antagonistic acts. External information campaigns and influence operations can be difficult to separate from legitimate domestic formation of opinion. Overall, it can be difficult to determine separate events from coordinated actions in a short-term or longer-term perspective. This may complicate and delay necessary decision-making and countermeasures. This capacity needs to be developed in order to maintain freedom of action and take the right action at the right time. It is facilitated by clear decision-making paths to enable early decisions on raising readiness or other countermeasures.

In the event of a security crisis, conflict or war in Sweden's neighbourhood, Sweden may be exposed to a combination of different means of power where military operations are also a component. Hybrid threats and non-linear warfare are examples of two concepts that exist to describe the use of various means by states or state-sponsored actors to deliberately disrupt the functionality of society or influence opinion, decision-makers and democratic processes. The concept of non-linear warfare is a component of Russian military thinking and action. Russia's systematic dissemination of disinformation and influence operations form part of Russian doctrine development in this area. The Defence Commission notes that the uncertainty that can arise in the borderland between peace and war is often referred to as a grey-zone problem. In international cooperation, the term hybrid threat is often used. None of the terms and concepts mentioned above has a uniform definition. In this bill, the Government uses the term hybrid threat. Using the means at disposal in the most effective way is
something that some states or non-state actors do to achieve certain purposes and to avoid an escalation into an armed conflict. This approach has been used for a long time. What characterises our era is the emergence of new applications and increased vulnerabilities created by social and technological development, as well as the ability and readiness of some states to use antagonistic means of influence in a coordinated manner. Western democratic societies with free formation of opinion and open economies have specific characteristics that an antagonistic counterpart can use to its advantage.

Various methods of influencing a state's actions or interfering with its functions can be used in peacetime conditions, in wartime and also as deliberate steps in an escalating use of force. By knowing a country's legislation, government structure, flaws and weaknesses in organisation etc., an antagonistic actor can create both greater room for manoeuvre and more time to strengthen its own position. At the same time, the uncertainty about what is actually happening diminishes the ability to act of the defender. The attacker can choose to act quickly, for example to mislead and tie up resources, or slowly to avoid detection.

As the Defence Commission notes, Sweden faces a multifaceted pattern of threats. Antagonistic measures and attacks are being carried out against Sweden. The threats are mainly aimed at civil functions in society and politics and must primarily be dealt with in the ordinary activities of civilian agencies, including the Police Authority, the Security Service, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the Coast Guard and the Customs Service, as well as in international foreign and security policy cooperation. This sets clear requirements that these agencies can identify and address state-sponsored antagonistic threats in peacetime. The ability to identify and deal with this type of threat needs to be improved within different agencies and in the emergency response system as a whole. The emergency response system also provides an important basis for being able to handle crises or major events. The Swedish Armed Forces' support for the civilian authorities in this work is important. If the Government decides to increase readiness, additional rules will come into force and a number of actors, including the Swedish Armed Forces, will be given extended mandates.

Agencies and certain other actors need to take preventive measures to reduce vulnerabilities and protect their activities. For example, it is important that functions of importance for Sweden's security strengthen their protective security. Knowledge of existing rules needs to be disseminated,
tasks in total defence and society's emergency readiness needs to be practised and the ability to see things from the opponent's perspective is required. Cooperation between the security and intelligence services is central both in peacetime and during heightened alert.

Because hybrid threats are of a cross-border nature, a number of international initiatives have been taken to address the problem and act together. Cooperation to identify, prevent and respond to hybrid threats has intensified in both the EU and NATO, as well as in the cooperation between the two organisations. Since the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the EU has taken a series of measures to develop the ability to understand, analyse and detect and respond to hybrid threats, including through strengthened resilience. A joint framework on countering hybrid threats with 22 action points was adopted in 2016 and has been followed up with, among other things, a diplomatic toolbox and a thematic sanctions regime for cyber threats as well as a action plan against disinformation. A European Centre of Excellence has been established in Helsinki. In 2015, NATO developed a strategy to respond to hybrid threats based on the three pillars to be prepared, to deter and to defend. NATO's toolbox against hybrid threats continues to evolve and in 2018 counter-hybrid support teams were established which, at the request of an allied country, can support the country in preventing and responding to hybrid threats.

**Cybersecurity threats**

Sweden's security and economic prosperity rest increasingly on digital foundations. Digitalisation in Sweden and our vicinity affects both military and civilian activities within and outside total defence. Technological developments, the expansion of digital solutions and increased volumes of data create great opportunities, but also risks and vulnerabilities for agencies and for society as a whole. Vulnerabilities range from electronic communications, shipping and aviation to electricity grids, industrial control systems and in the financial system. The data generated also entails vulnerabilities as well as opportunities. Many of the systems that are critical to maintaining the functionality of society are already vulnerable to disruption in peacetime.

There are constant intrusion attempts against systems connected to the internet. The number of state-sponsored cyber attacks is constantly increasing and the attackers' methods are evolving. The most qualified antagonistic threats in the cyber domain are primarily cyber attacks by state or state-sponsored actors, but they may also be other actors with similar
abilities. Many states have built up considerable resources to be able to operate aggressively through cyber attacks. In addition to developing advanced methods and offensive tools, these states have created the ability to strike many different targets and to maintain endurance over time. The purpose of a cyber operation may be, for example, to find information about a country's defence capabilities or standpoints before a negotiation. It may also be to steal patents, research results or industrial secrets or to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure. The most qualified actors will always target the weakest links in our interconnected systems and therefore the entire threat scale in the cybersecurity field needs to be taken into account from a total defence perspective.

The effects of an antagonistic cyber attack can have as much impact on socially important functions and critical IT systems as a conventional armed attack. A cyber attack may, before or during a conflict or part of one, complement political, diplomatic, economic or military means. Such attacks may threaten the freedom of action of a state and ultimately its sovereignty.

There are different views on the role of states and the right to monitor, restrict and control infrastructure and information flows, such as access to the open internet. On the other hand, the EU, including Sweden, and the United States and others believe that existing international regulations are sufficient but that these are not fully respected and applied.

Work has been going on in the UN for several years in the field of cyber security on, among other things, standards for responsible behaviour and the application of international law (UN Group of Governmental Experts) with a focus on how to deal with threats in cyberspace. Disagreements in the group, mainly between the United States and other Western countries and Russia, China and Cuba, have made the group's future role uncertain. There is considerable disagreement over several issues including the right to self-defence in cyberspace, including countermeasures. There is thus uncertainty about the way forward in a situation where the number of cyber operations targeting states and other actors is increasing. The EU has developed a common diplomatic toolbox to respond to cyber attacks, including public identification and a special sanctions regime. NATO has, among other things, adopted a joint pledge (the Cyber Defence Pledge). Accountability and joint public identification of perpetrators after cyber attacks have become more common.
**Weapons of mass destruction**

The diminished respect for international norms and agreements in recent years has manifested itself, among other things, in the field of weapons of mass destruction. Developments in the field of nuclear weapons have received increasing attention in recent years and have led to increasing concern. This is due to the substantial investments made by Russia, and also by other nuclear weapons states, to develop and modernise the arsenals, and to Russia's use of its nuclear arsenal to send security policy signals.

The deterioration of the security situation has a negative impact on the conditions for global disarmament and non-proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) only allows the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia to possess nuclear weapons, while committing them to negotiate on disarmament. The other parties that have acceded to the treaty are non-nuclear states with a commitment to remain so. India, Pakistan and Israel have never signed the agreement and North Korea is considered to have withdrawn. The NPT is the most important arena for multilateral disarmament diplomacy and it is within the framework of the NPT that the nuclear states have made disarmament commitments.

Through its nuclear safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a central part of the global non-proliferation regime. The Additional Protocol is essential for the IAEA's ability to assess whether a country's nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful. New START from 2011, which regulates the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia, is being complied with until further notice. The agreement expires in 2021 but can be extended until 2026. However, no such decision has yet been taken. A strong American desire is that China should also be involved in nuclear arms control. On the Chinese side, however, such proposals have so far been completely rejected. A situation without agreement would mean a lack of any kind of mutual inspection mechanism between the United States and Russia. The situation is also made more difficult by the collapse of the agreement to abolish ground-based medium-range missiles (the INF agreement) following Russian violations of the agreement and subsequent American and Russian suspension. This is a development that has a direct impact on the security situation in Sweden's neighbourhood.

North Korea has for many years purposefully developed its nuclear weapons programme despite international pressure and sanctions. North Korea has recently been judged to be in possession of long-range ballistic missiles capable of being armed with nuclear weapons. These pose a direct threat not
only to surrounding countries such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the American mainland. North Korea has repeatedly conducted test explosions and missile launches and there are indications that it is continuing to develop its nuclear weapons programme in other ways. As far as Iran is concerned, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) aims to address the country's possible nuclear ambitions. However, developments since 2018, when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, threaten the future of the agreement. Iran has repeatedly departed from the nuclear sections of the JCPOA, including by exceeding restrictions on stocks of low enriched uranium and heavy water, the permissible level of enrichment and research and development. At the same time, the American decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions on Iran has worsened relations between the states. This affects security globally and poses a threat to Europe's security.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons, which entered into force in 1975, prohibits the development, acquisition, possession and use of this type of weapon. However, the convention is weakened by the lack of a functioning mechanism for verifying that a state party is complying with its provisions. Despite the development of biological weapons programmes between 1940 and 1960 and the extensive Soviet biological weapons programme from 1970 to 1990, biological weapons, unlike chemical weapons, have not been used since the Second World War. On the other hand, biological substances have been used occasionally by non-state actors. In view of the deterioration of the international situation and the growing importance of weapons of mass destruction, the defence and maintenance of international rules-based frameworks, regulations and principles relating to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control are becoming more important.

Respect for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons has also deteriorated. Chemical weapons have been repeatedly used, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since its entry into force in 1997, this convention has helped to reduce the number of declared military chemical weapons programmes. Extensive chemical weapons stockpiles, industrial infrastructure and research capacities for the development and production of chemical weapons, such as nerve gases, have been destroyed or converted for civilian purposes. Nevertheless, the use of chemical weapons such as nerve agents and mustard gas as well as industrial chemicals such as chlorine gas has been verified in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The attempted murder of a former Russian intelligence officer in Salisbury in the
United Kingdom in March 2018, which was carried out with a neurotoxin of a type developed in the Soviet Union and caused a death among the public, is another example of the use of chemical weapons. Another is the poisoning of the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny in August 2020, which was carried out with the same type of neurotoxin, as noted by several independent institutions, including the Swedish Defence Research Agency.

**Terrorism**

Many states around the world consider terrorism to be one of the main threats to national security. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the American president was given an extended mandate to use military means to prevent terrorist attacks within the country’s borders. It was also the first and so far only time that NATO applied Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on collective defence. Since then, several states in Europe, including France and Belgium, have made greater use of military resources to prevent and combat both international and domestic terrorism. In the event of major terrorist attacks in EU member states, Sweden may receive a request for civilian and military assistance under Article 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon. This happened for the first time in connection with the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. Sweden has also decided to participate in international operations in states affected by internal conflicts that can be characterised as Islamist-motivated terrorism.

Western states are affected to varying degrees by terrorism. Most terrorist attacks are carried out outside Europe's borders, but in recent years Sweden and several states in our neighbourhood have been affected. In 2019, a worrying increase was seen in the Western world in terrorist attacks with right-wing extremist motives. The terrorist threat to Sweden is considered to be heightened and to come from Islamist and right-wing extremist motivated terrorism. The violent right-wing extremist environment in Sweden consists of individuals, groups and organisations who strive for ethnically homogeneous societies and/or a system of government based on ethnicity and who believe that violence is a legitimate means of changing the social order. There is an extensive international network of contacts within the right-wing extremist environment. In Sweden, the violent Islamist environment consists of individuals and groups advocating a violent ideology, according to which terrorist attacks against targets in the Western world, including Sweden, are considered legitimate. The Swedish environment is inspired by the propaganda conveyed by groups such as al-Qaeda and Daesh. Daesh's ability to control external attack operations has
been reduced as a result of the territorial collapse of the caliphate. Inspiring supporters of terrorist attacks in their home countries has been an important aspect of Daesh's international agenda. As Daesh has lost its territory in eastern Syria and with the killing of leading representatives of the organisation, the attractiveness has diminished. Islamist-motivated terrorism is nevertheless considered to continue to pose a threat to Sweden. Sweden has been a member of the Global Coalition Against Daesh since 2014.

One of the coalition's pillars is the military Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) which aims to train the Iraqi security forces and defeat Daesh. Sweden has been participating in the operation since 2015. Sweden also contributes personnel to the EU mission to Iraq (EUAM) which specifically works to support civil security sector reform, including in the field of terrorism. Sweden has also decided to contribute personnel to NATO's operation in Iraq (NMI), which aims to strengthen the country's security forces and military training systems. In accordance with the Government's bill 2019/20:86 on Swedish participation in military operations to strengthen security in Mali, the Swedish Armed Forces are planning for participation in the French-led special forces operation Task Force Takuba in Mali. The operation aims, among other things and together with the Malian security forces, to combat the terrorist groups active in south-eastern Mali. The operation also aims to increase the operational capabilities of the Malian armed forces by training and accompanying at operational level. The Swedish contribution is planned to consist of a helicopter-carried rapid reaction force.

**Climate change**

The effects of climate change are becoming increasingly apparent and are increasingly affecting basic living conditions in large parts of the world. The direct effects of climate change, such as extreme weather events, droughts, floods and rising sea level, will put great strain on Sweden and globally.

In the 2015 Paris Agreement, the international community agreed for the first time to a binding agreement aimed at keeping the temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius, with an effort to reach a limit of 1.5 degrees. However, the emission reductions undertaken so far by the international community are not enough to achieve the targets. The Paris Agreement has been followed up by a rulebook on how to implement it and by further discussions on ambition levels and burden-sharing.
Competition for natural resources, such as water, and the resulting migratory flows risk reinforcing ongoing conflicts. It also increases the risk of new conflicts arising. Climate change is already a cause of water shortages in many places. The situation is likely to be further aggravated by reduced rainfall and further rising temperatures. Water shortages are expected to become acute and widespread in large parts of the Middle East, Africa and Asia, where a majority of population have limited access to clean drinking water. Increased political and economic tensions combined with long dry periods with drought as a consequence can be expected to mean increased migration flows to the EU and Sweden.

Changes in the climate can also affect the dynamics between states. Climate change means that more people in vulnerable areas may be forced to migrate to neighbouring countries, which in turn can create antagonism and ultimately lead to violent riots or armed conflict. A warmer climate with ice melting as a consequence may also lead to increased tensions in the Arctic, where primarily Russia, but also China and the United States, are increasing their military presence to secure their strategic interests.

5.2 Security policy focus

**The Government's assessment:** The security situation in Sweden's neighbourhood and in Europe has deteriorated over time. An armed attack on Sweden cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled out that military measures, or the threat of suchlike, may be used against Sweden. A security crisis or an armed conflict arising in our neighbourhood would inevitably have an impact on Sweden as well. Total defence capabilities should therefore be strengthened. Sweden's bilateral and multilateral defence and security cooperation should be deepened.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** The purpose of Sweden's security policy is to guarantee the country's independence and self-determination, safeguard our sovereignty, Sweden's interests and our fundamental values, and to maintain freedom of action in the face of political, military or other pressure. By contributing to a safer global environment and a stable neighbourhood, Sweden increases its security. Swedish security policy is part of society's collective resources to address threats and challenges to our security. However, many threats and risks can result in disasters and crises without threatening national sovereignty or territorial integrity. Security policy thus involves a large part of the broad perspective on security but not everything. Sweden has many instruments at
its disposal to deal with challenges and threats in and beyond the neighbourhood, including diplomacy, trade, aid and military defence. Sweden uses diplomacy as a tool through dialogue and cooperation, including with countries whose values Sweden does not fully share. Participation in multilateral organisations and in peace processes is central to exerting influence.

According to the Defence Commission's assessment, the security situation in Sweden's neighbourhood and in Europe has deteriorated. An armed attack on Sweden cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled out that military measures, or the threat of suchlike, may be used against Sweden. A security crisis or an armed conflict arising in our neighbourhood would inevitably have an impact on Sweden as well. The Government shares the Defence Commission's view.

Sweden and the other Nordic countries are Arctic states and a conflict that affects any of the Nordic countries will affect Sweden. Northern Europe, including the Arctic, constitutes a strategic military setting. The increasing military presence of various actors underlines the importance of following trends that may lead to friction in the region. The Government will continue to strengthen Sweden's military capability to operate in the northern parts of Sweden and neighbouring areas.

Global developments require an active, broad-based and responsible foreign and security policy. Furthermore, defence policy must continue to develop based on its two pillars: strengthened total defence and enhanced bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. Challenges and threats shall, as far as possible, be met in cooperation with other countries and organisations. Security is built in solidarity with others. Threats to peace and Sweden's security are best averted in cooperation with other countries. Sweden is not part of any military alliance.

It is not possible to envision military conflicts in Sweden's neighbourhood that would affect only one country. The Swedish unilateral declaration of solidarity includes EU members and the Nordic region. Sweden will not be passive if a disaster or attack were to affect another EU member state or Nordic country. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected. Sweden shall therefore be able to provide and receive civilian and military support. The Swedish declaration of solidarity does not include any mutually binding defence obligations. Within the EU, there is interdependence that strengthens solidarity between countries, which is also
enshrined in the solidarity clauses of the EU treaties. It is in Sweden's interests to be perceived as a credible, reliable and solidary partner.

The Government believes that the capacity for total defence needs to be strengthened. By making it clear that an attack on Sweden would entail a high cost for an attacker, total defence, together with other security policy instruments, is a deterrent to those who would wish to attack Sweden or exert pressure with military force.

Sweden shall be able to defend itself against an armed attack, individually and together with other states and organisations. Sweden shall therefore be able to provide and receive civilian and military support. The giving and receipt of support before or in the event of an armed conflict in our neighbourhood must, to the greatest extent possible, be planned and coordinated together with the actors concerned. This applies to total defence as a whole.

Sweden's security situation is also affected by hybrid threats, cyber attacks and cross-border terrorism, as well as the effects of climate change on peace and security. The ability to deal with antagonistic threats in peacetime needs to be improved. Vulnerabilities need to be reduced and functions of importance for Sweden's security shall strengthen their protective security. The Government stresses the importance of the ability to act together to meet challenges and threats both in peace and with heightened alert. This means being able to use all the security policy instruments available in a coherent manner in order to safeguard Swedish sovereignty and Sweden's interests. It is also important to be able to act in a coordinated manner with others, thereby increasing the cost for those who attack us. The Government has initiated work on a review of the national security strategy. The strategy is a starting point for enhancing Sweden's national security and describes eight primary threats that challenge our ability to protect Sweden's population. The broad concept of security in the strategy has also been the starting point for the work of the Government's Security Policy Council.

It is of great importance to Sweden that the European security order and its fundamental principles are upheld and respected in the actions of all states. Any continued undermining of respect for these principles has consequences for Sweden's security. An acceptance of breaches of the security order could lead to the European security order being de facto replaced by another order in which spheres of influence and the use of military force as a political means are accepted. Sweden's chairpersonship of the OSCE in 2021 is an
important platform for maintaining the European security order and strengthening cooperation on, among other things, increased transparency and predictability, military confidence building and the comprehensive concept of security.

Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and the unlawful annexation of Crimea are contrary to the UN prohibition of violence and the European security order, as well as to the standards, cooperations and institutions that form the basis of European security. The Government stresses the importance of European and transatlantic unity, as well as a clear and principled policy to respond to Russia. It is of great importance that the EU should also continue to be able to take a united line on Russia, thereby creating a cost for any Russian action. Maintaining EU sanctions against Russia as long as the reasons for their introduction remain is an important indication that breaches of the European security order are not accepted. For the same reason, the suspension of Sweden's bilateral military cooperation with Russia should remain until there is a Swedish interest in resuming contacts.

The EU is Sweden's most important foreign and security policy platform. Sweden's EU membership is the basis for the unilateral declaration of solidarity and the solidarity-based security policy. In view of developments abroad, it is important for Sweden that cohesion, cooperation, solidarity and integration within the EU are safeguarded and strengthened.

The Swedish presidency of the EU in 2023 provides an important platform for pursuing issues of strategic importance for Sweden.

Sweden has a strategic interest in the EU and other countries being able to reach a common understanding on China's power claims and the use of trade, investment and critical infrastructure to achieve political goals. It is also important that Sweden prevents the unwanted spread of sensitive technology.

The Government wishes to stress the importance of a continued enhanced cooperation with Finland and the Nordic countries. Nordic defence cooperation shall cover peace, crisis and conflict. This focus forms, among other things, the basis for the deepening operational defence cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden. An in-depth security policy dialogue between our countries is important in order to support military cooperation.
The UN plays a central role and gives international legitimacy for handling conflicts in the world. The principles and rules of intergovernmental cooperation set out in the UN Charter form the basis of the global collective security system, and it is vital to safeguard them. Sweden has a long tradition of supporting the UN and should continue to be active in all areas of the UN, such as peace and security, development cooperation and human rights.

A strong transatlantic link is crucial for the security of Europe and of Sweden. In the overall bilateral relationship between Sweden and the United States, defence-related issues are of great importance. Sweden and the United States share a similar view of the challenges to the security situation in the Baltic Sea region, as well as on how to address them. It is of great importance that Sweden maintains and further deepens the bilateral relationship with the United States.

NATO is a key player in European security and integration and for international crisis management. NATO collectively maintains the security guarantees within the alliance. NATO constitutes the most important forum for a broad security policy dialogue between the United States and Europe. Sweden should continue to develop cooperation with NATO within the framework of the partnership. This provides an opportunity to develop military capabilities and to contribute to qualified civilian and military crisis management operations.

### 5.3 International cooperation

**The Government's assessment:** Sweden shall be able to give and receive military and civil support. This is crucial in order to create a real opportunity to act together and in a coordinated manner in the event of a crisis or war. Sweden should, as far as possible, develop joint operational planning with Finland and coordinate operational planning with Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and NATO.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** Sweden conducts extensive defence and security policy cooperation with other states and organisations. In addition, in the civilian field, there is a great deal of international cooperation that has a bearing on security policy, and which strengthens, among other things, society's crisis preparedness, crime prevention and civil defence. International defence cooperation contributes to enhancing the capabilities and interoperability of national defence and serves an important security policy purpose. These cooperations...
form an integral part of the solidarity-based security policy, which requires that the Swedish Armed Forces and other agencies can work together with others.

Joint exercises with other countries are important for developing cooperation and for being able to perform exercises with large units and high complexity. Joint participation in international efforts is often an important part of cooperation. The Government intends to continue the development and deepening of Sweden's bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation.

It is crucial that Sweden can receive and provide military and civilian support. In this way, a real opportunity is created to act together and in a coordinated manner in the event of crisis or war. Planning should therefore, as far as possible within the framework of our solidarity-based security policy, be carried out with others. This applies to total defence as a whole. This planning and coordination can be carried out in a number of stages, in which the activities gradually become more complex and coordinated.

The Government deems, in line with what the Defence Commission proposes, that Sweden should continue work on joint operational planning with Finland and coordinate national operational planning with Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and NATO. This planning also needs to take into account how civil actors are involved and affected.

Like the Defence Commission, the Government considers that there may be grounds for authorising the Government to take certain decisions on receiving or providing operational military support with respect also to countries other than Finland. However, the extent to which there are grounds for this is something that needs to be further investigated. The Government may come back to this issue.

Defence cooperation is important for the strength of total defence and thus ultimately for its deterrent capabilities. Cooperations contribute to increased interoperability and the development of the Swedish Armed Forces' capability. Cooperation with various countries around, and with a commitment in, the Baltic Sea region is of great importance for the security and stability of our neighbourhood and thus for Sweden. The security policy value must also be taken into account. Prioritising between the different cooperation formats, and the formulation of Sweden's participation in and contribution to them, should be based on operational capabilities. It is
crucial that the cooperations that Sweden engages in contribute to enhanced security in the region.

Sweden's defence research as well as technology and materiel cooperation are important means of ensuring the supply of technology and defence materiel and they take place both in bilateral and multilateral formats.

Concerning civil defence, the Government intends to develop international cooperation, especially with a focus on supply preparedness and rescue services.

**Finland**

Cooperation with Finland is the most far-reaching of Sweden's defence cooperations and holds the highest priority in this respect. During the 2016–2020 defence resolution period, bilateral defence cooperation has been significantly deepened. The Government has directed the development of cooperation in certain specific areas, such as bilateral operational planning, training cooperation, combined military units, establishment of secure communications, mutual use of military infrastructure, cooperation on defence materiel, personnel exchange etc. The cooperation covers a large number of activities that are carried out regularly within all armed forces, not least in the framework of national and international exercise activities. The purpose of joint operational planning is to be able to use military resources jointly in different scenarios, if so decided. According to the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on bilateral defence cooperation signed in 2018, the cooperation covers activities in peace, crisis and war. In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, the Government intends to continue to deepen cooperation with Finland during the next defence resolution period.

Enabling joint military action and operations in peace, crisis and war is a key objective of the cooperation. The Government intends, together with Finland and relevant agencies, to continue the work of clarifying the forms and regulations that are needed for operational military cooperation, including in the context of territorial surveillance and the assertion of territorial integrity. In this regard, creating prerequisites for joint military action and operations on the territory of each country is an important factor.

In order to further strengthen the defence cooperation with Finland, the Government proposed in its bill 2019/20:110 Military support between Sweden and Finland that a new act for the defence cooperation with Finland
is introduced, authorising the Government to take certain decisions on providing or receiving operational military support within the framework of the cooperation. These include decisions on deploying Swedish armed forces to assist Finland in preventing violations of Finnish territory and decisions to receive military aid in the form of military forces from Finland, either to prevent violations of Swedish territory or to face an armed attack against Sweden. The bill also sets out how transparency and the influence of the Riksdag can be ensured within the framework of the Government’s new decision-making powers. It should be stressed that the decision to deploy Swedish armed forces to assist Finland in responding to an armed attack against Finland must still be approved by the Riksdag. A number of legislative changes were also proposed aimed at improving the conditions for Finnish military forces to provide support to Sweden. On 8 September 2020, the Riksdag approved the Government’s proposal (committee report 2019/20:UFöU5, written communication from the Riksdag 2020/21:3). The new act and legislative amendments enter into force on 15 October 2020.

