The Government submits this Communication to the Riksdag.

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Main contents of the Communication

Terrorism threatens international peace and security, national security and our fundamental rights and freedoms. Every year, numerous terrorist attacks are carried out around the world. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in problems related to foreign terrorist fighters and there is presently no indication that this trend will abate.

The Government has now drawn up a new national counter-terrorism strategy that will form the basis of Sweden’s long-term work in this area, both nationally and internationally. The aim is to create a clear structure for the work needed to combat terrorist crime. The strategy emphasises the importance of cooperation and clear follow-up of the work done.

The goal of all counter-terrorism activities is to keep terrorist attacks from being carried out. This work is divided into three areas – Prevent, Preempt and Protect. Particular focus is given to the area Prevent. Measures in this area are intended to counteract radicalisation and recruitment to extremist and terrorist groups, and to influence the intent of individuals to commit or support terrorist crime. In this way, the recruitment base for terrorism can be reduced. The Preempt area deals with countering and reducing the capabilities and opportunities to commit terrorist attacks, while Protect deals with creating and maintaining protection for individuals and reducing society’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks. If a terrorist attack is nevertheless carried out, society must also be able to manage the resulting consequences.

One important premise for the Government is that fundamental rights and freedoms and the principles of the rule of law must be ensured in all actions to combat terrorism.
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1 A new counter-terrorism strategy

1.1 The need for a new strategy

Our society must be characterised by openness and respect for human rights and for the fundamental values of democracy. People must be able to move freely and safely, and be free to assemble, express their opinions and wear religious symbols without fear of threats of violence. Terrorism threatens these fundamental values and we must continue to combat it.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Acts of violence on the part of non-governmental or non-parliamentary groups have long been used to destabilise societies and create social unrest and fear, with the predominant purpose of damaging institutions, groups and individuals in order to influence social development and democratic decision-making. This year alone, the world has been shaken by a number of terrorist attacks. Examples include several attacks in Sweden’s immediate vicinity or which have affected Swedish interests. In January twelve people were killed in Paris at the office of a magazine and later sixteen people were taken hostage, five of whom were killed. In February, a lone perpetrator first killed one person at a seminar in Copenhagen and then one person outside a synagogue. In June, 39 tourists were killed in Tunisia by a lone perpetrator. At the same time, it should be pointed out that several attacks have been thwarted in recent years. For example, a planned attack on the head office of the Jyllandsposten newspaper in Copenhagen was uncovered in 2010, and in January this year the Belgian police managed to avert a planned attack similar to that carried out in Paris a few days earlier.

The fact that terrorist attacks continue to be committed in the world shows that we need to do more, which sets new demands for work to counter terrorism. Agencies that have long worked to counter terrorism have to become even more efficient in doing so. Agencies and other actors that have not previously been engaged in counter-terrorism work have now become involved and even more will have to do so, both on the national and the international stage. The fact that a large number of actors have now involved themselves in this work, all of whom work in different ways and in different combinations, makes cooperation even more important. At the same time, duties and responsibilities must be clear. It is also essential that actions to safeguard democracy against violent extremism and actions to prevent terrorism are seen as a whole.

We cannot protect ourselves against everything but we must do everything we can to protect ourselves. In this strategy, the Government seeks to create a framework for Sweden’s long-term counter-terrorism work. Counter-terrorism efforts must rest on a clear, long-term foundation, incorporating the flexibility required to tackle a changing threat scenario. This strategy replaces the previous strategy Responsibility and commitment – a national counter-terrorism strategy (Government Communication 2011/12:73).
1.2 The threat scenario facing Sweden and Swedish interests

The majority of terrorist attacks in the world are still taking place outside Europe’s borders. Often the victims are the civilian population and in the past year, for example, religious minorities have been hard hit by the brutal acts of violence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) in Syria and Iraq.

At European level, left-wing extremist groups, known as autonomous groupings, in southern Europe, particularly in Greece, have carried out several attacks in the past few years. Attacks have also been carried out in Europe by individuals belonging to the right-wing “white supremacy” extremist movement. It is likely that the capability to carry out attacks does exist within the white supremacy movement and in the autonomous groupings in Sweden, but there is no explicit intention to carry any out at this current time. However, there are actors with the potential to develop such an intention.

The foremost terrorist threat in Sweden today comes from actors inspired by al-Qaeda or the ideologies of closely related organisations. The violent extremist Islamist movement in Sweden contains people who probably have the capability to carry out terrorist attacks. Only a few of these, however, are judged to also have the intent to commit them. The increasing amount of travel to and, above all, returning from areas of conflict, where individuals have participated in terrorist training or committed acts of violence, means that the number of people in Sweden with the capability to carry out attacks or other types of ideologically motivated crime, such as threats and acts of violence, is increasing. Those returning from such trips, irrespective of their ideological background, have, in the vast majority of cases, gained the capability of carrying out serious violent crime. This does not only concern the ability to handle firearms or explosives, but also having crossed a threshold for the use of violence. Despite this, the majority of people who return to Sweden will not develop intent to commit terrorist attacks.

The internet and social media are key tools of the global movement inspired by al-Qaeda in spreading propaganda and for radicalisation and recruitment. Representatives of this movement have encouraged small-scale attacks carried out by simple means, such as using weapons for stabbing or cutting, simple firearms or vehicles. Signs can also be seen on social media that the rhetoric used by al-Qaeda and Isil is becoming normalised, even among very young people in Sweden. Individuals in Sweden are radicalised via the internet and risk being driven to commit acts of violence in Sweden or abroad. Furthermore, there is a trend towards attacks or attempted attacks where the intent is founded on individual motives. Such an intention may arise in conjunction with perceived restrictions to or infringement of individual liberty.

The attacks in Paris and Copenhagen in early 2015 show that previously perceived insults to Islam may be linked to attacks far in the future, even if the motive behind the attacks may have differed. Recent terrorist attacks or attempted attacks have primarily been aimed at countries that are involved in the US-led coalition’s military intervention
in Iraq. Swedish military involvement in areas of conflict may influence the view of Sweden as a target of attacks by violent Islamic actors.

An additional potential threat to Sweden comes from perpetrators acting alone. Such lone attackers may have different ideological motives, but what they have in common is that they do not belong to established groups or networks. These perpetrators are rarely acting on the specific instructions of anyone else, although statements made by leaders abroad may be viewed as legitimising the attack. In recent years, a number of attacks in the West have been carried out by this type of lone attacker.

1.3 How do we tackle this threat?

No one is born a terrorist. The aim must be to identify radicalisation processes as early as possible in order to counteract further radicalisation of these groups or individuals and prevent them from ultimately committing terrorist acts.

The Government is conducting ongoing dialogue on terrorism-related issues with the agencies concerned, particularly with the Swedish Security Service, which has the main responsibility to counter terrorism in Sweden. According to the Swedish Security Service, a variety of factors are at play in violence-promoting radicalisation. One factor is perceived injustices or insults, which may be substantiated. Another is exposure to a violence-promoting ideology that points out injustices, explains their cause and states what should be done about them. Finally, a social context is also needed in which the ideology is internalised. Some individuals join violence-promoting groups because they seek excitement and a sense of community. Others are more interested in the ideology. Yet others end up in violence-promoting groups because members of their families or people in their social circles already belong to such groups. Sometimes there is a charismatic leader but often people radicalise each other without a clear leader. It is not uncommon for radicalisation to occur through social contacts, as well as through lectures and propaganda (Swedish Security Service Yearbook 2014, p. 32).

The Swedish Security Service describes the way that push and pull factors act as risk factors or circumstances that enable a person to become radicalised. Push factors are factors inherent to the individual or the circumstances in which they are living that may increase the likelihood of radicalisation. Examples of push factors are seeking meaning or excitement, a desire to make a difference and perceived injustices. Pull factors are factors in a group that may increase the likelihood of radicalisation, such as social interaction or friendship, meaningfulness, significance or status in the group and attractive ideological arguments. The importance of different push and pull factors varies between different people (Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, Swedish Security Service, 2010, p. 34ff).

The whole of society must work with the underlying causes of terrorism and counteract its push and pull factors. Once a person has developed an intent and a capability to use violence or is on the verge of doing so, however, other measures are required that are more repressive
in nature. One of the major challenges in countering terrorism is therefore to find both a balance between long-term and short-term methods and an adequate use of preventive and repressive measures. The purpose of preventive measures is to reduce violent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist groups. Repressive and controlling measures are necessary to deflect immediate terrorist threats. Effective counter-terrorism therefore requires both preventive and repressive measures that complement each other. The Government particularly wishes to focus on preventive measures in order to prevent more people developing an intent and capability to commit terrorist attacks in the longer term.

As more and more actors participate in the work of countering terrorism, collaboration becomes increasingly important. This strategy therefore emphasises the need for increased cooperation and collaboration between all actors concerned. This also includes all those involved taking a holistic view of these efforts so that the measures that are taken to prevent, preempt or protect against terrorist attacks and manage the consequences of a terrorist attack do not have the effect of increasing radicalisation and exclusion.

This Communication sets out how the Government intends to carry out the work to counter terrorism. It sets out the objectives the Government has for this work and how it should be carried out in order for these objectives to be attained. The Communication will be supplemented by assignments and other steering measures for agencies so that the ambitions of the Communication become a clear part of their work. The Government will follow up what agencies are doing to ensure that this work can be adapted to identified needs. The Government shall also work to ensure that the agencies have the tools they need in order to perform their respective tasks and work jointly with other agencies or actors involved.

1.4 Counter-terrorism framework

1.4.1 Terrorism must be countered with respect for fundamental rights and freedoms

Terrorism threatens international peace and security, national security and our fundamental rights and freedoms. The aim of counterterrorism work is to prevent people from gaining the intent and the capability to carry out terrorist attacks. The whole of society must work with the underlying causes of terrorism and to counteract these push and pull factors. By promoting democracy, equality, tolerance and participation, we can counteract intolerance, discrimination and exclusion.

A fundamental premise underlying all work to counter terrorism is that human rights and the principles of the rule of law are respected. This also applies to protection for personal privacy. These principles are at the heart of the Government's counter-terrorism work in Sweden and internationally. Terrorism may only be countered by means that are appropriate in an open, democratic society governed by the rule of law. Each measure must be proportionate to its purpose, both when it comes to new general regulations and to application of the regulations to a specific
action. Combating terrorist crime therefore sometimes means a difficult balancing act between different interests and objectives. Freedoms and rights may only be restricted to meet aims that are acceptable in a democratic society and only by using such measures as are necessary, appropriate and proportionate.

1.4.2 Regulation of terrorist crime in criminal law

Terrorism involves more than planning and carrying out terrorist attacks. It may also be expressed in the form of spreading messages of violence, fundraising and other support for terrorist groups, recruiting people to carry out attacks, and training in the manufacture of explosive devices.

Swedish regulation of terrorist crime under criminal law, which is largely based on international conventions, is an important aspect of counter-terrorism work in Sweden. An account of the central legislation in criminal law is therefore provided as an introduction.

