# **Country strategy for development cooperation**

## Somalia

January 2003 – December 2005





# COUNTRY STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

## SOMALIA

1 JANUARY 2003 - 31 DECEMBER 2004

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### SOMALIA

Source Area Political system	UNDP Human Development Report 2001, Somalia 637,657 km <sup>2</sup> Non-functioning central government since January 1991. Regional administrations established in north-western Somalia 1991 (Somaliland), north-eastern Somalia 1998 (Puntland State of Somalia) and Mogadishu 2000 (Transitional Government)			
Population Poverty	Approx. 6.4 million Ranked 161 <sup>st</sup> of 163 countries (above only Sierra Leone and Niger) in the UNDP Human Development Index of 2001, Somalia is one of the world's poorest countries.			
GDP per inhabitant Health	Estimated at USD 200 Infant mortality: 132 per 1,000 births Child mortality for children under 5: 224 per 1,000 births Average life expectancy: 47 years			
Education	Average me expectancy: 47 years Children enrolled in the compulsory school system: 13.6% Adult illiteracy: 82.9%			

#### SUMMARY

Development assistance to Somalia is based on a combination of humanitarian assistance and support for reconstruction. The humanitarian assistance is aimed at mitigating the effects of the humanitarian disaster which overtook Somalia following the collapse of the government in 1991. The reconstruction programmes are designed to lend support to the regional and local peaceful political structures which have grown up and to contribute to poverty reduction efforts in the country in the medium term. It is felt that this combination provides the most effective assistance possible.

Swedish assistance in Somalia enjoys the full confidence of the local population, local authorities and other donors. Sweden is one of five largest aid donors in the country and has played an active part in shaping international support for Somalia. In light of this experience, it is proposed that continued Sida assistance be based on its previous approach, with an emphasis on local capacity building and a combination of humanitarian and reconstruction measures, focused to a greater extent than previously on peace building and conflict management. Efforts should be made to ensure the equitable distribution of resources among all the regions of Somalia. It is estimated that support to Somalia throughout the period 2003–2004 will amount to SEK 120m, to be appropriated from the budget item *Bilateral Development Cooperation*, sub-items *Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention* and *Africa*, respectively. Certain measures will be funded through the sub-item *NGOs*.

Assistance to Somalia will continue to be channelled through UN agencies, the Red Cross family and Swedish and international NGOs with knowledge and experience of the delicate, fragile environment – in political and humanitarian terms – to which the aid is being applied, and specialised expertise in their respective areas of operation.

#### **Objectives:**

The objectives of Swedish assistance to Somalia are to further the development of a peaceful, egalitarian, democratic society, promote respect for human rights and mitigate the effects of conflict and natural disasters. It is expected that achievement of these aims will help reduce levels of poverty in the country.

#### **Overall guidelines:**

- Local capacity building measures
- Peace building and conflict management

#### Priority target groups:

- Children
- Women

• Internally displaced people and refugees returning from elsewhere in the region.

#### Priority cooperation areas:

- Education
- Healthcare, nutrition and water/sanitation
- Human rights/democracy and good governance
- Re-integration of refugees, internally displaced people and minorities
- Land mine clearance
- The role of the business sector

The present strategy is to be implemented over a two-year period between 2003 and 2004. If the national peace process in Somalia shows signs of a breakthrough, the strategy should be reviewed.

#### **1 INTRODUCTION**

The Government has commissioned Sida to draw up proposals for a strategy for Swedish assistance to Somalia (Appendix 1, Government Decision UD2001/881/AF). Having regard to the size and current focus of aid to Somalia, Sida has proposed a more simplified strategy than normal in terms of process and documentation. The proposals include a special report on the outcome of assistance measures in 1999-2001 and the lessons to be drawn from them. Sida also considers the possibility of more long-term national support for Somalia and proposes that support should continue to be channelled through UN agencies and Swedish NGOs.

The background to this assignment is a Government decision taken on 8 April 1999 (UD 1999/439/AF) instructing Sida to commit a maximum of SEK 20 million per year over the period 1999–2001 in order to promote national reconciliation, stability and the re-establishment of Somalia's unity and territorial integrity with a view to fostering long-term poverty reduction. The funds were allocated in response to a Sida report, *Proposals on Swedish Support for Reconstruction in Somalia*, submitted to the Government on 14 December 1998. This support has served as a complement to the humanitarian assistance already provided, thus ensuring a balanced assistance programme for Somalia.

Sida has also submitted a country analysis and a performance analysis, *Outcomes and observations in connection with aid for reconstruction to Somalia 1999–2001* as part of its assistance strategy proposals for Somalia.

#### 2 COUNTRY ANALYSIS 1999-2001 – CONCLUSIONS

#### 2.1 Background

Somalia's currently estimated population of 6.4 million (including approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons) has shrunk significantly from the approximately 8 million inhabitants the country had before the civil war broke out. Some two thirds of the population live in southern Somalia, while one third live in the north. It is estimated that almost half (about 42 per cent) the inhabitants are nomadic pastoralists, 35 per cent combine agriculture and cattle rearing and 23 per cent live in towns and cities. A large number of Somalis fled the country when civil war broke out and took refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia, but also in Europe and North America where they make up a substantial diaspora.