As the expanded wartime organisation is established, the Government intends to review the possibility of preparing certain Swedish ground units to operate in Finland in the event of crisis, danger of war or war, if both parties deem it appropriate. In addition, cooperation between Swedish and Finnish military units should continue to develop with the ambition to increase the degree of coordination between units and mutual exchange of personnel in order to increase understanding of working methods and doctrines. This may include, among other things, the development of combined Swedish-Finnish military units and functions, which will be able to resolve common tasks. The Government also sees potential for Finnish-Swedish cooperation in areas of relevance for hybrid threats, including within the framework of cooperation with the Helsinki-based hybrid centre.

**Norway**

Cooperation between Sweden and Norway has been strengthened during the defence resolution period 2015-2020. Ongoing activities include security policy discussions as well as exchanges of experience, for example in the fields of total defence and personnel provision. The Swedish and Norwegian armed forces exercise jointly on a regular basis.

Sweden regularly participates with units in the Norwegian Cold Response series of exercises and Norway was the largest troop contributor in the Swedish army exercise Nordanvind 2019. In view of the geographical and strategic military conditions in Sweden’s neighbourhood, the Government,
like the Defence Commission, underlines the need for a deeper cooperation with Norway. Coordination of operational planning should be carried out as far as possible. The Defence Commission stresses that increased cooperation between the Swedish and Norwegian ground forces appears to be particularly important. Enhanced cooperation may include, among other things, army units and home guard units, but also airborne units etc. The Government believes that cooperation should be extended to include situations beyond peace. This is of particular importance in view of the fact that western connections are of central interest to both Sweden and Finland. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the western connection should be a focus area for further cooperation with Norway. In the Swedish context, this ascertainment forms, among other things, the basis for the deepened operational cooperation among Finland, Norway and Sweden. The Statement of Intent (SoI) sets out the common ambition to be capable of conducting coordinated military operations in crisis and conflict, if so decided. One possible outcome of the cooperation is coordinated operational planning for geographical areas of common interest, such as the northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden.

**Denmark**

In 2016, Sweden and Denmark signed a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation, to which a joint activity list has been added. Cooperation between Sweden and Denmark has mainly focused on naval and air forces. For example, the Swedish and Danish armed forces have an agreement on access to their respective airspace and air bases in connection with peacetime throughflights.

The Government intends to continue to work for deeper defence cooperation with Denmark with a special focus on the southern Baltic Sea, the Baltic Sea inlets and the Skagerrak and Kattegat, not least because the protection of lines of communication and security of supply is a vital common interest for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The Government believes that cooperation with Denmark should be extended to include situations beyond peace. Coordination of operational planning should be carried out as far as possible.

**NORDEFCO**

In view of the deterioration in the security situation in northern Europe, both the security policy dialogue and coordination within the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) have intensified in recent years.
Among the projects that have been concretised is the Cooperation for Air Surveillance Information Exchange (NORECAS), with a Memorandum of Understanding in place regarding exchange of air surveillance information in peacetime. Nordefco also includes a memorandum of understanding on military mobility (Easy Access), which includes exercises and training activities, transits and visits by military units.

The NORDEFCO vision 2025 which was adopted in 2019 states that the Nordic countries shall improve their defence capabilities and cooperation in peace, crisis and conflict. The objectives to be achieved by 2025 include minimising restrictions on military mobility within and between the Nordic countries, creating the conditions for an increased exchange of situation information in peace, crisis and conflict, and strengthening NORDEFCO as a platform for crisis consultations between the countries' defence ministries.

In the Government's view, it is of great importance that Nordic defence cooperation is developed to cover cooperation in peace, crisis and conflict within agreed areas. Such an extension of the cooperation has a security policy value while contributing to more efficient use of resources and increased operational capability. The deepened operational defence cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden is a concrete expression of the NORDEFCO vision's central objective. NORDEFCO can also provide a framework for consultations on bilateral and trilateral cooperation between the Nordic countries.

**Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania**

Sweden has a close dialogue with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the field of defence and security policy. From a security policy perspective, it is important for Sweden to maintain and develop cooperation with these states. It is of particular importance that Swedish units exercise on the territory of the Baltic states. The Government sees opportunities for developing cooperation in areas such as exercises and in training activities. NATO has established so-called Centres of Excellence in the capitals of all three countries (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga and Energy Security Centre of Excellence i Vilnius). The states possess significant competence and experience in hybrid threats and the Government sees potential for enhanced cooperation in this area. Sweden has been contributing for a number of years to the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn and to the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga.
The United Kingdom

In 2016, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a Programme of Defence Cooperation which complements the Statement of Intent signed in 2014. Sweden, together with Finland, also joined the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in 2017. At present, this cooperation includes, in addition to the United Kingdom, the Nordic and Baltic states and the Netherlands. The JEF cooperation is important, not only because it increases the Armed Forces' capacity for cooperation with British units, but also because it creates the conditions for the United Kingdom to remain engaged in Sweden's neighbourhood after leaving the EU. The Government underlines the importance of continuing and deepening cooperation with the United Kingdom, both through the EU and bilaterally. It is of particular importance that cooperation with the United Kingdom helps to ensure continued British involvement in the Nordic and Baltic region. The United Kingdom is one of the few European countries that possess a real ability to bring significant armed forces to Sweden's neighbourhood in a relatively short time. Coordination of operational planning should be carried out as far as possible. The Government stresses the importance of continued involvement in the JEF. Sweden is also part of the Northern Group, a flexible and informal forum for security and defence policy discussions initiated by the United Kingdom, regularly conducted at defence minister level twice a year. The group includes the Nordic and Baltic states as well as the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and Germany. The Government stresses the importance of continued cooperation within the framework of the Northern Group.

In July 2019, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Future Combat Air Systems Cooperation (FCAS-C).

The Defence Commission has stated that Sweden, in the negotiations on the future relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom, will work to ensure that the United Kingdom remains part of the EU’s security policy community and thus covered by the Swedish declaration of solidarity. The Government agrees that a security policy community between the EU and the United Kingdom is in Sweden’s interests. This relationship also has a bilateral dimension. The Government intends to engage in dialogue with the United Kingdom on how the bilateral security policy relationship can develop after the United Kingdom leaves the EU.
France
Sweden has established cooperation with France in the field of defence. Focus areas for cooperation have included international operations, mainly in Africa, and defence materiel in particular. France is active in the development of the EU's common foreign and defence policy. Sweden joined the French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in 2019. EI2 contributes to strengthening security and defence policy cooperation in Europe. The Government sees opportunities for increased cooperation with France in the field of defence, bilaterally through international operations, political dialogue and cooperation in exercises and multilaterally within the framework of EI2.

Poland
In 2015, Sweden and Poland signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of defence. Regular cooperation and exchange of experience at strategic level takes place between the countries, as well as exercise activities, such as the coordinated exercise activities between the Anaconda and Aurora 2020 exercises. The Government sees opportunities for further development of cooperation with Poland, aiming in particular at strengthening the common view regarding security in the Baltic Sea region, considering Poland's importance for the region.

Germany
In 2017, the Swedish and German defence ministers signed a joint letter of intent. The letter of intent covers a number of areas such as exercises, armaments and multilateral operations and concerns the army, navy and air force. In 2017, Sweden joined the German-led initiative, within the framework of NATO, for European capacity development, the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). The Government sees opportunities to continue to develop and deepen cooperation with Germany, aiming in particular at strengthening the common view regarding security in the Baltic Sea region.

The United States
The Government would like to underline the importance of maintaining and further deepening bilateral relations with the United States. This includes bilateral defence cooperation. Sweden's cooperation with the United States has been developed in five priority areas identified in the 2016 bilateral Statement of Intent. These are (1) interoperability, (2) training and exercises, (3) armament cooperation, (4) research and development and (5) multinational operations. The exercise activities with the United States have
evolved and cover all branches. Sweden has many civilian partnerships with the United States in research and development. Cooperation is also extensive in the field of defence materiel and cooperation in defence-related research and technology is of great importance for the supply of materiel and technology. The acquisition of the medium range Patriot air defence system constitutes another important and long-term reinforcement of the defence-related link between Sweden and the United States, which also has security policy implications. Cooperation between the Swedish Armed Forces and the United States European Command (USEUCOM) has been formalised. In May 2018, a trilateral declaration of intent on enhanced defence cooperation was signed between the defence ministries of Finland, Sweden and the United States. The purpose of the initiative is to complement the respective bilateral cooperation between the states and to create synergies between them.

Interoperability is necessary in order to be able to act together in a crisis situation. The components of interoperability are political dialogue, scenario-based discussions, well-established interfaces at military level and adapted exercise activities. There are also aspects such as secure communication systems as well as adjusted legal frameworks and logistics solutions. In order to provide credibility and efficiency in this cooperation, the Government, like the Defence Commission, believes that further steps such as adaptations to infrastructure etc. and prepared plans may be necessary. Coordination of operational planning should be carried out as far as possible.

Canada

In view of Canada's increased involvement in northern Europe, including the fact that Canada is the framework nation for NATO's EFP unit in Latvia, the Government sees increased opportunities for enhanced defence, security and armament cooperation with Canada. This is particularly due to the important role the country plays in the Arctic and its involvement in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea region.

The EU

The Government notes, like the Defence Commission, that during the current defence resolution period there has been a rapid development of EU security and defence cooperation.

The European states need to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security. The Government, like the Defence Commission, notes that no European state alone can face all of today's serious and complex security
policy challenges or have an impact as a global player. Strengthening the EU’s ability to act as a security policy actor and thus the Union's ability to take responsibility for its own security and the security of its neighbourhood is crucial. In addition, the credibility of Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty needs to be ensured. The cooperation should be designed in such a way that European and transatlantic cooperation can be mutually reinforcing.

The Government is affirming its efforts to strengthen the overall European defence capability and to strengthen the EU’s ability to act. Sweden should actively influence developments in the field of security and defence within the EU, while defending Swedish interests. In view of global developments, it is important for Sweden that cohesion, cooperation, solidarity and integration within the EU are safeguarded and strengthened. It is crucial that the cooperation is formulated in such a way that European and transatlantic cooperation is mutually reinforcing and avoids duplication. It is important to ensure the possibility of third-state participation in projects, defence research and materiel cooperation. The Government stresses the importance of ensuring that cooperation within the EU is formulated with the greatest possible transparency and without distorting competition. The consequences for the Swedish defence industry and economy must also be carefully taken into account.

The Government intends to continue to promote constructive cooperation between the EU and NATO in all relevant areas and levels within the framework of defence and security policy. This cooperation is important to, among other things, ensure that military units can move within Europe if required.

The Swedish presidency of the EU in 2023 provides an important platform for pursuing issues of strategic importance for Sweden.

**NATO**

Sweden has a well-developed cooperation with NATO within the framework of the partnership. In 2014, Sweden and Finland, as well as Jordan, Australia and Georgia, were granted Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP) status, which was extended by three years in 2017. The Government believes that Sweden should continue to work to hold EOP status. Since 2014, cooperation with NATO has deepened with a focus on political dialogue, training and exercises, as well as information exchange. Of particular importance is the dialogue on security in the region that Sweden and Finland conduct with NATO, where meetings take place regularly at both political
and civil servant level. The procedures for Sweden's dialogue and cooperation with NATO, including in a regional crisis scenario, are continuously developed on the basis of, among other things, experience from exercise activities.

Cooperation with NATO is central to the development of the Swedish Armed Forces' capabilities, both in national defence and for carrying out operations inside and outside the region. Among the different forms of international defence cooperation, it is primarily NATO cooperation that contributes to the development of the Swedish Armed Forces' combined ability to face a qualified opponent. NATO is the only organisation to have a command and planning structure capable of conducting large and demanding military operations, which is important for security in our region. Swedish participation in NATO exercises shows that Sweden takes responsibility for security in the region and contributes to increasing the Swedish Armed Forces' warfighting capability. The Planning and Review Process (PARP) goals are an important tool for how Sweden develops its military capabilities and interoperability for military operations within both NATO and other organisations, as well as with individual countries such as Finland and the United States.

NATO's experience in ensuring essential societal functions is valuable for work on civil defence. This is exemplified by the work on NATO's seven baseline requirements for national resilience, which are a key starting point for national work.

The enlargement of NATO has enhanced security in Europe, including for Sweden and its neighbourhood.

Since 2016, a Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and Sweden on host nation support has been in force. The agreement creates the conditions for providing and receiving military aid, in line with the solidarity-based security policy and simplifies cooperation on exercises.

The Government stresses the importance of continuing to develop the partnership within the framework of EOP status.

5.4 International military operations

| The Government's assessment: Sweden's active involvement and participation in international military operations, within the framework of international organisations and in other coalitions, should continue. In doing |
so, Sweden contributes to the protection of a rules-based international order based on the UN Charter. Participation in international military operations forms part of the solidarity-based security policy and strengthens Sweden's bilateral and multilateral defence and security cooperation. In addition, Sweden's national security is strengthened through the activities carried out in the areas of operation. Sweden should give priority to participation based on a concerted approach.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** Sweden's participation in international operations contributes to the protection and promotion of general security policy interests such as increased multilateral cooperation and a rules-based international order based on the UN Charter. The overall foreign and security policy objective of Sweden's participation in international operations is to contribute to peace and security, to prevent conflicts and create the conditions for building sustainable peace and sustainable poverty reduction. Participation is an integral part of the solidarity-based security policy. The Government believes that Sweden should continue to have active involvement and participation in international military operations, within the framework of international organisations and, where appropriate, in other coalitions. Participation in all cases requires a mandate based on international law.

The Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8) notes that participation in operations strengthens Sweden's bilateral and multilateral defence and security policy cooperation. This in turn can help to increase security in Sweden's neighbourhood and, by extension, Sweden's security. The Commission also believes that the military operations contribute to strengthening national capabilities by providing experience, increasing the Swedish Armed Forces' capacity for cooperation with other countries and organisations, promoting recruitment and increasing personnel skills. The Government shares the Defence Commission's view, but also wishes to stress that the military operations contribute to strengthening Sweden's security through the activities in the areas of operation.

The Defence Commission stresses that in the coming defence resolution period, it should be a priority to increase the ability to counter an armed attack, which will be achieved, among other things, by building up the force structure. Participation in international military operations should therefore be based on the resources and capabilities developed within the framework of the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to defend Sweden against armed attack. The Commission believes that Swedish participation in international military operations is an integral part of the solidarity-based security policy. The overall foreign and security policy objective of Sweden's participation in international operations is to contribute to peace and security, to prevent conflicts and create the conditions for building sustainable peace and sustainable poverty reduction. Participation is an integral part of the solidarity-based security policy. The Government believes that Sweden should continue to have active involvement and participation in international military operations, within the framework of international organisations and, where appropriate, in other coalitions. Participation in all cases requires a mandate based on international law.
operations during the next defence resolution period must be carefully considered and based on a broad analysis. This must include foreign and security policy trade-offs, including the role of the military operations in Sweden's international defence cooperation. An assessment must also be made of where and in which constellations Sweden can make the most use of the limited resources that will be available during this period. In each case, a careful assessment of costs should be made, including personnel costs, restoration and replacement of materiel, as well as the overall impact on the Swedish Armed Forces' national capabilities and opportunities to implement planned growth. Sweden is currently participating in operations within the framework of the EU, the UN and NATO, as well as in other formats and coalitions. Sweden's involvement in international military operations should be seen as an integral part of foreign, security and defence policy. Priorities should be based on this overall approach. Cooperation with actors and partners who can actively contribute to security in Sweden's neighbourhood is a key factor to take into account. This is described in more detail above in 5.3. International cooperation

As can be seen in section 5.3, Sweden has an interest in strengthening the EU's ability to act as a security policy player. The Union has a broad toolbox including both civilian and military crisis management, development cooperation and sanctions. There is a political value for Sweden to act together with other European countries within the framework of the EU, partly to strengthen the EU's cohesion. The EU's military and civilian crisis management operations are a concrete expression of the union's willingness and ability to contribute to peace and security.

Cooperation with NATO is central to the interoperability of the Swedish Armed Forces. Developing cooperation with NATO is of importance for Sweden's ability to contribute to multinational operations under the leadership and/or on behalf of the EU, the UN and NATO, since NATO's military standards have largely become internationally norm-setting.

In certain situations, the UN may be the only organisation capable of operating in a specific area. UN action is an important instrument, which helps to guide countries from conflict to sustainable peace. When the operation takes place in a very demanding conflict environment with asymmetric threats, such as in Mali where the UN Minusma operates, there is a particular need for qualified contributions. The Swedish contribution is an example of this.
In some cases, temporary coalitions of countries may organise a military operation. This may be, for example, where the ability of international organisations to operate in an area is politically or operationally limited. Swedish troop contributions should preferably be coordinated with countries and organisations that are important for security in Sweden’s neighbourhood.

In accordance with the Nordefco strategic document, Vision 2025, the Nordic countries aim to increase the capacity for coordination when participating in international operations and to increase involvement in capacity-building activities.

The Swedish Armed Forces consider that their participation in international operations should, as far as possible, be concentrated geographically and limited in time. This enables synergies and reduces the risk of exhaustion of limited and qualified capabilities. The Government shares this assessment in principle, but at the same time notes that the need for participation in various international operations changes over time, which requires flexibility.

The Defence Commission considers that the composition of contributions to international operations or staffs needs to be considered especially in the coming years, taking into account the development of the force structure. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment, but at the same time notes that the composition of the contributions needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Building up the force structure needs to be prioritised in the period 2021–2025, while international defence cooperation will continue to be nurtured and strengthened. Participation in international operations should continue. In the long term, once the force structure has been expanded, opportunities to participate in international military operations may be increased.

The Defence Commission believes that the results of international operations, both in the field of operations and for the Swedish Armed Forces, should be monitored in a more systematic and comprehensive manner than at present. The Government notes that Swedish participation in international operations often constitutes a limited part of the total effort, which affects the ability to measure direct results and the effects of a Swedish contribution. However, the Government considers that it is possible to set targets for Sweden's national involvement in international operations from a foreign, security and defence policy perspective and to
evaluate Swedish contributions in relation to these goals. For example, this has already been done in the latest bills for extended participation in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which set clear targets for Swedish participation. Furthermore, Sweden should, as far as possible, participate in the reform work and development of operations at the UN, so as to improve the governance, implementation and adaptation of operations. The transition from and phasing out of international operations is an important issue. As far as the EU is concerned, the objective should be for the union to be able to independently cover the entire spectrum of the crisis management operations set out in the treaty, including the most demanding operations. This is further discussed under the section Economy, management and monitoring.

The Government believes that there is a need for systematic integration of environmental, climate and gender perspectives into international efforts. The implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 and seven subsequent related resolutions, which together constitute the International Agenda for Women, Peace and Security, shall be an integral part of work on international military action, both internally and externally.

5.5 Force and coercion during international military operations

**The Government's assessment:** There is no reason to implement the Peace Operation Inquiry's proposal for a national regulation that, in certain circumstances, Swedish Armed Forces personnel have the right to use force and coercion during international military operations.

**The assessment and proposals of the inquiry** are not in line with the Government's assessment. The investigation considers that there is a need to make it clear in law that, in certain circumstances, Swedish Armed Forces personnel have the right to use force and coercion during international military operations and have submitted a proposal for legislation.

**The consultation respondents:** Most referral bodies, including the Swedish Armed Forces, either agree or do not object to the assessment and proposals of the inquiry. The Court of Appeal of Skåne and Blekinge and the Swedish Courts Administration object to the proposal, which they believe is not sufficiently clearly formulated. The Swedish Total Defence Research Institute believes that further analysis of the legal situation and the need for legislation in this area is needed.
The reasons for the Government's assessment

The Peace Operation Inquiry

In November 2011, the Peace Operation Inquiry presented the report Force and coercion during international military operations (Swedish Government Official Reports [SOU series] SOU 2011:76). The report proposes the introduction, for reasons of clarity, of a general law which, under certain conditions, allows the use of force and coercion during international military operations. According to the legislative proposal, force and coercion may be used to carry out an operation, provided that it is carried out in accordance with the mandate of the operation and applicable international law. Furthermore, according to the proposal, the use of force and coercion, which is not governed by international humanitarian law, must not cause more interference with the rights and freedoms of individuals than is necessary and proportionate in view of the importance of the fulfilment of the mandate of the operation or the current threat, and violations of certain fundamental human rights must never take place in such use of force and coercion. The proposal also contains a provision stating that Swedish Armed Forces personnel must comply with Sweden's obligations in international humanitarian law, regardless of whether Sweden is a party to the armed conflict or not. The report has been referred for consultation and the referral is available at the Ministry of Defence (Fö2011/01793).

A legal adjustment as proposed by the Peace Operation Inquiry should not be introduced

Sweden's involvement in international military operations has a long tradition and ultimately aims to help maintain international peace and security. Swedish participation in peace-building efforts is ultimately also about promoting national security and Swedish interests. Chapter 15 Section 16 of the Constitution Act contains provisions on the deployment of armed forces. According to this section, the Government may send Swedish Armed Forces to other countries or otherwise deploy such forces in order to fulfil an international obligation that has been approved by the Riksdag (first paragraph). Swedish armed forces may otherwise be sent to other countries or deployed if it is permitted in law that specifies the conditions for the action or the Riksdag allows it in a particular case (second paragraph). To send armed forces abroad, it is therefore necessary that the Riksdag has in some way approved the measure. The decision that Sweden should participate in international military operations, which usually takes place under a mandate from the UN Security Council and with an invitation from the host country in question, is taken after the Government has obtained the

As the Peace Operation Inquiry notes, there is no Swedish regulation of the use of force and coercion by Swedish armed forces during international military operations. The Government stated in its bill 1995/96:113 Swedish participation in the peacekeeping force of the former Yugoslavia that “[in] criminal law, an armed force's right to use force in connection with combat is basically unregulated. However, it is in the nature of things that the criminal law system is not intended to prevent a Swedish armed force from resolving its task in an established manner. In that regard, it may be presumed that no criminal liability can be claimed for the members of the force in respect of acts of violence which may be considered justified from a military point of view and which are in accordance with the rules of international law. No legislative action is called for in this regard.” (p. 12).

However, the lack of specific regulation in this area does not mean that the activities of Swedish forces abroad are unregulated. Firstly, there must be a mandate under international law for Swedish military force to act abroad. In the case of Swedish participation in an international peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the UN or NATO, the basis of international law for the operation is usually a UN Security Council resolution and an invitation from the host country. The military exercise of force must also be carried out in accordance with the applicable rules of engagement and otherwise applicable international law, i.e. international humanitarian law and international human rights commitments. In addition, the question of what powers a Swedish force has in the context of an international military operation is also governed by the national mandate. The national mandate consists of the Riksdag’s consent and the Government's decision before the operation as well as any national restrictions that may result from regulations on the use of force and coercive measures by Swedish personnel during the operation. The same approach applies when the Swedish military contribution does not constitute an armed force in the sense of the Constitution Act, e.g. certain training measures, with the difference that the
Government's decision before the operation does not require the prior consent of the Riksdag.

The prerequisite study assesses in the report Prerequisites according to the Constitution Act for enhanced defence cooperation (Swedish Government Official Reports [SOU series] SOU 2016:64 p. 111) that there is no requirement under the Constitution Act to regulate by law the powers of Swedish forces abroad against foreign populations or others on foreign territory, such as the exercise of force and coercion. The same assessment is made by the Inquiry on the legal regulation of defence cooperation with Finland in the report A law on operational military support between Sweden and Finland (Swedish Government Official Reports [SOU series] SOU2018:31 p. 159). In its referral response to the Swedish Government Official Reports [SOU series] SOU 2018:31 report, the Swedish Armed Forces supported the inquiry's proposals and had no comments on the content of the report or the proposed regulation. In the bill Operational military support between Sweden and Finland (Government bill 2019/20:110 p. 73) the Government expressed its support for the assessments made in the reports.

In the Government's view, there is no need to regulate the powers of Swedish forces in law if these are already regulated under the proposed act on operational military support between Sweden and Finland. The question then is whether there is reason to make a different assessment of the need for legal regulation regarding the use of force and coercion by Swedish forces in international military operations. The introduction of such a regulation would be a departure from the regime in force when Swedish forces provide military support to Finland and should therefore be introduced only if there are good reasons for doing so, such as the fact that the regulation can be assumed to contribute to increasing clarity and the security of the personnel involved in the operation. It is clear, however, that it is international law, the international mandate and the national mandate that constitute the basis and necessary regulation on force and coercive powers when participating in an international military operation. As the Government has previously stated in its bill 1995/96:113, the Government also considers that it is in the nature of the matter that the criminal law is not intended to prevent Swedish military personnel from resolving their tasks in accordance with international law within the framework of an international military operation. The Government does not therefore intend to proceed with the proposal of the Peace Operation Inquiry in the report.
6. Defence policy starting points and goals

6.1 Starting points for total defence

The Government's assessment: Total defence is designed and dimensioned in order to be able to counter an armed attack against Sweden, including acts of war on Swedish territory. Total defence is a deterrent because it has such strength, composition, command, readiness and endurance that it deters attempts to attack, control or otherwise exploit Swedish territory.

The starting point for the planning of total defence should be to be able to handle a security crisis in Europe and Sweden’s neighbourhood, which causes serious disruptions to the functionality of society, as well as war during part of this time, for at least three months.

The capabilities of total defence must continue to be strengthened.

The reasons for the Government's assessment: Total defence consists of such activities as are necessary to prepare Sweden for war. During the highest state of alert, total defence consists of all society's activities that must then be carried out. Our security, freedom, independence and freedom of action shall be safeguarded. Total defence includes military activities (military defence) and civilian activities (civil defence). The Riksdag, the Government, public authorities including county administrative boards, municipalities and regions, industry and NGOs, as well as individuals, are all part of, and are expected to contribute to, total defence. Total defence is therefore not an individual organisation. The capabilities of total defence are created by these actors, but also in cooperation with other states and international organisations. Total defence resources shall be designed in such a way that they can also be used in international operations and to strengthen society's capacity to prevent and deal with extraordinary events in peacetime.

In the event of a security crisis, conflict or war in its neighbourhood, Sweden may be exposed to a combination of different means of power where military operations are also a component. In such a situation, an armed attack against Sweden cannot be ruled out. The purpose of an armed attack may be for the attacker to use Swedish territory for its own military purposes or to deny another state access to Swedish territory. A major conflict could start with an attack on Sweden. An attack may also aim to prevent Sweden from directly or indirectly assisting another party in the conflict. Sweden does not in itself have to be the main target of the aggressor.
The actions of a possible aggressor will be guided, among other things, by available military resources, assessment of the strength of the Swedish total defence in various respects, the possibility of using surprise and misdirection, countermeasures and their own willingness to take risks. There is also the aggressor's assessment of other actors' military capabilities and their willingness to act.