According to the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences (2003:148) (the Terrorist Offences Act) an action constitutes a terrorist offence if it might seriously damage a state or an intergovernmental organisation. It must also be carried out with intent such as to seriously intimidate a population or a group of population, or to unduly compel, for example, a government, to perform an act or abstain from acting. The acts that constitute terrorist offences under these conditions include murder, kidnapping, sabotage, hijacking, spreading poison or a contagious substance, and unlawful handling of chemical weapons. Attempt, preparation or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence, or failure to reveal such an offence, are also punishable.

The Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment and Training concerning Terrorist Offences and other Particularly Serious Crime (2010:299) (the Recruitment Act) sets out particular criminal responsibility for a person who, in a message to the public, urges or otherwise attempts to entice people to commit particularly serious crime (public provocation) or who otherwise seeks to induce another person to commit or otherwise participate in particularly serious crime (recruitment). It also sets out particular criminal responsibility for a person who provides or seeks to provide instruction in the making or use of explosives, weapons or noxious or hazardous substances that are particularly likely to be used in particularly serious crime, if the act has been committed with the knowledge that the instruction is intended to be used for particularly serious crime (training). Particularly serious crime refers inter alia to terrorist offences and such crimes referred to in certain named international conventions.

According to the Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in Some Cases (2002:444) (the Financing Act) it is a criminal offence to collect, provide or receive funds or other property with the intention that it should be used or in the knowledge that it is to be used in order to commit particularly serious crime. Attempt to commit such an offence are also punishable.

As set out in section 2.2, a review of the criminal responsibility is currently in progress.
Three areas of counter-terrorism work

Terrorism cannot be prevented or countered using individual measures taken in isolation but instead demands parallel measures in several areas. The goal of all counter-terrorism activities is to avoid terrorist attacks being carried out. The work is divided into three areas termed Prevent, Preempt and Protect. If a terrorist attack is nevertheless carried out, society must also be well prepared to deal with the consequences. This aspect is addressed in section 3.

The purpose of dividing the work into three areas is to clearly set out the objectives of the work, facilitate follow up and clarify roles and responsibilities. This division seeks to make it clear what counter-terrorism involves and help agencies and other actors to see what they can do in their area of work in this regard. The intention is for the same division to be used in future strategies so that counter-terrorism work rests on a clear and consistent foundation.

It is unavoidable that measures in one of the areas will sometimes have an impact on other areas. A holistic perspective is required so that measures taken in one area do not have negative consequences in another. If the police are involved in intervening against a drug-related crime, for example, and following seizure find signs of radicalisation, e.g. on a phone or a computer, the information needs to be passed on so that the actors involved can act on the basis of that information. How the police take action in different contexts is also significant in terms of building trust, and they must therefore also consider the wider implications of all interventions. There may also be cause for non-law enforcement authorities, local government actors and other actors to take a holistic approach in their respective areas of responsibility. This work must not lead to the stigmatisation of particular groups.

As a strategy should be a steering document its purpose, in the view of the Government, is not best served by reporting on all the important work that agencies are already doing. The intention instead is to set out the Government’s objectives in the different areas and how work should be focused in order to achieve them. This is done by stating under each respective section what the Government is to work towards in the form of proposals for changes to legislation or other steering measures.
2.1 Prevent – counter and reduce the intent to commit or support terrorist attacks

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<th>Objectives:</th>
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<td>Identify and develop knowledge-based methods and measures capable of preventing radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>For relevant actors at national, regional and local level to prioritise work to combat radicalisation and violent extremism and to collaborate on actions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>For all actors to take a holistic approach so that measures to prevent, preempt or protect against terrorist crime or to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack are taken in a manner that does not lead to more people becoming radicalised.</td>
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Terrorism is an extreme form of violent extremism. To counter terrorism it is essential to work with the factors underlying extremism and terrorism, to prevent and counter its push factors and to identify individuals in the risk zone. Crime prevention work strives to systematically counter the causes of crime, based on factual knowledge, and to limit opportunities to commit crime. The preventive area of this strategy seeks to counter radicalisation and influence people's intention to commit crime. The focus is thus on measures that seek to reduce the recruitment base for terrorism.

There is much to indicate that work for an inclusive society, such as a secure and functioning school system and successfully functioning labour market policy, has a positive impact on work to combat crime in general and thus also on work to counter terrorism. However, this strategy will only address work that is judged to prevent terrorist crime in particular.

**Work to safeguard democracy against violent extremism**

Safeguarding democracy against violent extremism includes initiatives to counter radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist groups and terrorist crime in Sweden and abroad. In different ways, activities by the different extremist environments undermine, challenge and threaten democratic values. Norms, values and attitudes that interact and contribute towards the growth of extremism and terrorism must be effectively countered. It is important that a gender perspective is included in the work to prevent violent extremism and terrorism.

A National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism (Ju 2014:18, referred to below as the National Coordinator) was appointed in June 2014. The National Coordinator is tasked with improving the cooperation between agencies, local government and organisations at national, regional and local level. The National Coordinator must also work to increase awareness of violent extremism and to ensure that preventive methods are developed. In March 2015, the Government adopted additional instructions to the Coordinator to further strengthen and develop preventive work. The assignment now also includes encour-
raging disengagement initiatives for individuals wishing to leave violent extremist movements, producing and initiating the implementation of a cohesive strategy for work to safeguard democracy against violent extremism and setting up a network of experts. Furthermore, it includes improving work at local level on providing support to relatives. On 13 August 2015, the Government decided on further additional instructions to the Coordinator with the aim of initiating a pilot scheme with a national telephone hotline, which relatives, local government and organisations can contact to obtain information, advice and support on issues concerning violent extremism. The assignment of the National Coordinator as a whole is to be revised in June 2016.

On 13 August 2015, the Government adopted the Communication *Actions to make the society more resilient to violent extremism* (Communication 2014/15:144). The Communication contains the 21 measures the Government has taken with the aim of significantly reinforcing the preventive work. The purpose of the Communication is to provide a combined description of the measures currently being carried out, clarify areas of responsibility, collaboration and target groups, and to develop civil contingencies planning among national agencies during the period of the National Coordinator’s assignment. The aim of the measures is to make the society more resilient to violent extremism. The measures therefore seek to increase knowledge of violent extremism and to develop preventive initiatives and methods. The intention is for these measures to make agencies, local authorities and civil society organisations, including faith communities, better co-ordinated and able to effectively contribute towards protecting democracy against violent extremism. The measures carried out cover the following five areas:

- **National coordination to safeguard democracy against violent extremism.** The key to successful prevention work is functioning collaboration between relevant agencies and organisations.

- **Measures to safeguard democracy and the equal value and rights of all people.** Measures in this area are broadly geared towards everyone in relevant groups, such as pupils, young people, and affected professional groups and faith communities. They seek to reduce the fertile ground for anti-democratic behaviour and violent ideologies. These measures are also meant to reach individuals who are at risk and those who have already joined violent extremist movements.

- **Measures against identified risks.** The measures in this area seek to develop work concerning groups at risk and problems linked to violent extremism.

- **Measures to encourage individuals to leave violent extremist movements.** The measures in this area seek to develop initiatives geared towards individuals who are or have been involved in violent extremist movements.

- **Strengthened Nordic and international sharing of knowledge and experience.** Sharing knowledge and experience internationally has helped to develop the national work to safeguard democracy against violent extremism. This exchange will continue.

One issue on which attention should particularly be focused is the use of the internet and social media by extremist and terrorist groups to spread propaganda and other material that glorifies and encourages
violence, violent ideologies and terrorism. This leads to groups growing stronger and more people being radicalised and recruited. The Swedish Constitution provides powerful protection for freedom of expression. The opportunities that the internet provides for strengthening democracy must also be safeguarded. Sweden must be equipped to tackle propaganda and anti-democratic messages also when they are spread on the internet or in social media. The Government considers that the best way of tackling propaganda for violent extremism and terrorism is by providing knowledge. The Swedish Media Council was previously commissioned by the Government to produce digital training material with the aim of increasing media awareness among children and young people, thereby increasing their ability to question anti-democratic and violent messages on the internet and in social media that encourage threats and violence for an ideological cause. The Swedish Media Council has recently been commissioned to expand and extend the No Hate Speech Movement to also include initiatives to safeguard democracy against violent extremism by increasing media awareness among children and young people. The campaign shall particularly be focused on strengthening the ability of children and young people to use their freedom of expression and respect human rights, increase their participation in democracy and stimulate source criticism and individual critical thought in relation to the media. However, there is a need for further knowledge to understand, analyse and tackle the violent propaganda on the internet and in social media, and the role which social media plays in radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremism and terrorism. Therefore, on the initiative of the National Coordinator, the Swedish Defence University has been commissioned to survey violent extremism in social media. This task also includes describing how other countries in Europe use social media in their preventive work. The Swedish Defence University will report back to the National Coordinator during 2015.

The Government shall act to ensure that

- the knowledge, proposals and strategy that the National Coordinator has been commissioned to produce are taken on board and used,
- the knowledge and proposals drawn up in line with the assignments set out by the Government in the Communication Actions to make the society more resilient to violent extremism (Communication 2014/15:144) are addressed and any need for further measures is met.

Crime prevention

Crime prevention methods seek to combat the causes of criminality. Knowledge of the risk factors and drivers of significance for anyone developing criminal behaviour, and of the measures that are effective in reducing the risk of such behaviour, is crucial for preventing criminality. Risk factors and driving factors can be influenced and criminality reduced through focused initiatives, for example against youth criminality and recruitment to criminal groups, such as social action groups, and work with those wishing to disengage from such groups. Measures capable of influencing stereotypical norms that link masculinity with violence are also important. Development work, including school-based
programmes to prevent violence, is being carried out in local authorities in collaboration with different actors in society. The assignment of the National Coordinator includes improving interaction between agencies and local government. It goes without saying that collaboration between the Swedish Police Authority and local government actors is of vital importance to preventing crime.

**Local crime prevention**

The preventive work of law enforcement authorities primarily targets potential risk groups and potential crimes. The crime prevention work of the Swedish Police Authority must be founded on intelligence and take a problem-oriented approach. This means that the authority must compile a local problem scenario on the basis of the information available on criminality within a given area. On the basis of this, the causes assumed to lie behind criminality are then analysed so that measures and methods to tackle the problems can be identified. However, the Police Authority cannot combat the causes of crime effectively alone because many of the measures that have an effect fall within the remit of other actors, such as social services, the school system and voluntary and religious bodies. Crime prevention work must therefore be run in close collaboration between all these actors.

In most areas of the country, the Police Authority has signed collaboration agreements with local governments. These vary in scope but they constitute a firm foundation for work to increase cooperation between the Police Authority and the local government, for example. With their unique knowledge of crime and its development within a certain geographical area, the authority can contribute relevant information in producing the joint local problem scenarios that are to steer local crime prevention work. One starting point should be that the problem of foreign terrorist fighters must be identified in local problem scenarios and also be covered by collaboration agreements where relevant. To make this possible, the information obtained by the Swedish Security Service must be passed on to the Police Authority and to all local police districts concerned. For crime prevention work to be effective and successful all relevant actors at local level must work together on and contribute towards producing problem scenarios and to implement the measures that result from these. If there are signs of particular problems of radicalisation in a certain area, action needs to be targeted there.

