

Digest

The Swedish Defence Commission's report on the future direction of the total defence and the composition of the civil defence

Excerpts

The Swedish Defence Commission agrees on the main conclusions of the report. In some areas, Members of Parliament Morgan Johansson (Social Democratic Party), Peter Hultqvist (Social Democratic Party), Hanna Gunnarsson (Left Party) and Emma Berginger (Green Party) have reported opposing opinions.

Introduction

It's time to act!

Sweden must shape its security policy and its defence based on the scope of the threat that Russia will pose for a long time to come. An aggressive Russia, with both the ability and the will to wage a prolonged war, is the threat that must shape the development of Sweden's total defence.

The Defence Commission states that the civilian component of the total defence must rapidly increase its capability. A sense of urgency must permeate all parts of Swedish society and the further development of Sweden's total defence in the years to come.

Over time, total defence must be built to defend Sweden against an armed attack and to contribute to the defence of Allies. An armed attack on Sweden cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled out that military force or further threats of such force may be used against Sweden.

The Swedish total defence consists of military defence and civil defence. At the highest level of alert, total defence is all societal activities that should then be carried out. Civil defence is a prerequisite for the military defence to be able to fulfil its main task – to defend Sweden against an armed attack.

Sweden must be able to carry out total defence activities individually and together with others, within and outside the country and in accordance with Sweden's commitments as a member of NATO. Sweden's ability to support other Allies (including through Host Nation Support) is crucial to enable the Alliance to operate in our part of Europe. By already enabling early action in peacetime, Sweden can contribute to strengthening NATO's collective defence and thus its overall deterrence.

The Defence Commission would like to emphasise that it is not the most probable course of events that is most important in relation to the task of building the total defence, but the developments that would have the most serious consequences if they occurred. Security policy assessments must therefore also include developments that are seen as less likely and whose consequences would be particularly serious if they occurred.

The Defence Commission believes that the civil defence must develop a higher overall total defence capability in the immediate future. This build-up starts from a low level. An approach where an actor waits for additional resources or directives before taking necessary measures slows down the build-up.

The tasks, regulations, responsibilities and opportunity to build a stronger total defence capability are partly in place, but there is a lack of community planning and culture of doing this. Decision-makers – in both the public and private sectors – lack an approach that has the requirements of war as a starting point.

The total defence, including civil defence, carries out preparations, develops plans and acts in a state of heightened alert or war on the basis of a partly different legislation. This is made possible by enabling acts, which can be applied in the event of a heightened state of alert.

The Defence Commission also notes that a total defence that is built based on the requirements of heightened state of alert and war will contribute to strengthening peacetime crisis management.

At the same time, the Defence Commission would like to emphasise that the ability to carry out necessary tasks in the event of a heightened state of alert and in war must not be hindered by an excessive reliance on plans. An awareness of the importance of being able to adapt mentally and become solution-driven in the extremely difficult situations that arise during war is critical.

In times of heightened state of alert and war, the situation is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty as well as quick and unpredictable developments. This demands quick decisions under great uncertainty, where limited resources must be prioritised for extensive needs. The importance of clear and flexible leadership cannot be overstated.

Objectives for total defence

Defending Sweden and its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity is not only a military task but a responsibility for the whole of society. Total defence requires personal efforts from all residents. This requires an engaged population where everyone is expected to contribute.

The Defence Commission believes that Sweden's vital national security interest is to assert our country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are prepared to defend our

country, our people, our democracy, our freedom and our way of life with force of arms. The Defence Commission states that Sweden's vital national security interests should be determined by the *Riksdag* (the Swedish parliament).

With our membership of NATO, the national total defence capability is focused on defending Sweden and its Allies against armed attacks. It will also strengthen our ability to manage crises in peacetime.

As a NATO member, Sweden stands fully behind the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Sweden will take the actions it deems necessary without delay in the event of an armed attack against any NATO member state. The fact that Sweden, together with other Allies, maintains confidence in the collective defence guarantees is central to NATO's deterrence and to preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.

As an Ally, the national defence capability is part of the Alliance's collective defence in accordance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Sweden will develop its total defence as an integral part of NATO's collective defence with other Allies. The starting point is the strategic concept, where the level of ambition in NATO's capability planning process and the military operational planning is stated. Article 3 also forms the basis of NATO, which is a national responsibility and a collective commitment.