By making it clear that an attack on Sweden would entail a high cost or take a significant length of time, total defence, together with political, diplomatic and economic means, is a deterrent to those who would wish to attack Sweden or exert pressure with military force. Total defence must therefore have such strength, composition, command, readiness and endurance that it can act as a deterrent and thus be preventative and peacekeeping. Society's basic robustness and its ability to withstand peacetime crises contribute to the deterrent effect. If Sweden is attacked, the Swedish Armed Forces, with the support of the rest of total defence, shall defend Sweden in order to gain time, create freedom of action and ultimately ensure the country's independence. The resistance must be determined and persistent.

Sweden shall be able to provide and receive civilian and military support. This should be planned and coordinated as far as possible with the actors involved. Mutual support and interaction between military and civilian activities achieves the greatest possible defence effect.

The endurance of total defence shall enable society to be readjusted for a longer period of security crisis, as well as allowing conditions for being able to receive civilian and military support from other states. However, the time it would take for Sweden to be able to receive support – especially military support – is difficult to assess, and it is also difficult to assess in advance the detailed formulation and scope of any support. In a security crisis, support depends on further security policy developments both in our region and globally, as well as engagement and decision-making in other countries and organisations. Support also depends on available resources, transport times and infrastructure capacity. These and other additional factors mean that it may take a relatively long time for the necessary decisions to be taken on international support and before this can reach Sweden to any substantial extent. Sweden must therefore have a basic ability to cope on its own.

According to the Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8), military and civil defence should, within the framework of a cohesive total defence, plan to be able to meet and handle for at least three months a security crisis in Europe.
and our region that will have serious consequences for the functionality of society. During part of the time and within the three months, according to the Defence Commission's proposal, planning must allow for Sweden's being at war and that acts of war are ongoing on Swedish territory with both periods of high-intensity fighting and periods of lower combat intensity. During the three months, it is assumed that there is heightened alert and that logistics flows with the outside world have limitations but are not completely interrupted. The ambition shall be to safeguard the most important societal functions. In most areas this means a significantly lower level than in a normal peacetime condition.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that activities in total defence must be able to be sustained, which is an important prerequisite for achieving a deterrent capability. The starting point for planning should be the time conditions specified by the Defence Commission. The Government also considers that there is a need to deepen the analysis of what detailed requirements for endurance should apply and what measures this entails on the basis of the conditions prevailing in different areas of society. Further consideration also needs to be made as to when in time different requirements should be met. The Government does not rule out the possibility that certain requirements may need to be met gradually over a longer period.

In the event of a threat of war or war, the total defence efforts will initially gather the forces of the military defence, while safeguarding the main functions of society and protecting the civilian population. Society needs to be able to quickly adapt for wartime conditions, to gather forces nationally and to mobilise military and civilian resources that benefit defence efforts. The individual's own acceptance of responsibility and readiness as well as acceptance of a significantly lower level of public services represent a central part of resisting and alleviating the consequences of serious societal disruptions.

For some years now, there has been a transition in which the Swedish Armed Forces have focused on national tasks. Total defence planning has resumed. However, in the light of the previous security situation and associated defence decisions, the military defence has for a long time not been designed or dimensioned to defend Sweden against an armed attack. Similarly, planning and preparation for civil defence were not performed for many years. The transition that has begun therefore needs to continue and the ability of total defence to counter an armed attack needs to be
strengthened. A strong total defence also increases society's ability to prevent and deal with extraordinary events in peacetime.

6.2 Overall goal for total defence

The Government's proposal: The overall goal of total defence shall be to have the ability to defend Sweden against an armed attack and protect our security, freedom, independence and freedom of action. Activities in total defence shall be able to be carried out individually and together with others, within and outside the country.

The reasons for the Government's proposal: The Defence Commission considers that the present division of separate military and civil defence goals should be replaced by a common goal for total defence and that the goal should be realised through tasks for the military and civil defence. The Defence Commission's proposal reads: total defence shall, alone and together with others, within and outside the country, defend Sweden against armed aggression and protect our security, freedom, independence and freedom of action.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that a common goal is needed for total defence. A combined capability in total defence, where many different actors are involved, requires common starting points, a common goal and a common focus. An overall goal for total defence to which all stakeholders contribute should therefore be introduced.

In substance, the Government proposes the same overall goal for total defence as the Defence Commission. However, the government considers that the goal should be more precisely defined by introducing the term capability. Such a definition clarifies that capability assessments in different areas of activity in total defence are important for the overall follow-up and assessment of goal fulfilment. The Government also proposes in sections 6.3 and 6.4 that there should continue to be goals decided by the Riksdag for military and civil defence, which together will contribute to goal fulfilment for total defence. The overall goal of total defence should therefore not replace the goals for military and civil defence, but complement them.

The Government, like the Defence Commission, believes that strong total defence contributes to strengthening peacetime crisis preparedness. Through coherent planning for total defence, command, readiness and the necessary resources to cope with war, the ability to prevent and handle peacetime crises is also improved.
6.3 Goal for the military defence

The Government’s proposal: The goal for the military defence shall be to have the capability to:
- defend Sweden against armed attack,
- assert the territorial integrity of Sweden and safeguard sovereign rights and national interests in Sweden and outside Swedish territory in accordance with international law,
- promote our security and prevent and handle conflicts and wars by conducting operations in peacetime on our own territory and in the neighbourhood, as well as participating in international peacekeeping operations, and
- protect society and its functionality by assisting the rest of society, with existing capabilities and resources both in peacetime and in times of heightened alert.

The reasons for the Government’s proposal: In substance, the Government proposes the same goal for military defence as the Defence Commission but with a partly different formulation. Whereas the term assignment is commonly used in the Government's ordinances with instructions to agencies to describe the individual agency's task and activities, the Government's proposal is instead formulated as a goal. In accordance with the Budget Act (2011:203), the Government will return to the Riksdag with an account in the Budget Bill of what has been achieved annually in relation to the goals decided by the Riksdag. As before, the tasks and areas of responsibility of each agency, which contribute in various ways to goal fulfilment, will preferably be specified in the agency's instructions.

The Riksdag's Committee on Defence has, among other things, in bet. 2019/20:FöU1 stressed the importance of clear goals that can be followed up, on which the report to the Riksdag on results can be based. In order to increase opportunities for following up and expressing an opinion on goal fulfilment, the Government proposes that the term capability is included in the goal proposal.

The military defence shall be peacekeeping and a deterrent. Its most important function is to be able to counter an armed attack against Sweden. An armed attack should be able to be countered even if it is a surprise attack, which requires the capability of advance warning. For a possible attacker, the disadvantages of acts of war against Sweden must seem greater than the advantages. A prerequisite for being able to prevent, respond to and handle an armed attack is that the military defence has the resources and has made the necessary preparations to implement decisions on heightening alert and
to sustain the performance of its activities. Military defence shall be capable of providing and receiving support from other countries and organisations.

The Swedish Armed Forces shall uphold Sweden's territorial integrity and protect sovereign rights and national interests. Its activities include monitoring the territory and detecting and rebutting violations. This also means being able to protect Sweden's freedom of action against pressure by military force. Furthermore, it shall be possible to safeguard Swedish sovereign rights and national interests outside the territory in accordance with international law, for example with regard to the right to use international waters or airspace for goods and services. The Armed Forces shall also be able, with the support of other agencies, to monitor sea areas and airspace in the region.

The Swedish Armed Forces shall, with the support of other agencies, promote Sweden's security and prevent conflicts and wars by being able to carry out operations on Swedish territory and in the region in peacetime, following the decision of the Government and the Riksdag. Furthermore, the global security policy situation means that for the foreseeable future there will be a continued need for international operations. Sweden should continue its active engagement and participation in international operations of various kinds, civilian and military, within the framework of the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE and with coalitions of states. The Swedish Armed Forces shall thus continue to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and war by being able to participate in international operations in peacetime.

Military defence shall be able to protect society and its functionality, based on existing capabilities and resources, by assisting society, under certain conditions, including in peacetime crises. With a strengthened peace time organisation and force structure, and increased training of conscripts etc., conditions in this respect can be improved and increased. The Swedish Armed Forces, together with other involved agencies, need to cooperate and plan for how resources can be used effectively in different situations. If possible, support for society should also be provided in the event of the risk of war and war. In this context, the Government also wishes to highlight the importance of the home guard and voluntary defence organisations in dealing with peacetime crises.

International defence cooperation is important to strengthen our military capabilities in various respects. Participation in bilateral and multilateral international cooperation strengthens total defence and contributes to
stability and security in the neighbourhood. It must therefore be possible to conduct activities in military defence alone and together with others.

The Swedish Armed Forces shall maintain and develop military defence. Other actors also contribute to goal fulfilment, including the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Defence University and the Swedish Fortifications Agency. Military defence also depends on the operation of a number of functions in society such as health care, transport and the supply of various types of consumables.

The Government's proposal means that total defence is given an improved capability and endurance to defend Sweden against armed attacks. This means a comprehensive reinforcement of military defence. The proposal aims to strengthen, among other things, the military defence's capability to defend Sweden against armed aggression, to assert Sweden's territorial integrity and to collaborate with other countries and organisations.

6.4 Goal for the civil defence

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<th align="left">The Government’s proposal: The goal for the civil defence shall be to have the capability to:</th>
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<tr>
<td align="left">– protect the civilian population,</td>
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<td align="left">– safeguard the most important societal functions,</td>
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<td align="left">– maintain necessary supplies,</td>
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<td align="left">– contribute to the military defence's capabilities in the event of armed attack or war in the world around us,</td>
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<td align="left">– maintain society's resilience to external pressures and contribute to strengthening the willingness to defend,</td>
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<tr>
<td align="left">– contribute to strengthening society's capability to prevent and deal with extraordinary events in peacetime, and</td>
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<td align="left">– contribute with available resources to the capability to participate in international peace-building and humanitarian operations.</td>
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The reasons for the Government’s proposal: In substance, the Government proposes the same goal for civil defence as the Defence Commission but with a partly different formulation. Since the term assignment is commonly used in the government's ordinances with instructions to agencies to describe the individual agency's task and activities, the Government's proposal is instead formulated as a goal. In accordance with the Budget Act (2011:203), the Government will return to the Riksdag
with an account in the Budget Bill of what has been achieved annually in relation to the goals decided by the Riksdag. In order to increase opportunities for following up and expressing opinions on goal fulfilment, the Government proposes that the term capability is included in the goal proposal.

Civil defence is the civilian activity that agencies, municipalities and regions, as well as individuals, companies and the civil society and others undertake to prepare Sweden for war. In peacetime, the activities consist of contingency planning and capability-enhancing measures. During heightened alert or ultimately in the event of war, the activities are necessary measures to attain the goal for civil defence. The civilian population shall be safeguarded by civil defence providing protection, rescuing those in distress and providing care. The most important societal functions shall be safeguarded, and the necessary supplies maintained. The will to defend among the population shall be strengthened and resilience to external pressures that threaten Sweden's freedom of action and the right to self-determination shall be maintained. This is achieved, among other things, through a strong psychological defence.

Military defence depends on the functioning of a number of important societal functions in order to carry out its tasks. Civil defence shall therefore assist the military defence measures and participate in the overall defence efforts. The actions taken in civil defence contribute to strengthening society’s capability to prevent and handle extraordinary events in peacetime and resources shall also be usable in international peace-building and humanitarian operations.
7. Economy, management and monitoring

7.1 Economic orientation of military defence

**The Government's assessment:** In comparison with the economic framework for military defence in 2021, which follows from the Government's proposal in the 2021 budget bill, there is reason, in addition to the notifications made before 2019, to increase the economic framework for military defence by SEK 5 billion in 2022, SEK 10 billion in 2023, SEK 16 billion in 2024 and SEK 22 billion in 2025. The economic framework for 2025 will be prolonged from 2026 onwards. This means that the financial framework for military defence will increase by SEK 1 billion in 2024 and a further SEK 1 billion in 2025, which together is SEK 3 billion in addition to what has previously been announced until 2025. A further SEK 13 billion will be added between 2024 and 2030 by means of a prolongation of the financial framework in 2025. The economic effects of the additional funding on expense area 6 Defence and on society's emergency readiness will be presented in the 2021 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill. The Defence Commission will also evaluate the realisation of the 2020 defence resolution by means of a control station in 2023 in order to ensure that the reinforcement and cost development are in phase with the Riksdag's decision on direction and economic framework. In the 2024 budget bill, the government will return to the question of the implementation of the defence decision and handling the planning framework for the period 2026-2030. Before that, the Defence Commission will submit their proposal on the planning framework.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** Considering the gradually deteriorated security situation and the need to increase operational capabilities in the combat units, for the defence resolution period 2016-2020 the Riksdag has decided to add a total of approximately SEK 33 billion to military defence. The level of appropriations for military defence has been increased by SEK 10.5 billion from 2016 to 2020 inclusive.

The need for stable long-term planning conditions for military defence has been expressed by both the Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8) and the Swedish Agency for Public Management (2018:27). The Defence Commission stresses that it is essential to create predictability, responsibility and control in the defence economy in order to implement the proposed reinforcements to the wartime organisation. In order to create predictability and provide the necessary planning conditions, the Defence Commission proposes that the defence decisions should include a direction for the
economic framework during the defence resolution period, as well as an overall direction for the subsequent five-year period. The Swedish Agency for Public Management also emphasises the need for long-term thinking and stability in the field of defence and makes suggestions, among other things, on how the Government's management of the Swedish Armed Forces can be more strategic and how the Swedish Armed Forces' internal leadership, management, and control can be strengthened.

The Government shares the views of the Defence Commission and the Swedish Agency for Public Management on the need for a clear orientation for the economic framework. Development of the wartime organisation as proposed in this bill will take time. Stable and long-term planning conditions are important in order to create an effective development of defence and to bring about the changes the Government wishes to achieve.

The specific conditions that apply to the field of defence, with long lead times for the provision of personnel, materiel and infrastructure, suggest that the economic direction should be indicated in a longer time horizon than the three-year calculation horizon set out in the Government's budget bill. In order to provide the authorities with good conditions for developing the activities in the proposals in this bill, the Government considers that there is a need to clarify the economic direction for the next ten years.

In the budget bill for 2021, the Government proposes that SEK 5 billion is added to military defence in 2021. In the same bill, the Government stated that the increase in appropriations for military defence of SEK 5 billion annually from 2022 to 2025, in addition to previously made decisions, which was announced in the budget bill for 2020, remains in place. After further consideration, the Government believes that in addition to this, the economic framework for military defence should increase by SEK 1 billion in 2024 and a further SEK 1 billion in 2025. This means that in total a further SEK 3 billion will be added by 2025, in addition to what was previously announced. A further SEK 13 billion will be added between 2024 and 2030 by means of a prolongation of the financial framework in 2025. In comparison with the economic framework for military defence in 2021, which follows from the Government’s proposal in the 2021 budget bill, the economic framework will thereby increase by SEK 5 billion in 2022, SEK 10 billion in 2023, SEK 16 billion in 2024 and SEK 22 billion in 2025, in addition to the appropriations decided before 2019. The economic framework for 2025 is prolonged from 2026 onwards. As the funding is added, subsequent years will be subject to price and wage adjustment. The
economic effects of the additional funding on expense area 6 Defence and on society's emergency readiness will be presented in the 2021 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill.

Table 7.1 Economic framework for military defence 2021-2025, UO6 appropriation 1:1 – 1:12 (excluding price and wage adjustment) 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic framework 2021 according to the 2021 budget bill</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic framework 2021 according to the 2021 budget bill</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announced appropriation changes before 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announced increases in the 2020 budget bill</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Announced increases in this bill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New economic framework</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with what is stated in section 4 Policy focus, the Defence Commission will also evaluate the realisation of the 2020 defence decision by means of a control station in 2023 in order to ensure that the reinforcement and cost development are in phase with the Riksdag's decision on direction and economic framework. The Government will return to the Riksdag in the 2024 budget bill to ensure that the implementation of the defence decision continues as planned and with proposals on how the planning framework for the period 2026-2030 will be managed. The Defence Commission shall submit proposals for the planning framework before this. The definitive decision regarding the defence resolution period 2026-2030 is made on the basis of the Defence Commission's proposals in the defence resolution 2025. If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 Policy focus. From 2021, the Government agencies shall plan for the possible implementation of the measures set out in Section 4 Policy focus.

In the report When planning meets reality –Internal leadership, governing and follow-up with the Swedish Armed Forces (2018:27), the Swedish Agency for Public Management recommends, among other things, that the Government reviews the purpose and structure of the defence price index.

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1 Appropriation at 2021 prices. In subsequent years, the economic framework and new funding will be subject to price and wage adjustment.
The Defence Commission has endorsed the Swedish Agency for Public Management's proposal that the Government, as a first step, should review and analyse the purpose and principles behind the defence price index so that the structure is fit for purpose. In the light of the Swedish Agency for Public Management’s report among other things, the Government has decided, within the framework of the general price and wage adjustment, to instruct Statistics Sweden to identify and describe alternative price calculation methods for defence materiel appropriations.

7.2 Developed management and monitoring of military defence

The Government’s assessment: Work on developing the Government’s management and monitoring of the military defence agencies should continue. The Government’s management should focus on becoming more strategic by being clear, long-term, operationally oriented and geared towards the results of activities. It is important that the Swedish Armed Forces and other military governmental agencies apply the principle of design in accordance with the distributed finances, what is known in English as design to cost. This means that the acquisition of materiel as well as unit operations must be adapted to the funds available, for example in terms of volume and requirement specifications. The methods for monitoring and evaluating the activities need to be developed.

The reasons for the Government’s assessment: The requirements for Swedish defence capabilities have changed and Sweden will invest significant resources in total defence in the coming years. It is of great importance that decisions of the Riksdag and the Government take effect and that they can follow developments in this area, which places high demands on management and monitoring.

During the present defence resolution period, the Government has taken several measures to develop the financial management and monitoring of military defence, in particular with regard to the provision of materiel. With effect from 2019, the main proposals made in the report Logistics for Higher Defence Readiness (SOU 2016:88) have been implemented. The reform has, among other things, meant that the Swedish Armed Forces are responsible for the material used by the agency, while the responsibility of the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration for the implementation of decided materiel procurements has been clarified. Responsibility for activities correlates with responsibility for finances and appropriations. The implementation of the new planning, decision-making and follow-up process
described in the report Investment Planning for Defence Materiel (SOU 2014:15) began with improved reporting of planned investments in the 2017 budget bill. With effect from 2019, the developed planning and decision-making process has also been implemented based on the new areas of responsibility of the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration. This creates better conditions for strategic long-term management of materiel investments and for increased supplies of defence materiel to combat units. This represents major changes that need time to stabilise and have an impact.

In 2018, the Government commissioned the Swedish Agency for Public Management to analyse and assess, among other things, whether the economic data provided by the Swedish Armed Forces to the Government is appropriate as a basis for the budget process. The Swedish Agency for Public Management was assisted by the National Financial Management Authority in parts of the assignment. In the report When planning meets reality – Internal leadership, governing and follow-up with the Swedish Armed Forces (2018:27), with the appendix on the National Financial Management Authority’s assessment of the effectiveness of the Swedish Armed Forces Investment Plan (ESV 2018-00176), the Swedish Agency for Public Management and the National Financial Management Authority concluded that investment planning has shortcomings. The Government has since instructed the Swedish Armed Forces, with the support of the National Financial Management Authority and the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, to develop the investment plans in accordance with the report's recommendations. Development work has focused, among other things, on measures to achieve planning in both long-term and annual balance, improved handling of price developments and planning that is not based on presumed export revenues. All in all, the work has resulted in several of the deficiencies that the National Financial Management Authority noted having now been addressed.

Although several measures have been taken, the Government considers that management and monitoring in the field of defence need to be further developed, among other things in the light of the recommendations of the Swedish Agency for Public Management (2018:27) and the conclusions of the Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8).

The Government shares the view of the Swedish Agency for Public Management and the Defence Commission that management should be directed towards becoming more strategic and less detailed, in order to
increase the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to determine within a given economic framework how the agency's tasks should be solved in order to achieve the objectives for the activities. The Government's management shall be clear, long-term, operationally adapted and focused on the results of the activities.

Based on the Riksdag's decision on the goal for military defence, the Government intends to decide on goals for the operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces. The operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces mean the capability of the combat units to resolve their tasks and the agency's capability to use the combat units in military operations in peacetime and to defend Sweden against an armed attack. The Swedish Armed Forces have proposed goals for operational capabilities that provide a good basis for the Government's further consideration.

The operational goals shall determine the design and economic balances of the activities and contribute to a more coherent management of defence, where the goals for operational capability govern the orientation and follow-up of materiel procurement, infrastructure investments and training and exercise activities. This also increases the possibility of specifying what support the Swedish Armed Forces need from civil defence.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment of the need for coherent management of the military defence agencies. In addition to the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Defence University and the Swedish Fortifications Agency perform tasks in military defence. In order to achieve the growth of the wartime organisation and the strengthening of operational capabilities, the management of the government agencies should reflect that the military defence goal is common to all agencies in military defence and that all agencies should contribute to goal fulfilment and to increasing the operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The Defence Commission believes that the Riksdag needs to gain a better insight into how the operational capability is developing, in order to be able to decide on the overall development needs of the wartime organisation. The Government is continuously reviewing its reporting to the Riksdag, including the presentation of the report of results in the budget bill, and will, within the framework of this work, review the possibilities of reporting how
operational capacity develops over time in more detail. The Government believes that operational capability goals will improve the conditions for following up on the development of operational capabilities.

Although the Government’s management of its agencies becomes more strategic and the focus is increasingly on the goals and on monitoring the results of the activities, the Government sees a continued need to be able to follow the production of the wartime organisation, including in terms of the set-up, putting into order and conversion of combat units and the development of the combat units’ wartime fighting capability. The Government therefore intends to commission the Swedish Armed Forces to present a plan for the development of the wartime organisation in a ten-year perspective that includes, among other things, developments in personnel, materiel, infrastructure and exercises. The agency shall report annually to the Government how the wartime organisation is developing in relation to the plan and the allocated funding. The Government in turn will report to the Riksdag every year in the budget bill how the wartime organisation is developing.

In view of the funding provided to the Swedish Armed Forces and the difficulties that have been found in the Swedish Armed Forces’ financial planning and documentation, the Government considers it particularly important to ensure that the Swedish Armed Forces have well-functioning methods for economic management, planning and follow-up. Like the Defence Commission, the Government stresses the importance of the Swedish Armed Forces and other agencies with support roles in military defence working on the principle of design in accordance with the distributed finances, what is known as design to cost. This means that the acquisition of materiel as well as unit operations must be adapted to the funds available, for example in terms of volume and requirement specifications. In the event of increases in costs, reprioritisation should be carried out primarily in the context of the activities concerned or within the materiel project concerned, e.g. by adapting the requirements. The Defence Commission also stresses that any increases must have consequences in the areas in which they arise and that the consequences of any reprioritisation should be reported back to the Riksdag.

In order to increase the degree of predictability and transparency in economic planning for the two most resource-intensive materiel areas, combat aircraft and underwater capabilities, the Government has developed the reporting of these in the 2021 budget bill. Specific frameworks, which
are set by the Riksdag according to the Government's proposals, will be introduced for combat aircraft and underwater capabilities.

7.3 Economic orientation of civil defence

In the budget bill for 2021, the Government proposes that civil defence is allocated SEK 1 billion in 2021. In addition, the Government announced that civil defence will be allocated SEK 1.5 billion in 2022, SEK 2.5 billion in 2023, SEK 3 billion in 2024 and SEK 3.8 billion in 2025. See also section 9 Civil Defence.

7.4 Management and monitoring of civil defence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Government's assessment: Work on developing the management and monitoring of civil defence should continue. The management and monitoring should be long-term and clearly focused on the results of the activities.</th>
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</table>

The reasons for the Government's assessment: Civil defence is the civilian activity that agencies, municipalities and regions, as well as individuals, companies and the civil society and others undertake to prepare Sweden for war. In peacetime, the activities consist of contingency planning and capability-enhancing measures. During heightened alert or ultimately in the event of war, the activities are necessary measures to attain the goal for civil defence.

The activities are thus carried out by many different actors at central, regional and local level. Effective implementation of such extensive activities requires well-functioning planning, coordination and follow-up.

The Defence Commission stresses the importance of coherent planning in peacetime, as well as coordinated action during heightened alert and war. According to the Defence Commission, the large number of civil defence actors, as well as the diversified composition, set particular requirements for leadership and coordination. The commission makes a number of proposals on how processes and structures can be strengthened at central, regional and local level in order to achieve coherent planning that includes a balance between different areas of activity and sectors within civil defence.

The Government largely shares the Defence Commission's assessments and proposals. Steps forward have been taken between 2015 and 2020; among other things the Government has decided on planning instructions for civil
defence and the agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence have been given specific tasks in letters of appropriation, in order to develop civil defence. The Government believes that further steps can be taken. The Government intends to decide on a structure for responsibility, management and coordination in civil defence at central, higher regional, regional and local level. Such a structure will also strengthen society's capacity to deal with peacetime crises. The Inquiry on civil defence (Ju 2018:05) is tasked with proposing a structure for responsibility, management and coordination at national, regional and local level. The inquiry shall, among other things, propose a structure with Government agencies divided into sectors and agencies responsible for sectors. The inquiry shall also propose an appropriate geographical breakdown for civilian management and coordination at regional level and how these areas are to be managed. The inquiry shall also propose a clearer management capability for municipalities and regions. The inquiry shall also propose how the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's task of promoting civil defence coordination can be developed and analyse whether there is a need to achieve an increased degree of coordination and a holistic approach to the resource needs that may exist in crisis preparedness and civil defence.

The Government further notes that the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Armed Forces, as a result of a joint government mission, have developed a model for coherent planning, focusing primarily on civil defence. Within the framework of this model, a national programme plan is planned to be developed. The programme plan is intended, among other things, to provide a coherent evaluation of the state of readiness planning. It is important that the agencies' work on achieving effective planning and follow-up of civil defence continues to develop during the defence resolution period.