General awareness of what influences a person to turn to criminal behaviour is also relevant in order to reduce the risk of individuals choosing to engage in terrorist crime. Existing information on which people choose to join terrorist groups indicates, however, that there is large variation in backgrounds and push factors. The problem is complex and different measures are therefore required for different individuals. As set out in section 1.3, the importance of push and pull factors varies from person to person. However, more concerted information is required on what these factors are, and the measures that are relevant to countering them. It has to be determined whether existing crime prevention work is sufficient or whether further methods need to be developed and applied.
practically. Further information is also needed to better be able to identify people who are already engaged in a radicalisation process.

Work is under way within the Swedish Police Authority to create a national model for work to counter violent extremism, including activities to create contacts and sharing updates with collaborating agencies. Over the past few years, initiatives have also been carried out to increase awareness in this field. Every year the Swedish National Police Academy runs the CoPPRa programme (Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation) for instructors. On completing the training, the instructors train relevant staff in detecting and preventing violent radicalisation at local level. The Government takes a positive view of this work having been launched and of its continuation.

The Government intends to develop local crime prevention work partly by strengthening national coordination in the area. The National Council for Crime Prevention will be commissioned to analyse the areas in which there is a need for greater support and to suggest proposals for how a national support and coordination function can be constructed at the Council. The crime prevention structures already in place must be developed and a problem-oriented approach reinforced. These initiatives will benefit terrorist crime prevention.

Activities to support people wishing to leave criminal networks are run in different places across Sweden. However, there are few local operations to identify the individuals who need support and help to leave violent extremist movements. As shown in the previous section, the National Coordinator has been commissioned to support relevant actors in working to create organisations to assist people wishing to leave violent extremist movements. The Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service, through the Police Authority, have an important function to perform here in passing on to relevant actors, where possible and appropriate, information on those individuals who may need support and help in disengaging from violent extremist movements.

**Work at agencies in the justice system**

All agencies within the justice system have an important preventive function to perform. Prosecutors may notice signs of radicalisation in individual criminal inquiries when carrying out a pre-sentence report investigation. This information should be passed on to the Police Authority, who can ensure that it is used in local crime prevention. In the courts, signs may emerge during a trial that the accused is on the way to becoming radicalised or is already radicalised. It is important that such information is passed on to the agencies tasked with implementing any subsequent sanctions so that it can be made use of in prevention.

Within the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, work is in progress to identify people, groups and phenomena that show signs of ongoing recruitment to violent extremism. Organisation and expertise in handling this set of problems has been developed in recent years. The Prison and Probation Service also participates in several national and international collaborations that provide opportunities to share knowledge and experience on preventive measures. Lessons can be learned from the events that have taken place in Sweden’s near vicinity where perpetrators
are judged to have been radicalised within the prison environment. In Sweden, the Prison and Probation Service has extensive intelligence operations, the units in its institutions are relatively small compared with those in other countries, there is a deliberate strategy when deciding where to place inmates, and staff work in close contact with inmates day to day. These circumstances are protective factors in this context, but radicalisation can naturally occur even in Swedish penal institutions. It is therefore appropriate that the Prison and Probation Service continues its intelligence work and continues to obtain information on individuals as well as on the experience of other agencies and states. Staff within the service needs to be aware, for example, of signs of radicalisation and have the ability to correctly handle information that comes to their attention. In June 2015, the Government commissioned the Prison and Probation Service to carry out a survey of methods and approaches that can be used to prevent violent extremism in the clients of the Prison and Probation Service. The survey is also to cover methods and approaches that may be used in work with those clients who are already members of or otherwise linked to violent extremist groups. The Swedish National Board of Institutional Care has recently been given a similar task regarding the implementation of sanctions in treatment centres.

*The Government shall act to ensure that*

- the coordination of local crime prevention is further strengthened,
- knowledge of the factors that contribute towards terrorist crime increases,
- the agencies in the justice system make the most of knowledge on the factors that contribute towards terrorist crime and adapt preventive work accordingly,
- measures are put in place to increase expertise within the justice system,
- the Security Service and the Police Authority continue to develop their cooperation so that information can be efficiently disseminated and operational information is passed on to the local level,
- the Police Authority works to ensure that local problem scenarios cover aspects concerning radicalisation and terrorism,
- the Prison and Probation Service maintains and develops the work run within the service’s security organisation.

*Actors*

In the area of prevention it is clear that actors with no explicit mission to counter terrorism play a central role in work to counteract radicalisation and to prevent terrorism. Key actors are social services, the school system, associations and societies, voluntary organisations, religious leaders and politicians.

The Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service contribute information and input in collaboration with local authorities. The Swedish Prison and Probation Service works on measures to prevent criminals reoffending and also has good opportunities to prevent and draw attention to radicalisation in institutions run by the service. The Swedish National Board of Institutional Care, which is responsible for
running compulsory care and implementing secure youth care, is also an important actor in this area. The prosecution service and the court system also have important functions to fulfil.

2.2 Preempt – combat and reduce the capabilities and opportunities to commit terrorist attacks

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<th>Objectives:</th>
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<tr>
<td>– For law enforcement authorities to have appropriate tools, under the rule of law, to preempt terrorist attacks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Improve the efficiency of work to detect and counter the funding of terrorism and better integrate it with other counter-terrorism work.</td>
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<tr>
<td>– For criminalisation of terrorist crime to be appropriate and comply with international undertakings.</td>
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Even well-functioning preventive work will not make it possible to completely prevent people from developing an intention to commit terrorist crime. In these cases the criminality must be preempted by limiting the capability and opportunities to implement the plans to commit a crime. It is crucial to the success of this work that the agencies concerned have sufficient information about the people who have developed an intention to commit terrorist crime. In recent years a number of attacks in the West have been carried out by lone perpetrators, which poses a particular challenge in this context. Information can be used to avert plans to commit crime, investigate and take legal proceedings against crimes, and combat the financing of terrorism. In many cases an attack can be preempted in this way. The Preempt area is therefore divided into two parts: Access to and sharing information and, in addition, Opportunity to act.

Access to and sharing information

Access to information is a fundamental prerequisite for agencies’ opportunities to preempt terrorist crime. The agencies must have access to adequate information at the right time and they must also have an opportunity to process and analyse this information. However, it is not always the agency that has access to certain information in its operations that is also tasked with analysing it or acting on its basis. An agency may need to share information to which it has access with an agency that has a need for it, or to request information that it needs from an agency that has access to it. The opportunity to collaborate and share information, at strategic level as well as operationally, is therefore of the utmost importance in the Preempt area.

The Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council is a good example of strategic collaboration. The Council does not have a formal mandate but is a network of fourteen agencies which work together at national level to improve coordination and improve the efficiency of the agencies’ work to combat terrorism. Within the Council there is a permanent working
party for communication issues, whose tasks include ensuring that functioning channels for communication between the agencies are in place where required. Within the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council, work is also in progress to support the strategic work of the agencies in adapting to changed threat levels. The Government takes a positive view of the agencies’ collaboration and intends to monitor this work. The agencies in the Council should continue to exploit opportunities to share information with each other so that the best and most effective use is made of their combined expertise.

Another example of strategic collaboration is the informal permanent working group the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT). It involves the Swedish Security Service, the Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment, and the Swedish Armed Forces (Military Intelligence and Security Service). The working group was set up by the agencies in order to enable them to work together to strategically assess terror threats against Sweden and Swedish interests in the short and long term. These threat assessments seek to provide an early warning of changes that may affect the threat scenario and may require action. Cooperation enables the combined expertise of the three agencies to be put to use. The Swedish Security Service has identified a need to grant the other agencies within NCT direct access to the information in the agency’s operations needed for cooperation and thus improve efficiency.

It is the Security Service that has main responsibility for preempting terrorist crime in Sweden. Being a police authority as well as a security service, the agency holds a unique position. The Swedish Police Authority also plays a central role in this area. The agencies must work with each other to the extent necessary for operations to be run effectively. The operations of both agencies must be characterised by a clear division of responsibilities. The main elements where assigning responsibilities between them is concerned are set out in a statute and letter of appropriations; in addition to this, they have entered into several agreements on cooperation. The Government finds that there is a good collaborative relationship between the agencies, including within the framework of the National Counter Terrorism Council that the agencies have jointly set up, comprising members of staff from both agencies.

The Security Service and the Police Authority must continue to develop their cooperation in order to attain a clear division of responsibilities and a well-developed exchange of information. As shown in section 2.1, it is important that the intelligence gained by the Security Services reaches the local level. The Security Service also needs the expertise and information that is available locally in order to efficiently carry out its mission and it is therefore equally important that the expertise and information that the Police Authority gather through its work at local level is shared with the Security Service.

In addition to exchanging available information, the agencies also need opportunities to obtain more information. Certain information can be obtained through open channels. Because terrorism is often a cross-border crime, there is also a need for information to be shared efficiently in the international arena.

Alongside gaining information through open channels and through cooperation between agencies nationally and internationally, there is also a
need to be able to obtain information covertly. In 2014 the Riksdag decided to make permanent certain statutory provisions on covert coercive measures, namely bugging, preventive use of certain covert coercive measures and the opportunity of increased use of covert coercive measures when investigating crimes within the remit of the Security Service. At the same time, the regulations on preventive coercive measures were adapted to better meet the Security Service’s needs in averting terrorist crime, etc. The Government sees adequate regulation of the use of covert coercive measures as a necessary element in the ability of law enforcement authorities to keep pace with criminality. The technology is constantly being developed and communication methods have undergone major changes in the past decade. Criminals have adapted to the opportunities provided by technology and the law enforcement authorities need to be able to tackle this. At the same time it is important that personal privacy is protected in the use of coercive measures. The Government will carefully monitor developments.

The Government shall act to ensure that

– information is efficiently shared within NCT,
– the law enforcement authorities have the opportunity to share and actually share information to the extent necessary for effective counter-terrorism,
– the law enforcement authorities use existing opportunities to share information with other states to the extent necessary for effective counter-terrorism,
– the law enforcement authorities are given the means, taking into account protection for personal privacy and the rule of law, to maintain their capacity to obtain information.

Opportunity to act

Using available information, agencies can act to preempt terrorist attacks. This may, for example, concern countering the financing of terrorism, initiating preliminary investigations in cases of suspected terrorist crime and, if possible, taking legal proceedings against those who may be suspected of the crime.

Combating the financing of terrorism

One way of supporting and facilitating terrorist acts is by financing them. Sweden’s measures to counter financing of terrorism, and money laundering, have constantly been improved. As criminality changes, efforts must continue to be reviewed and developed, both at the agencies concerned and by market actors who carry out financial transactions. In June 2014 the Governments Communication *A national strategy for an effective regime for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism* (Communication 2013/14:245) was submitted to the Riksdag. One of the priority areas identified in the national strategy is to increase general knowledge of the phenomena. Therefore, an initiative headed by the Swedish Defence University’s Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) is currently being carried out to increase the level of knowledge
... and awareness at agencies and market actors regarding the financing of terrorism.