The social system in Somalia may best be described as a network of autonomous families bound up in alliances – clans or sub-clans – at various levels. The main clans, the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Darod and Rahanweyn, along with Swahili- and Bantu-speaking minority groups, are concentrated in southern Somalia. The main religion is Islam.

Somalia became independent in 1960, when the British Somaliland protectorate and the Italian colony Somalia merged to form the Republic of Somalia. In July 1969 the elected president Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated. In October of the same year General Siyad Barre seized power through a military coup. His regime saw the introduction of a one-party system and an authoritarian, highly centralised administration. The government was strongly dependent on external economic support and its internal power base was weak. The fall of the Barre regime at the end of 1990 was followed by civil war. UNSCOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia) was established in 1992 but withdrew in 1995.

Over the last decade Somalia has been devastated by clan warfare and widespread lawlessness. Its inhabitants have witnessed the wholesale destruction of their country's infrastructure, economic collapse and untold human suffering. There have been numerous attempts to mediate between the various factions and many broken agreements. In recent years, a number of broad-based peace initiatives have taken place at both regional and intergovernmental level – without however yielding tangible results – and at local and national level. Mainly thanks to local initiatives, local administrations have been set up in Somaliland and Puntland in the north, where a measure of progress has been made towards the establishment of security, stability and peaceful conditions.

#### 2.2 Political development

In 1991 Somaliland declared independence from the rest of Somalia. In 1993 Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal was elected president. The country's borders and identity were based on those of the former colony, British Somaliland. However the state has not been recognised by the international community. In recent years, however, the transition to a multi-party system and periodic elections have led to increased tensions. A group of traditional leaders allied to politicians aspiring to the

presidency have made attempts to obstruct the transition to a multi-party system. Seven political parties have registered to date, and an electoral commission has recently been appointed. Although President Egal's death has contributed to the growing uncertainty, a new interim president has been appointed and new elections are scheduled for the end of 2002.

The self-declared autonomous region of Puntland in the north-east of the country was established in 1998 at a constitutional conference organised by the political parties involved and traditional leaders. A president and vice-president were appointed. A parliament was elected and an interim constitution drawn up for a transitional three-year period. The conference declared that Puntland was to be regarded as a state within a future, reconstructed Somali federation.

The recent political developments in Puntland may be viewed both as a crisis and as a sign of democratisation. In 2001 President Yussuf tried to extend his mandate in defiance of the constitution and met with resistance from the elders. A conference of elders was held in Garowe and a new president, Jama Ali Jama was elected with the support of the transitional government in Mogadishu. After a failed attempt at mediation and armed clashes between the supporters of Yussuf and Jama, the former retook power in the spring of 2002 and the latter left Puntland. Despite the fluid political situation in the region, however, the outlook for a return to the relatively peaceful, stable conditions that have prevailed in this part of Somalia in recent years appears favourable.

The peace initiative (the so-called Arta process) set in motion by the president of Djibouti in the autumn of 1999 restarted the deadlocked national reconciliation process in Somalia. Over 1,000 delegates took part in the conference, which in May 2000 agreed to a constitution and a parliament for a three-year transitional period. Abdikassim Salad Hassan was elected interim president and a transitional government based in Mogadishu was set up shortly afterwards.

Although the Arta process did not fulfil the expectations of its framers in terms of peace, stability and development, there is still a chance that it will break the deadlock in the reconciliation process in Somalia. However, there are major challenges ahead for the transitional administration. Representatives of Somaliland have for the time being chosen to remain outside the peace process. The same applies to a number of prominent warlords, several of whom have joined the rival Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC).

The transitional government in Mogadishu has taken part in summit meetings held by the OAU and the organisation for regional cooperation IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). The UN formally expressed its approval of the transitional government and Somalia took a seat in the General Assembly in 2000. Recent political developments, including a parliamentary vote of no confidence in the prime minister and his government, led to the removal of the transitional government and the appointment of a new administration under a new leader Hassan Abshir Farah.

In the autumn of 2001, Kenya's president Daniel Arap Moi convened a number of conferences on reconciliation in Somalia. However, little progress was made at these

meetings. At the IGAD summit in Nairobi in February 2002, the heads of state and government of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya, Eritrea and Uganda agreed to hold a reconciliation conference for Somalia including representatives of the transitional government in Mogadishu and other groups. The conference opened in the middle of October 2002 in Eldoret, Kenya.

Following the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent measures to step up the fight against terrorism, the spotlight once again fell on Somalia. The fact that Somalia still lacked – and lacks – a viable government apparatus was one reason. Another was the wave of Islamisation that swept over the country following the outbreak of civil war. It was this that helped groups like AI Itihaad, which had previously failed to take power by force in north-eastern Somalia, to resort to religious instruction financed by a growing business network to achieve its objective of transforming Somalia into an Islamic state based on Sharia law. However, no clear evidence connecting these groups with AI Qaida and the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 has been presented.

#### 2.3 Socio-economic development

Somalia is one of the world's poorest countries. The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index ranks it 161<sup>st</sup> on a list of 163 countries. The child mortality rate is 224 per 1,000 children under the age of 5. The maternal mortality rate is 1,600 per 100,000 women. Some 17 per cent of the population is estimated to suffer from moderate undernourishment and 3.5 per cent from severe undernourishment. Only 28 per cent of Somalis have access to clean drinking water.