The Commission notes that Sweden's vital national security interests and the requirements of NATO membership must be reflected in the overall goal for total defence, as well as the objectives for both military and civil defence. The Defence Commission therefore considers that the current targets, which were established in the defence bill 2020, should be adjusted. Furthermore, the Commission states that the governance of civil defence during the defence decision period of 2025–2030 should be developed to enable goals and plans to be translated into concrete measures to a greater extent than before.

The measures taken by Sweden and other Allies to maintain and strengthen civilian resilience reduce the vulnerability of the Alliance as a whole and thus raise the threshold for an aggressor. This resilience is a national responsibility, but also a collective commitment. Military measures to defend the Alliance's territory and population will be complemented by civilian measures and preparations to reduce vulnerabilities in the event of an attack.

Considering Sweden's vital national security interest and membership of NATO, the Defence Commission believes that the overall goal of total defence should be to have the ability to:

- defend Sweden and our people against an armed attack, assert our country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and contribute to the defence of Allies. It must be possible to conduct activities within the total defence individually and together with others, within and outside the country and in accordance with Sweden's commitments as a member of NATO.

The goal of military defence should be to have the ability to:

- defend Sweden against armed attack;
- uphold Sweden's territorial integrity;
- safeguard rights and national interests outside Swedish territory in accordance with international law;
- within the framework of NATO's collective defence and other tasks, fulfil Sweden's commitments as a member of NATO;
- promote our security and prevent and manage conflicts and wars by conducting peacetime operations on our own territory and in the neighbouring region, and by participating in international peace support operations; and
- protect society and its functionality by using existing capabilities and resources to assist the rest of society, both in peacetime and in times of heightened state of alert.

The goal of civil defence should be to have the ability to:

- ensure the most important societal functions;
- contribute, within the framework of NATO's collective defence and other tasks, to military defence capabilities;
- protect the civilian population; and
- maintain the will to defend and society's resilience to external pressures.

The outset of the total defence

Sweden is best defended within NATO. As a member of NATO, Sweden will be covered by the mutual defence guarantees set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. There will thus be a commitment from the other Allies for Sweden to receive support in the event of an armed attack. Likewise, Sweden makes a commitment to assist other Allies in their defence if they are attacked.

According to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Sweden's total defence capability will form part of the collective defence. NATO membership increases Sweden's defence capability through greater opportunities to cooperate with Allies in peace, crisis and war. As an Ally, Sweden will be subject to NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities.

Over time, total defence will be designed and dimensioned to defend Sweden and contribute to the defence of Allies against armed attacks. This includes planning for acts of war on Swedish territory. The antagonistic threats are broad and complex.

Within the framework of NATO's collective defence, the total defence must have a credible warfare capability with military and civil defence. A strong Swedish total defence that deters war will form part of NATO's overall deterrence capability, which will serve as a means of conflict prevention and ultimately as a way to maintain peace.

If a NATO member is attacked, the Swedish Armed Forces, with the support of other parts of the total defence, together with Allies and within the framework of NATO's joint operations, will contribute to NATO's overall collective defence. If Sweden is directly attacked, the Swedish Armed Forces, with the support of the rest of the total defence, together with Allies and within the framework of NATO's joint operations, will defend Sweden. Resistance must be determined and persistent. Deepening cooperation with Allies in the framework of NATO's Joint Operational Planning must be a priority.

The Defence Commission believes that the threats to Sweden, as described in the report, largely apply to other Allies as well. Some NATO Allies are also facing the threat of a direct cross-border invasion. This is dealt with within the framework of NATO's joint operational planning. As a member of NATO, Sweden must contribute to the Alliance's collective defence in solidarity and by contributing to the defence of NATO's eastern border. Sweden will also contribute to the security of NATO as a whole in accordance with the Alliance's 360-degree perspective on deterrence and defence.

The Defence Commission states that total defence must be based on a credible military and civilian capability.

The Defence Commission states that the Swedish total defence must be built in order to be able to meet an armed attack. In the event of a threat of war or war, the efforts of the total defence will be concentrated on the military defence.

Sweden must ultimately be able to handle the severity a war entails. The sustainability of the total defence must create the ability to adapt society for a longer period of war and maintain important parts of the Swedish economy. It also entails that military support to and from other Allies can be ensured and that NATO-wide operations involving Swedish territory can be carried out.