The financial system is exploited in financing terrorism and information on financial transactions and methods needs to be shared. The demands on market actors to assess the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing in their operations were made stricter through amendments in legislation that entered into force on 1 August 2015 (see Government bill 2014/15:80). The obligation to provide information incumbent upon financial and non-financial market actors under the Money Laundering Act enables Sweden to gather and gain access to this type of information. It is important that all concerned market actors with an obligation to report meet this requirement and that the information is provided in a manner adapted to its purpose.

The Swedish Security Service has the primary responsibility for pre-empting terrorist crime. However, it is the Financial Intelligence Unit at the Swedish Police Authority that is tasked with receiving information on suspicious transactions from market actors. Both the Security Service and the Financial Intelligence Unit must therefore have the capacity to analyse the information and to continuously provide feedback on developments in criminality to the market actors obliged to report and their supervisory authorities. The Financial Intelligence Unit and the Security Service must continue to work closely together on these issues. Opportunities for information exchange between the supervisory authorities, law enforcement authorities and market actors with an obligation to report can be further improved through an appropriately designed and effective coordination mechanism. In this context it is important to take note of the fact that the supervisory authorities possess valuable information regarding work to combat the financing of terrorism that may be of value to law enforcement authorities in every aspect of counter-terrorism. Correspondingly, the information that the law enforcement authorities possess is valuable to the supervisory authorities in shaping effective supervision. The fact that combating financing of terrorism in this way is being more closely integrated with other counter-terrorism measures is a positive move.

Criminalisation

One important aspect of the fight against terrorism is the existence of appropriate criminal law legislation. The central provisions of Swedish law on terrorist offences and offences linked to terrorism are set out in the Terrorist Offences Act, the Recruitment Act and the Financing Act (see section 1.4.2).

It is essential that Sweden complies with its undertakings under criminal law to pre-empt and counter terrorism. Resolution 2178 of the UN Security Council (2014), which is binding under international law, requires that travelling or attempting to travel abroad with the purpose of perpetrating, planning, preparing or participating in terrorist acts or providing or receiving terrorist training must be criminalised. Furthermore, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), of which Sweden is a member, requires in its recommendations that member states criminalise the financing of terrorism in line with the UN’s International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism adopted in 1999. Member states must also ensure that not only the financing of terrorist offences but also of terrorist organisations and individual terrorists is included in the criminalisation process. The latter also applies where there is no link to a specific terrorist act.

An Inquiry Chair has analysed the need for legislative amendments to ensure that Sweden lives up to the obligations of criminal law provisions set in the Resolution and in the Recommendation on terrorist financing (Criminal law measures against terrorism travel, SOU 2015:63). The Chair drew the conclusion that the acts that are to be criminalised under the Resolution are already punishable to a certain extent but that legislative measures are required to ensure that Swedish law fully complies with the requirements. The report submits proposals for new criminal provisions on receiving training for particularly serious crime and on terrorism travel, i.e. travel with the intention of committing or preparing particularly serious crime or providing or receiving training for such crime. Proposals have also been submitted for a new criminal provision on financing terrorism travel. Regarding the FATF Recommendation, the Inquiry Chair has proposed that it be punishable to finance a person or a group of people who commit, attempt to commit, prepare or participate in particularly serious crime, irrespective of the purpose of the financing. The report is currently being processed by the Government Offices of Sweden.

In May 2015 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted an Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. The Additional Protocol is intended to contribute towards uniform implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and is mainly focused on provisions on substantive criminal law based on those in the UN Resolution. Sweden was actively involved in negotiating the Protocol, which helps to strengthen protection against terrorism in criminal law. During the negotiations, Sweden also worked to ensure that the Protocol respects fundamental human rights and stringent requirements regarding the rule of law. In June 2015 the Inquiry Chair was commissioned to reach a view on whether Sweden should sign up to the Additional Protocol and two remaining UN instruments in the field of criminal law that concern threats to civil aviation. This extended remit also includes analysing the need for further criminalisation to prevent and preempt people from engaging in armed conflict abroad within the framework of a terrorist organisation, and considering whether the criminal provision on unlawful recruitment should be clarified, expanded or changed in any other way. The Inquiry Chair’s report is to be presented by June 2016.

Legal proceedings

International judicial cooperation in the field of law is of the utmost importance in ensuring that Swedish agencies are able to investigate and take legal proceedings against crime. With the aim of improving the efficiency of cooperation on legal assistance, in August 2014 the Government commissioned an inquiry on investigating how Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the
European Investigation Order in criminal matters is to be implemented in Swedish law. The Directive, of which Sweden was one of the initiators, is intended to make it easier and quicker for law enforcement agencies within the EU to assist each other with investigation measures during a preliminary investigation. The investigator’s report is to be presented in November 2015. The European arrest warrant is also very important in this context. To further improve cooperation, the Government has initiated a review of the Act on Surrender from Sweden according to a European Arrest Warrant (2013:1156) and intends to present a proposal for certain improvements to it during the autumn. The Extradition for Criminal Offences Act (1957:668) is also the subject of a more extensive review. In conjunction with this review, it must also be considered whether Sweden should adopt the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, etc. The Protocol increases opportunities and obligations to work together within the extradition area, etc. when it comes to several of the acts covered by the UN’s global counter-terrorism conventions in criminal law.

A broad approach and the use of existing structures for combating crime and agency cooperation are valuable in this context. The Swedish Economic Crime Authority carries out activities that can indirectly lead to preempting terrorist attacks, for example. A person who attempts to finance terrorism from Sweden may, for example, often also be suspected of other crime. This may involve financial crime to generate economic gains that can be used for terrorist activity. In these cases, the Authority works with other agencies involved, such as the Security Service, the Prosecution Service, the Police Authority, the Tax Authority and Finansinspektionen (the Financial Supervisory Authority).

Criminal cases involving terrorism are complicated and require in-depth expertise on the part of law enforcement authorities and courts alike, for example on threat scenarios, approaches and trends characteristic of these kinds of crime. Today, for example, there are special prosecutors for security-related cases, including terrorism cases. There should be expertise in this area throughout the chain of justice.

The Government shall act to ensure that

- Sweden complies with its existing undertakings in criminal law within the UN, the FATF and the Council of Europe,
- opportunities for international legal cooperation are improved by implementing the Directive regarding the European Investigation Order, and improving the Act on Surrender from Sweden according to a European Arrest Warrant and the Extradition for Criminal Offences Act,
- the supervisory authorities work to ensure that all operators with an obligation to report fulfil their obligation to report suspicious transactions,
- the Police Authority and the Security Service are highly capable of analysing reports of suspicious transactions, and that effective and appropriate feedback is provided to operators with the aim of facilitating frequent, high-quality reporting,
the Police Authority and the Security Service continue to develop their cooperation to further improve the efficiency of combating the financing of terrorism,

– expertise in the court system is improved regarding terrorism cases.

**Actors**

The Swedish Security Service has primary responsibility for preempting terrorist crime. Through its work the Swedish Police Authority has an important role to play in discovering indications of criminal activity. The Police Authority also contributes resources to the Security Service. The collaborative body the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment fulfils an important function, as does the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council, whose members are the Swedish Economic Crime Authority, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Migration Agency, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Police Authority, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Security Service, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Transport Agency, Swedish Customs and the Swedish Prosecution Authority.

As well as the law enforcement authorities, the system for combating the financing of terrorism includes supervisory authorities such as Finansinspektionen (the Financial Supervisory Authority), the Swedish Estate Agents Inspectorate, the Swedish Gambling Authority, the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants and the County Administrative Boards of Stockholm, Västra Götaland and Skåne, as well as the Swedish Companies Registration Office. The same applies to the Swedish Bar Association and the appointed financial and non-financial operators.

2.3 **Protect – creating and maintaining protection for individuals and reducing society’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Objectives:</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>– To provide strong protection for people, information, functions and facilities – people must feel safe, secure and free within society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>– For the protective measures taken to be carefully considered and maintain reasonable accessibility.</td>
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While the *Preempt* area is about limiting the capacity to commit terrorist attacks, the *Protect* area covers protecting the targets of potential attacks. It involves making it more difficult for people with an intention and capability of committing a terrorist attack to enter Sweden and to remain here. The area also covers measures concerning objects that may be used to aid such attacks. It is also about police protection of the exercising of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion, and reducing society's vulnerability to terrorist attack by
protecting sensitive information, facilities vital to society and critical infrastructure.

**Controls on aliens and dangerous objects**

A large number of people and goods cross the borders between the EU and third countries every day, as well as the borders between EU Member States. Today’s global society, with increasing cross-border mobility of both people and goods, demands that we are able to identify risks in these flows. The opportunity to detect preparations for terrorist crime at an early stage, for example, in conjunction with border controls, may be vital. Border checks must always be within the rule of law, efficient and non-discriminatory.

**People**

The Government strives for an open and transparent society. Sweden shall have a humane asylum policy and be a refuge for those fleeing persecution and oppression. Swedish aliens legislation offers protection to a greater extent than that demanded by international agreements. There is strong support for this policy in the Swedish Riksdag.

Among those seeking asylum and residence permits for other purposes may be people who constitute a security threat, and it is important that these individuals are identified. The Swedish Migration Agency may refer cases to the Swedish Security Service in order to obtain information on whether people seeking residence and work permits in Sweden have terrorist links. On the basis of what is known about the person’s background, contacts or activities – in Sweden or abroad – the Security Service makes an assessment of whether he or she might carry out activities that threaten security, and provides a statement in this regard to the Migration Agency. Both the Migration Agency and the Security Service need information on whether an applicant has terrorist links. This also applies to people who have been granted a residence permit. Collaboration between agencies needs to be developed further, and the agencies have initiated such work.

When someone applies for Swedish citizenship, the requirement to have led and be expected to lead a respectable life means that an investigation into whether there are any security-related obstacles to granting citizenship is conducted. Such obstacles may involve links to terrorism or circumstances concerning security of the realm. The Government does not judge that any initiatives should be taken at the current time to amend the regulations on citizenship.

In addition to the residence permit and citizenship processes, the Security Service also has an opportunity under the Aliens Controls (Special provisions) Act (1991:572) to take special measures to monitor individuals assessed to constitute a threat but who for various reasons remain in Sweden.

In addition to this, measures may be considered to impede misuse of Swedish passports. The Ministry memorandum *Abuse of Swedish Passports – Extent and proposed measures* (Ds 2015:12) was submitted in March 2015. The memorandum analyses the extent and the causes of the misuse of Swedish passports. It also proposes various measures to tackle
Illegal imports of firearms and other aids

The opportunity to check firearms and other aids at the external borders of the EU and at the Swedish border with other EU Member States is important for protecting against terrorist crime.

The Swedish Police Authority and Swedish Customs have developed a joint control strategy and shared procedures for exchanging intelligence to reduce the import of illegal firearms. The agencies also work within an EU project to counter illegal firearms. Combating smuggling of firearms requires that the agencies work together nationally and internationally, sharing the information and the intelligence available. To combat illegal imports of firearms, efforts to identify the origin of illegal firearms should be stepped up, nationally and internationally. Smuggling of firearms in postal and courier consignments from abroad is a growing problem. Swedish Customs is working actively to improve its working methods and to increase exchanges of intelligence with other countries with the aim of working more efficiently to counter this type of smuggling.