Approximately 14 per cent of all children of school age attend compulsory school and only half of all adult men and a quarter of all adult women can read or write. Girls have limited access to education and only a small proportion attend school. A 1999 UNICEF study of 651 primary schools in Somalia showed that only 35 per cent of the children attending them were girls. Attendance rates are even lower at secondary school level as many girls leave school after the third grade of primary school.

The private sector has expanded considerably, particularly in the north, in lucrative areas such as telecommunications, currency exchange, urban communications and the construction of private wells. However, inflation rose sharply in 2001 following the importation of newly minted Somali shillings, a ban on the export of cattle to Saudi Arabia and the freezing of the assets of Al Barakaat – the largest company in Somalia and a major conduit for monetary transactions – stemming the flow of money from exiled Somalis.

#### 2.4 Floods, drought and over-grazing

Floods, mainly in the vicinity of the rivers Juba and Shabelle, and droughts caused by infrequent rainfall occur naturally in Somalia. A particularly vulnerable group in times of drought are cattle herders, whose freedom of movement has been severely cut back by the ongoing conflicts.

Food security – and by extension the nutritional situation – worsened in 2001 and domestic crop yields have fallen off, particularly in the south of the country. Food security in southern and central Somalia has suffered as a consequence of the general security situation, which has been badly impaired, and in north-eastern Somalia as a result of armed conflict. This state of affairs persists. The worst hit area at present is Gedo, but Bay and Bakpool have also been severely affected. Lack of water and grazing land combined with the ban on cattle exports to Saudi Arabia is leading to over-grazing and competition among cattle herders.

#### 2.5 The conflict

Somalia has been the scene of continuous strife since 1991. The conflict has caused untold suffering and wide-scale destruction. It has prevented the formation of a viable government with effective powers and crippled services such as schools, healthcare and communications. It has also tended to consolidate existing social structures – clan-based government, the control of large areas by rival warlords and religious fundamentalism.

The situation at present is characterised by local power structures at village level and in smaller towns or comparatively secure city areas in exchange for clan loyalty. This is the main reason why Mogadishu is still a divided city. It is also behind the new conflict in Puntland, where sub-clans and clans are contending for supremacy. The situation is aggravated by ready access to light arms, which makes it difficult to build security and reinforces a culture of violence.

The conflict is rooted in deep inter-clan mistrust and an unending struggle for Somalia's scarce resources. The mistrust was fomented during the military dictatorship, when the regime played groups off against one another, and reinforced during the long civil war. As a result of the prolonged conflict, control over central resources, particularly around Mogadishu, has become concentrated in the hands of a small number of clans and sub-clans. Thus there are groups opposed to any change in the status quo because of economic interests. The absence of trust and security and the influence of economic interests are inimical to a lasting peace and the re-establishment of a Somali state.

The special interests of other countries must also be taken into account for a full and proper understanding of the conflict and the prospects for peace in Somalia. While Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries play important roles in this respect, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries are prominent players in international endeavours to bring about peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

A new factor of relevance to Somalia is the international fight against terrorism and the consequent freezing of the assets of the Al Barakaat network, which has further aggravated the difficult economic situation in the country.

#### **2.6** The role of assistance in the peace process and future scenarios

Experience acquired from previous assistance projects in Somalia have shown that locally based initiatives involving representatives of the local community – including political, traditional and religious leaders, women's groups and NGOs – are the best possible strategy for achieving peace and reconciliation. Experience also points to the need for dialogue-promoting measures at local and national level. Assistance combined with trade play a crucial role in getting dialogue going between different clans, groups and regions in Somalia and thereby also contribute to national reconciliation.

However experience also shows that providing assistance in conflict-ridden areas can in fact heighten antagonisms and further inflame conflicts. This highlights the importance of rigorous conflict assessments, a do-no-harm approach and the need to choose cooperation partners with know-how and experience of the delicate environment to which the aid is being applied.

Assistance can also have a security-promoting effect if it is used directly in support of measures such as weapons collection, disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration of former soldiers and child soldiers in regions where a measure of security has been established. Aid can also serve to promote structural stability when it is used to address the basic causes of the conflict in Somalia, as shown by the results of reconciliation work where civil society has provided the basis for peace building efforts, and by the national contacts gained through measures such as support for the police, judiciary and constitution building. Such support includes mechanisms and institutions for the promotion of good governance and greater respect for and knowledge of human rights and gender equality, as well as procedures for handling property-related disputes and following up serious crimes committed during the civil war.

The UN Secretary-General stated in his report to the Security Council that the peace process in Somalia is likely to be prolonged in view of the scale of the political, humanitarian and developmental challenges posed by conditions in the country. He went on to appeal to the international community to support a Somali peace process, the establishment of a legal system and the development of independent national political and judicial institutions.

The reconciliation conference which opened in October 2002 in Eldoret in Kenya may well affect the situation in Somalia. One possible development scenario involves the establishment of a polity based on a number of decentralised regions capable of devising suitable avenues of and procedures for cooperation within the framework of a federal state. Here, assistance could help drive the dialogue processes necessary to the achievement of national reconciliation. Other key players in such a scenario would include the major donors and the UN.