The Defence Commission points out that there are currently no performance indicators to assess and follow up developments in civil defence and proposes that such indicators be developed. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that there is a need for performance indicators to assess and follow up developments in civil defence. At the same time, the Government notes that work has begun on indicators for the work of agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence, as well as for the work of priority regions and municipalities on civil defence. The indicators refer to personnel in wartime placement, planning for support to the Swedish Armed Forces, joint cooperation between actors that meets high standards of secrecy and
robustness, and planning to operate from alternative or protected command positions. These indicators have been used, among other things, for the assessments made in the budget bills for 2019, 2020 and 2021. The Government considers that the possibility of developing additional performance indicators for the follow-up of civil defence should be further analysed.

The methods for monitoring results in civil defence should be further developed. Civil defence planning is currently being performed on the basis of the planning instructions decided by the Government in 2015. In accordance with these instructions, the agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence annually report on the work that has been performed in civil defence. The Government believes that this work should be further developed as part of strengthening monitoring activities. The Government intends to decide on revised planning instructions to the agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence. In addition to these annual reports, the Government receives additional information on the state of civil defence, including through the annual follow-up of appropriation 2:4 Emergency Preparedness and the agencies’ risk and vulnerability analyses that also include the perspective of heightened alert. An important part of the work of developing the follow-up of civil defence is thus to coordinate and structure the work that is already being performed by key actors.

7.5 Management and monitoring of total defence

The Government's assessment: The continued development of coherent planning for total defence, as well as follow-up of the overall capability in total defence is important. With an increased level of ambition and significant financial contributions, it is necessary to ensure that the intended impact is achieved and that public funds are used effectively. An allocation-funded agency for the monitoring and evaluation of total defence activities will be established by 1 January 2023.

The reasons for the Government's assessment: In order to strengthen overall capability in total defence, it is important to continue to develop coherent planning for total defence.

In this bill, the Government proposes an overall goal for total defence. Military and civil defence contribute jointly to this goal. In the bill the Government also describes the starting points that should form the basis for
total defence planning in the form of a basis for dimensioning and endurance, among other things. The Government believes that common goals and starting points improve the conditions for achieving a coherent focus, planning and development of total defence. On the basis of the Riksdag's decision on this bill, the Government intends to decide on revised instructions for planning in civil defence, military defence and total defence.

The Defence Commission stresses that methods should be developed for monitoring the results of total defence planning. This includes the conditions to evaluate the overall capability of total defence and to follow up the overall goal of total defence.

Well-developed management and monitoring of military and civil defence creates better conditions for coherent orientation, planning and monitoring of total defence. In order to monitor and evaluate the overall capability in total defence, it is therefore necessary to start from the follow-up and evaluation work in military and civil defence.

The Defence Commission proposes that a new agency is set up with the task of reviewing, evaluating and following up activities in total defence as a whole. The Defence Commission proposes that such an agency should have as its primary task the evaluation of the goal for total defence and the tasks of military and civil defence respectively. It is also proposed that the agency is tasked with evaluating the overall capability of total defence in relation to the requirements that have been set for total defence. Effective use of tax revenue is also proposed to be an important task.

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment of the importance of independent follow-up and evaluation of total defence. With an increased level of ambition and significant financial contributions, it is important to ensure that the orientation gives the intended effect and that public funds are used effectively.

The Government intends to instruct a special investigator to analyse and make proposals to establish a new agency for monitoring and evaluating activities in total defence. The agency shall be financed by appropriations. The new agency shall be established by 1 January 2023.
8. Military defence

8.1 Strengthened military defence

**The Government's assessment:** Military defence needs to be further strengthened and operational capabilities improved. Military defence is designed and dimensioned to be able to counter an armed attack on Sweden. The endurance of the wartime organisation needs to be strengthened with an improved balance between support and combat units. A core defence capability needs to be safeguarded over time. A new wartime organisation should be organised starting on 1 January 2021 and gradually completed during the 2020s.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** In view of the deteriorated international situation, the Government considers that military defence needs to continue to be strengthened and operational capabilities improved. Following the 2015 defence resolution, the military defence is undergoing a transition in which the Swedish Armed Forces refocus on national tasks. The single most important thing in the period 2016-2020 has been to increase the operational capability of the combat units and ensure the overall capability of total defence. Several measures have been taken to implement this approach. All parts of the Swedish Armed Forces organisation that have tasks to perform in the event of heightened alert have been organised as wartime units. All personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces needed in the event of heightened alert are placed in the wartime organisation. Basic training with conscription and refresher training has been reintroduced in order to create complete wartime units with coordinated exercise training. Exercise activities have increased considerably. Military exercises, as well as readiness and mobilisation exercises, are again being performed continuously and during the period a major joint armed forces exercise, Aurora 17, has taken place for the first time in 20 years. Increased investments have been made in materiel in all services. The Swedish Armed Forces' ability to operate together with other countries and organisations has increased, not least through participation in international exercises of high complexity. The measures taken and the increased capability achieved during the period 2016-2020 provide a good basis for further development.

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that in peacetime the Swedish Armed Forces perform tasks both nationally and internationally with good quality. The Government notes that the Swedish Armed Forces' combined operational capabilities have increased in recent
years. At the same time, the Government considers that operational capability has not developed at the rate envisaged in the defence resolution in 2015 or that is justified by external developments. When it comes to the requirement to be able to face an armed attack, the Swedish Armed Forces have an operational capability with limitations. These include both limitations in the wartime organisation's overall ability to respond to armed attacks and the capability of individual wartime units to perform their tasks. The limitations in capability are due, among other things, to human and material deficiencies in the wartime units, insufficient joint training, very insufficient unit volume and limited endurance.

Defending Sweden against armed aggression is the main task of military defence and must be the starting point for dimensioning all agencies with tasks in military defence. Military defence should, as part of total defence, have such strength, composition, command, readiness and endurance that it can act as a deterrent. A strong Swedish total defence, with a credible warfare capability, has a deterrent and thus peacekeeping, effect.

Building up units and military capabilities takes a long time. In order to build the capability to face increasing threats and have a base for growth, a sufficient number of units of different types need to be continuously maintained. Even in times of a more favourable security situation when the immediate need to respond to armed aggression is low, this task should govern the structuring of military defence.

The Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8) notes that the present wartime organisation is not designed to counter an armed attack and acts of war on Swedish territory. The wartime organisation as a whole is undersized, as the number of units is not large enough to sustain resistance to an armed attack. The capability is also limited by the fact that individual functions, such as logistics and command, are not designed, or too few in number, to support all units of the wartime organisation at the same time. The Defence Commission therefore believes that the wartime organisation needs to be restructured and strengthened. The Government shares the Defence Commission's view. The wartime organisation needs, among other things, to be given greater durability given the requirements that should be set for total defence as a whole. Furthermore, a better balance is needed between the constituent parts, in particular between support and combat units. It follows that the number of units in the wartime organisation needs to be increased, not least within the army, and that support functions such as logistics and command need to be strengthened.
The development of the new wartime organisation will begin on 1 January 2021 with existing personnel and materiel. Given the long lead times for the procurement of materiel and infrastructure and for supply of personnel, the Government estimates that the new wartime organisation will not be ready until 2030. At the same time, the Government underlines the importance of the new wartime organisation being developed and completed as soon as possible. It is fundamental to the development of the wartime organisation to increase the operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces and to create trained wartime units that can be deployed to defend Sweden against an armed attack. The Armed Swedish Forces shall have planning in place to carry out accelerated production of wartime units, once a particular decision has been taken.

In the Defence Policy Orientation Bill for the period 2016-2020 (prop. 2014/15:109), the Government decided that all wartime units should be given a requirement for availability in peace time, as well as a readiness requirement for the adoption of heightened alert. The Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8) proposes adjusted readiness requirements. The commission considers that the requirements for availability in peace time should be discontinued and that the requirements for the Swedish Armed Forces to maintain readiness for performing tasks both in peace and in wartime should be expressed in the form of readiness requirements. The Government shares the Defence Commission’s assessments and believes that it should be made clear in particular that the requirements for readiness should be based on the dimensioning task of being able to counter an armed attack. The main requirement for readiness that the Government should set the Swedish Armed Forces is that the agency as a whole should be able to be organised for war and that all units should be able to start to perform their wartime tasks within a week after a decision on increased readiness and general mobilisation. Within the framework of this basic requirement, parts of the wartime organisation must be able to start performing their wartime tasks earlier than this. It should be possible to counter an attack even if it is a surprise attack and it should be possible to perform mobilisation during an ongoing attack.

The Government notes that the peacetime tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces, in particular the assertion of territorial integrity, also involve readiness requirements for parts of the agency. Certain parts of the Swedish Armed Forces should therefore be immediately available for operations regardless of whether or not the Government has decided to enhance readiness.
## 8.2 Development of the wartime organisation

### 8.2.1 The Armed Forces wartime organisation

The Government’s proposal: The approach shall be that the Swedish Armed Forces' wartime organisation shall consist mainly of the following wartime units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wartime units</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Staff with Division Command Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanised Brigade</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorised Brigade (reduced)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanised Battalion Gotland (reinforced)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranger Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arctic Ranger Battalion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Defence Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Police Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Battalion</td>
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<td>Air Defence Battalion</td>
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<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
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<td>Navy Staff</td>
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<td>Corvette Division</td>
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<td>Mine Countermeasures Division</td>
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<td>Clearance Diving Division</td>
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<td>Submarine Division</td>
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<td>Amphibious Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport Aircraft Squadron</td>
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<td>Specialist Aircraft Squadron</td>
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<td>State Aircraft Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter Wing</td>
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<td>Helicopter Squadron</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Surveillance and Air Control Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Swedish Armed Forces Joint Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters with staff units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Region with staff</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Communications Battalion</td>
<td>2</td>
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The reasons for the Government's proposal: Based on the Defence Commission's proposal, the Swedish Armed Forces have reported how the agency believes that the wartime organisation should be developed during the period 2021-2030. The Government largely shares the Defence Commission's and the Swedish Armed Forces’ assessments and proposals.

The proposed wartime organisation is a goal for how the organisation is destined to grow by 2030. Development of the new wartime organisation will begin from 1 January 2021. The wartime units will gradually be organised and filled up with personnel and materiel, as well as performing joint exercises.

The wartime organisation should have a comprehensive and versatile composition so as to be able to carry out different types of operations. Each service should be able to operate both individually and together with others. The capability to carry out operations with other countries and organisations should be strengthened and is important for developing competence in the wartime organisation. In this context, the Government would like to stress the importance of continuing cooperation with countries around, and with involvement in, the Baltic Sea region. Cooperation between Swedish and Finnish units should be particularly emphasised.

In addition to the wartime units listed in the table above, there are also independent units. When the Armed Forces mobilise, military depots for example are organised as part of the wartime organisation. In peacetime, the military depots consist of the peacetime organisational units.

### 8.2.2 Army

The Defence Commission considers that the army's wartime organisation needs to be reinforced in order to strengthen the capability to face an armed attack. According to the Defence Commission, this should be done by reorganising and providing resources to existing units, as well as establishing
new wartime units. The Government shares the Defence Commission's view.

After mobilisation, the army shall be able to face an armed attack. The wartime organisation should be able to be deployed in one operational direction or, if necessary, be able to operate in several directions at the same time.

The army is responsible for the production of two types of wartime units, field units and territorial units. Field units shall be able to perform tasks throughout the country and to be organised in brigades and other independent units. The field units have, among other things, high firepower, good protection and good mobility. The territorial units, such as the local defence battalions, perform tasks in the military regions. The territorial units are responsible for defending, protecting and guarding important areas and objects, as well as supporting and protecting the mobilisation and concentration of other wartime units.

The Government considers it essential during the period 2021-2025 to organise the two present brigade structures into two mechanised brigades, to begin the organisation of a third mechanised brigade and a reduced motorised brigade in the Stockholm area (Life Guard Brigade), as well as to strengthen the units on Gotland where the core consists of a mechanised battalion with reinforcement resources. During the period, the organisation of a divisional staff and a divisional command battalion and other independent field units shall also begin. A structure that creates functioning wartime units that exercise together is a priority. A cohesive, strengthened and expanded logistics function for the army is central to a functioning wartime organisation.

The brigades are the heart of the army’s capability to counter an armed attack. Three mechanised brigades are planned to be set up by Norrbotten Regiment (I 19), Skaraborg Regiment (P 4) and South Skåne Regiment (P 7). The mechanised brigades and the reinforced mechanised battalion on Gotland are organised based on the availability of tanks and combat vehicles. All mechanised battalions should be given sufficient capability for indirect fire support.

In addition to three mechanised brigades, it is proposed to start the organisation of a reduced motorised brigade (Life Guard Brigade). This wartime unit is planned to be set up by the Life Guard (LG) and is primarily
intended for the defence of the Stockholm metropolitan area. On Gotland, it is proposed to develop a reinforced mechanised battalion with anti-aircraft and indirect fire. In addition to this, the defence of Gotland should be reinforced with territorial units.

In order to command the brigades in a larger ground operational context and coordinate a battle with reinforcement resources, a divisional staff with a service unit in the form of a divisional command battalion should be organised. The divisional level is necessary in order to assemble the army units in an operational direction and improve the opportunities for coordination with any additional third-party ground units. The capability for indirect fire should also be reinforced by the establishment of two divisional artillery battalions with gun barrel artillery.

It is proposed to establish two Arctic ranger battalions. A further ranger battalion is organised through a reorganisation of the present light infantry battalion. Five local army defence battalions are further proposed to be added.

In addition, it is proposed that a number of independent wartime units are organised in the form of, among other things, intelligence, security, surveillance, engineering, artillery, logistics and air defence units. The electronic warfare capability should gradually be strengthened. The threat of weapons of mass destruction or targeted weapons with chemical, biological or radiological substances implies that the armed forces' capability to also operate in such an environment must be strengthened. A unit that is specialised in this area should be maintained. This unit, which is a qualified resource, can also support society in general if necessary. At the same time, the ability to avoid or to some extent operate in a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threat environment must be strengthened in the Armed Forces' other wartime units.

The Government notes that the proposed expansion of the army's wartime organisation requires that all combat vehicles and battle tanks are organised in units and an upgrade of all vehicles needs to begin during the period 2021-2025. New battle tanks and combat vehicles need to gradually replace battle tank 122 and combat vehicle 90 in the 2030s. The process of replacing these systems should start during the period 2021-2025 to allow for a turnover in the 2030s.
All Archer-type artillery pieces should be organised in units. The acquisition of new artillery pieces for the division artillery battalions should also begin during the period 2021-2025. New modern air defence missile systems will be introduced in accordance with previously taken decisions and air defence systems from the materiel reserve will be organised in units. Substantial procurement of military stock materiel such as trucks, tracked vehicles, specialist vehicles, command and communication materiel, firearms, ammunition and personal equipment is planned to be carried out to strengthen the overall capabilities of the entire wartime organisation.

If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 policy focus.

8.2.3 Navy

The Defence Commission considers that the naval forces need to be reinforced to improve the capability to respond to an armed attack, while at the same time strengthening the capability to maintain territorial integrity. The commission also considers it important to achieve an improved balance between, for example, combat units and support functions within the Navy. The Government essentially agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment.

The majority of the navy units shall be immediately available and have a high initial capability to conduct missions in the immediate area. The main focus of the navy shall be to counter an armed attack in the Baltic Sea. With a new amphibious battalion on the west coast, the navy is given an increased capability to operate in several operational directions.

It is proposed that the submarine division is maintained and developed during the period 2021-2025 by increasing the number of submarines in the wartime organisation from the present four to five. The growth is done by maintaining the third Gotland class submarine. The two new Blekinge class submarines will, when delivered, replace the remaining Södermanland class submarine. Preparations for the acquisition of replacements for the Gotland class submarines should begin by 2025. However, the decision to acquire will not be made until the two Blekinge class submarines have been delivered, at the earliest.

It is proposed to maintain and develop the corvette divisions by initiating the mid-life upgrade of the Visby class corvettes during the period 2021-2025. Anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes should be upgraded and air
defence capabilities developed through the integration of air defence missiles. The intention of the mid-life upgrade is to maintain the Visby class for continued operation until 2040. The Gävle class corvettes should be maintained as well as the Stockholm class patrol vessels. Preparations for the acquisition of new surface combat vessels, in place of Gävle class corvettes, will begin during the period 2021-2025 with the aim of ensuring that two new ships will be delivered during the period 2026-2030. The acquisition of two more corvettes will be initiated before 2030.

The Spärö class clearance diving vessel should be half-time modified and the lifetime of the Koster class mine countermeasure vessels extended. The ability to operate from land with heavy anti-ship missiles is maintained until replacement systems in the form of land-based heavy anti-ship missiles have been commissioned during the period 2026-2030. Previously decided systems in the form of sea- and air-based anti-ship missiles will also be commissioned during the period 2026-2030.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that amphibious units on the west coast and Gothenburg are required, among other things, to help defend and protect the important western connections. An additional amphibious battalion is therefore proposed to be organised and located in Gothenburg. Replacement of assault craft, missiles and other organisation-determined materiel should begin during the period. A new anti-aircraft system for the amphibious battalions should be procured.

In order to achieve a balance between combat and support units, it is proposed that the navy’s logistics organisation is strengthened by establishing a seaborne logistics concept with two naval logistical battalions. The acquisition of vessels for the naval logistical battalions should begin during the period 2021-2025. Personnel growth needs to mainly occur in the amphibious battalions and naval logistic battalions by increasing the number of conscripts. The Government stresses the importance of maintaining the capabilities of the naval forces, also during periods of extensive materiel reviews.

If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 Policy focus.

8.2.4 Air Force

The Defence Commission considers that it is important to strengthen basic capabilities in order to increase the availability of the combat air system,
ensure redundancy in air defence capabilities and achieve a better balance in
the air force as a whole. Among other things, this involves measures to
improve the command, protection, deployment and effectiveness of air
combat forces. According to the Defence Commission, an increased
operational effect can be achieved through increased redundancy and better
balance between parts of the air force. The Government shares the Defence
Commission's view.

The air force shall have the capability to respond early and collectively to an
armed attack and maintain territorial integrity. The combined air defence
capability is in many respects a prerequisite for the air force and other
services being able to operate. The air force shall therefore primarily,
together with air defence, have the capability to control airspace and protect
against enemy air forces and other long-range capabilities.

The present six fighter squadrons are proposed to be maintained between
2021 and 2025. In order to maintain the number of fighter squadrons, it is
proposed that the present JAS 39 C/D fighter combat system is maintained
in parallel with the introduction of the new JAS 39 E fighter combat system.
With the introduction of the JAS 39 E, four fighter squadrons of the JAS 39
C/D are successively being replaced. It is proposed to maintain two fighter
squadrons with JAS 39 C/D. This means that JAS 39 C/D will continue to
form the core of the fighter combat system during the next defence
resolution period and, together with JAS 39 E, will be an important part of
the wartime organisation beyond 2030. Maintaining the JAS 39 C/D also
enables a number of aircraft to be used as advanced training aircraft.

In order to strengthen the capability of the fighter squadrons, additional air
to air missiles and associated mission equipment should be procured and
electronic warfare capabilities strengthened. In addition, a new missile with
an anti-ship capability and air to ground capability will gradually be
introduced. The Government also believes that long-range combat
capabilities should be procured and supplies to the fighter squadrons should
begin during the period 2026-2030. The Riksdag has announced to the
Government that the Riksdag supports what the Parliamentary Committee
on Defence states about Sweden’s disposal of long-range combat systems in
the coming mandate period (bet. 2015/16:FöU3 point 7, parliamentary
communication 2015/16:49). The Government considers that the
announcement has been finalised.
The capability of combat aircraft for intelligence gathering should be maintained. The reconnaissance pods that reach the end of their technical life early in the period should be replaced through the acquisition of new sensors.

Decisions on the replacement of the present fixed sensors and for the S100D/ASC 890 airborne command and air surveillance platform should be made during the period 2021-2025 and replacement should be completed after 2025. Airborne signal reconnaissance capabilities should be maintained during the period 2021-2025 by maintaining S102B and a decision on replacement is due to be made after 2025.

Measures have been taken to improve the air base organisation and the capability to disperse to bare bases, but the organisation needs to be further strengthened. Each air wing should be capable of maintaining a permanent wing base and additional side bases.

The helicopter wing shall consist of four helicopter squadrons organised as separate wartime units. Two squadrons are focused on ground operational capabilities, one squadron is focused on naval operational capabilities and one squadron is focused on support for the special forces. The present transport and specialist aircraft squadron will be divided into three parts: a transport aircraft squadron, a specialist aircraft squadron and a state aircraft squadron.

In 2019, Sweden entered into a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom (Future Combat Air Systems Cooperation FCAS-C) in order to explore possibilities for meeting future operational requirements through cost-effective development of future technology needs in the field of combat air and to assess the possibilities for both nations to ensure the necessary industrial competence in the long term. The Government estimates that decisions on studies, joint technology development and demonstrators may need to be made in 2021. Initially, technological development shall primarily support the JAS 39 system.

If Finland were to choose the JAS 39 Gripen as a new combat aircraft, this would provide opportunities for enhanced cooperation both operationally and in the operation and development of combat air capabilities. If Finland takes such a decision, the strategic importance of this should, as far as possible, also be taken into account in the national direction for the development of combat air capabilities.
If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 Policy focus.

8.2.5 Home guard

The home guard is an important part of the defence of Swedish territory and plays a central role in protecting the mobilisation of other wartime units, as well as in the protection and defence of important areas and facilities. It thus creates the conditions for other parts of the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to operate. The home guard units have an important role to play in the context of tasks related to host country support. The home guard will continue to carry out important tasks in the handling of peacetime crises.

In order to perform its tasks, the Government considers that the home guard units should be reinforced materially and the long-term provision of personnel for the home guard ensured. The home guard's wartime organisation will comprise 40 battalions.

The supply of materiel to the home guard should be coordinated and taken into account in other procurements, to the army in particular, but with a specification adapted to the needs of the home guard. The Defence Commission proposes a major renewal of materiel for the home guard. The Government shares the view of the Defence Commission, but also notes that in some cases it will be natural for the home guard units to receive materiel transferred from other wartime units as new materiel is brought into the wartime organisation. Thus, during the period 2021-2025, the supply of newly acquired materiel, such as vehicles, sensors and night vision equipment, begins, as well as materiel transferred to the home guard.

With a new wartime organisation and a improved means for recruitment, the Defence Commission believes that it is important that the number of home guard soldiers is increased. The Defence Commission has set an objective which should, as a first step, be a wartime organisation of at least 25,000 home guard soldiers. At the same time, the commission stresses that voluntary involvement in the home guard should not be restricted. The Government shares the view that the home guard's numbers should increase and that voluntary involvement is central. Given that basic training levels have been low and have fallen below the targets set during the years without conscription, the recruitment base for the home guard has decreased, which is also a challenge during the coming years. As conscription volumes increase, however, the conditions for increasing numbers in the home guard are improving.
If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 Policy focus.

**The home guard in peacetime crisis preparedness**

The home guard is also of great importance for peacetime crisis preparedness. There is a great deal of volunteer involvement on the part of home guard soldiers and other volunteers. The Defence Commission has pointed out that the home guard's ability to provide support in peacetime crises can be developed. In times of crisis in peacetime, the home guard's support to society is normally based on the individual's voluntary commitment in each individual case. The Defence Commission believes that this voluntary commitment may need to be complemented in the event of major crises so that entire home guard units can be deployed. This creates opportunities for greater numbers, while the home guard can operate in the regular organisation and not in a temporary organisation. In this context, the Defence Commission has pointed out the possibilities offered by the Home Guard Ordinance (1997:146) regarding the deployment of the home guard if this is necessary, for example for national security. The Government notes that the support the home guard is currently providing to peacetime crisis preparedness is in all essential respects appropriate.

8.2.6 Special forces

During the period 2021-2025, special forces will continue to develop towards national defence. This shall be done at the same time as maintaining an ability to perform operations internationally with the special forces.

The support functions of the special forces in logistics and command should be strengthened during the period in order to begin the development towards the new requirements on endurance that have been set for the military defence. The present light infantry battalion should be developed into a ranger battalion with the task of supporting the special forces, among other things. In developing the capacity to act in the event of an armed attack, the transport capacity of the special forces should also be maintained with the necessary adaptations.

8.2.7 Defence logistics

The Defence Commission is of the opinion that well-functioning defence logistics is a prerequisite for the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to operate and respond to an armed attack, as well as to be able to effectively receive international support. The Defence Commission emphasises that the entire
logistics chain functions and that today’s logistics organisation is to be strengthened. The Government shares the Defence Commission’s assessment. The combined logistics function in the Swedish Armed Forces shall be strengthened. The logistics function is currently undergoing a reorganisation so that each service will be responsible for the units that form the forward (tactical) logistics. This development should continue. In addition, a number of operational logistics resources need to be created to ensure a coherent logistics chain, as well as the establishment of effective interaction with other actors.

The entire logistics chain must operate in a coherent system that enables the simultaneous mobilisation and deployment of the entire wartime organisation on the basis of the requirements for readiness and endurance that have been set for it. This includes the supply of essential consumables (such as food and ammunition), technical services (repair resources), medical services, transport services and other logistics. It also requires the acquisition and storage of ammunition, spare parts, fuel, pharmaceuticals and sustainable food, including the ability to handle domestic fresh produce. Transport resources are crucial to the logistics function. Military logistics also depend on support that civil defence can provide to the Swedish Armed Forces.

Effective and appropriate cooperation between the Swedish Armed Forces’ own logistics and activities that are performed or can be performed by other actors, e.g. within the framework of Nordic defence cooperation, other multilateral cooperation or by companies, should be established and, if necessary, expanded. A coherent logistics function is also a prerequisite for being able to provide and receive international support effectively.

During the period 2021-2025, the logistics function within each service will grow in line with and adapted to the growth of the services in general. Operational logistics battalions shall be organised. Priority should be given to determining and initiating the development of a logistics concept that can respond to the collective needs of the wartime organisation in the simultaneous mobilisation and deployment of the entire wartime organisation, as well as the requirements that need to be set for coordination with total defence in general.

During the period 2021-2025, work on identifying the collective needs of the wartime organisation will also be prioritised and stockpiling based on the requirements for endurance will begin. This means that significant resources
should be used for the acquisition of vehicles, military stock materiel and consumables that are essential for war, in order to ensure the stocks deemed crucial to meet the requirements of the endurance of military defence, after 2025.

Medical services in the Swedish Armed Forces should be developed and strengthened. Responsibility for medical resources for acute treatment on the battlefield should lie with the respective defence commands. In order to strengthen medical resources in the military regions and priority areas, the two hospital companies should be developed into mobile field hospital companies, each responsible for one field hospital. However, the Government wishes to stress that the health care chain must be seen in a context within total defence. The Inquiry on Health Care Readiness states in its interim report Health Care in Civil Defence – basis for defence policy direction (SOU 2020:23) that the starting point should be that the Swedish Armed Forces should primarily be responsible for all medical care on the battlefield and that civilian health care must have insight into and planning for what additional needs it should be able to meet. The Government shares the inquiry’s assessment.