Other items which may be used in a terrorist attack are chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive substances (CBRNE substances) and explosives precursors (chemical substances or compounds that can be used to manufacture explosives). Regarding the external border of the EU, Swedish Customs is responsible for controlling and monitoring the flow of goods. Regarding internal borders, Swedish Customs has the authority to control some of these goods. In order to carry out these controls, Swedish Customs depends on functioning collaboration with other agencies and sharing intelligence.

Handling illegal firearms and other aids

As part of efforts to combat increased carrying and use of firearms in criminal circles, the minimum penalty for a gross firearms offence was increased from six months’ imprisonment to a year on 1 September 2014. At the same time the maximum penalty for a normal degree firearms offence was increased from imprisonment for one year to imprisonment for two years. A new category of exceptionally gross firearms offence was also introduced with a penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of three and a maximum of six years.

Stages preceding committing firearms offences are not currently criminalised. However in its final report (SOU 2014:63), the Inquiry into more stringent criminal law measures against organised crime proposed that attempting, preparing and conspiring to commit a gross firearms offence and an exceptionally gross firearms offence should be criminalised. The proposal has been circulated for consultation and is currently being processed by the Government Offices of Sweden.

Flammable and explosive goods, such as hand grenades and similar objects, are not, however, included within the scope of the Weapons Act and are instead covered by the provisions of the Flammables and Explosives Act (2010:1011). Anyone who handles, transfers or imports explo-
sive goods and anyone who handles flammable goods professionally or in large amounts must have a permit to do so. The scales of penalties for failing to obtain a permit are equivalent to those applicable to normal degree firearms offence and gross firearms offence before the penalties were raised in 2014.

Hand grenades are becoming increasingly prevalent in criminal circles. They are small, making them easy to hide in clothes, bags or similar and can cause large amounts of damage in a short period of time. The similarities with the provision on criminal responsibility for firearms offence are clear and, particularly in the light of the increased penalties for firearms offence recently introduced, there are grounds to review the penal provisions in the Flammables and Explosives Act.

The most critical explosives precursors are covered by a ban or a requirement to obtain a permit for possession by private individuals and an obligation for financial actors to report suspicious transactions and theft and wastage of the substances concerned. To impede illegal manufacture of explosives, preventive work is required, as is efficient supervision of the sale of the substances covered by the rules on explosives precursors, but also under the rules that apply to legal manufacture and other handling of explosives. CBRNE substances can also constitute a threat. The law enforcement authorities need to have substantial capacity to preempt and manage bomb-related incidents and incidents that involve hazardous substances and objects. Knowledge of incidents, construction and methods needs to be obtained and disseminated between the agencies concerned. The collaboration that already exists in this area should be developed.

The Government shall act to ensure that

- the Migration Agency and the Security Service develop and improve the efficiency of their collaboration with the aim of improving opportunities to identify people with links to terrorism,
- the misuse of passports is combated through inter alia changes to passport legislation,
- the Police Authority and Swedish Customs develop national and international collaboration with the aim of countering the import of illegal firearms and other goods that may be used to commit terrorist attacks,
- there are effective sanctions against the illegal handling of firearms and other aids,
- there is effective supervision regarding explosives precursors and CBRNE substances,
- ongoing collaboration between agencies regarding the illegal use of explosives precursors and the handling of CBRNE substances is developed.

Protection for exercising rights and freedoms

An open debate is fundamental to democracy. Elected representatives, journalists, cultural creators and other opinion shapers play a central role in this debate. This requires that we protect freedom of speech, freedom of opinion and the ability to exercise other rights and freedoms. Repre-
sentatives of the state and its critics must feel safe in expressing their opinions. It is equally important that the people feel safe in moving freely, assembling, and wearing religious symbols without fear of threats or violence. There are meeting places and functions in society that, even if they are not frequently exposed to crime, are subject to greater threat than others. This may, for example, concern the buildings of the Riksdag and the Government, polling stations, media headquarters and premises used by religious communities.

The task of the Swedish Police Authority is to reduce criminality and increase safety. Where threats or other criminal acts target such places or functions, it is the task of the Police Authority to investigate these crimes and take the relevant security measures. Where the criminal acts fall within the remit of the Swedish Security Service, there are procedures in place for collaboration and coordination between the agencies. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen in early 2015, the Police Authority have strengthened and developed dialogue with faith communities with the aim of ensuring that people are safely able to practice their religion. The Police Authority have also carried out measures to ensure safety at religious meeting places. CCTV may also form part of the protection of such places and buildings.

As well as protecting meeting places and functions, measures to ensure safety are also needed, as is effective communication of the relevant information so that people are not restricted in going about their daily lives by worrying about possible terrorist attacks. General concern in society may, for example, lead to people no longer feeling safe in crowded places, on public transport, or participating in demonstrations and other public meetings. In this context, measures to ensure safety may include providing adequate surveillance of public assemblies. It is also very important that information that can be passed on to the public about the current threat scenarios or risk of terrorist attacks is communicated in a calming manner that is easy to understand.

*The Government shall act to ensure that*

- the agencies concerned, in collaboration with other actors, work to ensure that safety in society increases by passing on information to the public,
- the Police Authority and other agencies and actors concerned continue to engage in dialogue and collaboration with groups that feel vulnerable.

**Reducing the vulnerability of society to terrorist attacks**

Vulnerabilities in society can be exploited to carry out terrorist attacks. Factors such as vulnerability and exposure must therefore be weighed up in assessing threats and risks. In this area, increased collaboration is required between agencies and other actors and more attention should be paid to the problems.
Risk and vulnerability analyses

Effective protection of important societal activities and improved emergency/crisis management requires greater knowledge of threats, risks, vulnerabilities, critical dependencies and the capabilities of actors. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency plays an important role in moving this work forward. Risk and vulnerability analyses must therefore be carried out in those operations identified as being important societal activities. Because a large proportion of these operations are privately owned and run, there is a need for increased collaboration between private and public actors in working to produce risk and vulnerability analyses. The terrorist threat must be more clearly incorporated in this work than is currently the case.

Protective security and other protective measures

The Protective Security Act (1996:627) contains provisions on protection against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other crimes that may threaten security of the realm, and protection in other cases of information covered by confidentiality which concerns security of the realm. Provisions for these purposes are also set out in the Installations Protection Act (2010:305) on measures to strengthen protection of certain buildings, other installations, areas and other objects (protected objects).

Since the Protective Security Act entered into force in 1996, the protective security climate has changed in many ways. The Inquiry on the Protective Security Act was therefore commissioned to review the legislation. In its report *A new Protective Security Act* (SOU 2015:25) the inquiry proposes that the Protective Security Act be replaced by a new act more adept at handling the changes in requirements in terms of protective security. The purpose of the Act must be to protect operations that are of importance to Sweden's security or which are covered by an international security undertaking. The report proposes that protective security, through the measures information security, physical security and personnel security, should protect firstly classified information and secondly operations that need protective security for some other reason (other security-sensitive activities). Protection for operations that are otherwise security-sensitive involves expanding the current regulatory framework and, in addition to protection for confidential information, would also include protection for the operations as such. This may, for example, concern IT systems that control important social functions, operations in which explosive substances or other hazardous substances are handled, the transport of nuclear waste and research facilities within the nuclear industry. The report is currently being processed by the Government Offices of Sweden. The Government will prioritise work on a new Protective Security Act.

The Security Service is tasked with providing advice on protective security. However, terrorism is not only focused on the facilities covered by protective security legislation but also on public places such as public transport and cultural and retail centres. Temporary events such as sporting and cultural events have been shown to be potential targets for terrorist attacks. It is important that these aspects are taken into account.
when planning security and protection measures at such facilities and events. Within the framework of its law enforcement work, the Police Authority can provide advice on measures to protect against terrorist attacks when such venues and facilities are being constructed or renovated and when planning events.

Information security and cyber security

Digitalisation has increased in Sweden and in the world around us. Society’s dependence on information technology has also increased. Information and cyber security has thus become a question of national and international security. Vulnerabilities in society’s information management go hand in hand with risks of information systems suffering cyber-attacks from antagonistic actors. A new dimension in this threat scenario is that poor information security can also be exploited by terrorist organisations. Cases have been known of terrorist organisations carrying out cyber-attacks with the aim of spreading their message or otherwise publicising their presence in society.

The body responsible for an operation is also responsible for ensuring that the level of information security is sufficient. All agencies and bodies that deal with sensitive information need to work actively to protect their information. The Swedish Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Post and Telecom Agency, the Swedish Security Service and the Swedish Police Authority, however, have a particular responsibility for information security. The distribution of roles and responsibilities in this area must be as clear as possible. At the same time, it is unavoidable that areas of responsibility sometimes overlap. It is therefore a matter of particular urgency to ensure that collaboration between these agencies works well.

A functioning digital society is high on the Government’s agenda and work is in progress to improve the information and cyber security of the whole of society. In March 2015 the Government received the report *Cyber security in Sweden – strategy and measures for secure information in central government* (SOU 2015:23). The inquiry’s proposals include a new cyber security strategy, a system for compulsory IT incident reporting, setting up a government agency council for information and cyber security, and greater supervision. The report is currently being processed by the Government Offices of Sweden.

To increase society’s preparedness and ability to handle IT incidents, it is necessary to raise the level of awareness of security issues in the field of IT and to improve the process when an IT incident has occurred. The Government intends to continue prioritising work in this area in the future. In this way the proposals in the report *Cyber security in Sweden* and the upcoming Directive on Network and Information Security (see section 4.3) will be of major importance.

The Government shall act to ensure that

– the agencies affected move work forward on risk and vulnerability analyses, evaluations and monitoring the capacity to tackle terrorist attacks,
it produces more modern protective security regulations that better meet the changed requirements for protective security,
– the process when an IT incident has occurred is improved, e.g. by introducing compulsory incident reporting for Government agencies,
– the readiness of the agencies affected and their capacity in the field of information and cyber security is strengthened by increasing the level of awareness of security issues in the field of IT.

Actors
The Swedish Security Service, the Swedish Police Authority, the Swedish Migration Agency and Swedish Customs all have important tasks regarding controls on aliens and controls on dangerous objects. The Swedish Board of Agriculture, the Swedish Chemicals Agency, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority and the county administrative boards are examples of supervisory authorities for the handling of CBRNE substances. There are also other agencies tasked with responsibilities in the area of CBRNE, e.g. the Public Health Agency of Sweden, the National Board of Health and Welfare and the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. The municipalities exercise supervision of the sales of explosives precursors. Collaboration between the law enforcement authorities and other agencies concerned is central to keeping the illegal use of these substances in check. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency heads a national working group on explosives safety (NAGExpSec) whose members are the Swedish Armed Forces, the Defence Materiel Administration, the Coast Guard, the Police Authority, the Security Service, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Transport Agency and Swedish Customs.