#### **3 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1999–2001 – CONCLUSIONS**

#### 3.1 Total Swedish assistance to Somalia in 1999–2001

Sida notes in its performance analysis for the last three years that the situation, particularly in northern Somalia, has permitted a widening of Swedish support, from exclusively humanitarian assistance to a combination of the latter and reconstruction efforts. This accords with the objectives set out in the government decision (UD 1999/439/AF) commissioning Sida to commit a maximum of SEK 20 million per year during 1999–2001 to promote reconciliation, stability and reconstruction in those areas of Somalia where initiatives had been taken to set up self-governing regional administrations. This support has served as a complement to the humanitarian assistance already being provided, thus ensuring a balanced assistance programme for Somalia. Both types of support are accounted under the budget sub-item *Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention*. In 2000–2001, the bulk of support for peace building and human rights, democratisation, and good governance measures were accounted under the sub-item *Africa*.

Programme/Sector	1999	2000	2001	Total
Health, water sanitation	17,999	9,810	13,800	41,609
Education	2,465	15,847	13,600	31,912
Food distribution	3,000	2,000		5,000
Re-integration of refugees	0,255		2,000	2,255
Peace bldg/conflict manageme	nt 13,100	11,300	11,200 <sup>1</sup>	35,600
HR, democracy, good governar	nce 3,600	$7,700^2$	12,300 <sup>3</sup>	23,600
Landmine clearance			6,150	6,150
Coordination/security	1,000	1,500	2,000	4,500
Total	41,419	48,157	61,050	150,626

Table: Funds disbursed to Somalia, January 1999–December 2001 (SEK 1,000)

Donations to UNHCR and WPF and support accounted to sub-item NGOs are not included in the above figures.

#### 3.2 Support for reconstruction in 1999-2001 – outcome

A performance analysis of the Swedish reconstruction support programme for 1999–2001 shows that measures were implemented largely as planned and achieved the predicted results. Priority areas during the period were conflict management and peace building, human rights, gender equality, democracy and the rule of law. In addition, some support was provided for the re-integration of refugees, the rehabilitation of water sources and adult education.

In the fields of conflict management and peace building, efforts were focused on strengthening local structures and improving conflict management skills. The Life and Peace Institute (LPI) and the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP) sought to strengthen a bottom-up perspective and encourage active participation from local

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Of which SEK 1,300 thousand from budget sub-item *Africa* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Of which SEK 8,599 thousand from budget sub-item Africa

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Of which SEK 5,100 thousand from budget sub-item Africa

authorities, traditional leaders and the civil society. However results were somewhat contradictory. While the implementing organisations reported positive effects in the form of enhanced local knowledge and understanding of and widespread local commitment to the reconciliation processes, the measures failed to contribute to national reconciliation or prevent local conflicts from flaring up in previously peaceful areas. Sida nevertheless concludes that support for peace building enjoys strong local legitimacy is therefore of continued relevance in Somalia.

Support for measures to promote human rights and democracy were mainly channelled through LPI, WSP, Diakonia and UNDP. A relatively large share of the allocated resources was devoted to promoting women's rights. Activities included adult education, featuring literacy training, courses in human rights and democracy and continuing education and training for women in computer use, English and administration. They also included support for women parliamentarians in Puntland in the form of a study trip to South Africa and an information centre. These measures had a substantial effect on the participation of women in society – in the Parliament, women's organisations, school education and the labour market. Sida concluded that the support extended to women during the strategy period yielded concrete gains, that recipient capacity was good, and that the need for this type of assistance is still considerable.

Other measures aimed at promoting democracy and human rights focused on education and training for traditional leaders and members of local parliamentary assemblies, village councils, the media and local organisations. A number of local organisations were strengthened and – though still relatively weak in structural terms – provide an increasingly strong base for dealing with these issues. The result was a better organised civil society with more knowledge and awareness of human rights and democracy-related issues. Local authorities also increased their knowledge and understanding of these issues through training and education programmes, although there was a risk, due to structural deficiencies, that the measures would not have the far-reaching effects desired. Sida nevertheless concluded that the need for education, particularly in the sphere of human rights/democracy, remained.

Another priority area was the rule of law. Measures here were aimed at enhancing local authorities' legal competence by imparting knowledge of and respect for human rights. UNDP and Diakonia collaborated on a training project aimed at locally established courts, police authorities, prison authorities and civil society. As long as Somalia lacks a functioning central government, the local institutions responsible for the administration of justice will remain undeveloped and short of funds. This support therefore led to a marked improvement in levels of legal competence and awareness on the part of local institutions. The main problems encountered were limited absorption capacity in courts, police authorities and prisons and a fragmented legal tradition made up of elements of common law, Islamic law and modern legislation. Specific examples of support in this area include the distribution of copies of legal statutes and enactments currently in force to the courts, parliament and police authorities, and the completion of premises for training police. In addition, a dialogue was started with a view to devising a model for a judicial system which takes account of common as well as Islamic law, Sharia, while respecting human rights. Sida concluded that this was a long-term process in which limited absorption capacity and a sensitive judicial environment had to be taken into consideration.

Somalis has pressing problems which can only be addressed at regional level. Examples include conflict resolution, natural disaster planning and preparedness, the environment, HIV/AIDS, repatriation and re-integration of refugees, trade and infrastructure. Sida has therefore chosen to deal with these issues from a long-term, regional perspective.

Observed departures from originally planned activities were mainly caused by delays in implementation due to the security situation, which held up certain projects in 2001. Difficulties were also experienced in recruiting qualified local staff and coordination with other players was inadequate.