If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 Policy focus.

8.2.8 Command and control

A functioning and coherent command system in the Swedish Armed Forces is crucial to being able to use the wartime units in a relevant way. The Defence Commission stresses the importance of the operational command functions being robust and secure enough to facilitate the military defence's command and control needs in wartime, as well as cooperation with civil defence. The Government shares this assessment.

It is important that there is an overall strategic command concept in order to clarify responsibilities and tasks and associated support systems, units, infrastructure and redundancy for the conditions that may prevail in wartime. Effective and clear conditions for leadership and responsibility for creating coordination between military and civil defence are also essential for the reinforcement of total defence.

The requirements for command structure should be determined early in the period 2021-2025. This should form the basis for further efforts to achieve a stronger command capability based on a balance between infrastructure,
including available radio spectrum, command materiel, command support systems and methods. The wartime organisation also needs to be developed with staffs and associated communications and service units, including starting the development of two communications battalions for the operational level. A reorganisation of the command units should be carried out in order to adapt the command units to the proposed development with brigade and division commands.

In the task of providing and receiving military support, command is a fundamental capability for being able to perform and coordinate operations. This applies to both methodological and technical interoperability. The capability in this context shall continue to be developed and, where necessary, should be taken into account in the acquisition of materiel and support systems, as well as in the development of methods.

8.3 Personnel supply

8.3.1 Basic training with conscription

**The Government's assessment:** An extension of the wartime organisation in accordance with the proposals in this bill means an increased need for personnel. The total number of positions in the wartime organisation will amount to about 90,000 when the organisation is fully reinforced with both personnel and materiel.

Basic training volumes should gradually increase so as to reach 8,000 conscripts per year by 2025. Basic training should last for at least 9 months.

The capacity of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency to muster and recruit individuals for conscription needs to be increased through the establishment of a third examination office.

A force generation model should be developed with a view to producing and subsequently maintaining and, where appropriate, further developing, complete trained wartime units.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** The Government's proposal to expand the wartime organisation means an increased need for personnel. The Government judges that the total number of positions in the wartime organisation will amount to about 90,000 positions plus reserves when the organisation is fully reinforced with both personnel and materiel, compared with about 60,000 positions in 2020.
In order to ensure a wartime organisation of sufficient volume, the opportunities for total defence need to be further safeguarded and more persons than today need to complete basic training with conscription and then become part of the wartime organisation. With more people carrying out basic training, the conditions for supplying the Swedish Armed Forces with officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, as well as home guard personnel are also improved. Basic training with conscription also contributes to the popular endorsement of the Armed Forces. The Government believes that conscription is a prerequisite for the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to produce fully manned, trained and practised wartime units.

The Defence Commission’s assessment is that the increased personnel needs within the wartime organisation require that up to 8,000 a year need to undergo basic training from 2024. That means double the 2019 level. The Swedish Armed Forces propose a phased expansion of basic training volume from 2021, leading to 8,000 a year undergoing basic training with effect from 2025. The Government shares the assessment of the need to gradually expand basic training volume from 2021 and that 8,000 conscripts per year should be trained from 2025 onwards.

In order to enable the increase in basic training volumes, a well-functioning mustering and selection process is required. In order to be able to select more individuals for basic training and to identify the best-suited individuals for each group of positions, more individuals need to undergo mustering. The Government underlines the central role of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency in achieving increased basic training volume and thus increased personnel growth in the wartime organisation. According to the Government’s decision, the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency also carries out the examination of personnel for other agencies. For example, the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency conducts trials of all eligible applicants for police training and is thus an important part of the Government’s objective that the Police Authority shall grow by 10,000 police employees by 2024.

The Government shares the Defence Commission’s assessment that the agency’s capacity to muster and recruit individuals for conscription needs to be increased by setting up an additional examination office in 2022 and therefore proposes in the 2021 budget bill an increase in appropriation 1:6 Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency in order to begin its establishment.
The Government, like the Defence Commission, believes that the Swedish Armed Forces should increasingly train recruits for command positions in the wartime organisation at platoon and company level. These can then complement the employed personnel. Also, recruits who are trained for command positions are an important recruitment base for employment as officers. Furthermore, the Government would like to stress the importance of basic training to have a content and length that allows the recruit to have such knowledge and skills immediately after training that he or she can be placed in a wartime unit and that during the basic training the wartime unit has trained and exercised together. This requires a basic training period of at least nine months. Recruits who have completed and passed basic training shall be placed in the ordinary wartime organisation.

The Government stresses that basic and refresher training should be organised so as to allow the training and recirculation of wartime units that have trained and exercised together. Plans should be developed with a view to producing and subsequently maintaining and, where appropriate, further developing, complete trained wartime units. This includes, among other things, training, refresher training and replacement of personnel according to a force generation plan. It is particularly important that the brigades and their constituent units train and exercise together.

8.3.2 Employed personnel

Standing units, mainly staffed with employed personnel, are important in order to quickly meet the need for qualified units in peacetime and to perform certain tasks before the rest of the wartime organisation can be mobilised. The periodically and continuously serving soldiers and sailors shall therefore man the standing units. With an expanded wartime organisation consisting mainly of conscript personnel in mobilisation units, the Government assesses that the need for periodically serving soldiers and sailors will be reduced.

Access to officers and officers in reserve is a prerequisite for an expanded wartime organisation and thus the supply of these categories of personnel is an important issue. High retirement levels and few new officers have led to an imbalance in supply. In addition, the lead times for training officers are long and the imbalance will thus persist throughout the 2020s. The Government notes that the Swedish Armed Forces have a mandate to organise the supply of officers and officers in reserve to address this imbalance. To this end, the Swedish Armed Forces have taken several measures; for example the agency has created more paths into the profession.
through an adapted training program lasting about a year and which can be
applied for by people who already have an academic degree. Measures are
also being taken to re-employ officers who have taken early-retirement.

Since the present officer training program was established in 2007, the
wartime organisation and its development have been subject to significant
changes. The Government therefore intends to review the officer training
program and ensure its effectiveness. Wartime conditions demand certain
personal skills and leadership and it is important that officers are trained in a
wartime position and given the opportunity to command units. It is also
important that officers have the knowledge and skills required for the
training and assembling of wartime units, as well as other functions in
peacetime. The objectives of officer training are set out in Regulation
(2007:1164) for the Swedish Defence University. Any adjustment of the
officer training does not mean that the organisation or assignments of the
Swedish Defence University will be changed.

8.3.3 Home guard and contract personnel
Volunteer personnel serving with home guard or voluntary contracts will
continue to be an important part of the supply of personnel, in particular for
staffing the home guard. The home guard will continue to be a large part of
the wartime organisation and is thus an important part of Sweden's defence
capabilities. Due to smaller numbers undergoing training each year,
recruitment to the Home Guard has been decreasing for a long time. With
an increased basic training volume, there is also the possibility of securing
the supply of personnel to the home guard in the longer term. The territorial
units being introduced may also favour recruitment to the home guard. The
Government believes that voluntary commitment should continue to form
the basis of the home guard.

The Defence Commission considers that conscripts who no longer have a
wartime position in other wartime units and who have been transferred to
the personnel reserve should be encouraged to apply to the home guard
units. With local selection of conscripts to the territorial units, recruitment to
the home guard can be facilitated. The commission's proposal on basic
training of territorial units and training for field units will thus replace today's
direct training for the home guard. The Government shares the Defence
Commission's assessment. The home guard will thus be provided with
personnel by means of returns from other parts of the wartime organisations
and by staffing from the voluntary defence organisations.
In November 2014, the Inquiry on the Swedish Armed Forces’ military personnel supply (Fö 2013:03) presented the report The Swedish Armed Forces in Society – long-term, sustainable military personnel supply and a modern public endorsement of the armed forces (SOU 2014:73). With reference to this investigation, the term home guard was changed to home guard soldier in, among other things, the Home Guard Ordinance (1997:146). The proposals made in the report were based on a voluntary personnel supply system. The Government’s decision to reactivate the obligation to undergo mustering and complete basic training with conscription means changing the conditions for the personnel supply for the military defence. The Government therefore intends to file the report.

8.3.4 Gender equality

Gender equality in the personnel composition of the Swedish Armed Forces contributes to the legitimacy, credibility and public endorsement of the military defence. Being able to reach the entire recruitment base in the population is also a prerequisite for being able to appoint the most suitable. Continued active work should be done to increase the number of women at all levels of the Swedish Armed Forces. Total defence and the obligation to undergo mustering and complete basic training with conscription covers both women and men, and the reintroduction of basic training with conscription provides better conditions to increase the number of women in military defence. In this respect, balanced appointment requirements are important. The Government believes that it is important that the Swedish Armed Forces conducts systematic development work in order to be an equal organisation by continuing to work on information and communication, as well as identifying and removing any obstacles to women applying for and taking up employment in the Swedish Armed Forces. In this respect, the Swedish Armed Forces should, among other things, require that the material and equipment acquired is appropriately designed for the entire recruitment base.

8.3.5 Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency becomes Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency

| The Government’s proposal: | The Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency shall change its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency. |

The change of name leads to amendments to the Social Insurance Code, the Public Employment Act (1994:260), the Total Defence Act (1994:1809) the
Act on the measures taken by municipalities and regions before and in the event of extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened alert (2006:544), the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400) and the Total Defence Data Act (2020:151).

The memorandum's proposal is in line with the Government's proposal.

The consultation bodies approve the proposal or have no comment on it. The Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency does not object to the proposal, but considers that the expression agency is more timely than administration. The Swedish Defence University welcomes the proposal with its broadened assignment for the agency, but stresses that the expression agency can better reflect the activities of a forward-looking total defence.

The reasons for the Government's proposal

The assignment of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency

In connection with the introduction of the Total Defence Act (1994:1809), the Total Defence Conscription Administration was set up with the task of, among other things, being responsible for dealing with individuals who were to be conscripted. The agency's tasks, according to the Total Defence Act, included calling in and mustering conscripts, enlisting total defence conscripts and deciding on placing in the wartime organisation.

The activities of the Total Defence Conscription Administration changed in response to the Riksdag's decision in 2010 (prop. 2009/10:160, bet. 2009/10:FoU8, parliamentary communication 2009/10:269) that total defence personnel supply should be based on volunteering and not on conscription. However, the agency continued to have a responsibility to maintain, among other things, the activities of personnel reporting and registration of wartime organisation-placed total defence conscripts.

Within the framework of the voluntary system, the Agency provided selection tests based on the needs of the Swedish Armed Forces in recruitment and also undertook assignments, for a fee, from other agencies in total defence, to carry out examination activities, i.e. testing and assessing persons for occupations and training in the area in question (sections 1 and 3 of the Regulation [2010:1472] with instructions for the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency).
The Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency received its present name on 1 January 2011. The change of name was prompted by the change in the role of the agency and was considered to reflect its tasks more clearly.

In the light of the Government's decision of 11 December 2014 (Fö No 15) on the reactivation of the obligation for conscripted personnel to undergo refresher training and the Government's decision of 2 March 2017 (Fö No 3) to activate the obligation for total defence conscripts to undergo mustering and complete basic training, the activities of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency have changed again. Among other things, the agency has resumed its tasks under the Total Defence Act to call to and implement the mustering of total defence conscripts, handle enrolment to basic training with conscription, call total defence conscripts to refresher training and thereby examine related issues related to the rights and obligations of the individual under the law. The agency also continues to carry out the activities that follow from its instructions, such as assignments financed by fees.

**Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency – a clearer designation**

The activities of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency have changed radically through the 2014 and 2017 Government decisions. Therefore, as set out in the memorandum, the name of the agency no longer reflects the agency's main activities. It is also reported that the agency's contacts with total defence conscripts, among others, have shown that the current name entails uncertainties as to what the agency's assignment is. It is also noted that the agency does not recruit but conducts tests and selections of applicants for professions, training courses and positions. This means that the agency’s name is misleading at present.

The Government agrees with the memorandum's assessment that there are grounds for considering a change of name for the agency.

The Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency is central to the provision of personnel to total defence and should have a name that clearly reflects the agency's activities and assignment. The proposal to change its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency takes into account the agency's extensive activities and meets this requirement. The proposed name also adequately reconnects with the agency's previous name.

The Government therefore intends to change the name of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency to Swedish Defence Conscription and
Assessment Agency. The change of name leads to changes in the statutes in which the term "Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency" appears.

8.4 Changes in the peace time organisation

The Government’s proposal: During the period 2021-2025, the Riksdag authorises the Government to re-establish Norrland Dragoon Regiment (K 4) in Arvidsjaur, Älvsborg Amphibious Regiment (Amf 4) in Gothenburg, Uppland Air Wing (F 16) in Uppsala, Bergslagen Artillery Regiment (A 9) in Kristinehamn, Dala Regiment (I 13) in Falun and Västernorrland Regiment (I 21) in Sollefteå, with training detachment in Östersund, as distinct organisational units, with the focus that Dala Regiment (I 13) in Falun and Västernorrland Regiment (I 21) in Sollefteå will be re-established by 2022 and reach full capacity during the period 2026-2030.

The reasons for the Government’s proposal: The peace time organisation of the Swedish Armed Forces consists of the regiments, air wings, schools and centres etc. which as a collective term are named organisation units. The Defence Commission (Ds 2019:8) believes that extensions to the peace time organisation are needed so as to achieve a larger wartime organisation. The Defence Commission proposes that Norrland Dragoon Regiment (K 4) is re-established in Arvidsjaur, that the air combat school organisation unit in Uppsala is reorganised into the Uppland Air Wing (F 16) and that a regiment is re-established on the west coast. The Defence Commission also proposes the establishment of two smaller regiments for basic training of territorial defence battalions. The Defence Commission notes that Falun, Härnösand, Sollefteå and Östersund have shown interest in the establishment of armed forces operations. The Defence Commission also proposes increased artillery training in Kristinehamn and Villingsberg, as well as increased basic training on Gotland.

In its documents for the defence policy bill, the Swedish Armed Forces proposes that three new organisation units should be established: Norrland Dragoon Regiment (K 4) in Arvidsjaur, Älvsborg Amphibious Regiment (Amf 4) in Gothenburg and Uppland Air Wing (F 16) in Uppsala. According to the Swedish Armed Forces, this is mainly a reorganisation of existing organisation units or the re-establishment of former regiments that take over existing operations from another organisation unit, while activities are expanded due to the addition of new wartime units.
The Government agrees with the assessments of the Defence Commission and the Swedish Armed Forces that an enhanced wartime organisation also requires an expansion of the Armed Forces’ basic organisation. Military presence around the country also contributes to the popular endorsement of the Swedish Armed Forces. Accordingly, the Government proposes the re-establishment of the three basic organisation units Norrland Dragoon Regiment (K 4) in Arvidsjaur, Älvsborg Amphibious Regiment (Amf 4) in Gothenburg and Uppland Air Wing (F 16) in Uppsala. The Government also proposes the re-establishment of Dalregementet (I 13) in Falun, Västernorrland Regiment (I 21) in Sollefteå and Bergslagen Artillery regiment (A 9) in Kristinehamn with Villingsberg as a firing range. As a result of the proposals, the amphibious regiment in Berga will change its name to Stockholm Amphibious Regiment and the Artillery Regiment in Boden will again be called Boden Artillery Regiment (A 8).

The re-establishment of Norrland Dragoon Regiment (K 4) in Arvidsjaur is motivated by the expanded basic training resulting from the organisation of two Norrland ranger battalions. With increased training in Arvidsjaur by Norrland ranger battalions specially designed and trained to operate in a subarctic environment, the military presence and capability in upper Norrland as well as the opportunities to operate in the Arctic area are also reinforced. Since operations have been continuously conducted in Arvidsjaur even since Norrland Dragoon Regiment was disbanded, most of the infrastructure needed is already in place. Restoring the organisation unit Norrland Dragoon Regiment needs, in addition to existing premises, further military and civilian personnel so as to set up a regimental staff, as well as support units such as a logistics unit, defence health and firing range personnel.

According to the Government, an amphibious regiment in Gothenburg is needed to make room for and train the amphibious battalion that is proposed to be established on the west coast. A permanent military presence on the west coast is also important for operational reasons, not least to protect port areas and westbound links. Since Älvsborg Amphibious Regiment was disbanded, some activities have continued to be carried out in the area. This means that the basic infrastructure remains. However, several items need to be addressed due to the expansion of activities. These measures include accommodation for conscripts, office and training facilities and an expansion of the number of berths, boat storage and mooring places. As the training of conscripts and exercises with wartime units expands, the need for more and larger training areas and firing ranges in the archipelago is
also increasing. In order to re-establish Älvsborg Amphibious Regiment (Amf 4), a gradual redeployment of personnel will be performed, mainly from the amphibious regiment in Berga.

The re-establishment of the Uppland Air Wing (F 16) creates a more robust base organisation and creates the conditions for possible growth of the Air Force in the longer term with combat aircraft permanently based. The present organisation units in Uppsala, i.e. the Air Combat School and the Air Force Staff, should remain alongside Uppland Air Wing. Since flight operations have been continuously conducted in Uppsala even since the disbanding of the Uppland Air Wing, albeit to a limited extent, the infrastructure needed is already in place. The existing personnel at the Air Combat School will be distributed between the Air Combat School and Uppland Air Wing organisation units.

The Government considers that Dalregementet (I 13) in Falun and Västernorrland Regiment (I 21) in Sollefteå are needed mainly for military geographical reasons and for readiness. It is proposed that the regiments are re-established by 2022 and will reach full capacity during the period 2026-2030. The Defence Commission notes that there is a clear need for units for the protection of western connections via western Svealand to the Oslo area, as well as via Jämtland County to Trondheim. There is also a need for units for the protection of important total defence facilities. For geographical, readiness and training reasons, the commission assesses that two new basic organisation units need to be established in the form of two smaller regiments. The regiments should have a training capacity of approximately 200–250 incoming conscripts annually. Conscripts should as far as possible be recruited regionally to ensure, among other things, high readiness in the wartime units. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission’s assessment.

The Dala Regiment (I 13) in Falun is re-established to train two local defence battalions for the protection of connections to Oslo and for the protection of important total defence facilities. The Government also intends to instruct the Swedish Armed Forces to report on how the home guard activities of the Dala Regiment group can be further developed and reinforced, for example through the continued development of special functions or weapons systems within the framework of the home guard.

A regiment is also being re-established in lower Norrland to train two local army defence battalions for the protection of connections to Trondheim.
The regiment is located in Sollefteå in the form of the re-establishment of Västernorrland Regiment (I 21). A training detachment, Jämtland's Ranger Corps (equivalent to a battalion) is located in Östersund. The basic training of conscripts in Västernorrland Regiment will take place in both Sollefteå and Östersund. In view of the strategic situation, it is important to reinforce the military presence in Östersund in peacetime, including the training of conscripts. In this context, the possibility of using infrastructure connected to the airport at Frösön also needs to be safeguarded. The Government considers Östersund to be of strategic importance for the future development of the Swedish Armed Forces.

In order to handle the increased training needs resulting from having more artillery battalions, the Government believes that Bergslagen Artillery Regiment (A 9) should be re-established in Kristinehamn with Villingsberg as a firing range. The regiment will be responsible for training two or three artillery battalions for the brigades in southern Sweden, among others. It is proposed that the re-establishment begins during the period 2021–2025 and will reach full capacity during the period 2026–2030.

The Government believes that in the longer term there is a need for additional military capability in upper Norrland in the form of, for example, special border ranger units. Further military presence and capabilities are also justified from a security policy point of view. Therefore, in the run-up to the defence resolution in 2025, the Swedish Armed Forces should be given the task of presenting an analysis of what a capability reinforcement could best look like in Northern Lapland. In the report, the Swedish Armed Forces shall assess consequences regarding, among other things, operational capabilities and finances. The capability reinforcement will be trained to operate in a subarctic environment and will also be able to operate on the Arctic area within the framework of the trilateral cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The expansion of the peace time organisation, and also the reinforcement of the wartime organisation, leads to an increased need for investment in infrastructure. Access to training areas and firing ranges is also crucial for the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to achieve the targets set during the period. This may include the need to apply for changes to conditions in environmental permits that have already been issued and the need to apply for new environmental permits for previous training areas and firing ranges that are needed in the locations where new peacetime organisation units are set up.
Taking into account the requirements for the tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces, the agency shall take environmental considerations into account in its activities in peacetime. The Swedish Armed Forces are working systematically to achieve sustainable activities that reflect the goals set out in Agenda 2030 and the national environmental quality goals. The Swedish Armed Forces have an environmental management system that aims to give guidance to activities in how to respond to and deal with environmental issues, thus reducing the agency’s environmental impact and taking environmental considerations into account in all activities. The strategic environmental work is something that permeates the entire organisation, from environmental policy and environmental goals to working methods and follow-up of operations. Within the framework of this environmental work, the Government sees it as important that the Swedish Armed Forces continue to develop and integrate environmental considerations into activities and that the Swedish Armed Forces continue to contribute to achieving the generation goals for environmental work and environmental quality goals set by the Riksdag and, if necessary, propose measures for the development of environmental work.

Expanded or new activities at the Swedish Armed Forces' firing ranges and training areas are environmentally tested in accordance with the provisions of the Environmental Code. Several of the Swedish Armed Forces' training areas and firing ranges have high ecological value and a rich biodiversity. The Swedish Armed Forces, and the Swedish Fortifications Agency, which owns the land, are responsible for managing the ecological value of the areas by means of management and forestry plans in accordance with legislation and other governance.

8.5 Defence acquisition

The Government's assessment: The acquisition of defence materiel should ensure the Swedish Armed Forces' requirements of materiel and services in time of peace, heightened alert and ultimately war. Security of supply should be developed to meet requirements for the endurance of the wartime organisation.

The reasons for the Government's assessment: Supply of materiel is designed to ensure the Swedish Armed Forces' requirements for materiel and services so that wartime units can perform their tasks in peace, heightened alert and ultimately war. Operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces determine demand and supply of materiel.
Over the next five years, military defence funding will increase. A significant part of this increase will be allocated to acquisition of new materiel and maintaining existing systems.

The Government notes that a continued increase in defence capabilities increases demands on all agencies involved in the supply of materiel. This applies to the Swedish Armed Forces' skill in regard to placing orders for acquisition, planning and finding a balance between acquisitions and maintenance, as well as the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration’s drawing up of technical and economical specifications, as well as the performance of commercial activities. This also applies to the Swedish Fortifications Agency's planning and documentation for investments linked to facilities, equipment and other infrastructure. A well-functioning supply of materiel requires efficient processes and with a balance between tasks and resources for individual agencies.

Operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces shall be paramount within the financial framework. Volumes and requirements shall be adapted to available resources. The Government notes that it is of key importance that in-time deliveries to wartime units create conditions for a strengthened wartime organisation.

A defence of Sweden against armed aggression puts higher demands on military security of supply than a service mainly focussed on international operations. It is a prerequisite for the strength of the wartime organisation that activities critical to supplies to armed defence also can be performed during heightened alert. Sufficient security of supply, i.e. the possibility of obtaining materiel and supplies required by an operation, is critical for credible military defence.

The endurance requirements for total defence, including military defence, as shown in section 6.1 Starting points for total defence, illustrate the importance of planning and preparation to ensure that materiel, technical know-how, spare parts, ammunition and other supplies are available to a sufficient extent for the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to perform their tasks, in spite of supply disruptions. It is also important to ensure that companies on which the Swedish Armed Forces depend have the capability to continue the defence-critical parts of their activities during heightened alert. The Government stresses that the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration's task of supporting the Swedish Armed Forces in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war must be clearly regulated.
Since the 2009 defence decision, the armament policy has formed the base line for the supply of materiel. According to this, the supply of materiel is firstly to be carried out through maintenance and upgrading of existing materiel, secondly through acquisition of existing and proven materiel available on the market and thirdly through the development of new materiel. The Government notes that the application of the armament policy needs to acknowledge increased focus on territorial defence and armed aggression, requirements on security of supply, essential security interests and changing international conditions.

8.5.1 Essential security interests

In previous bills in the field of defence policy, the Government has identified the combat aircraft domain, the underwater domain and integrity-critical parts of the command domain, such as sensors, electronic warfare and crypto, as essential security interests for Sweden.

In the designated domains, for reasons of security of supply, the state has a particular need for national technical know-how and a defence technological and industrial base, which requires, among other things, that the defence industry is given long-term conditions for its activities. At the same time, in each individual acquisition, it is up to the companies to prove their competitiveness, efficiency and ability to deliver. Essential security interests may in some cases be met with foreign materiel if requirements for security of supply, transfer of technology and knowledge are taken into account. However, the ability to maintain national integrity and independence in domains of particular importance is vital.

8.5.2 A strategy for defence acquisition

The Government intends to instruct an inquiry to develop a long-term acquisition strategy for the military defence. Part of the inquiry’s assignment is to clarify the meaning and application of essential security interests and integrity-critical domains. The inquiry shall also describe the roles and responsibilities of the state and defence industry and clarify the state's commitment vis-à-vis the defence industry, including the essential security interests. The inquiry shall also identify the state's possibilities for technical and financial insight in defence companies and analyse whether these are sufficient from a risk management perspective and if they are proportionate to the public interest in the companies’ activities. The inquiry shall also describe the strategic choices made by the state with regard to domestic development and production of defence materiel, as well as report on the
consequences of these choices in terms of Sweden's defence, security and foreign policy interests. The strategy shall provide the state with guidance for action that is well considered, long-term and sustainable in relation to the operational capabilities of the armed forces, as well as the state's resources and security interests. The forthcoming inquiry with the task of developing a long-term acquisition strategy for the military defence shall have parliamentary endorsement such as a parliamentary reference group.

8.5.3 The market for defence materiel

**The Government's assessment:** Defence companies contribute to the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces. The competence that exists within the defence industry also makes Sweden attractive as a partner country and therefore increases the possibility of accessing cutting-edge foreign technology.

The reasons for the Government's assessment: The Government stresses the importance of an active defence industry in Sweden that develops and produces qualified defence materiel. Defence companies contribute to the Swedish Armed Forces' operational capabilities and the security of supply by creating the conditions for developing, producing, maintaining and adapting defence materiel. The competence within the defence industry also makes Sweden attractive as a partner country and therefore increases the possibility of accessing cutting-edge foreign technology. The Government notes that the skills and know-how that the Swedish companies possess are beneficial for Sweden's defence and security policy.