Within the framework of a cohesive total defence, the military and civil defence must prepare and plan to be able, for at least three months, to meet and manage a war in Europe that leads to serious consequences for the functioning of Swedish society. It must be assumed that the North Atlantic Council has invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the Government has decided on the highest level of alert. These three months give society time to adapt to wartime conditions with, for example, changed production conditions, flows of goods, etc., in order to be able to handle a longer period of serious security policy crisis or war.

The normality of a functioning society must be maintained even in wartime, for as long as possible. The Defence Commission emphasises, however, that the ambition of peacetime total

defence preparations should be to maintain the most important societal functions during wartime. This means a significantly lower level of ambition in most sectors of society compared to a normal, peacetime situation. It also means great limitations and a great efforts throughout society to cope with such a situation.

The ability to support NATO's military operations with the support of the Host Nation Support Agreement – and related command, logistics and maintenance assets – needs to be developed in close cooperation with NATO and our neighbouring countries, in particular Norway, Finland and Denmark, and with other bilateral agreements with contributing Allies.

Every individual must be prepared to manage their own maintenance and care for a week without support from the public sector. This requires preparation.

Through planning, preparedness and the resources necessary to be able to handle war, the ability to prevent and manage peacetime crises will also be improved.

Ukraine's resilience following Russia's full-scale invasion

Ukraine's defence against Russia's full-scale invasion has shown that the resilience and will to defend of a nation's population and society are crucial. Ukraine's resistance has further underlined the importance of a functioning total defence, and the need to be able to mobilise the society as a whole.

Ukraine's defence against Russia's war of aggression highlights the importance of a total defence characterised by determination, speed, adaptability and pragmatism, with access to both the skills and the resources needed in order to carry out its tasks in war.

Furthermore, Ukraine's defence underlines the importance of preparations, plans and exercises, as well as the central value of a nation's citizens' strong collective will to defend their country. At the same time, experience from Ukraine shows a rather chaotic situation, not least initially, despite eight years of previous low-intensity war and established routines and strategies, in which individual initiative and speed –rather than waiting – has been of great importance.

Ukraine's experiences underline the importance of identifying, protecting and securing critical infrastructure. The ability to repair and restore functions has been of great importance for both the civilian and the military side of the total defence.

Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of maintaining the functionality of society. This is important for the overall war effort, maintaining trust in decision-makers and authorities during the war, and as a way to maintain the will to defend the nation.

Command structures in the total defence

The total defence must function in war. A fundamental ability is to lead and coordinate society's collective resources in an efficient way. Clear command structures that coordinate both within the civil defence and between the military and civil defence are crucial to enable the total defence to carry out its tasks.

The Defence Commission states that the command structure of the civil defence must be constructed so that the civil defence can carry out its tasks even in situations of great uncertainty and during rapid and unpredictable events.

The Defence Commission proposes that the structure of civil defence in times of heightened state of alert and war be carried out by actors with geographical areas of responsibility, from the Government (national level) via the civilian areas (higher regional level), the county administrative boards (lower regional level) and the municipalities (local level).

In peacetime, the main task of civil defence is to prepare Sweden for war with the resources, capabilities and objectives decided by the Riksdag. The Defence Commission emphasises that even in peacetime, the course of events can be characterised by uncertainty. The Commission emphasises that the work of developing total defence, including civil defence, in the prevailing serious and changing situation places particular demands on speed.

The Defence Commission proposes that the authorities responsible for the sector and the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas be given the agency to issue regulations. The authorities responsible for the sector are responsible for coordinating measures in the sector at central level and for ensuring that these measures are coordinated with the measures taken by other emergency authorities, including the civilian areas and county administrative boards, as well as the Swedish Armed Forces. The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas should be given responsibility for coordinating measures within their geographical area of responsibility. How such a regulatory authorisation is weight against the responsibility of other actors needs to be investigated, and the exact design and delimitation of such an authorisation needs to be further analysed. The Commission would like to point out that the civilian areas are part of a chain of command and control based on the Government. Even in peacetime, authorities responsible for sectors and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas may need to push forward planning and other preparations through regulations.