The Security Service is a key actor in this area in that it provides advice on protective security. The Police Authority can also contribute advice on facilities not covered by security legislation. There is a collaborative information security group that seeks to achieve collaboration between agencies with special duties in the field of information and cyber security. The agencies involved are the Swedish Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Post and Telecom Agency, the Security Service and the Police Authority. The National Cooperative Council against Serious IT Threats (NSIT) is another form of collaboration between the Security Service, the Swedish Armed Forces (Military Intelligence and Security Service) and the Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment, which analyses and assesses threats and vulnerabilities regarding serious or expert cyber-attacks against Sweden’s most critical national interests. The Civil Contingencies Agency is invited to take part in the work of the group where necessary.
Managing the consequences of a terrorist attack

Objectives:

- Quickly and effectively be able to intervene against and halt a terrorist attack in progress.
- Limit the societal consequences of a terrorist attack.

Even if a great deal of effort is put into preventing, preempting and protecting against terrorist attacks, there must be a readiness to manage the situation if such an event nevertheless occurs. In the event of a terrorist attack, it must be possible for several different actors to quickly act simultaneously in order to meet the direct needs that exist in relation to the event and the needs that arise in society as a consequence of the attack. Effective intervention must take place to halt the attack, while people need help and the functions of society need to be reinstated.

Capacity to intervene against and halt a terrorist attack

If a terrorist attack takes place, it is of crucial importance to get expert police resources on site as quickly as possible to halt the attack or in any case to disrupt any perpetrators so that they are unable to fully implement their plan. The emergency services and medical personnel must reach the site quickly to assist any injured people and limit the immediate impact. The capacity for strategic and operational leadership in critical circumstances is vital to Sweden’s opportunities to manage a terrorist attack. The work carried out within the Swedish Police Authority on developing a capacity for concerted and effective operational leadership through operations rooms at regional and national level should therefore continue. The capacity for coordinated leadership of the total resources of society should be reinforced. More information is also needed in order to develop a capability to intervene in and halt a terrorist attack in progress and to limit the consequences to society of such an attack. Consistent evaluation, feedback on experience from exercises and actual events, as well as research initiatives in the area enable us to adapt as necessary to changes in the threat and risk scenario.

Police intervention

If an attack occurs, several time-critical operations need to work as a single system. The emergency phase needs to be halted or limited while the injured are being cared for. Premises and locations may need to be evacuated and searched, while preliminary investigation measures such as sealing off a crime scene, securing evidence and arresting suspects need to be taken simultaneously.

It is vital that the cooperation between the Swedish Security Service and the Police Authority is functioning well. It must be clear which agency is in charge of an intervention and deciding on measures, particularly when several initiatives and measures need to be carried out in parallel and under time pressure. The Security Service and the Police
Authority have entered into agreements regarding which organisation the various responsibilities should be assigned to in the event of a terrorist attack and how the Police Authority should assist the Security Service in cases where the latter is responsible for a measure but needs assistance and support from the Police Authority in order to carry it out. The Government takes a positive view of the way the Police Authority is working to build up capacity to support the Security Service.

It is the Police Authority who will first intervene and tackle a terrorist attack in line with its remit. The basic tactical capacity of police officers on the ground is vital to opportunities to deal with a terrorist attack in its initial stages. The different parts of the Police Authority’s ordinary and reinforcement organisation must also be able to work together efficiently. The agency is now developing a national reinforcement system consisting of task forces in all of Sweden’s police regions. The fact that the Police Authority is now a single coherent agency facilitates this kind of approach. The intention is that the task forces will reinforce both the other parts of the agency and each other in the event of serious incidents. The task forces should be equivalent to each other, uniformly designed, flexible and mobile nationwide, and located close to the general public. The work currently being put into developing a nationwide task force concept is of value and should continue.

As well as resources from the police regions, the national reinforcement organisation is part of the reinforcement system. The Counter Terrorist Unit within the Police Authority is Sweden’s ultimate police resource tasked with handling situations that are so serious, unusual or risk-related that they cannot be dealt with within ordinary police operations. Its main remit is to intervene in the event of a terrorist attack or potential terrorist attack. Regarding interventions at sea, the Counter Terrorist Unit cooperates with the Coast Guard where necessary. If several terrorist attacks were to take place at the same time, if they are cross-border in nature or if a terrorist attack were to continue for a long period of time, there may be a need for additional police reinforcements. The national special intervention units within the EU and Norway work together in what is known as the Atlas Network to increase and equalise the capacity of participating states to counter terrorist attacks. Work is in progress at the Government Offices of Sweden to implement Council Decision 2008/617/JHA on the improvement of cooperation between the special intervention units of the Member States of the European Union in crisis situations (the “Atlas Decision”) to make it possible for Sweden’s Counter Terrorist Unit to request support from intervention forces from other Member States in the event of a terrorist attack in Sweden.

Support provided by the Swedish Armed Forces to the police

Act on Swedish Armed Forces support to the Swedish police in combating terrorism (2006:343) contains provisions stating that under certain conditions the Swedish Armed Forces may provide support to the Police Authority and the Security Service with interventions that may involve violence or force against individuals.

In its report The defence of Sweden; stronger defence for uncertain times (Ds 2014:20), the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Commission
pointed out that the special units of the Swedish Armed Forces constitute a capacity capable of assisting the police in combating terrorism. The Government shares the view of the Defence Commission and in this context wishes to point out that within the framework of established cooperation between the agencies, work is being carried out to further expand the opportunities for the Armed Forces to provide support to the police in counter-terrorism activities.

The police and the Armed Forces are currently working to carry out the Government’s commission *Opportunities of the Swedish Armed Forces to support the police with medium-lift utility helicopters* (Fö2013/1312/MFI). The assignment involves creating a capacity that enables the Armed Forces to support the police with medium-lift utility helicopters at short notice. Transport capacity must be gradually expanded and reach its full extent in terms of the ability to carry out such helicopter transport round the clock, all year round, by 1 January 2016 at the latest. During 2015 the assignment will focus on the ability to work together in tactical counter-terrorism interventions. This involves training in and adaptation to providing more advanced transport and support under the Act on Swedish Armed Forces support to the police in combating terrorism.

**Collaboration and coordination**

An effective intervention organisation requires clear division of responsibilities and well-functioning collaboration between the actors concerned in order for them to have the capacity to act efficiently and carry out coordinated interventions. This capacity is needed for actors responsible for public order and safety, rescue services and medical care. Greater focus on collaboration should have an impact on the planning and procedures of the different actors and should be able to serve as a basis for cooperation on special contingency planning for terrorist attacks. Coordination should be improved through responsible actors strengthening their ability to cooperate. In ongoing work, developing coordinated operational procedures, a capacity for communication and exchanging information, for example through the Rakel radio communications network, joint and regular training and exercises, and cooperation also taking place during normal conditions day to day are of great importance.

**The Government shall act to ensure that**

- the Counter Terrorist Unit have the opportunity to request support from foreign intervention forces,
- the Security Service and the Police Authority ensure that there is a clear division of responsibilities between agencies in the event of a terrorist attack,
- the Security Service, the Police Authority and the Swedish Armed Forces carry out exercises and training to ensure that the Swedish Armed Forces are able to support the police in the event of a terrorist attack,
- the agencies concerned develop joint contingency planning for dealing with terrorist attacks and carry out national coordination exercises at operative level,
the agencies concerned work to strengthen capacity for coordinated leadership when handling terrorist attacks.

Capacity to handle the societal consequences resulting from a terrorist attack

Crisis management

All actors in the society must jointly, within their respective area, take responsibility for and improve the security of society and managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. Experiences from the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 and from a number of other events and exercises in recent years have demonstrated the importance of all actors working together if crisis management work is to be effective. The report of the 22 July Commission (NOU 2012:14) found that the terrorist attack of 22 July 2011 revealed major vulnerabilities that were a result of the lack of or late implementation of measures already decided upon and that plans, aspects of which were extremely relevant, were not put into use. Lessons learned from the work of the Commission partly concern the importance of working together on early warnings and handling information. These lessons should also be taken into account in work to develop Swedish preparedness for terrorist attacks.

The work to counter the threat from terrorism should be characterised by a whole society approach and be based on the principles and the general capacity for emergency management built up within the framework of emergency management in society. Capacity to handle the consequences for society resulting from a terrorist attack should therefore be developed on the basis of the fact that attacks seek to disrupt Sweden’s social order and create obstacles to an open and democratic society with a great degree of freedom. The work on objectives and principles, warnings and information coordination, research and knowledge building therefore needs to be developed in relation to the threats that terrorism constitutes and in relation to the objectives for Sweden’s security.

An extensive terrorist attack involving hazardous substances makes particular demands of crisis management because the consequences of such an attack would be wide-ranging. Therefore the capacity to handle such an attack should be improved through information sharing, collaborative exercises and training. This also applies to private actors, e.g. private companies that transport hazardous goods.

Emergency/crisis communication

The capacity to protect and guide people in the event of a terrorist attack can be crucial to safeguarding people’s lives and health. Preparations should be made so that the system for warning and informing the general public, e.g. by mobile phone can be used in an effective manner.

A terrorist attack does not only cause direct damage but can also lead to great anxiety in society. The question of communication between agencies, the general public and the media may be of crucial importance for the course of a crisis or incident. Providing warnings and coordinating information are vital to creating trust, preventing disinformation,
communicating decisions and assisting those affected. In the event of a terrorist attack it is of great importance that agencies and other responsible actors quickly reach out to the general public and the media with well-considered, correct and consistent information.

The Government shall act to ensure that

– a system for informing the general public by telephone of serious accidents and crises can be set up,
– concerned agencies in collaboration with other actors affected develop methods and procedures for enduring emergency management regarding cooperation, reporting, compatibility in management systems, ascertaining status and information,
– concerned agencies in collaboration with other actors affected carry out emergency management exercises that include different levels of society.

Actors

The Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Security Service are the agencies that play the main role when it comes to tackling and halting a terrorist attack. Under certain circumstances the Armed Forces can provide support to the Police Authority and the Security Service.

Each agency is responsible for its emergency management. The duty officer function is in place at the agencies that have a particular responsibility for the capacity to handle a crisis, including the Government Offices of Sweden.

The rescue services, SOS Alarm, ambulance and A&E services and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency are key actors in this area.

4 International work

Terrorism is transnational and can therefore not be countered by one state alone. Although the primary interest of Swedish counter-terrorism work is the security in Sweden and of Swedish interests, we must also work in solidarity to protect international security and human rights and freedoms globally. International work includes working in areas of conflict and cooperation with other countries to combat terrorism.

The situation in the rest of the world affects the threat to Sweden. People who travel to areas of conflict in order to join terrorist organisations may constitute a threat in the country to which they are travelling. They can also constitute a threat when they return or by attracting more people to join these organisations. Work on development, security and freedom from violence is therefore crucial to halting the trend in foreign terrorist fighters. Sweden must work actively to ensure that both the UN and the EU take greater responsibility for resolving conflicts and provide help to those affected. Sweden must also work to ensure that the EU takes greater responsibility for security and development, both in the vicinity of the EU and on the global stage.
International counter-terrorism efforts have been stepped up considerably in recent years. Sweden’s point of departure in all counter-terrorism efforts is to actively promote and protect international law, including human rights and compliance with the principles of the rule of law. Sweden must work to ensure that efforts in this regard are transparent. The work must be characterised by a gender equality perspective. In the long term we must work to counteract stereotypical norms that link masculinity with violence. We must also focus attention on the way these norms are manifested in violence that particularly targets women and girls. Terrorism constitutes a significant threat to the rights of women, including through sexual violence. Preventive measures and dialogue are fundamental aspects of this work.