#### 3.3 Humanitarian assistance in 1999-2001 – observations

Any observations on Sweden's humanitarian aid to Somalia must include a reference to the immense difficulties that daily confront these operations. Security and access are the main problems to be contended with and success or failure in dealing with these factors in turn affect the already critical humanitarian situation. The groups most difficult to reach are those in southern and central Somalia, mainly minorities. Humanitarian operations in Somalia are performed under the most arduous conditions. The absence of an authority with national legitimacy has forced the humanitarian aid organisations to assume responsibility for the provision of basic social services. Because of the lack of security, particularly in southern Somalia, where lawlessness is rife and aid workers risk being kidnapped or attacked, the international humanitarian organisations conduct their operations from Nairobi.

This means that building up the capacity of national humanitarian networks such as the Somali Red Crescent and Somali personnel employed by the UN and the ICRC is crucial to the stability of the operation and the implementation of aid. Meanwhile UN strategies for health, nutrition, water and sanitation and education have replaced what would normally be national policies in these areas. Coordination within the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and of UN activities and UN information to the rest of the world are of strategic significance for support to the people of Somalia.

Somalia suffers frequently from natural disasters such as drought and flooding. Sida accordingly provided support for healthcare, water and sanitation during the 1999–2001 strategy period.

Education was one of the fields in which humanitarian aid measures had positive results. A number of international organisations working closely with local authorities devised a model for an education system focused on local ownership. Water was another area where organisations cooperated to good effect with local authorities both in acute disaster situations brought on by drought and on more long-term projects. These areas are also examples of the integration of humanitarian aid with reconstruction assistance right from the outset.

As a complement to the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on behalf of refugees, UNDP has launched a programme for the re-integration of refugees, mainly in southern Somalia, with support from Sweden

and other donors. However, an obstacle to the return of refugees and, above all, their re-integration, is the fact that many of the areas suitable for dwelling and small-scale agriculture are mined. The Danish Demining Group, which conducts mine clearance operations, initiated a socio-economic study of the landmine problem in Somalia during the strategy period.

#### 4 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

#### 4.1 The role of Swedish assistance

Somalia currently lacks a functioning government administration. Somaliland is seeking international recognition as a state in its own right. Similarly, Puntland has set up its own independent administration but professes adherence to a federal system. In southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, clans and warlords are locked in a violent struggle for power. The territory controlled by the transitional government in Mogadishu is limited. The aim of the reconciliation conference convened by IGAD, which opened in Eldoret, Kenya in October 2002, is to reach agreement by peaceful means on the sharing and exercise of power in Somalia, and on the best way of undertaking the country's reconstruction. Sweden also supports the 'peace dividend' principle, under which that areas that have established peace and relative stability are favoured.

Swedish aid, which aims to promote human rights and a peaceful solution to the conflict, thus takes on a political significance alongside its development promotion objectives. Support aimed at strengthening the democratic exercise of power in an environment where incipient as well as competing power structures are being assembled has implications in international law which should not be ignored.

While conforming to the objectives set out in the present strategy, Swedish assistance to Somalia must be structured so as to support ongoing efforts and any results that may come out of the IGAD reconciliation conference. Assistance programmes must also take account of any standpoints and conclusions that may have been adopted as part EU common foreign policy. Because of the close connection between development measures and political and international law considerations, Sida should consult regularly with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the design and aims of its assistance strategy.

As in the past, Swedish assistance to Somalia must be firmly focused on strengthening local capacity. Cooperation between Swedish and Somali NGOs have ensured that projects enjoy wide local support and active local participation. If aid is to be effective, there must be trust between the members of the local community, local authorities and other players.

Helping to coordinate and develop international donor support for Somalia must be an important part of Swedish assistance efforts. As its name suggests, the Nairobibased Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) coordinates aid operations in Somalia. The UN has a particularly important role to play in Somalia given the absence of a viable government administration or the coordinating functions a recipient country is normally expected to provide. Cooperation between UNDP/UNCO/OCHA and SACB is therefore extremely important. Through its decision to provide assistance for reconstruction as a complement to humanitarian aid, Sweden has acquired a prominent role as a provider of support to local authorities and civil society in Somalia. As in the past, Sweden must actively seek to ensure the coordination of efforts by Swedish NGOs, the UN and other donors. The Swedish embassy in Nairobi has a vital role to play in this connection. When planning and preparing projects Sida must emphasise the importance of conducting conflict assessments, a do-no-harm approach and the need to choose cooperation partners with know-how and experience of the delicate environment to which the aid is being applied.

#### 4.2 Cooperation with international actors

The UN strategy for humanitarian aid and development projects and EU policy on this area should both be regarded as having an important bearing on Swedish assistance in Somalia. Sweden expects to cooperate closely with the Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body (SACB), which is divided into a number of sectorally defined working groups. These have drawn up common sector policies at operational level. The UN and EU are expected to extend humanitarian support combined with support for the promotion of good governance, peace building and a long-term capability for reconstruction.

The UN's primary objectives for Somalia – to save lives, support good governance, peace building efforts, economic recovery and the repatriation and re-integration of returning refugees and internally displaced people – closely match Sweden's own concerns.

#### 4.3 The policy of the EU Commission

Sida must continue to be active in the context of EU development assistance policies and help promote coherence between programme/project areas. Lacking the necessary institutions, Somalia has not yet ratified the 7<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> EDF (European Development Fund) or the current proposals for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. However, Somalia has access to EDF funds by virtue of a special article in the AVS-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou in June 2000. The EU Commission has drawn up a country strategy proposal for Somalia for the period 2001–2007 in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Its principal, long-term, objectives are to reduce poverty and help bring about a peaceful, egalitarian, democratic society.