The Defence Commission states that there is a need for a central administrative agency that has a clear role in supporting the Government's work at national level. In peacetime, the agency is responsible for coordinating the planning and preparations for civil defence at national level. Based on the Government's direction, it is proposed that the agency submit proposals for trade-offs and priorities. It is also proposed that the agency have a role in supporting the Government's coordination of the sector-responsible agencies' activities in total defence and to be tasked with submitting proposals to the Government for priorities and allocation of

resources. In order to ensure synergies between civil defence and peacetime crises, the agencies should, in support of the Government's coordination of civil defence, be responsible for issues relating to society's emergency preparedness.

Economic defence affects all sectors that have a specific role to maintain preparedness (preparedness sectors) The agency in support of the Government's coordination of civil defence should therefore be given the national responsibility for plans and preparations in peacetime concerning economic defence, including security of supply.

In peacetime, this agency should also consult with the Swedish Armed Forces and coordinate civil defence's contingency planning at a central level. The agency should have a certain regulatory agency, which needs to be investigated further. The agency should also be given sectoral responsibility in terms of planning, command and control capability and coordination for a new, overarching sector. However, the agency will not lead civil defence.

The Defence Commission states that the proposal for a central agency to support the Government's coordination of civil defence should be implemented by redesigning the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The redesign of the agency places great demands on a change in the agency's culture and focus. To underline this change, the Commission believes that MSB should be given a new name that reflects its new mission.

The Defence Commission notes that the new contingency structure means that parts of the coordination tasks that MSB has should instead be included among the responsibilities of the various sectors and civilian areas.

The Defence Commission states that consideration should be given to transferring the responsibility for protection against accidents and necessary measures within civil defence, including sectoral responsibility for rescue services and the protection of the civilian population, to another principal. Organising the activities as a new agency could be considered.

MSB currently conducts international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in conflict and disaster situations. This may include medical support, capacity-building, assistance with emergency shelters, the establishment of refugee camps or hygiene facilities. These activities are closely linked to the tasks of civil protection and protection of the population.

In order to clarify the assignment of the agency that will have the supporting role of the Government's coordination of civil defence, organising the responsibility for cyber and information security – which currently lies with MSB – as a new agency may be considered.

The Defence Commission is also of the opinion that the tasks relating to psychological defence that are currently organised within MSB should be transferred to the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency.

The Defence Commission states that there is currently a need to establish a cooperative body similar to the former National Defence Chiefs' Board for coordination at agency level, with the involvement of the Government Offices. Consideration should be given to how today's cooperation between MSB and the Swedish Armed Forces should relate to a body similar to the Swedish Defence Chiefs' Board.

War organisation and personnel

When a decision to raise the state of alert is taken, the total defence must be able to switch from a peacetime organisation to a wartime organisation. This must be possible even during severe disruptions in society. This capability is crucial for other defence preparations within the total defence to be able to have an effect in the event of a heightened state of alert and war.

The possibility to shift to a wartime organisation can be done gradually after successive decisions by the Government or immediately at the highest level of alert. However, the Defence Commission states that each actor must plan to be able to transform into a wartime organisation, with parts of its organisation within a few days and with its entire organisation within seven days. For certain actors, and for certain parts of an actor's activities, it must be possible to transform into a wartime organisation within a few hours.

The wartime organisation consists primarily of tasks that are subject to special requirements in wartime, such as a changed threat scenario. The military organisation must have the ability to sustainably carry out its war tasks in the event of a heightened state of alert or war. An actor who has become part of the wartime organisation should, if the situation permits, continue to carry out its regular activities as far as possible. However, the Defence Commission emphasises that in most cases this must be done with a lower level of ambition, where only the most basic needs for goods, services and information can be met.

Tasks that focus on the ability to continue to carry out ordinary tasks in the event of a heightened state of alert or war, and that have a more indirect significance for the efforts to fight the war, often do not require a wartime organisation, even if the scope and quality of the activities may be affected and require certain special plans. For example, it may concern certain parts of health care and services such as schools, childcare and elderly care, and others.

In addition, this planning must be carried out together with other civilian actors and the Swedish Armed Forces in order to identify and manage tasks, interdependencies and the ability to transfer resources, such as personnel and capabilities, between operations.

In order to ensure the availability of personnel in the civil and military defence in the event of a heightened state of alert and war, total defence duty applies. This is carried out by means of military service, civilian service or general service. Military service must be performed by the Swedish Armed Forces and civilian service in the activities within the total defence determined by the Government, which also includes activities within the Armed Forces such as health and medical care. Conscription and civilian service include the obligation to complete enlistment,

basic training, refresher training, standby service and military service. A person liable for total military service who is not deployed to military or civilian service may, in the event of a heightened state of alert, be called upon to fulfil general service obligation in the areas decided by the Government, or the agency determined by the Government.