The defence industry operating in Sweden is privately owned. Foreign ownership has gradually increased and in recent decades there has been a gradual consolidation within the defence market. At the same time, the development of more knowledge-intensive and service-producing activities has led to the establishment of more small and medium sized companies that offer goods and services to both the civil and military markets. The market has also become increasingly internationalised. Most defence companies depend on imports of components from abroad. The importance of exports has also increased and is a prerequisite for the Swedish companies' ability to maintain a strong and competitive level of technology and the necessary skills. Several defence companies supply products for both civilian and military use or have pure civilian products alongside the military products that fall under the definition of munitions.
The defence materiel market is subject to more restrictions than most other markets. Generally, there are only government customers. Although the defence companies in Sweden to a large extent are export companies, the Swedish Government's orders are a prerequisite for securing, above all, the fundamental development and production capacities needed in the combat aircraft and underwater domains. Without this coverage, this competence base cannot be maintained over time. Streamlining, rationalisation and restructuring of the industry are from time to time necessary to maintain competitiveness. The importance of the companies to the operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces consequently means that measures taken should be carried out in dialogue with the state and with some state insight.

8.5.4 Defence materiel exports and export support activities

The Government believes that export support activities should be used as a means of promoting a cost-effective supply of defence materiel contributing to the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces. Within this framework, and with the clear limitations of Sweden's export control legislation, the Government notes that the export support is necessary in order to maintain the defence industry competence base.

The Government notes that export support is provided by several actors and that coordination and common priorities are a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the activity. Government export support may be a prerequisite for the Swedish companies' access to the market.

8.5.5 European Defence Fund

The European Defence Fund (EDF) will be the EU's first defence research and development programme and aims to promote the development of a strong, competitive and innovative European defence technological and industrial base. The fund is financed under the EU multiannual financial framework 2021-2027. Sweden thus finances the fund via the EU budget.

The Government notes that the EU defence initiatives as a whole mean that the role of the EU in the field of security and defence policy is strengthened, and that this contributes to increasing security in Europe. Thus, the Government notes that the EDF rules may affect materiel cooperation with strategic partners outside the EU, as restrictions on third countries apply. Several EU Member States, including Sweden, rely heavily on the USA for supply of defence materiel. For Sweden, a balanced assessment is therefore
important when assessing which cooperations would serve Swedish interests best in a long-term perspective. The Government also deems that competition and, to a certain extent, diversity in supply chains are a prerequisite for fulfilling Member States' materiel needs.

The Government notes that, by its purpose, the EDF complements national research, technology and materiel development in integrity-critical areas. The EDF should be used actively as an instrument to increase knowledge in areas that can lead to a broader scope for the integrity-critical areas. It can also provide wider funding possibilities for strategic competences, provide access to research that is not integrity-critical in itself but is important for Sweden, act as an instrument to promote the transition between research and development, by means of joint demonstrators, or provide a bridge between research and development and the procurement of materiel.

The Government encourages a broad and active Swedish usage of the EDF by both industry and research actors. The EDF should be an integral part of the Swedish materiel procurement. Government co-financing should therefore be granted to projects that promote key targets for the development of the Swedish Armed Forces' operational capabilities, in both the short and long term.

8.6 Research and development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Government's assessment:</th>
<th>Research and development is a prerequisite for the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to maintain their operational capabilities and help secure access to integrity-critical knowledge and strategic competence in Sweden. Research and development should be directed more towards increasing the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to face future threats in the long term. It is important that research and development is maintained regardless of the level of readiness.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The reasons for the Government's assessment: | A continued increase in defence capabilities places increased demands for sustainable and long-term access to our own capability in research and development, including technological development and necessary research infrastructure.

Understanding key technologies and their importance for both the threat pattern and defence capabilities is central to the development of doctrines, combat techniques and tactics, as well as for materiel procurement. The deteriorating trend of security abroad increases the demand for security of supply for these key technologies.
The Government notes that conditions that enable the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration to obtain research and development results and use them in the development of military capabilities need to be safeguarded.

Military defence is highly dependent on integrity-critical knowledge, that is to say, knowledge that is not openly available or that can be purchased from others but that can only be achieved through one’s own efforts. The government believes that Sweden itself, via long-term and sustainable research and development, must cater for its need for integrity-critical knowledge. Some integrity-critical knowledge also needs to continue to be maintained at a high international standard in order to preserve and develop the possibility of exchange, thereby ultimately contributing to the generation of threshold effects.

The development of technologies relevant to defence is largely performed in the civil society. The application of new civilian technologies is therefore necessary for the services to remain relevant. The Government therefore stresses the need for cooperation between civil and military research actors and clients. Research and development also contribute to the availability of strategic competences. The expression strategic competences refers to areas of knowledge where individuals and groups who, because of their specific skills in the event of heightened alert and thus ultimately war, need to be made available to both the military and the civil defence. The Government believes that it is an important component of the defence of Sweden that strategic competences are identified within the state, within academia and at private actors.

International research and development cooperation is important for Sweden to be able to generate and access relevant knowledge for military defence through exchange and in cooperation with others. The government stresses the importance of continued multilateral research and development cooperation within the framework of the EU and NATO, among others, as well as bilateral cooperation with relevant strategic partner countries.

### 8.7 The Armed Forces' need for support from civil defence

<table>
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<th>The Government's assessment: In civil defence, the actors concerned should plan to be able to support the Swedish Armed Forces during heightened alert.</th>
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Ministry of Defence
The reasons for the Government's assessment: In the event of a threat of war or war, the total defence efforts will initially gather the forces of military defence, while safeguarding the main functions of society and protecting the civilian population. Society needs to be able to quickly adapt for wartime conditions, to gather forces nationally and to mobilise military and civilian resources that benefit defence efforts.

In order to perform its tasks, military defence depends on the operation of a number of functions in society such as electricity and fuel supply, health care, transport and water and food supply, as well as various types of essential supplies. It is important that civil defence contributes to the operational capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war. In civil defence, the actors concerned should plan to be able to support the Swedish Armed Forces during heightened alert. The planning for civil defence support to the Armed Forces shall be based on the needs of the Swedish Armed Forces. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that the Swedish Armed Forces’ defence planning needs to be gradually developed in order to provide a basis for civil defence actors at various levels.

Each agency shall take into account the requirements for total defence in its activities. The Government believes that the agencies concerned must support and collaborate with the Swedish Armed Forces in order to strengthen Sweden's defence capabilities. This cooperation and support capability should continue to be developed and planned in cooperation between agencies at both national and regional level.

Civil defence support for the Swedish Armed Forces may involve difficult trade-offs, both in an emergency situation and in the longer term, in terms of how resources should be prioritised, taking into account the needs of the Armed Forces during heightened alert, as well as society’s general needs. Critical resources that may limit the capabilities of the military and civil defence, as well as the overall defence effect in the event of heightened alert, need to be kept together nationally. The distribution of critical resources cannot be based on an individual actor’s needs but must be seen in a broader context. It is therefore important that there are planning and principles for how priorities are to be set.

Military defence depends not only on the support of other agencies, but also on goods and services provided by industry. In the event of heightened alert and ultimately war, the Swedish Armed Forces need support from the
business community. Preparations for this must be made in peacetime. In December 2019, the Inquiry on Total Defence Security of Supply (Fö 2018:01) presented its report The Role of Industry in Total Defence (SOU 2019:51). The inquiry proposes, among other things, that the Government instructs agencies to identify companies that perform activities that are important for total defence. The proposal is being processed within the Government Offices.

8.8 The Swedish Armed Forces' support for society

The Riksdag has announced to the Government what the Parliamentary Committee on Defence proposes for a review of civil military issues and support for society (bet. 2016/17:FöU6 point 6, parliamentary communication 2016/17:176).

Military defence shall have the capability to defend Sweden against armed attack and protect society and its functionality by assisting the rest of society, with existing capabilities and resources both in peacetime and in times of heightened alert. Society’s resources shall be used effectively through the interaction of the relevant agencies, which is ultimately a matter of credibility for the state. The Swedish Armed Forces, together with other involved agencies, need to cooperate and plan for how resources can be used effectively in different situations. There is a need to create forms of enhanced coordination between civil and military defence; for example larger geographical areas at regional level could be of benefit for the management and coordination of total defence. The Government has therefore instructed the Civil Defence Inquiry (Ju 2018:05) to propose an effective geographical breakdown for civilian management and coordination at regional level before and during heightened alert. The Government believes that such a development of total defence would also improve the conditions for effective cooperation between the Swedish Armed Forces and other agencies in peacetime crises.

The Swedish Armed Forces may provide support to society in accordance with the Regulation (2002:375) on the Swedish Armed Forces’ support for civilian activities if the Swedish Armed Forces have appropriate resources to permit this, if such support does not seriously hinder the regular operation of the Swedish Armed Forces and if the other conditions laid down in the regulation are fulfilled. As a government agency, the Swedish Armed Forces also have an obligation to assist in a rescue operation according to the Act (2003:778) on protection against accidents. In February 2017, the Government also decided on the Regulation (2017:113) on the Swedish
Armed Forces' support for the police with helicopter transport, according to which the Swedish Armed Forces shall assist the police with helicopter transport in the performance of police operations. This last task is also apparent from 3 b section 8 of the Regulation (2007:1266) with instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces. The Act (2006:343) on the Swedish Armed Forces' support for the police in counter-terrorism also contains provisions on the Swedish Armed Forces' support for the Police Authority and the Security Service in counter-terrorism operations in the form of operations that may involve the use of force or coercion against individuals.

According to information provided by the Swedish Armed Forces from 2017 until 31 May 2020, the agency has provided support on 274 occasions in accordance with the Act on Protection against Accidents, on 202 occasions in accordance with the Regulation on the Swedish Armed Forces' support for civilian activities and on 5 occasions in accordance with the Regulation on the Swedish Armed Forces' support for the police with helicopter transport. In 50 cases, requests pursuant to the Regulation on Swedish Armed Forces' support for civilian activities have been denied on the grounds of lack of resources or where the request has not been covered within the scope of the support regulation. In the case of the ongoing pandemic, the Swedish Armed Forces have, for example, provided extensive support to the civil society in the spring and summer of 2020, aimed at supporting responsible agencies. The Swedish Armed Forces have, among other things, assisted with the establishment of field hospitals and provided staff officers to reinforce responsible agencies, as well as logistics related to testing. The Swedish Armed Forces have also assisted with transport helicopters to transfer Covid-19 patients.

In view of this overall statement, the Government does not see any need to perform any specific review of the Swedish Armed Forces' support for the civil society. The Government thus considers that the announcement has been finalised.
9. Civil defence

9.1 A strengthened civil defence

**The Government's assessment:** Sweden's ability to cope with heightened alert and ultimately war needs to be strengthened on a broad front. An important part of this work is to strengthen civil defence.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** The Defence Commission (Ds 2017:66) notes that crisis preparedness is not dimensioned to deal with an armed attack and the severe hardships of a war. Society lacks many of the resources, capabilities and structures that will be required to deal with the danger of war and war itself. The Government agrees with this assessment and therefore believes that Sweden's capability to handle heightened alert and ultimately war needs to be strengthened on a broad front. An important part of this work is to strengthen civil defence.

Civil defence covers the whole of society, where many actors must collaborate and work on the basis of the goal for civil defence. Creating a strong civil defence is therefore a process that must continue for many years to come. The activities are performed by many different actors: agencies, municipalities, regions, industry and NGOs. This means that this is a complex activity that, based on the Government’s governance, needs to be planned and strengthened and that many different processes need to be coordinated. Building capabilities in civil defence, as well as in military defence, involves a very great deal of work and long lead times. Work on planning, knowledge building and capability development needs to be further developed and deepened. During the period 2021-2025, it is important that civil defence capabilities are developed and that concrete steps forward are taken. The Government intends to be clear in its governance in order to provide the actors responsible with good conditions for planning. Civil and military defence reinforce each other. In order to safeguard the balance in total defence, it is important that civil defence is also given priority and continues to develop.

In order to strengthen and further intensify the reconstruction of civil defence, the Government's focus is a step-by-step reinforcement comprising SEK 1 billion in 2021, SEK 1.5 billion in 2022, SEK 2.5 billion in 2023, SEK 3 billion in 2024 and SEK 3.8 billion in 2025.

The breakdown by area for the period 2021-2025 is shown in the table below. The table also shows the amounts added with effect from 2018.
Together with the funds provided in the 2018 budget bill, the total civil defence funding in 2025 amounts to SEK 4.2 billion.

Table 9.1 Summary of funding for civil defence 2021-2025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Previous funding with effect from 2018</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Care (UO 9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports (UO22)</td>
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<td>Energy supply (UO6, UO21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food and drinking water (UO23)</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>Public order and safety (UO3, UO4, UO6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisation and management (UO1, UO6)</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>120</td>
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The starting points set out for total defence in this bill also apply to civil defence.

The security situation in Sweden's immediate neighbourhood and in Europe has deteriorated. An armed attack on Sweden cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be excluded that military force or threats of this might be used against Sweden. Total defence shall therefore be designed and dimensioned in order to be able to face an armed attack against Sweden, including acts of war on Swedish territory. The starting point for the planning of total defence should be to be able to handle a security crisis in Europe and Sweden's neighbourhood which causes serious disruptions to the functionality of society, as well as war during part of this time, for at least three months.

Climate change is a serious and growing threat to global security and will put a great strain on the world around us and on Sweden, not least because of our geopolitical position as an Arctic state. When the climate changes, it also has consequences for people's living conditions and for many vital societal functions.

The Defence Commission notes that a credible total defence capability, which includes coherent planning, management, preparedness and the necessary resources to deal with war, also improves the possibilities for preventing and handling peacetime crises and conflicts in the world around us, as well as dealing with so-called grey area problems.

The Defence Commission stresses that the development of civil defence should, as far as possible, be based on structures and processes used in crisis preparedness. The Government shares this view. The Government considers that, to the extent that these structures and processes need to be revised based on the experiences of Covid-19, this should be done. The Government wishes to stress that the capability to deal with peacetime crises in society also provides a basic endurance and capability to deal with wartime situations. At the same time, the development of civil defence also strengthens society's capability to deal with severe stressful situations in peacetime. Like the Defence Commission, the Government believes that

<table>
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<th>Protective security (UO1, UO2, UO4, UO6, UO21, UO22)</th>
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<th>100</th>
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<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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* In this area, from 2022 onwards, there is an increase in the contributions for financing measures against serious peacetime threats and trying situations related to electronic communications.
robust crisis preparedness means that there are conditions for basic endurance and resilience in society. Total defence resources shall be designed in such a way that they can also strengthen society's capacity to prevent and deal with stressful situations for society. Crisis preparedness and civil defence should therefore be seen as mutually reinforcing. The experiences, structures, processes and working methods that have proved to be appropriate and effective in crisis preparedness are important for the development of civil defence. The structures, processes and working methods that have not proved to be appropriate and which are not sufficient to cope with heightened alert need to be updated during the period 2021-2025.

The Defence Commission has proposed how civil defence should be developed. In February 2019, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Armed Forces presented the Government commission to promote and develop coherent planning for total defence (Fö2019/00198). The Government has subsequently instructed the agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence in most sectors to provide input for the further direction of civil defence, accounting for the feasibility and consequences of the proposals submitted (Ju2019/02477). In some cases, similar issues have been dealt with by Government inquiries.

Part of the work in civil defence is to develop international cooperation. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment of the importance of cooperation with Finland and Norway. This cooperation should be developed and deepened in a number of areas, such as supply preparedness. Sweden should also, within the framework of the partnership with NATO, continue to deepen cooperation and the exchange of information on civil defence. In order to safeguard the balance in total defence, it is important that civil defence is also given priority and continues to develop.

9.1.1 Civil defence support for the Swedish Armed Forces

Civil defence and military defence need to be developed in a coordinated manner and there should be coherent planning for total defence. Since the interdependence between civil and military defence affects the overall capability of total defence, it is important that endurance and the capability for mutual support is strengthened.

In the event of a threat of war or war, the total defence efforts will initially gather the forces of military defence, while safeguarding the main functions
of society and protecting the civilian population. Society needs to be able to quickly adapt for wartime conditions, to gather forces nationally and to mobilise military and civilian resources that benefit defence efforts.

In civil defence, the actors concerned shall plan to be able to support the Armed Forces during heightened alert and ultimately war. This planning should continue to be developed at both national and regional level. The support needs that are identified in military defence, as well as the ability of civilian actors to meet these needs, are an important part of the planning.

In the event of an armed attack, the civilian population shall be protected, and the vital societal functions safeguarded, even if they cannot be pursued with the same level of ambition as in peacetime. Support shall be provided to contribute to the capabilities of military defence and to strengthen the will to defend and resilience of the population. Civil defence support for the Armed Forces may involve difficult trade-offs, both in an acute situation and in the longer term, in terms of how resources should be prioritised, taking into account society's general needs and the needs of the Armed Forces during heightened alert. It is important that, during the period 2021-2025, work is carried out to develop planning and principles for how priorities are to be set.

9.1.2 Starting points

In accordance with the comments of the Defence Commission, the Government believes that the starting point for the planning of total defence should be to be able to handle a security crisis in Europe and Sweden's neighbourhood, which causes serious disruptions to the functionality of society, as well as war during part of this time, for at least three months. It is particularly important to strengthen resilience in the most important societal functions. This will also develop and strengthen support for military defence.

In most areas, this means that the public sector will not be able to deliver activities or services other than what is judged to be of societal importance for the needs of total defence. On the basis of the Riksdag's decision on this bill, the Government intends to decide on revised instructions for preparedness planning in civil defence. The Armed Forces' defence planning is an important starting point for the overall total defence planning at central, regional and local level. The Government's focus for the Armed Forces defence planning is thus also important for the planning of civil defence. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that defence planning needs to be gradually developed in order
to provide a basis for civil defence actors at all levels. The planning framework is also determined based on the resources available. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that there is a need for performance indicators to assess and follow up developments in civil defence and that the question of how such performance indicators should be designed, as well as their forms, needs to be further analysed. The starting point should be that the results of the analysis should clarify the conditions that apply for planning. This work will be made easier by clarifying the goal for civil defence in this bill.

As a response to the assignment to promote and develop coherent planning for total defence (Fö2017/00688), the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency have developed a model for coherent planning and a coherent evaluation of the state of readiness planning, focusing in particular on civil defence. It is important that the agencies' work on achieving effective planning and follow-up of civil defence continues to develop during the period 2021–2025.

9.1.3 Responsibility, management and coordination in civil defence
The Defence Commission notes that effective and clear conditions for command and responsibility for creating coordination both within civil defence and between military and civil defence are essential for the reinforcement of total defence. The Government shares this assessment. A number of government agencies, in their reports on the continued orientation of civil defence, stress the importance of clarifying responsibility, planning conditions and governance in this area. The Defence Commission makes several proposals regarding conditions for responsibilities and leadership at central, regional and local level and proposes that these shall be further investigated. The Government has appointed an Inquiry on Civil Defence (Ju 2018:05) which will report on its assignment by 1 March 2021 (dir. 2018:79 and 2019:98). The Government intends to decide on a structure for responsibility, command and coordination in civil defence at central, higher regional, regional and local level. Such a structure will also strengthen society's capacity to deal with peacetime crises.

9.1.4 Psychological defence
The deteriorating security situation provides a need for psychological defence that is adapted to today's social conditions and which helps to preserve the free exchange of knowledge and information in an open society. A strengthened psychological defence creates the conditions for
safeguarding an open and democratic society, free expression of opinion and Sweden's freedom and independence, as well as ensuring the people's willingness to defend. Within the framework of civil defence there is a need for Sweden to develop strategic and modern psychological defence capabilities. The Government's approach is therefore to establish an agency for psychological defence in 2022 with the task of leading the work to develop and coordinate Sweden's psychological defence.

9.1.5 Supply preparedness and the role of the industry in civil defence

Swedish supply preparedness should be developed, and the business community should be increasingly involved in safeguarding the most important social functions.

In the event of a threat of war or war, the activities of civil defence will include safeguarding the main societal functions including the necessary supplies, protecting the civilian population and providing support for military defence. To a large extent, private actors own and are responsible for many of the most important societal functions, including the production and transport of essential goods and services. The industry is thus central to total defence and supply preparedness. The involvement of the private business community in the planning process should be increased. Public actors should assess, in close dialogue with private actors, the need for preparation so as to ensure reasonable. This may include prioritising and allocating resources, as well as other necessary measures such as the production or storage of products and materials in areas such as health care and the food chain.

The Government believes that supply preparedness should be able to safeguard as far as possible the flows in the supply chains during peacetime crises, heightened alert and ultimately war. Questions of responsibility and methods for achieving security of supply, such as public or private storage and manufacturing preparedness, are important and complex questions that need to be analysed and further investigated in the coming years. Extensive analysis work on supply preparedness is already underway at a number of responsible agencies. In order to further develop the supply preparedness, the Government intends to appoint an inquiry on what a nationally coordinated supply preparedness should comprise and how it should be organised and financed. Experience from previous solutions should be taken into account in the work. The Government's starting point is that a supply model should be financed by charges, wherever appropriate. As a first step, the Government has commissioned the Swedish Defence Research Agency...
to analyse certain general issues of national supply preparedness. The assignment shall be reported on 16 November 2020.

The Defence Commission believes that a national commerce and business council should be introduced in order to establish a long-term interaction between public and private actors at central, regional and local level and to enable the industry’s resources to provide for the needs of total defence.

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that long-term cooperation between public and private actors at central, regional and local level needs to be established. In several areas, such as transport and health care, work is already underway to develop and clarify cooperation with the industry. The Government believes that this type of cooperation, which occurs by area and sector, needs to be further strengthened. The Government's assignment to the Inquiry on Civil Defence to propose a sectoral division for Government agencies and to propose which agencies should be given special responsibility for emergency preparedness and civil defence should ultimately create good conditions for the work. As a complement to commerce and business councils in different areas of society, a cross-sectoral commerce and business council shall be established during the period 2021-2025 where commerce and industry associations participate in the development of Swedish supply capability in total defence. The Defence Commission considers that the establishment of a commerce and business council should aim at a mutual exchange of information with the task of developing a common approach, plans and conditions for cooperation between public and private actors at all levels. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment of the need for a commerce and business council for total defence.

9.1.6 Protective security

Protective security is fundamental to our ability to deal with antagonistic threats and to reduce vulnerabilities at all levels of society. The Government agrees with the Swedish Security Service, which has pointed out in its report on the basis for the continued direction of civil defence that well-functioning protective security is the basis for the entire total defence. The Security Service has also repeatedly stated that many actors are failing in their protective security work. Unlike many other areas, there is no possibility for supervisory agencies to impose sanctions on those who fail in their protective security work. There is therefore a great need for an increase in ambition in the area of protective security.
It is also important that security-sensitive activities are protected when exposed to third parties. The Security Service and other agencies have on several occasions noticed that foreign actors are making strategic acquisitions of Swedish operations that should be subject to protection. In addition, the outbreak of Covid-19 means that many companies are struggling financially, which could make them even more vulnerable to acquisition. Real property and other property of importance for Sweden's security may also be the subject of strategic acquisitions. Mechanisms are therefore needed to stop acquisitions that could harm Sweden's security. In autumn 2019, the Government, in light of the Swedish agencies’ comments on the existence of strategic foreign acquisitions, set up an inquiry with the task of proposing how a Swedish system for the examination of foreign direct investment in sensitive areas could be designed (dir. 2019:50). The inquiry shall give its final report by November 2021.

In conclusion, the Government believes that protective security needs to be strengthened. The Government has already put forward proposals for legislation that provides for an opportunity to stop transfers of security-sensitive activities and certain property that could harm Sweden's security. In addition, legislation needs to be developed that among other things addresses the need for an increase in the level of ambition in terms of supervision and better protection when security-sensitive activities are exposed to outsiders.

A tightening of legislation in this area should be completed by the end of the period 2021-2025.

9.1.7 Municipalities, regions and county administrative boards

Municipalities, regions and county administrative boards have important roles before and during heightened alert. It is important that these actors are given a good opportunity to participate in the work of reinforcing preparedness.

The Government notes that the focus on important societal functions proposed in this bill also strengthens the work of municipalities, regions and county administrative boards on civil defence. This may include, for example, personnel resources for basic civil defence work, investment support, resources for carrying out training and exercises and the storage of certain supplies and input goods.
The intensified work on civil defence by Government agencies can be expected to create some new conditions for work in municipalities and regions. It is important that municipalities and regions receive support from the agencies in this work. The inquiry on civil defence includes reviewing the requirements for readiness preparations contained in the Act (2006:544) on the measures of municipalities and regions before and in the event of extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened alert. The inquiry also includes assessing the needs of municipalities and regions for possible allocation of resources, based on analysis and proposals for a more uniform and transparent management capability for municipalities and regions.

9.1.8 The supply of personnel in civil defence

The overall need for planned personnel in total defence is the basis for how the supply of personnel should be designed. The present system of personnel supply in civil defence is that those employed on a daily basis in vital societal functions remain in those activities during heightened alert, provided that they are not needed for military defence. Staffing through agreements will also be important for the provision of personnel in civil defence, in particular for voluntary defence organisations’ support for agencies, municipalities and regions.

Important steps to ensure the supply of personnel have been taken by means of the agencies with specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence placing the personnel needed for activities during heightened alert into the wartime organisation. Municipalities and regions have also begun the wartime placement of their personnel. This work needs to continue. Cooperation between public actors and voluntary defence organisations also needs to be further developed.

The Defence Commission states that heightened alert and war place such demands on civil defence activities that staffing cannot be fully covered with the regular personnel and therefore advocates the activation of civil conscription.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the personnel needs for civil defence will primarily be met by employed personnel who, in the event of heightened alert, are subject to the general obligation to serve. Volunteers also have an important role to play in the provision of civil defence personnel. Like the commission, the Government believes that the supply of personnel should, as far as possible, be based on the individual's interest, motivation and will. The Government, like the
Defence Commission, notes that situations may arise when the personnel available to employers are not sufficient to maintain the necessary activities.

The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry (SOU 2020:23), The Inquiry on Total Defence Security of Supply (SOU 2019:51) and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Ju2019/03951) propose that the regulations on personnel provision for civil defence should be reviewed. The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry also considers that civil conscription would create increased opportunities for the area’s personnel supply in wartime (SOU 2020:23).