Development assistance projects and programmes financed by the Commission are mainly implemented by NGOs. The guiding principles governing the provision of EU aid to Somalia are:

- the 'peace dividend' principle, by which donors favour areas that have established peace and relative stability
- Somali ownership and participation in aid operations
- area-based operations
- development oriented assistance, i.e. bridging relief-development
- coordination (at Nairobi level via SACB, within the EU and in the field).

The Commission's policy is in close agreement with Sweden's assistance strategy.

Sweden will continue to monitor developments in Somalia through participation in coordination meetings and through informal contacts with other donors and players. Field operations are mainly monitored from the embassy in Nairobi. Sida will be required to follow up and assess operations in connection with peace building and

conflict management, minorities, the re-integration of refugees and human rights. In addition, Sida, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the embassy in Nairobi will be expected to follow up and discuss strategy, measures and developments in the country on an annual basis.

#### 4.4 Access for humanitarian interventions and security issues

Due to the lack of security, particularly in southern Somalia, where lawlessness is rife and aid workers risk being kidnapped or attacked, the international humanitarian aid organisations involved conduct their operations from Nairobi. In view of the security situation, Sida should ensure that Swedish cooperation partners have a comprehensive evacuation plan.

#### 4.5 Prospects for long-term national support to Somalia

Although the outcome of the reconciliation conference which opened in October 2002 remains unclear, conditions for long-term national support for Somalia are not thought to exist at present. Assistance – in particular support for reconstruction measures – should therefore be designed to extend over a medium-term time frame of 3–5 years. In the event of the emergence of an internationally recognised government with which Sweden could establish official links, the question of support on a national scale would once again become relevant. If there appear to be grounds for extending such support, Sida should submit proposals to that effect to the Government. Similarly, Sida would be expected to seek advice from the Government should the reconciliation conference or other development produce a situation calling for changes to the structure, configuration or aims of Swedish assistance as specified in the present strategy.

In the medium term, Sida is advised to continue to extend support for development promotion measures aimed at building up local administrative capacity, which can in turn serve as platform for any future long-term support. Also in the medium term, assistance should be provided to support the development of organisations in civil society.

Support for Somalia should also be viewed from a regional perspective. Examples of issues that must be addressed at regional level include conflict resolution, natural disaster planning and preparedness, the environment issues, HIV/AIDS, repatriation and re-integration of refugees, regional exchange and participation, trade and infrastructure. Sida is thus authorised to draw on funds from the regional budget appropriation for Africa for its undertakings in Somalia.

#### 5 DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OBJECTIVES FOR 2003-2004

The objectives of Swedish aid to Somalia are to contribute to the promotion of a peaceful, egalitarian and democratic society, promote respect for human rights and mitigate the consequences of armed conflict and natural catastrophes. Progress in these areas may be expected to contribute to poverty reduction in Somalia. This support forms an integrated part of Sweden's policy on Somalia. An added objective is to prevent further emigration from Somalia.

#### 5.1 Overall guidelines

Swedish assistance to Somalia must focus on promoting peace and reconciliation efforts. The outcome of the IGAD reconciliation conference – whether positive or negative – is therefore significant, and contingency plans should be drawn up to deal with either eventuality.

#### Local capacity building

Support for building local administrative capacity and independent organisations at local level is regarded as crucial to establishing conditions for poverty reduction. This aid component should therefore form an integral part of all support measures in Somalia.

Support should be focused on strengthening local initiatives from within existing civil structures in Somali society. If they are to be sustainable, measures must be based on local participation and 'ownership'. They should also include a clear educational component whatever the area of activity.

The traditional weakness of organisations in Somali civil society must be taken into account when providing assistance. Failure to do so could result in a growing number of organisations whose survival is dependent on external financing. Where local ownership obtains, assistance can help sustain democratic values and diversity in civil society.

A central issue is the status of women in Somali society and decision-making forums. Efforts should be focused on finding ways to support women's groups and the participation of women in civil society.

#### Peace building and conflict management

Peace building will be a key element of assistance to Somalia during the coming strategy period. The objective is to seek solutions to existing conflicts of interest by peaceful means rather than violence. Efforts include activities aimed at promoting dialogue between the various parties involved, security enhancement measures that will have an impact on the parties' behaviour, and, ultimately, projects designed to promote stability and address the root causes of the conflict. Measures may be general in character or specific, e.g. dialogue between groups, support for local peace support initiatives and opinion shaping. As all those involved in providing assistance and support must respond with the greatest possible flexibility and sensitivity to the unique quality of each new situation or need, aid aims should continue to emphasise participatory processes and local capacity building efforts. Cooperation organisations may include WSP, LPI, UNDP and Diakonia.

Contributing to peaceful conflict management and/or peace building should therefore be established as a general guideline for assistance provision in Somalia.

#### 6 COOPERATION AREAS

#### 6.1 Target groups

Sida is required to give special priority and devote particular attention to the needs of women and children during the forthcoming strategy period. Measures must be designed to strengthen capacity and turn their resources to account. Support to internally displaced people and returning refugees and minorities must also receive priority. These groups may be supported both directly and indirectly within one of the cooperation areas set out below.