The EU and its Member States have an obligation to protect all people resident, living in or visiting the Union. In June 2015 the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted an updated Internal security strategy for the European Union for 2015–2020. The strategy identifies counter-terrorism as one of three priorities. It also draws attention to the fact that the EU’s internal security is increasingly dependent on factors outside the Union’s borders. Within the EU, work is also under way to develop a broad strategy on foreign and security policy.

Work carried out at the international level, particularly within the UN, the Council of Europe and the EU, affects Sweden and Swedish counter-terrorism efforts. Sweden has ratified the majority of agreements that exist within the UN and the Council of Europe of significance for countering terrorism, and these instruments have played a central role in designing Sweden’s criminal legislation to combat terrorism. Work is currently in progress to determine whether or not Sweden should accede to the remaining agreements in criminal law (see section 2.2). Also, the sanctions decided by the UN and carried out by the EU or which the EU decides itself have a direct impact in Sweden. Because we are affected by work carried out internationally, we also need to play our part in influencing it. How this is to be done is set out below under the same areas defined in sections 2 and 3.

4.1 International work in the Prevent area

**Objective:**
- For preventive work to form the focus of Sweden's international counter-terrorism efforts.

Sweden must work to ensure that measures to prevent terrorism play a prominent role in international collaboration. Conflicts are a breeding ground for terrorism, and work to comply with international law and human rights and to strengthen the rule of law must be the focus of international efforts. The UN is a central organisation in countering violent extremism and as a forum for dialogue and safeguarding pluralism. The UN is therefore vitally important in the work against terrorism and the Government would like to see a stronger UN.
Sweden works within the UN for global sustainable development through political engagement and financial contributions. Work for democracy and good governance is important in creating stable societies in which citizens are treated with respect and are able to have faith in the future. Sweden provides extensive core funding to the UN’s development system. It provides police staff, etc., to missions abroad for the UN, the EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The purpose of civil emergency management is to create conditions for people in conflict and post-conflict situations to live in freedom, security and justice. The main focus of Sweden's contributions is to provide support for community building, strengthening the rule of law and thus also tackling the root causes of terrorism. The mandate of the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission also includes strengthening counter-terrorism efforts in Niger.

The Council of Europe also has an important role to play in preventing terrorism. In May 2015 the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers adopted an *Action Plan on the fight against violent extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism*. The Action Plan contains measures regarding the international legal framework for combating terrorism and violent extremism and measures for preventive work. Sweden has been active in ensuring that the Action Plan focuses on areas where the Council of Europe offers added value, primarily preventive initiatives.

Work is also being carried out in the field of prevention within the EU. In 2014 a *Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism* was adopted, as was a counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign terrorist fighters. Sweden played an active role in drawing up the strategies, emphasising the importance of respect for human rights and preventive measures against radicalisation and violent extremism. The European Commission has launched the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), which seeks to contribute towards cooperation against radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremist groups by making it easier to share experiences, spread information and provide inspiration. The network helps those working locally on preventive work and facilitates sharing experiences and best practices to counteract different types of radicalisation. The network includes representatives of organisations and professional groups. Because RAN enables local practitioners to share experiences cross-sectorally, it has become a valuable network for knowledge about preventing violent extremism. The RAN Centre of Excellence will be set up in autumn 2015, which will improve RAN’s capacity to provide more tailored services to Member States. Swedish agencies should obtain the information that exists in the network and make use of it.

It is also essential to strengthen Nordic cooperation on these issues as the Nordic countries share many similarities in terms of the way our societies are organised. A Nordic network was therefore set up during 2015 to promote cooperation between Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland, with the aim of sharing knowledge and experiences of work to prevent violent extremism. The ministers adopted a joint, non-binding declaration of intent in Oslo in January 2015.
The Government shall
– continue to actively contribute to ensuring that the UN is a forum for
dialogue on pluralism and tolerance and for resolving conflicts,
– continue to work to ensure that the Council of Europe's counter-
terrorism efforts are focused on measures capable of preventing
terrorism,
– work to ensure that the EU continues to contribute towards prevent-
ing terrorism outside the Union's borders, in full compliance with
international law, human rights and the principles of the rule of law.

4.2 International work in the Preempt area

Objectives:
– For law enforcement authorities to have good opportunities to
work together across national borders.
– For the international collaboration that already exists in this area to
continue to be developed.

Agencies in different states must be able to work together in an appro-
priate manner. Swedish agencies participate in several international
collaborative bodies and also work together with law enforcement
authorities and bodies within the EU.

Sharing information
Opportunities to exchange information across national borders are of
great importance in combating terrorist crime. As set out in section 2.2, it
is not always the agency that possesses the information that is tasked
with acting on the basis of it, and sometimes the agency that has the
information or needs to act is located in a different state. There are
several legal instruments that regulate the exchange of information and
there are also established channels for doing so. It is the agencies them-

selves that must determine how these opportunities should best be used
in order to attain the overall objectives of counter-terrorism work.
Because national security is a national matter, it is of the utmost impor-
tance to retain the national capacity to determine when, how and to
which recipient information is to be spread.
Sweden is a member of a number of multinational forums and
collaborative groups, and one such which is central in this regard is the
Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG). The Group comprises security and
intelligence services from all the EU Member States, Norway and
Switzerland. The European Police Office Europol is tasked with helping
Member States to better work together to prevent and combat serious
cross-border crime and terrorism in Europe. Europol has started work to
bring together its various areas of expertise in counter-terrorism into one
department (the European Counter-Terrorism Centre) in order to further
support Member States in this area.

With the aim of improving border checks, Sweden has introduced
provisions that give the Swedish Police Authority the opportunity to
request that a carrier that transports passengers to Sweden by air from a state outside the Schengen area provide certain information about the passengers to national agencies responsible for identity checks at the border (Advance Passenger Information, API). The information also provides greater opportunities to identify people with links to terrorism at an early stage. Through this Sweden complies with the undertakings set out in Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data.

The European Council has further agreed that a directive on air passenger data (Passenger Name Record, PNR) be adopted as soon as possible. Regulations governing this have been discussed for several years and the aim of this is to consistently regulate the collection, saving and processing of air passenger data for law enforcement purposes. The system could help to combat terrorism more effectively and has been highlighted in several counties as one of the foremost tools for identifying and monitoring foreign terrorist fighters. Achieving a coherent EU regulatory framework for the collection and use of this information would also boost the protection of personal integrity and avoid the development of different PNR systems within the EU, which could lead to a weakened rule of law, higher costs and to risks of deficient protection of personal integrity. The PNR system should be coordinated with the system for API information because they can jointly be a useful tool in countering terrorism.

The Government shall act to ensure that

– the agencies use existing channels and tools for cooperation and that new channels and collaborative forms are created only where there is a need for them and they provide added value,
– existing legal instruments and existing counter-terrorism tools are introduced and applied,
– a PNR Directive is adopted, providing more effective law enforcement in line with the rule of law, hand in hand with safeguarding protection of personal integrity.

Opportunity to act

Combating the financing of terrorism

With the aim of protecting privacy within international financial systems and preventing them being used for money laundering and the financing of terrorism, countries at national level and through international collaboration must take administrative, operational and legal measures. This is the starting point for the work being run globally by the multilateral Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Sweden is a member of the FATF, which currently comprises a total of 36 members – 34 states and two organisations.

Regarding compliance with the Recommendations issued by the FATF, Sweden was criticised in a previous evaluation by the FATF and also by the UN regarding measures combating the financing of terrorism. The main criticism was that Sweden lacks procedures or mechanisms at national level to identify and list persons or entities that meet the criteria
for becoming subject to freezing measures in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which, in the absence of full measures at the EU level, means that the requirements of the UN and the FATF cannot be fully met. As shown below in the Sanctions section, since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, there has been a possibility to establish an additional mechanism at the EU level which has not, however, yet been utilised. The Government has observed that an increasing number of EU Member States have instead introduced national legislation to supplement existing possibilities for carrying out freezing measures at the EU level. There are no such possibilities in Sweden today. The Government considers that this should be considered for Sweden too, as shown below under the heading Sanctions.

**Legal proceedings**

The fact that international judicial cooperation works is largely due to states having entered into and being bound by relevant international conventions or agreements. It is essential that existing instruments are applied in the manner intended and that states with which there is a need to collaborate adopt existing conventions or enter into agreements, in the first instance with the EU. In some states, however, there is no functioning state mechanism that enables judicial cooperation. In such case there is a greater need for closer cooperation with other strategically important states.

**Sanctions**

Sanctions are coercive measures that supplement other, both supportive and restraining, measures in diplomacy and aid. The UN Security Council has introduced two sanction regimes to counter terrorism that have binding effect on Member States: one in relation to al-Qaeda and the other of a general nature. In the latter case it is left to Member States to identify those against whom measures must be imposed. There are also country-specific sanction regimes determined by the UN, e.g. in relation to Afghanistan and Somalia, where sanctions target, among others, persons and entities involved in terrorism. The EU Member States have a common implementation of these sanction regimes.

Sweden, together with other states, has worked to increase the rule of law concerning sanctions. As a result of this and taking into account several rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), the Security Council has gradually improved the procedures in the UN system regarding the sanctions regime in relation to al-Qaeda. The UN is currently issuing reasoned decisions and regularly revises the list of persons and entities that are the object of sanctions and the reasons for each listing. The UN has also introduced an ombudsperson function. The ombudsperson has a strong right of recommendation and is to contribute by performing inquiries and submitting proposals in cases regarding delisting under these sanctions. Corresponding improvements have not been made in the UN’s other sanction regimes. Also, the UN system still lacks an opportunity to have cases tried by an impartial court. Rulings from the CJEU have contributed towards improvements of the rule of law also regarding the sanctions determined by the EU. The EU’s
terrorist list has been thoroughly reviewed. Sweden’s efforts have contributed towards these improvements.

The legal basis for implementing these types of measures at EU level is found within the common foreign and security policy. The measures can only be used in relation to third countries and physical and legal persons, groups and entities there. However, through the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a possibility was created to set up a special mechanism, in a terrorism-related context, to freeze the assets of physical or legal persons or entities within the EU as well. The question of putting such a mechanism in place has been discussed within the EU but no legislative initiative has yet been taken. Sweden has carefully followed the discussion on this issue and expressed support for the EU starting work towards a common sanction process that is in accordance with the rule of law as soon as possible, in line with these opportunities.