The large number of private actors carrying out socially important activities and the deterioration of the security situation over time are two contributing factors to the need for a review of the provision of civil defence personnel. Such a review should include an assessment of the personnel needs that may arise in situations of heightened alert and war. The review should also highlight the question of how this personnel need can be met. The review should take into account previous experience of different staffing solutions. At the same time, consideration should be given to whether such a review of personnel supply should also include a broader threat picture, hybrid threats and serious peacetime crises. The level of ambition in this area needs to be adapted to the additional finance that the Government intends to allocate in 2024 and 2025 for a more secure supply of personnel in civil defence.

9.1.9 Voluntary defence organisations

Voluntary defence organisations are today an important part of society’s emergency preparedness and for several years the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s assignments to the voluntary defence organisations have mainly focused on tasks to strengthen peacetime preparedness. Work has begun to complement this approach with a special focus on civil defence, but the Defence Commission believes that more needs to be done to develop activities in this direction. The Defence Commission points out, among other things, that voluntary defence organisations could play an important role in the organisation of population protection, health care, supply preparedness and animal husbandry in the event of crisis and war. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency also assesses in its document with data for the defence resolution period 2021-2025 (Ju2020/00870) that the number of trained volunteers needs to increase during future defence resolution periods.
The Government notes that during the last defence resolution period there has been a development in which the role of voluntary defence organisations in civil defence has begun to be clarified and planned for. This development should continue.

If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 policy focus.

9.1.10 Individual preparedness contributes to a sustainable and resilient society
The Defence Commission considers that each individual should be prepared to cope with his or her own supplies and care for a week without the support of public services. The responsibility of each individual is important, not only for their own safety and security, but also for taking joint responsibility for ensuring that those who most need help from the public services in the event of a serious event can receive that help. The Government considers that in the event of a serious social disturbance or heightened alert and ultimately war, citizens' expectations for social services need to be significantly lower than under normal conditions in peacetime. The Government considers that individuals who do not have an immediate need for assistance in the event of a serious event and who have the conditions and resources to fend for themselves should be able to take responsibility for their own supplies for a week and assist each other as far as possible in solidarity and cooperation with others.

9.1.11 Research and development
The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that Sweden must have research environments available for the needs of total defence. Knowledge building in certain key areas cannot be fully met by open research calls, as these do not provide secure and permanent access to the necessary information over time.

Synergies between civil and military research and development should be sought where these are considered to be relevant and of mutual benefit not only to civil and military defence, but also in the context of total defence.

9.2 Safeguarding the most important societal functions

| The Government's assessment: | It is particularly important that work to strengthen resilience in the most important societal functions is further developed and deepened. Safeguarding the most important societal functions |

Ministry of Defence 147 (180)
includes maintaining necessary supplies. This normally means a lower level of ambition than in a normal peacetime situation. Work has begun but now needs to be further intensified. Efforts to increase resilience, especially in the areas of public order and safety, protection of the civilian population, healthcare, food and drinking water, financial preparedness, transport, energy supply and electronic communications and post, need to be further developed and strengthened.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** Important societal activities are activities that are necessary to ensure that a serious crisis does not occur in society or are necessary or very important to ensure that a crisis that is already occurring does not worsen. For example, in a wartime situation, these may involve activities and functions necessary for military defence or activities and functions necessary to protect the civilian population. Safeguarding the necessary supplies of food, drinking water, energy and pharmaceuticals, as well as access to certain strategic input goods for domestic industrial production and related transport, is essential to maintain the capability of total defence. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that, in accordance with the principle of responsibility, all actors in total defence must take responsibility for strengthening preparedness and the capability to also perform activities during a crisis and ultimately in war. This applies to public sector actors as well as to private companies and, ultimately, to individuals.

The Government believes that during the period 2021-2025 it is particularly important that work to strengthen resilience in the most important societal functions is further developed and deepened. Safeguarding the most important societal functions includes maintaining necessary supplies. This normally means a lower level of ambition than in a normal peacetime situation. Work has begun but now needs to be further intensified. Efforts to increase resilience, especially in the areas of public order and safety, protection of the civilian population, healthcare, food and drinking water, financial preparedness, transport, energy supply and electronic communications and post, need to be further developed and strengthened. Cross-sectoral issues should be taken into account where necessary. As shown in Table 9.1 (p. 126), the Government's approach is that additional finance should be allocated to the above areas.

Another part of the work of safeguarding the most important societal functions is to strengthen information security and cybersecurity and reduce vulnerabilities. An important component of this is the establishment of a
cybersecurity centre. The Government believes that a cybersecurity centre will have a concrete impact on Sweden's capability to prevent and handle antagonistic threats. Many of the systems that are critical to maintaining the functionality of society are already vulnerable to disruption in peacetime. Agencies of importance for Sweden's security need to strengthen their protective security.

9.2.1 Public order and safety

The Defence Commission notes that law enforcement agencies, such as the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service, have important roles in total defence. The commission further notes that these agencies need to be prepared and trained to deal with antagonistic activities in the context of a major security crisis, thereby contributing to a credible total defence and to creating a deterrent capability. The Government notes that this also includes Swedish Customs and the Swedish Coast Guard.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that planning for a three-month endurance places higher demands on the measures that the agencies need to take than was the case before. The agencies note that such planning generates costs. The Coast Guard, Swedish Customs, the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service perform, individually and together with others, activities that form the basis for a society founded on the rule of law. The ability of the agencies to perform over an extended period is therefore important. Building and maintaining greater resilience and endurance is a key measure for the agencies and requires coordinated cross-sectoral planning.

A reinforcement resource for the police

The demands for police activities will increase before and during a war. An adversary will use various means to attack functions, activities and objects that are important to our defence capabilities and can attempt to achieve political and military objectives through sabotage, vandalism or deliberate influence.

A deteriorating security situation, heightened alert and war will also require resources for the monitoring of security objects and other societal important activities. Against this background, the Defence Commission proposes the establishment of a reinforcement resource for the police.

In its documentation to the Government on the continued direction of civil defence, the Police Authority states that the agency has a new national
organisation, an internal reinforcement organisation and the ability to lead, transfer and pool resources where necessary across the country. The Police Authority will also be reinforced by 10,000 police officers by 2024.

The Government considers that further consideration would be needed to identify any needs for protection and reinforcement resources that may exist in a situation of heightened alert and ultimately war from a holistic perspective, as well as how they can contribute in a cost-effective way to the best possible defence capabilities from a total defence perspective. As stated by the Government in the section 8.1.8 The supply of personnel in civil defence, it is important to perform a review of the civil defence personnel supply as a whole, including the possible need for reinforcement resources, including an organisation for reinforcement of the police. In this context, consideration should also be given to whether a reinforcement resource can be based on an obligation placed on recently retired police officers, for example, or those who have transferred to other careers.

**Border surveillance in wartime**

In peacetime conditions, and also during heightened alert and ultimately war, it is of particular importance that Sweden has control over its borders. The Defence Commission highlights the importance of a functioning structure and planning for border surveillance when there is a danger of war. If the country is in danger of war or such extraordinary conditions exist as are caused by war or by the danger of war, the Government may, pursuant to the Act (1979:1088) on border surveillance in wartime etc., order border surveillance to be organised.

The four agencies the Coast Guard, Swedish Customs, the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service have, in their report on the basis for the continued direction of civil defence, jointly highlighted the need for a review of the law on border surveillance in wartime.

Questions concerning the organisation of border surveillance and the status in international law of border surveillance personnel in an armed conflict and otherwise during heightened alert have previously been investigated and discussed in the report Border Surveillance during Heightened Readiness (SOU 2002:4). The question of the need for investigation was raised in an earlier inquiry into the tasks and status in international law of certain personnel in the field of total defence in the report Status in International Law etc. (SOU 1998:123). The two reports have been referred for consultation. Within the Government Offices of Sweden (Ministry of
Defence), a memorandum with a proposal for a new border surveillance law has also been prepared and referred in 2009. The reports and memoranda have been prepared within the Government Offices.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that it is important that there are operational structures and planning for border surveillance when there is a danger of war. Coordinated planning between stakeholders is needed to ensure the possibility of coordinated border surveillance. The Government, like the agencies, believes that the agencies need good conditions to also fulfil their tasks in the event of war and the risk of war. Several of the starting points on which the assessments and proposals in SOU 2002:4 and the 2009 memoranda were based have been amended. The Government therefore intends to file SOU 2002:4 and the 2009 memoranda. Furthermore, there are currently insufficient grounds to depart from the current regulation on the status in international law of certain personnel in total defence in the event of war. The Government therefore intends to also file SOU 1998:123 Work on reviewing the issue of the structure and planning of border surveillance should be able to start during the coming defence policy period 2021–2025.

**Measures to respond to hybrid threats across the entire threat scale**

Total defence must be designed to be able to face an armed attack. Increased capability and planning are also needed to be able to handle the broader threat from foreign powers that is relevant at all levels of conflict. The area of public order and safety is of particular importance in this context.

The Government stresses the importance of the ability to act together to meet challenges and threats both in peace and in heightened alert. This means being able to use all the security policy instruments available in a coherent manner in order to safeguard Swedish sovereignty and Sweden's interests. It is also important to be able to act in a coordinated manner with others, thereby increasing the cost for those who attack us.

The Government notes that hybrid activities are directed against Sweden today. It cannot be excluded that such threats may be part of an escalating process aimed at undermining the Swedish defence capability in the face of an armed attack, but they may also represent the very heart of a conflict. Hybrid threats in peacetime are directed very much, although not exclusively, at our civil society. Vulnerabilities in civilian structures must be reduced and the peacetime handling of hybrid threats strengthened including a holistic approach. See section 5.1.10 Thematic security issues for the
foreign and security policy aspects of hybrid threats that should be taken into account. Law enforcement agencies have a special role and the emergency response capacity of society is an important part of tackling serious events. Developing intelligence cooperation between the relevant agencies in both military and civil defence is urgent from this perspective.

The Defence Commission believes that the ability to meet the challenges and deal with situations that arise at the borderline between peace and war must be strengthened. The Defence Commission also includes the grey area problem in the underlying conditions for the three-month endurance requirement to respond to and deal with a security crisis in Europe and in our vicinity that leads to serious consequences for the functionality of society. The Government deems it necessary for the responsible agencies to increasingly include the hybrid threat perspective in their planning. The Government also underlines the need for an overall development of the capability to deal with the broader threat pattern and hybrid threats in peacetime. Against this background, there is a need for further analysis on this topic.

9.2.2 Protection of the civilian population

In order to protect the civilian population in the event of an armed attack, targeted measures should be taken and a clear direction and further planning should be established.

Shelters, evacuation and accommodation and the need for a support organisation

The Defence Commission's assessment is that much of the civil defence in terms of protecting the population against the effects of war has been largely dismantled and that there is therefore a need for protection well suited for today's conditions. The Defence Commission also believes that existing shelters should be put in order, but the need varies geographically. Militarily strategic areas should be prioritised and combined with an effective early warning system.

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission’s assessment and, with regard to that, the Government's position is that it is important to establish a distinct alignment and a more detailed planning for an effective development of the future protection of the civilian population in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war.
Therefore, the Government intends to give an assignment to a special investigator to review these issues.

**Emergency services during heightened alert**

The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that municipal emergency services are an important part of the overall capability for the protection of the civilian population. However, the emergency services of today are essentially dimensioned for tasks in peacetime. Thus, there is a need for more information on how municipal emergency services can safely and effectively deal with different consequences of armed attacks on the civilian population and society in general.

**Important Public Announcement**

The Defence Commission considers that a functioning shelter organisation requires an effective early warning system. The Government shares the Defence Commission's view. The Government wishes to stress that it is essential to be able to reach out quickly and effectively with Important Public Announcements (known as VMAs in Swedish), so as to protect people, the environment and property in the event of accidents and other serious events in both peace and war. The public must always be able to trust the VMA system.

The VMA system is currently primarily adapted for accidents and serious events in peacetime. The system needs to be better adapted to the present need to be able to alert the public throughout the threat scale.

The Government therefore intends to appoint an inquiry to review the need for more coherent regulation for such information and warning for the public as is to be communicated within the VMA system in both peace and war.

**9.2.3 Healthcare**

The Government, like the Defence Commission, stresses that it is important to maintain the functionality of healthcare in wartime. If healthcare does not function, this has consequences for people's lives and health.

The Government, like the Defence Commission, wishes to stress that it will not be possible to perform healthcare in the same way in wartime as in normal life and that not all peacetime requirements in legislation will be able to be upheld. Guidance is therefore needed at national level on which care municipalities and regions can de-prioritise and which care should always be
maintained. Civil healthcare services should, in the event of war, have the capacity to provide care that cannot be deferred. Such care shall be ensured for both civilians and military personnel. The priority platform decided by the Riksdag applies when prioritising care needs. Although the general standard of care cannot be the same, medical treatment results for the vast majority of patients should, as far as possible, correspond to the level that is normal in peacetime.

Experiences from the Covid-19 pandemic shall be taken into account in further readiness work.

**Healthcare in wartime needs to cover the entire healthcare chain**

The Defence Commission proposes that the regions identify at least one existing hospital in each civilian area or military region as emergency hospitals.

Like the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry (SOU 2020:23), the Government considers it is not appropriate to start from the concept of emergency hospitals when describing the capabilities that the region needs to plan for in heightened alert and ultimately war. The capability required is ultimately to maintain certain functions and certain levels of care rather than maintaining the activity in one or more pre-designated physical buildings. What the regions should be able to maintain in wartime is a certain capability to provide healthcare. In some cases, this requires specific medical or technical resources or special skills that are now available in hospitals. Healthcare provided in health centres or in home health care also needs to be covered by the planning. The entire care chain is important because access to hospital beds is affected by whether primary care and municipal health care can cope with their respective tasks. If the municipal healthcare service fails to do its job, patients from there will have to be hospitalised, which risks making it difficult to receive war wounded. Thus, healthcare readiness planning must be done from a broader perspective than trauma care and cover all areas of healthcare, including infection control, primary care and municipal healthcare. The concentration of resources in one or a few places creates vulnerability. The health facilities included in the organisation should be geographically dispersed in order to reduce vulnerability and create redundancy. Planning also needs to take into account the need for durable premises, for example in terms of protective security and provision of water, sewage, heating, electricity and ventilation.
The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that healthcare must be seen as a joint system for the needs of total defence, where military and civilian healthcare need to be able to support each other. For its planning, the civilian healthcare system needs to know what it is expected to do and what the Armed Forces intend to manage on their own. The detailed clarification of what the Armed Forces shall be responsible for follows from the Government's approach to military defence. The interface between military and civilian healthcare needs to be clear, although in practice they will have to work together in many situations. The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry points out that the starting point should be that the Armed Forces should primarily be responsible for all medical care on the battlefield, which means handling both their own and hostile military personnel and wounded civilians, on land and at sea. The Government shares this assessment.

**The ability to care for many injured needs to increase**

The Defence Commission believes that the capacity in the Swedish healthcare system to be able to reorganise activities in order to take care of a large number of injured must be significantly strengthened.

In order to identify the capabilities of the regions at national level, there need to be common criteria for the capacity that is to be accounted for. The National Board of Health and Welfare, in cooperation with the regions, should, as a matter of urgency and on the basis of common criteria for healthcare facilities during heightened alert and ultimately war, identify and compile information at national level on the healthcare capacity available in the country. With the measures proposed in this bill, the Government believes that during the period 2021-2025 the regions will be able to create the capability to significantly increase the number of physical care places compared to a normal peacetime situation, with staffing and medicines that are available under such conditions.

A reasonable level of ambition should in the long term be to aim towards a doubling of the number of healthcare places.

Furthermore, as part of the work to coordinate and monitor the planning of civil healthcare readiness, the National Board of Health and Welfare should begin work on the development of a national mass casualty plan. Once established, the national plan should form the basis for the efforts of the regions to develop regional mass casualty plans. At the start of the assignment, priority should be given to the development of a national system
for assessing care needs and principles for the distribution of patients between hospitals and regions.

The resilience of healthcare needs to increase
More resilient healthcare in normal conditions creates better conditions for crisis preparedness and for the preparedness that is necessary to also ensure care in the event of war. Digitalisation and the introduction of artificial intelligence into healthcare must take into account the requirements of total defence for resilience and redundancy. At the same time, municipalities and regions need to be prepared to perform the most central tasks during periods without the support of electronic systems. Work on the resilience of healthcare should be coordinated by the National Board of Health and Welfare in cooperation with other stakeholders.

Transportation of patients
The National Board of Health and Welfare, in cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces and other relevant government agencies, regions and organisations, should plan for how civilian and military transportation of patients shall be coordinated during heightened alert and ultimately war. This should include planning and proposing measures for how the transport of patients can be stepped up in peacetime crises and in wartime.

The personnel are healthcare’s most important resource
The availability of trained personnel will be a major challenge for healthcare in peacetime crises and in wartime.

The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry considers that the rules for the provision of personnel in the civil defence healthcare sector need to be reviewed. According to the inquiry, there needs to be clarification of the ways in which municipalities and regions can involve private actors in their wartime organisations, as well as how municipalities and regions can reinforce their organisations with, among other things, personnel from private employers, trained personnel who are not in employment and those under training. These issues need to be seen in a broader context of personnel provision throughout civil defence; see section 8.1.8 The supply of personnel in civil defence.

All the healthcare personnel involved need to be given the necessary education and training to enable the healthcare system to perform its tasks during crisis and war, which may also include any changes to or
simplification of treatment methods. National training in trauma care and war surgery also needs to be reinstated based on the demands of war.

Education and training are needed to achieve an increased knowledge of disaster medicine and the role of healthcare in total defence. The content of the national education and training plan needs to be developed within the framework of the assignment of the National Board of Health and Welfare to support the regions in the provision of knowledge; among other things, a national model for education and training needs to be developed. The assignment shall be reported by 31 December 2020. The Government wishes to stress the importance of making such support to the regions available as soon as possible.

**Stockpiling of supplies needs to increase**

Safeguarding the necessary supplies of medicines and healthcare materials is essential for the protection of the civilian population and for maintaining the capability of the entire total defence in the event of a serious security crisis or war. The Government, like the Defence Commission, believes that robustness in the supply of medicines and healthcare materials needs to be increased so that the products are available with sufficient endurance over time. Planning and readiness measures taken for healthcare supplies must be carried out on the basis of the care to be provided during peacetime crises and in war. Such measures also need to include planning for infection and health threats. In order to achieve the objective of secured supply, increased stockpiling of medicines and healthcare materials in Sweden is required. The need for coordination with efforts in other sectors needs to be taken into account in further work.

According to the Government, a nationally cohesive system for stockpiling medicines and healthcare supplies in Sweden for peacetime crises and wars needs to be developed. For reasons of efficiency, such stockpiling is best suited to end-users, in the regular logistics chain. Responsibility for such stockpiling should therefore rest with the ordinary actors. Like the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry, the Government believes that turnover of stock in storage is preferable wherever possible. The Government intends to come back with proposals for such a system during the mandate period. The Healthcare Readiness Inquiry has been commissioned by the Government to submit an interim report by 1 April 2021 with proposals for such a system.
The regions are responsible under current legislation for the existence of medicines and other necessary equipment for the care they are to provide. Therefore, there needs to be some stockpiling of such supplies in the regions in order to reduce vulnerability in normal circumstances. Some regions have already started work on reviewing their inventory.

Like the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry, the Government believes that the regions need to take measures to ensure that the supply of medicines and healthcare materials is sufficient, not only for good care in a normal state of peace, but also to maintain medical disaster readiness.

According to the Health Care Readiness Inquiry, government emergency storage should be expanded to include trauma care products, medical supplies that may be needed in epidemics and some additional antidotes. The Government agrees with this assessment. The Government also shares the assessment of the inquiry that there may be grounds for reviewing manufacturing readiness needs for a limited number of products. Work on manufacturing readiness could take the form of cooperation with neighbouring countries.

There are also issues relating to more efficient use of resources and ensured distribution, including transport, which need to be resolved, such as prioritisation and distribution, as well as distribution via wholesalers and pharmacies. These issues are currently being investigated by the Healthcare Readiness Inquiry. The government intends to return to these matters during the mandate period. The supply of blood also needs to be reinforced. Regional blood operations need to be resilient and develop plans to be able to increase the capacity of the operations to meet the requirements for medical disaster readiness.

9.2.4 Food and drinking water

Both food and drinking water supplies are critical prerequisites for total defence and support all the capabilities of civil defence. The government shares the Defence Commission's assessments and believes that food preparedness needs to be built up in order to safeguard food supplies in the face of a security crisis for at least three months when logistics flows with the outside world are restricted.

Safeguarding food supplies requires the functioning of domestic agricultural and food production, while the flow of goods in the food supply chain needs to continue without interruption. Competitive agricultural and food
companies and a high Swedish market share are important prerequisites. The food sector’s critical dependence on input goods and the activities and services of other sectors must also be safeguarded during strained conditions. The Government believes that supply capability should be the starting point for building up food readiness and that drinking water is included. A model describing the supply capability can be a support in the work of building up food readiness and this will be addressed in the assignments the Government intends to submit to the authorities in the food and drinking water sector.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that various measures need to be implemented by both private and public actors at central, regional and local level. The work of building up food readiness begins from a low level, since food readiness was largely phased out about 20 years ago. In this context, the individual's readiness to manage his or her own supplies for a week without the support of the public sector is of crucial importance. The Government believes that the work of building up food readiness can begin at the National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute before the structure of sectoral agencies has been established. The National Food Administration has already been instructed by the Government to investigate by 1 December 2021 which diet meets nutritional requirements in the event of heightened alert.

**Measures to start building up food readiness**

The Defence Commission believes that the Government needs to specify a direction regarding which methods are to be used to increase food preparedness. The focus should be on an analysis of current societal conditions and the changes that have taken place in food supplies. Finland's food readiness planning may be used as an example. The Defence Commission also considers that food readiness needs to be built up primarily through the stockpiling of necessary foods and that there is a need to store certain strategic goods in storage that is based on stock turnover, in particular those which cannot be secured by deliveries from foreign suppliers or which cannot be produced domestically.

The Government essentially shares the Defence Commission's views on the focus for food readiness, but considers that in-depth analyses of the purpose, content, scope and location of stocks need to be carried out so that any storage under government or private management can be an effective and cost-effective measure. One of the starting points is what domestic
primary production and the processing chain can provide in relation to the
diet that needs to be ensured. The Government believes that Sweden will
also depend on imports in the event of heightened alert. It is therefore
essential to safeguard, as far as possible, trade flows, transport resources and
transport infrastructure.

In addition to stockpiling as a method, the Government believes that the
capability of business actors to resist disruption needs to be increased.
Through cooperation, increased sustainability and secured access to critical
resources, actors in the food supply chain can continue operations even
during strained conditions. Measures to strengthen the capability of the
National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the
National Veterinary Institute to carry out their tasks in socially important
activities during heightened alert are also important. Public control in the
food supply chain, expert support and laboratory capability are some
examples of such important tasks.

Building up supply capability needs questions about how strategic goods can
be stored, how our self-sufficiency and industry's resilience can increase,
how trade flows can be ensured and how personnel needs can be secured,
analysed and managed – so as to ensure a basic supply capability.
Competitive agricultural and food companies and a high Swedish market
share are important prerequisites for food readiness. The efforts we are
making in the field of food in civil defence are creating the conditions for an
increased level of food self-sufficiency.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that actors at
central level in peacetime need to establish a basis for allocation and
prioritisation that can be used during heightened alert. If there is a risk of
scarcity of supplies over a longer period, the Rationing Act (1978:268) may
need to be applied. Before any application of the law, prepared structures
should be in place at central, regional and local level in order to implement a
rationing decision. The Government therefore considers that structures and
procedures for prioritising and distributing food, animal feed and other input
goods need to be developed within the framework of future assignments to
the relevant agencies.

The Defence Commission believes that at local level municipalities need to
agree with private actors and conclude agreements on how food shall be
delivered. The National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of
Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute believe that the
responsibility and division of roles in food readiness between municipalities, regions, county administrative boards and central agencies needs to be clarified. The agencies also point to the need for municipalities and regions to identify activities of societal importance and to draw up contingency plans to increase the capability for food supplies in the activities of municipalities and regions. The Government considers it important that municipalities and regions develop their work on food readiness issues, including in connection with the operational responsibility in schools and healthcare.

**Measures to ensure access to drinking water in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war**

The Government, like the Defence Commission, notes that it is important that municipalities ensure that as far as possible there are backup water supplies that they can use. In order to further strengthen the municipalities' capability to ensure access to drinking water, there may be a need for government reinforcement resources in the form of mobile water works in strategic locations in the country. The Government and the Defence Commission also note that there may be a need to expand the storage of chemicals and spare parts at drinking water producers in order to ensure drinking water production. The National Food Administration should continue to support municipalities in their efforts to ensure the production of drinking water, for example in issues such as access, redistribution and storage of chemicals and also work to standardise equipment and spare parts.

In order to develop the supply of drinking water in the event of crisis, heightened alert and ultimately war, endurance needs to be strengthened and access to spare water supplies, emergency water, auxiliary power and critical resources improved so that the actors in drinking water production can continue to operate even under strained conditions. Municipalities need to practise their crisis planning both internally and in relevant cases with the drinking water producer and the drinking water distributor. This does not affect the existing division of responsibilities between state and municipality. Information and training input by Government agencies at central and regional level is also important to support municipalities in their further work.

The Defence Commission notes that there may be a need to secure the availability of auxiliary power in order to safeguard the emergency water supply. The Government agrees that auxiliary power and also joint reinforcement resources for emergency water equipment contribute to
increased robustness in drinking water production with heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government considers that possible measures that could be considered to support efforts to increase the resilience of drinking water production in the event of heightened alert and ultimately war are investment grants for auxiliary power and an expansion of the joint reinforcement resources for emergency water equipment.

The Defence Commission believes that in peacetime municipalities need to plan in order to be able to perform a prioritisation of drinking water supply and that the county administrative boards may have a role in setting priorities for emergency water between municipalities in the event of heightened alert. The Government believes that the emergency water exercises that the National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute propose that municipalities should carry out can support the capability to prioritise drinking water. It is also important that the county administrative boards can contribute to the joint planning of drinking water issues during heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government also agrees with the National Food Administration, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute that the need for water for socially important activities needs to be highlighted and believes that this question should be taken into account in the further planning of civil defence.