#### <u>Children</u>

Swedish assistance to Somalia must incorporate measures that promote respect for children's rights. It is important that a child rights perspective in line with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child be introduced at all relevant levels of Somali society. The main aid areas incorporating measures aimed at children are in this case education and healthcare. The right of children to food, healthcare, shelter, psycho-social assistance and education are key assistance areas. Functioning schools are particularly significant from a protection standpoint, as they help prevent the recruitment of child soldiers and provide a basis for psychosocial rehabilitation. Because of the prolonged conflict, many children in Somalia have gone without schooling for prolonged periods or received virtually none at all. Instead they have been forced to take part in the conflict. Swedish assistance should therefore serve to support compulsory school education and, if local conditions permit, support the re-integration of child soldiers.

#### <u>Women</u>

Support for women must be given priority. A central issue for women in Somalia is the widespread practice of female genital mutilation. This is not only a health and gender equality issue but also a question of women's rights. Sweden is expected to support UNICEF, which is working for the abolition of female genital mutilation via information campaigns and the integration of the subject in school instruction and maternity care. Gender equality must be a clearly defined component of all assistance if the latter is to be effective in areas such as family health – including sexual and reproductive health – and peace building. It also ensures that more emphasis is placed on assessment of men and women's needs, that women and men enjoy equal access to assistance and that women can have a say in running their own lives.

#### Internally displaced people and returning refugees

Special attention must be devoted to the needs of internally displaced people and returning refugees. These are vulnerable groups that tend to end up outside the otherwise strong social safety net in Somalia. They are also important to the peace and reconstruction process. The great majority of returnees place considerable strain on areas where resources are scarce. This can lead to new problems such as conflicts, environmental damage and poverty. On the other hand, the mass return of refugees affords new opportunities in the form of increased labour and purchasing

power and better access to education. It is therefore vital that priority should be given to measures aimed at supporting the return of internally displaced people and refugees. When planning support special consideration should be given to the task of re-integrating children who have gone through asylum procedures alone in countries outside the region, including Sweden.

It is estimated that more than a million Somalis have fled the country since 1991. There are approximately 300,000 Somali refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 50,000 Somali refugees were repatriated from camps in these countries in 2001. Most of these ended up in the area in and around Hargesia in Somaliland. In the past, Sweden has assisted UNHCR operations in support of Somali refugees via a general annual grant administered by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

According to UN figures, there are also 300,000 internally displaced persons in Somalia, over 100,000 of whom have taken refuge in Mogadishu. As a basic requirement, these people must be given appropriate guarantees of protection against arbitrary removal, and protection and assistance when being returned to their homes or moved elsewhere. Swedish assistance must therefore be used to help people return safely, settle and re-integrate into their communities. Support should also be designed to facilitate the return of refugees from countries outside the region, including Sweden. The Somali diaspora includes resource staff whose efforts can make a substantial contribution to development in a range of areas.

#### 6.2 Cooperation aims

Swedish assistance to Somalia covers a wide area which includes disaster prevention, acute life sustaining measures and support for reconstruction over the medium term. An overall, holistic view, capable of integrating reconstruction and humanitarian efforts is therefore essential. Efforts should also be made to ensure equitable distribution of funds and resources among the affected regions of Somalia, although needs and access may be expected to determine shorter-term tactical decisions.

The volume of assistance in any given case should be carefully determined in light of the implementation capacity of the aid organisation concerned, and with the country or region's capacity to absorb aid. In view of Somalia's limited capacity to absorb large-scale measures, small and medium-size projects are preferable. Major increases in volumes of assistance are not without problems; an important lesson to emerge from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)<sup>4</sup> was that these tended to heighten the risk of conflict.

Having regard to Sida's performance analysis and other considerations, assistance to Somalia should focus on the following areas:

#### **Education**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> United Nations Operations in Somalia 1992-1995

Priority should be given to basic education for children, young people and adults, especially young girls and women. Education is particularly important given that two entire generations have been deprived of schooling due to the civil war. Continued priority to and further development of support for education are possible thanks to the experience gained from previous successful projects in this sphere.

In the long term, access to education, including adult education, helps to improve people's ability to make decisions about their lives and circumstances, and to strengthen local capacity. Cooperation between donors and between implementing organisations is vital to the achievement of a uniform, nationwide education system. The channels likely to be used for support for basic education are UNICEF, Diakonia and IAS.

#### Healthcare, nutrition and water/sanitation

Needs in the healthcare sphere are very great in Somalia. Efforts should be focused on improving the general health situation by supporting greater access to basic healthcare, nutrition, and clean water and sanitation. Support in this area should be continued, mainly through the Red Cross and UNICEF.

A central issue in connection with support for healthcare is the widespread practice of female genital mutilation. The high incidence of HIV/AIDS in two of Somalia's neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia, call for greater focus on this problem. Refugee flows from areas where HIV/AIDS is prevalent pose a potential risk if the situation in Somalia continues to permit repatriation.