Until this becomes reality, the question of sanctions implementation needs to be investigated at national level. The Government therefore intends to commission an inquiry that will analyse the need of measures in order for Sweden to live up to its obligations to take measures in the field of sanctions as a result of the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the requirements set by the FATF regarding freezing measures. The use of sanctions against individuals must be compatible with very high requirements regarding the rule of law. The inquiry must carefully take into account protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. This concerns, among other things, provisions on the right to property and other rights that involve aspects concerning the rule of law, e.g. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Government shall

– continue to promote within the UN issues concerning the rule of law and respect for public international law, including human rights, in all sanction regimes,
– continue to support, actively participate in and contribute towards the work run within the FATF that seeks to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and in the long run protect and preempt terrorism,
– continue to work within the EU to ensure that there are clear criteria as to who can be added to a sanctions list and that listings are well-founded and clearly motivated,
– work to achieve within the EU a regulatory framework that enables freezing measures at the EU level also in relation to EU-internal individuals and entities with links to terrorism,
– review the opportunity to implement a national system for freezing measures as a complement to the EU’s system,
– work to ensure that more countries take part in international legal cooperation and develop cooperation with strategically important states.
4.3 International work in the Protect area

**Objective:**
- For standards for maintaining protection for individuals and reducing the vulnerability of society to terrorist attacks to be equivalent in the EU Member States.

**Control of aliens and control of dangerous objects**

*Individuals*

The Schengen area gives participating Member States a common external border. This requires that the states concerned manage border controls in the same way. Consequently the EU’s Schengen Borders Code contains a common definition of the conditions for entry. Today searches are carried out in the Schengen Information System and certain national databases on all third country citizens entering the Schengen area to check that they do not pose a threat to public policy and internal security. Such systematic searches may not be made on EU citizens or others who enjoy free movement. The Government intends to work to ensure that the Member States are able to carry out the necessary searches, e.g. in the Schengen Information System and national registers of wanted persons to check whether such individuals pose a threat to Sweden’s public order and internal security.

*Firearms and other aids*

As set out in section 1.2, a trend can be identified in which attacks are being carried out using simpler and more easily accessible equipment, such as firearms. Effective firearms legislation and effective measures against illegal firearms are therefore of the utmost importance in limiting the capacity and opportunity to carry out terrorist attacks. The requirements governing the measures that must have been taken for a firearm to be considered deactivated and the requirements governing possession of such firearms vary between EU Member States. This means, for example, that there is a risk that a deactivated firearm could be sold freely in one state and then converted into an activated firearm and smuggled into another state. One way of controlling deactivated firearms would be to require a permit for such firearms as well. Sweden should continue to work to ensure that we are able to retain our national rules that require a permit for deactivated firearms.

Sweden is participating in work currently in progress within the EU and the UN to harmonise legislation on the legal handling of dangerous substances. At EU level an action plan has also been drawn up to improve safety surrounding explosives, with a particular focus on the terrorist threat. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Armed Forces have been charged with coordinating Swedish implementation of the action plan within the remit of a national working group. Furthermore, in May 2014, the decision was made to issue a European Commission Communication on a new EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRNE risks. The Government welcomes the Communication and sees it as an important
tool in jointly preempting terrorism using dangerous substances at EU level.

The Government shall act to ensure

- a high standard within the EU regarding deactivated firearms and also to ensure that deactivated firearms remain subject to stringent controls.

Mechanisms to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction

Since 11 September 2001 a number of international initiatives have been launched to prevent terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. Sweden participates in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear security programme, the G7’s Global Partnership, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, as well as Nuclear Security Summits and the Global Health Security Agenda. In the area of biosecurity, the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations for national control of infectious substances were strengthened, and discussions are in progress on how Sweden can promote the implementation of the regulations within the framework of existing aid programmes. The regimes for export controls of products with dual-use items have also sharpened their focus on non-state actors.

The UN Security Council has adopted Resolution 1540 (2004), making it compulsory for countries to strengthen national controls of transfers of materials and technology for weapons of mass destruction. A committee within the Security Council and an expert group within the UN support work to implement the Resolution. Instruments for preempting acts of terrorism include the revised Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the UN Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

The Government shall

- continue to be engaged in existing international initiatives to prevent terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.

Reducing the vulnerability of society to terrorist attack

Sweden participates in the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). The overarching objective is to improve the protection of critical infrastructure in the EU. The threat from terrorism is prioritised, but protection of critical infrastructure is to be based on a strategy that covers all relevant threats. Sweden will continue to play an active role and contribute towards the work being carried out in this respect.

At EU level the final negotiations are currently taking place on an EU Directive concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union (the NIS Directive). According to the Directive all Member States are to produce a national network and information security strategy and ensure that there is an adequate agency structure to tackle information security issues. The
Directive further makes it incumbent upon Member States to identify the public and individual subjects (“operators”) that provide critical services in a number of sectors that depend on electronic networks and information systems.

*The Government shall act to ensure that*

– on border checks, Member States are able to carry out the necessary searches to check whether an individual poses a threat to Sweden’s public order and internal security.
– the NIS Directive is adopted.

### 4.4 International action to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack

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<th>Objectives:</th>
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<td>– Good capacity to work together across national borders.</td>
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If a terrorist attack were to occur, it is primarily the state affected that must handle the consequences. However, there are opportunities to request support from other Member States. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty introduced a “solidarity clause” in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which involves an obligation for Member States to assist each other on request in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster.

The EU and its Member States possess instruments and resources for emergency service interventions within the EU and internationally. A new common legal instrument for cooperation on civil protection within the EU entered into force on 1 January 2014 (Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism). This legal instrument covers emergencies and accidents at land and at sea, both acts of nature and those caused by people, e.g. terrorism. It emphasises regional collaboration, collaboration with international organisations and preventive measures. Exercises form an important part of cooperation on civil protection.

*The Government shall act to ensure that*

– the agencies concerned carry out exercises with relevant states with the aim of improving capacity to work together in the event of a terrorist attack.
5 Counter-terrorism – a common responsibility

5.1 Success requires collaboration

The whole of society is responsible for counter-terrorism efforts. Terrorism is constantly developing, bringing new challenges for counter-terrorism. Everyone able to play a role in this work must take responsibility for doing their bit. Collaboration is essential if this work is to succeed.

5.1.1 Counter-terrorism must be prioritised by more actors

Several agencies and actors have long had an express mission to work to counter terrorism. The work being performed by the National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism means that more actors have been involved in the work to combat radicalisation, which is a key element of counter-terrorism. All actors who can contribute to the fight against terrorism in any way must take responsibility for doing so. This responsibility also goes hand in hand with paying attention to what one can do or contribute with in addition to those undertakings imposed by legislation, mission etc. Responsibility also means drawing attention to deficiencies in mandates, missions, regulations or resources, and obstacles to cooperation.

Several actors able to contribute with interventions and information in work to counter terrorism do not have any stated duty to do so under legislation, appropriation directions or another steering document. The work they carry out within their remit may, nevertheless, is vital to society’s work to counter terrorism. The actors must pay attention to how they can contribute towards the task of countering terrorism within the framework of their undertakings and missions.

5.1.2 Collaboration is needed at national, regional and local level

Collaboration is central both in the work to prevent a terrorist attack from being carried out and in the work to deal with such an attack if it nevertheless occurs. Well-functioning and well-established collaborative structures are needed at the national, regional and local level.

At national level it can be said that several successful collaborative structures are already in place. The Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council is one example (see section 2.2). The agencies with key tasks in this area should be represented on the Council. At the same time the Council should not become too large as this can hinder cooperation. Within civil contingencies planning, there are areas of cooperation with agencies as set out in the Ordinance on Emergency Management and Heightened Alert, (2006:942). There are thus several collaborative struc-
tures at national level. Good coordination and well-functioning collaboration offer opportunities to run work efficiently. The Government takes a positive view of agencies and other actors contributing in this respect.

The National Counter Terrorism Council, a collaborative body of the Swedish Police Authority and the Security Service is a good example of collaboration between agencies. As the Council comprises staff from both agencies, it is able to bring together the Police Authority’s measures to counter and tackle terrorism with support provided by the Security Service’s knowledge and assessments. Another example of a similar collaborative body is the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (see section 2.2).

Yet another positive example of cross-agency collaboration is the cross-sectoral reference group established by and assisting the National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism. The reference group, which consists of fifteen national agencies and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, meets regularly to discuss preventive initiatives to combat violent extremism. The National Coordinator also has an assignment to support actors that identify problems of violent extremism at local level. As part of this, many municipalities have now appointed local coordinators of work against violent extremism.

The main purpose of appointing the National Coordinator was to create an engine to initiate collaboration at national, regional and local level on safeguarding democracy from violent extremism. A similar initiative may be needed to inspire collaboration in other areas of counter-terrorism. The Government will consider such measures where necessary.

Producing local problem scenarios that show the trends and risks that exist and the potential problems that may arise is essential to effectively being able to prevent terrorism. With the help of analyses of which individuals risk being drawn to violent extremism, it is possible to ensure readiness and a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities for the input of different actors. Collaboration at local level is therefore vital to successful work where there is great room for improvement. Local crime prevention councils play an important role here.

5.2 A clear cohesive approach makes work more efficient

Taking into account the fact that a large number of actors are now involved in the work of counter-terrorism, all of whom work in different ways and in different combinations, a more cohesive approach to all the work carried out in this area is required.

To create the conditions for better cohesion in counter-terrorism work, the Government has brought together questions of public order, security and civil contingencies planning under the remit of the Minister for Internal Affairs. Within the Government Offices of Sweden, however, basically all ministries work on terrorism-related issues in some form, and the Government recognises a need to coordinate this work more
effectively. Therefore, within the Government Offices of Sweden, headed by the Ministry of Justice, work will be carried out to create better and clearer cohesion regarding all the initiatives being carried out and measures taken.

To improve the visibility of the work carried out and to clarify responsibilities, the Government will create a dedicated website for work to counter violent extremism and terrorism. Links can be provided to measures and information that other actors possess, making it easy to obtain a clear, comprehensive picture of the work in progress and identify best practice.

6 The need for follow-up

In this strategy, the Government seeks to create a clear framework for Sweden’s long-term counter-terrorism work. The strategy sets out the objectives the Government has for this work and how it should be carried out in order for these objectives to be attained. The strategy will be supplemented by assignments and other steering measures for agencies so that the ambitions of the strategy become a clear part of their operations.

To ensure that the work of the agencies is run in line with the focus laid down in the strategy, the strategy needs to be followed up systematically. In that it shows how the Government’s objectives for counter-terrorism are to be attained, it will be possible to follow up the work carried out in the different areas. A focus on follow-up means that the strategy will have a greater impact and that counter-terrorism efforts are given a higher priority in the work of the agencies concerned.

To serve as a framework for counter-terrorism work, a national counter-terrorism strategy should apply for at least one term of office. The focus of the work may, however, need to be reviewed more frequently than this in order to tackle changed threats and adapt measures and methods so that the agencies remain one step ahead in the fight against terrorism. Regular monitoring makes it possible to focus the work in the best possible way so that it constantly covers all areas and perspectives.

Reporting from the agencies on how the work has been carried out and what measures have been taken make it possible for the Government Offices of Sweden and the agencies themselves to judge whether the work has been performed effectively. The Government will therefore follow up the work of the agencies and their results in this area. Follow-up will enable work to be re-focused if required should any shortcomings be cited or identified. There may also be a need to highlight best practice in methods or cooperation carried out in order to disseminate these more widely. This will enable counter-terrorism efforts to constantly be improved and become more efficient.
Ministry of Justice

Extract from the minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, 27 August 2015


Rapporteur: Minister Ygeman

The Government hereby resolves to pass to the Riksdag Prevent, preempt and protect – the Swedish counter-terrorism strategy