9.2.5 Financial readiness
The functionality of the financial system and underlying infrastructures also needs to be maintained in peacetime crises, as well as during heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the development of peacetime crisis preparedness in the financial sector should be complemented by continued total defence planning and preparations to handle heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government also shares the view that there must be conditions to maintain basic financial transaction possibilities through access to cash, alternative means of payment or some form of Government credits. There must be total defence planning, practised preparations and fallback procedures aimed at also maintaining the basic functionality of the financial system in the event of serious disruption. In order to achieve this, the relevant government agencies should continue their efforts to strengthen readiness so that they can perform their tasks. This means that there must be relevant contingency rules and plans for the provision of personnel in crisis situations and that the international dependencies of the financial sector are taken into account. The
Government believes that there is reason to consider whether legislation relating to the payment system should be updated. The Riksdag has announced to the Government that it will urgently appoint an inquiry to investigate the consequences of digitalisation and the reduction in cash use for the payment market and the roles of the public and private sectors in this market (bet. 2018/19:FiU44 point 1, parliamentary communication 2018/19:293). The Government intends to come back on this issue. The announcement has not been finalised.

The Government notes that the tasks of the government agencies concerned in civil defence are of great importance to other actors: agencies, companies and individuals alike. Some personnel reinforcements may be needed by the relevant agencies to ensure the capability to continue total defence planning and develop the work and further strengthen capability. There is also a need for investment in, among other things, IT infrastructure and premises that further contribute to strengthening capabilities.

**9.2.6 Transport**

There is a need for increased resilience and redundancy, as well as enhanced protective security, information security and secure communication systems in the transport sector.

The functioning of transport and transport infrastructure is a prerequisite for trade and travel both between countries and within Sweden and thus for Sweden's supply of various goods and services. Basic functionality in the field of transport is also a prerequisite for many other important societal functions to be maintained in times of peace, heightened alert and ultimately war. These include transport for food, supplies of fuel for vehicles and heating, ambulance care, police and other rescue operations. The transport of personnel and goods is also a prerequisite for the Armed Forces' security of supply. Public transport will be important in the event of heightened alert and war, including for evacuation and the transport of war personnel who are reporting for duty.

**Division of responsibilities and conditions**

The Defence Commission notes that investments will be needed in the future to enable both the adaptation of existing infrastructure and new construction, in order to increase resilience and readiness for war conditions. In order to create endurance during a war or in a situation of hybrid threats where, for example, sabotage is occurring, it is also necessary to have the
ability to urgently repair certain infrastructure in order to enable reasonable functionality in the circumstances. The four monitoring agencies in the field of transport (Swedish Airports and Air Navigation Services, Swedish Transport Administration, Swedish Transport Agency and Swedish Maritime Administration) share the Defence Commission's assessment.

According to the four transport agencies in their presentation of the basis for the continued orientation of civil defence, there is a need for enhanced protective security, information security and secure communication systems based on national coordinated solutions. This includes, among other things, the need to strengthen the protection of traffic management centres and other important facilities. The basic prerequisites for the capability of the four transport agencies to develop civil defence are measures for organisational structure and ensuring a robust IT infrastructure. The proposals in this bill allow for funds to be provided to the agencies in order to begin the work described above.

According to the Swedish Transport Administration, new construction, repair, evacuation and road and track clearing readiness are crucial parts of the agency's ability to repair and maintain a functioning transport infrastructure in the event of social disturbances and heightened alert. This work needs to be based on the needs of total defence for a functional and redundant infrastructure and needs to be done together with the Swedish Transport Administration's contractors. This also illustrates the need for goods and services from industry to meet the needs of total defence. The Government intends to instruct the Swedish Transport Administration to report what is needed in order to achieve appropriate readiness for total defence based on identified needs for e.g. goods/materiel, machinery, skills and contingency plans. The assignment shall also include reviewing the need to use volunteers to improve repair readiness and to take into account experience gained from how such repair readiness has been organised previously (e.g. roads and hydraulic engineering corps).

Since the establishment of the existing system with designated temporary preparedness airports in 2012, there have been changes abroad that have affected the conditions for this type of airports. In December 2019 therefore, the Government instructed the Swedish Transport Administration to carry out a review of the Swedish system with designated temporary preparedness airports and the effectiveness, functionality and appropriateness of the present system. The assignment was completed on 15 June 2020 and is now being prepared within the Government Offices.
**Need for transport resources, prioritisation of transport resources etc.**

Since many societally important activities in the field of transport are managed and operated by commercial operators, such as private and public limited liability companies, the Defence Commission believes that different forms of cooperation and requirements for private actors should be analysed and developed. In this context, municipally owned airports and ports should also be taken into account. According to the Defence Commission, the Swedish Transport Administration, with the support of other agencies in the transport sector, should lead the work of developing the readiness of the commercial actors. The transport agencies broadly share the Defence Commission's assessment. The Government shares the assessments of the Defence Commission and the agencies and agrees that industry should be increasingly included in total defence planning.

**9.2.7 Energy supply**

The resilience of energy supply needs to be increased and measures should be taken to ensure a satisfactory level of readiness.

The Defence Commission believes that today's energy supply can largely meet the needs of society in peacetime, but that the energy supply is too vulnerable to withstand an armed attack on Sweden. The Defence Commission considers that stakeholders need to take into account the needs of total defence in the development of new energy systems and in the construction of new energy infrastructure in order to create a more resilient energy supply as a preventive measure. Better information security and cybersecurity, increased redundancy and improved protective security are important in further development.

Svenska Kraftnät (the Swedish power grid), the Swedish Energy Agency and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority have assessed in their documentation for the continued orientation of civil defence that there are a number of general needs for measures to strengthen the capability of different actors. This applies, for example, to the capability of municipalities, regions, county administrative boards and individuals etc. to deal with long interruptions to electricity and heat supplies. There are development needs in terms of society's ability to prioritise and rationing and other consumption suppression in the event of shortages of all types of energy, especially taking into account the needs of total defence. Support for the Armed Forces on energy supply issues needs to be further developed and concretised. The agencies further state that work on total defence planning creates special
needs for resilience at all stages of energy supply, including information security and continuity planning.

The Government shares the assessments of the Defence Commission and the agencies. One of the pillars of energy policy is security of supply. When the energy policy objectives were proposed to the Riksdag, the Government stated that the need for total defence and crisis preparedness for a robust energy supply, especially under disturbed conditions, needs to be taken into consideration in the development of the energy system and in the development of new infrastructure in the energy field (prop. 2017/18:228, bet. 2017/18:NU22, parliamentary communication 2018/19:411). It is important to remember that the individual energy user also needs to be prepared to deal with the consequences of energy supply disruptions both in everyday life and in the event of heightened alert. Reinforcement of the agencies’ resources contributes to the development of prioritisation, rationing and other consumption suppression in the event of energy shortages, which also includes the heightened alert perspective.

**Electricity supply**

The Defence Commission notes that a normal supply of electricity cannot be guaranteed in a war situation. The Defence Commission considers that the fortificatory protection in certain parts of the national grid is still in need of reinforcement, while the commission concludes that it is difficult and costly to obtain full fortificatory protection of the national grid infrastructure. In order to secure the supply of electricity in the event of an armed attack, the Defence Commission states that there will need to be an increased emphasis on independent auxiliary power in contingency planning by the actors responsible for societally important activities. The Defence Commission stresses the importance of having defined procedures and structures for prioritising and rationing in the event of heightened alert.

The Svenska Kraftnät (the Swedish power grid), the Swedish Energy Agency and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority have identified the need for measures in the areas of protection and robustness, repair readiness, micro grids, management and cooperation, as well as cybersecurity. In the nuclear energy field, for example, the present rules need to be clarified with regard to responsibility for safety during heightened alert and the requirements for physical protection at nuclear installations need to be analysed and adapted, since the threat pattern for nuclear power plants during heightened alert is likely to be higher than in peacetime.
The Government shares the Defence Commission's view that normal electricity supply cannot be guaranteed in a war situation and that there is a risk of very large disruptions. The Government notes that there is a need for efforts to strengthen the capacity of electricity supply, such as the ability to operate in micro grids.

Since the national grid is vulnerable, the Defence Commission believes that there may be a need to create better conditions for local production and distribution of electricity. The Defence Commission stresses the importance that the work to develop renewable electricity generation also takes into account total defence aspects. The Government agrees with the Defence Commission's assessment that the transition to renewable electricity should also be able to provide benefits from a total defence perspective and stresses the importance of societal planning taking into account the need for new facilities and new infrastructure.

**Fuel supply**

The Defence Commission considers that existing storage of oil is sufficient to supply important societal activities even in the event of a security crisis in our region. The Government notes that the need for fossil fuels will be reduced by the transition to renewable fuels in peacetime. However, the need for storage of fuels remains, regardless of whether these are fossil or renewable.

The Defence Commission also considers that actors responsible for societally important activities need to analyse their fuel needs and make the necessary preparations to ensure the availability of fuel. The Defence Commission believes that a planning requirement should be imposed on societally important actors whose activities depend on fuel. Requirements should be imposed on private fuel actors to increase stockpiling of fuels at regional and local level. The Defence Commission also stresses the importance that, in peacetime, there must also be a defined national system for prioritising fuel. The Defence Commission notes that the development of alternative fuels reduces vulnerabilities and mitigates the consequences of disturbances.

The Swedish Energy Agency has identified a number of development and investigation needs in its role as the agency responsibility for oil and fuel readiness, including prioritisation of fuels. The Government agrees that fuel readiness needs to be developed for adaptation to total defence and the energy transition.
The Defence Commission notes that the development of alternative fuels reduces vulnerabilities and mitigates the consequences of disturbances. The Swedish Energy Agency has stated that Sweden is also dependent on imports for the majority of biofuel consumption and that it is important to develop and safeguard fuel storage systems.

**Provision of district heating and district cooling**

The Defence Commission notes that interruptions to district heating can have very significant consequences and that the endurance of the district heating supply needs to be strengthened with a focus on, among other things, functional requirements for suppliers and various preventive measures for handling vulnerabilities in the supply of district heating. The Defence Commission also notes that municipalities and, if possible, individual households need to be able to handle interruptions to district heating supply.

The Government notes that the supply of district cooling is also an important aspect for the functionality of society. Interruptions to district cooling can affect, for example, server halls and the functionality of healthcare. The Government agrees that readiness in district heating and cooling can be improved. The individual energy user, in turn, also needs to be prepared to deal with the consequences of disturbances both in everyday life and in the event of heightened alert. Unlike disruptions in electricity supply that often have a direct impact in society, interruptions in the supply of district heating or cooling usually have a more delayed effect.

**9.2.8 Electronic communications and post**

The robustness of electronic communications and post needs to be increased and measures need to be taken to ensure that the activities that society needs can be performed sustainably and to achieve the highest possible total defence capability.

The Defence Commission stresses the importance of electronic communications for the functionality of society, but at the same time points out that electronic communications systems are not designed to cope with the pressures of war or the risk of war. The Government considers that the work of the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) to strengthen robustness is important and considers that measures need to be taken in this area to reinforce the capacity for crisis preparedness, as well as the capability to cope with heightened alert and ultimately war. These include ensuring
further redundancy in electronic communications networks, shell protection for certain technical areas for critical infrastructure, increased autonomy in communications networks and the availability of spare parts and auxiliary power in order to maintain capabilities for a longer period of time. The majority of traffic goes through private network owners’ networks, which makes it important to strengthen these networks from a total defence perspective. The Government's assessment is that state funding initiatives should be implemented to strengthen the robustness of private network owners' networks in order to achieve a capability that goes beyond that required in a peacetime crisis. This involves, for example, the capability for endurance during protracted sequences of events and to cope with many simultaneous events that are geographically dispersed throughout the country.

PTS has carried out a feasibility study of the needs of total defence for postal services (PTS-ER-2020:23) and notes, among other things, that the agencies and organisations surveyed assess that there is a need for effective handling of physical items of post both in peacetime and during heightened alert, in spite of the increased digitalisation of activities. The Government shares the agency's assessment and sees that work in this area needs to continue.
The Government's assessment: Sweden's cyber defence capabilities should be further strengthened. This includes the capability to conduct defensive and offensive operations in the cyber domain. The systematic work on cybersecurity should be further strengthened by actors in the field of total defence.

The reasons for the Government's assessment: The cyber-related threat pattern is described in detail in, for example, the Defence Commission’s reports, the National Cybersecurity Strategy (skr. 2016/17:213) and in the annual reports of a number of agencies. As noted in section 5.1.10 of this bill, there are continuous intrusion attempts against internet-connected systems in Sweden and the most qualified antagonistic cyber threats are primarily attacks executed by states or state-sponsored actors. The effects of a cyber attack can have as much impact on societally important functions and critical IT systems as a conventional armed attack. A cyber attack may, before or during a conflict or part of one, complement political, diplomatic, economic or military means. Such attacks may threaten the freedom of action of a state and ultimately its sovereignty. A cyber attack may in some cases be considered as an armed attack. Cyber attacks can also constitute a subset or indicator of a composite antagonistic attack, so-called hybrid activity. These are activities that occur in all parts of the threat scale, in peacetime, during heightened alert and ultimately in war. Handling such complex activities requires situational awareness and a warning capability.

Based on the Defence Policy Orientation Bill of 2015 (prop. 2014/15:109), a cyber defence capability has been established by the Swedish Armed Forces with the support of the National Defence Radio Establishment. In view of the threat pattern, the Government, like the Defence Commission and in accordance with the Government's proposals in the 2021 budget bill, believes that Sweden's cyber defence capabilities should be further strengthened, including the capability to conduct defensive and offensive operations in the cyber domain.

Cyber defence can be defined as a nation's combined capabilities and actions, both defensive and offensive, to protect its critical societal functions, as well as the ability to defend against cyber attacks from qualified opponents. The purpose of defensive operations is to defend information systems, including electronic communications networks, in order to prevent opponents from affecting information, information systems, computers or
networks. The purpose of offensive operations is to prevent opponents from using their systems or to force opponents to stop attacks against Swedish systems.

The development of defensive and offensive cyber defence capabilities is based on three interacting elements: knowledge of the threats, protective measures and countermeasures. This in turn requires a strong security service and foreign intelligence capabilities so as to prevent and identify threatening activities, the capability to detect, warn and handle intrusions and attacks and strong protection of the most vulnerable activities in society. The Government sees significant value in cooperation between the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Security Service in the development of protection for the most vulnerable activities in Sweden against the most serious threats. There is reason to consider whether qualified support should also be given to separate activities that are considered to be particularly in need of protection.

The Swedish Armed Forces shall maintain and develop a military defence that can counter an armed attack. The Swedish Armed Forces are responsible for Sweden's offensive cyber defence capabilities. The cyber domain is one of several domains where the Swedish Armed Forces shall be able to counter an antagonistic threat with the support of other agencies, such as the National Defence Radio Establishment and other foreign intelligence agencies, the Security Service and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Within the cyber domain, the Swedish Armed Forces shall be able to operate in all levels of conflict. Sweden's cyber defences contribute to impede and raise the threshold for an actor who is considering attacking or exerting pressure on Sweden or Swedish interests. With its signals intelligence capacity, the National Defence Radio Establishment has an important role in supporting the Swedish Armed Forces' intelligence processing. This also applies to cyber defence, where it is particularly important to maintain situational awareness in an area with short lead times. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that close cooperation between the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment is necessary in order to maintain and develop capabilities over time.

As a result of rapid technological development, continuous research and development are required to contribute to the maintenance and development of cyber defence capabilities. Qualified personnel are required to provide
long-term skills and strengthen both defensive and offensive cyber defence capabilities.

A prerequisite for strong cyber defence, as the Government points out in the 2021 budget bill, is that all actors involved in total defence have a high level of cybersecurity. The systematic work on cybersecurity needs to be further strengthened by these actors. Part of this is the increased reporting of IT incidents to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency according to the Regulation (2015:1052) on crisis preparedness and monitoring agencies' measures during heightened alert, as well as notification of security-threatening events and activities to the Security Service and the Armed Forces in accordance with the Protective Security Regulation (2018:658). In order to ensure a high level of cybersecurity in total defence, it is necessary that the cybersecurity perspective is already taken into account during the procurement phase of networks and IT systems, for example. The Government, like the Defence Commission, stresses the importance of preventive work and raising awareness, as well as the capability of all users of IT systems to foster a security culture throughout society. The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that a higher degree of national coordination is needed in the cyber field. The 2019 Statement of Government Policy announced the establishment of a national cybersecurity centre during 2020. The centre shall, in accordance with what the Government states in the budget bill for 2021, strengthen Sweden's capability to prevent, detect and handle antagonistic cyber threats to Sweden and reduce vulnerabilities.

The Government shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the ability to command requires that methods and infrastructure for secure communications function even in disturbed conditions and take into account secrecy requirements. As the Government has stated in the 2021 budget bill, agencies and organisations responsible for total defence need access to secure and robust communications services and high-security network solutions that are appropriate for the processing and communication of classified information. The IT infrastructure that supports the activities is of particular importance so that information can be exchanged in a secure and robust manner. The Government also shares the Defence Commission's view that the ability to command requires actors to be able to operate from command positions other than their normal ones and considers that further measures need to be taken in this area.
11. Foreign intelligence and military security services

11.1 A strengthened and developed foreign intelligence capability and military security service

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<th>The Government's assessment:</th>
<th>Foreign intelligence capabilities and military security services should be strengthened and developed.</th>
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The reasons for the Government's assessment: A good foreign intelligence capability is a prerequisite for Sweden's ability to conduct an independent and active foreign, security and defence policy, as well as for mapping external threats to the country. Foreign intelligence is important for developing the wartime organisation and other capabilities in an effective way and for the Government to be able to make timely decisions on, for example, readiness heightening measures.

Foreign intelligence is conducted by the Swedish Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration and the Swedish Defence Research Agency.

The international situation has deteriorated and military activity in the region is increasing. Furthermore, the antagonistic threat pattern, including terrorism, advocacy operations and cyber threats, remains broad. The Government therefore agrees with the Defence Commission in concluding that the foreign intelligence capability should be strengthened and developed. Foreign intelligence activities contribute to the Swedish Armed Forces' operational capabilities in that information about other actors can be used for both tactical and strategic considerations and prioritising.

The Government also shares the Defence Commission's assessment that the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies must focus on the needs that are of the greatest importance for Sweden's national security and so as to achieve the central foreign, security and defence policy objectives.

The capability to act on intelligence is an important part of the development of total defence, especially the capability to deal with hybrid threats. The broader threat pattern against Sweden entails the need to strengthen cooperation between the security and intelligence services in order to ensure common situational awareness across the entire threat scale.

Foreign intelligence must be organised in such a way that it maintains sufficient readiness in the long term, is able to provide warning and is able to
follow the events of a crisis or war over an extended period. Good situational awareness is a prerequisite for the Government to be able to act proactively and decide on the right measures in the event of security crises. In this way, intelligence activities contribute to the deterrent capabilities of total defence.

Foreign intelligence agencies collaborate with other agencies in several areas of expertise. Examples include the National Centre for Terror Threat Assessment (NCT) and the National Collaboration to Protect Against Serious IT Threats (NSIT) in which the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Armed Forces/Military Intelligence Service and the Security Service participate. The Government believes that the foreign intelligence agencies should continue to collaborate with the Security Service, among others. Foreign intelligence agencies should also plan and exercise so as to be able to handle a transition to heightened alert.

International cooperation in the field of intelligence is of fundamental importance for Swedish intelligence capabilities. It is crucial that Sweden has its own relevant intelligence to contribute and that long-term and trusting relationships are built.

In view of the developments abroad, the reconstruction of total defence and the fact that Sweden has had a new protective security act since 1 April 2019, the requirements and importance of the military security service are increasing. With increased activity within the Swedish Armed Forces and total defence, the exposure of sensitive activities also increases. All in all, therefore, the military security service needs to be strengthened and developed.

11.2 Signals intelligence legislation should be reviewed

At the Riksdag's final debate on the Government document Integrity protection in signals intelligence in foreign intelligence (skr. 2017/18:70), the Riksdag decided to advise the Government that the Riksdag supports what the committee has stated, that the Government should review the possibility of giving the Inspectorate for Strategic Products (ISP) the right to issue detailed tasking directives for the National Defence Radio Establishment’s signals intelligence (bet. 2017/18:FöU5 point 3, parliamentary communication 2017/18:178 and parliamentary communication 2017/18:179).
The Swedish Defence Radio Establishment's signals intelligence in foreign intelligence makes a significant contribution in areas that are of increasing importance for Sweden's security. At the same time, this is a question of a capability that depends on specific technical and personnel resources, as well as clear priorities. Among other things, developments abroad and the resumption of total defence planning have realised the need for a review of existing signals intelligence legislation. The inquiry Regulation of the National Defence Radio Establishment's international cooperation (Fö 2020:01) has been given the task of reviewing the part of the legislation relating to the National Defence Radio Establishment's international cooperation. The assignment shall be reported by 30 November 2020.

The Government also sees a need for a broader investigation in order to ensure that Sweden has legislation that, taking into account global developments and the changing needs of total defence, offers effective and appropriate support for Swedish foreign, security and defence policy and for mapping external threats against the country, while continuing to take due account of the personal integrity of individuals. A special investigator should therefore be given the task of reviewing the Signals Intelligence Act (2008:717) during the period 2021-2025. The review should include, among other things, the question of the right to issue detailed tasking directives for signals intelligence within foreign intelligence. The Government intends to come back on this issue. The announcement has not been finalised.
12. Voluntary defence organisations

**The Government's assessment:** The ability of voluntary defence organisations to contribute to the overall defence capability should be safeguarded in the long term.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** The Government has identified 18 voluntary defence organisations whose activities are regulated by the Regulation (1994:524) on voluntary defence activities. The organisations have a large number of members and exist at local level throughout the country.

In total defence, voluntary defence organisations contribute the public’s endorsement, reinforcement resources and will to defend. Popular endorsement and a strong will to defend Sweden are a prerequisite for total defence as a deterrent. Popular endorsement is based, among other things, on the existence of knowledge and understanding of the needs of society and total defence in times of crisis and war. Popular endorsement also requires that people, in addition to their normal employment, take an interest in and directly engage in the activities of total defence. The dissemination of information on total defence is thus an important part of the task of voluntary defence organisations. Voluntary defence organisations train their members in order to strengthen total defence and society's crisis preparedness. The organisations also carry out youth activities, which create the conditions for increasing commitment to total defence in more age groups. Voluntary defence organisations also support society with valuable input. The Government further notes that voluntary defence organisations have an important role to play in the organisation of war volunteers.

Voluntary commitment is important for the overall capability of total defence. It is therefore important to ensure the ability of voluntary defence organisations to contribute in the long term to total defence and to society's crisis preparedness. The Government believes that the planning of total defence and of society's crisis preparedness should include a developed voluntary perspective.

The activities of voluntary defence organisations are financed from state resources through the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and the Swedish Armed Forces. The Defence Commission proposes that the financing model for voluntary defence organisations is reviewed and adapted, and that the financial circumstances of voluntary defence organisations are clarified and made more predictable. The Defence
Commission believes that this increases transparency and provides better conditions for voluntary activities. The Government shares the view that voluntary defence organisations need to be given good opportunities to contribute to total defence and society's crisis preparedness. During the last defence resolution period, the Government has gradually increased the contribution that the Swedish Armed Forces and MSB may use for mission compensation to the voluntary defence organisations, which has enabled more training and development for the organisations. With an increased role for the voluntary defence organisations in total defence, the Government believes that this contribution will need to be further increased, not least in order to ensure a sustainable long-term organisational structure for the activities of voluntary defence organisations.

If the economic framework is increased between 2026 and 2030, the funds will be used to implement the measures set out in Section 4 Policy focus.
13. Entry into force and transitional provisions

**The Government's proposal:** The proposed legislative amendment shall enter into force on 1 February 2021.

**The Government's assessment:** There is no need for specific transitional provisions.

**The memorandum's proposal** is that legislative amendments shall enter into force on 1 January 2021. The memorandum does not contain an assessment of the need for transitional provisions.

**The consultation bodies** do not give any particular opinion on this part.

**The reasons for the Government's proposal and assessment:** The Government considers that the legislative amendments should enter into force as soon as possible, preferably on 1 February 2021.

There is no need for specific transitional provisions.
14. Consequences

**The Government's assessment:** The change of the name of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency leads to certain statutory amendments. The change of name is considered to lead to marginal cost increases for the agency. It should be possible to finance these within existing funding frameworks. The proposal has no financial consequences for other government agencies, municipalities, regions, businesses or individuals. Nor is it considered to have any social or environmental consequences.

The memorandum's assessment is essentially in line with that of the Government.

The consultation bodies do not make any particular comment on the memorandum's assessment.

**The reasons for the Government's assessment:** The change of the name of the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency means, among other things, that the agency needs to change façade signs, update its graphic profile and perform reprinting of printed matter. The Government, like the memorandum, considers that the costs of this can be covered within existing cost frameworks. The proposal has no financial consequences for other Government agencies, municipalities, regions, businesses or individuals. Nor is it considered to have any social or environmental consequences.

Otherwise, the Government reports on the consequences of the proposals in this bill under each section.
15. Legislative comments

a. Proposal on amending the Social Insurance Code
In chapter 110 section 35 and the heading immediately before chapter 110 section 35 amendments are made in that the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency changes its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency. The deliberation is found in section 8.3.5.

In section 31 amendments are made in that the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency changes its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency. The deliberation is found in section 8.3.5.

c. Proposal on amending the Total Defence Act (1994:1809)
In chapter 2 sections 1, 2 and 4, chapter 3 sections 1, 3–4 a, 9, 15, 15 a and 22, chapter 5 sections 1, 6, 7, 10, 15 and 17, chapter 7 section 1, chapter 10 sections 6–8 and points 10 and 15 in the provisions on entry into force and transitional provisions, amendments are made in that the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency changes its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency. The deliberation is found in section 8.3.5.

d. Proposal on amending the Act on the measures taken by municipalities and regions before and in the event of extraordinary events in peacetime and heightened alert (2006:544)
In chapter 6 section 1 amendments are made in that the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency changes its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency. The deliberation is found in section 8.3.5.

e. Proposal on amending the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400)
In chapter 37 section 4 amendments are made in that the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency changes its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency. The deliberation is found in section 8.3.5.

f. Proposal on amending the Total Defence Data Act (2020:151)
In sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14 and 15 amendments are made in that the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency changes its name to Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency. The deliberation is found in section 8.3.5.