#### Human rights, democracy and good governance

Aid to Somalia must serve to further national reconciliation and stability. The principle of Somalia's unity and territorial integrity can be upheld where support is provided for the reconstruction of local administrations, provided that aid measures are designed to promote a uniform judicial system throughout Somalia. Education and training and other capacity-building measures within the judiciary form an important part of these efforts. Uniform support, extended to all parts of Somalia, will tend to facilitate the harmonisation of the legal system and promote dialogue between administrative Support for promoting continued bodies. participation, transparency and responsibility on the part of the administrative system must be an essential component of future assistance to Somalia. The political implications of such measures have been touched on earlier in this report as has the need for regular consultation with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

To date, only limited support for democratisation and human rights-related measures has been possible in southern Somalia due to the precarious security situation. Areas in which such measures might be feasible should be carefully specially tested for security, access and the nature (civilian or military) of administrative structures.

To date the question of administration of justice as part of the peace process has received very little attention. Demands that those responsible for human rights violations and crimes against humanity be brought to justice may acquire greater weight as time goes by. Sida's performance audit of assistance for reconstruction to Somalia in 1999–2001 found that measures to promote human rights/democracy and good governance had positive results. It is therefore expected that this area will continue to be central to support for Somalia. Aid should mainly be channelled through UNDP and NGOs with special expertise and experience in this field, provided that the latter's activities are closely coordinated with the UN.

#### Re-integration of refugees, internally displaced persons and minorities

A significant proportion of total assistance should go to supporting the voluntary repatriation of refugees and their re-integration into the community. The freedom and ability of refugees to return is an important precondition of any peace process and the reconstruction of the country. However, sustainable return is dependent on access to protection on a national scale, the existence of law and order, good governance, justice and equality.

Support for returning refugees and internally displaced persons can be provided via special projects. Combining ongoing reconstruction and peace support operations, moreover, can improve conditions for returning refugees. Land mine clearance, education and healthcare and support for human rights and gender equality are examples of measures that can be combined to good effect.

A lasting solution to the refugee problem is predicated on the ability of aid providers to cover the needs of the entire local community, including returning refugees, internally displaced persons and local inhabitants. Measures should be designed to reach the most vulnerable refugees, such as women and children. Access to social services and economic rehabilitation should form part of re-integration efforts.

Support for refugees, internally displaced persons and minorities is likely to be channelled through organisations like UNHCR and UNDP. The latter – acting in coordination with UNHCR – is involved with the return of refugees in other related areas. Other organisations may also participate.

#### Landmine clearance

Landmine clearance is a limited commitment which can be fulfilled in the medium term. Thus the Danish Demining Group (DDG) estimates that the landmine problem in Somaliland can be solved within 3–5 years assuming capacity and the extent of the problem remain unchanged.

The lack of local capacity in this sphere in Somalia and the difficulty in building an appropriate capability pose serious problems as they limit the possibility of handing over to local players. In practice, responsibility lies with the UN and NGOs in charge of demining operations in Somalia. The UN is mainly concerned with coordination, while implementation is left to NGOs, which are deemed to have more capacity. The Danish Demining Group has achieved excellent results and should be given continued priority as a channel for demining support.

#### The role of the business sector

Somalia's private sector has grown significantly in recent years. To some extent it may be said to have benefited from the 'stateless' situation in large sections of the country by such short-term advantages as not having to pay taxes or comply with or respect government and/or international procedures, standards or regulations. Nevertheless, the private sector is severely hampered in its operations by the absence of official government structures, legal systems, public services, a functioning infrastructure and a normal financial system. The unstable security situation and the mobility-limiting clan-based boundaries also create extra costs and preclude major business opportunities.

The absence of an effective legal/judicial framework is an obstacle to networking and exchanges with other countries. The informal sector largely lacks know-how and expertise – a direct consequence of the collapse of the education system. International measures to combat terrorism following the events of 11 September 2001 have had a somewhat negative impact on the Somali economy. Inflows of foreign capital have shrunk drastically since the destruction of the country's informal banking system. Despite these problems, the private sector has to some extent filled the vacuum created by the absence of government-run social services and offers education and healthcare services, operates pharmacies and provides electricity and water services. The growing private sector is thus assuming an increasingly important role in Somalia.

The absence of government structures, the lack of infrastructure and a functioning judiciary combined with the fact that the private sector is still at an early stage of development has had a detrimental effect on the economy's ability to diversify from trade into productive investment, and limited its capacity to create additional jobs. Sida therefore intends to continue providing assistance for the development of a peaceful national structure and a national judiciary. It also intends to support measures aimed at improving the infrastructure through landmine clearance. These measures – combined with support for education and the re-integration of refugees and coordinated with other donors – is expected to help promote a climate more favourable to the further development of the private sector.

Under the terms of the strategy, Sida is enjoined to actively test new measures and initiatives that could help strengthen and accelerate the development of the country's business sector.

#### 7 FINANCIAL PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

Having regard to the risks and problems referred to in the present report, the volume of assistance should remain at its present level, i.e. approximately SEK 120 million for the 2003–2004 strategy period. In the event of significant changes in the present situation in Somalia, Sida should draw up proposals for a revised support package and submit these to the government.

The bulk of the funds are to be appropriated from the budget item *Bilateral Development Cooperation*, sub-items *Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention*. Funds may also be appropriated from the budget item *Bilateral Development Cooperation*, sub-item *Africa*, respectively. In addition, certain measures will be undertaken under the sub-item NGOs.

Since 1994, a humanitarian coordinator has been stationed at the Swedish embassy in Nairobi *inter alia* to monitor the humanitarian situation in Somalia. Continued monitoring from Nairobi is planned.



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