To ensure that essential societal functions can function even during a heightened state of alert or war, a robust and reliable supply of personnel is crucial. Total defence should be seen as a whole in which the available human resources must be allocated in a rational manner. The needs of different parts of the total defence must be weighed against each other. The basic principle should be that individuals participate in the position where the benefit to the total defence is greatest.

In this context, the Defence Commission would like to emphasise that militarily trained personnel required for the Swedish Armed Forces' war organisation should generally be placed in military positions.

The Defence Commission states that the organisation of war and the deployment of war are tools that must not be used casually, but should be based on an analysis of tasks and needs regarding the tasks in times of heightened state of alert and war. Otherwise, there is a risk that an extensive bureaucracy will be created linked to military deployments and that many will be deployed to war, and thus locked into one position, without a clear picture of what their tasks and roles should be in the event of a heightened state of alert.

The Defence Commission states that for many actors, large parts of the activities that are not part of the war organisation can be staffed by permanent personnel through the employment relationship and general service without being placed in peacetime. There may be exceptions for, for example, certain business-critical positions where personnel can be called upon or placed in war on the basis of the employment contract or through civilian service after another investigation.

The Defence Commission states that the supply of labour is a fundamental task in order to achieve a functioning civil defence. The Commission is therefore of the opinion that a special contingency sector for labour supply should be established.

The Defence Commission states that in order to ensure personnel in the business sector's activities that are important for total defence, clear regulation of companies that are important for war must be introduced. Personnel at such companies who are necessary to maintain the production or service required by the total defence should not, as far as possible, be called up for other compulsory service.

The ability to provide support to Allies on Swedish territory

Sweden's membership of NATO and participation in NATO's joint operational planning entail significantly increased demands on military and civilian capabilities to support NATO operations involving Swedish territory. In order for a foreign unit to be able to operate on or transit through Swedish territory, there must be legal and practical arrangements, known as Host Nation Support.

The Defence Commission notes that Sweden's ability to support other Allies is crucial for the alliance to be able to operate in our part of Europe. Sweden is expected to be able to grant territory, among other things, by constituting an approach and base area for Allied land, sea and air forces, as well as by providing supply and transit areas for Allied forces. By enabling early action even in peacetime, Sweden can contribute to strengthening collective defence and thus to NATO's overall deterrence.

NATO's Host Nation Support doctrine defines Host Nation Support as civilian and military support in peace, crisis and war from a host country to NATO units or other units and NATO organisations based in, operating on or from, or moving through the host country's territory.

The Swedish Armed Forces, which have the main responsibility for Allied forces' Host Nation Support, need to further develop concrete preparations, plans and capabilities regarding support to Allies. This means that the ability to support NATO operations must also be practiced. The civilian areas play a crucial role in the coordination of civilian support for military defence in the event of a heightened state of alert. Prior to a heightened state of alert, the civilian areas must initiate measures and coordinate the planning and preparation of civilian aspects of Host Nation Support. The ability of civilian actors to provide support in the conduct of military operations is a necessary contribution to the total defence effort and thus also to the total defence's contribution to NATO's overall deterrence capability.

In times of war, support to Swedish and Allied units may need to be handled at the same time as humanitarian and other civilian support is received to protect the population and society. Support for certain military operations with Swedish and Allied units may also need to take place before Sweden has taken a decision on a heightened state of alert.

The Defence Commission notes that coordinated and effective support for military defence and Allies, as well as for civilian purposes, requires the development of civil defence. This may involve adaptations of infrastructure, preparations and planning of tasks to be carried out, as well as a developed command and control capability in the event of a heightened state of alert and war. NATO operations and Allied units will be commanded by NATO staff. The coordination of the support required by these units will take place through Swedish military staffs. Regardless of which civilian authorities' areas of responsibility need to be used for the support, developed preparations are required between the Swedish Armed Forces and civilian actors at central, regional and local level.

Economic defence

The Defence Commission notes that the total defence capability is directly linked to a functioning national economy. In the event of a heightened state of alert and war, Sweden needs to be able to meet the total defence's need for goods and services, and ensure the country's financial stability, the functionality of trade and industry, and the maintenance of trade with the rest of the world. A robust and cohesive economic defence needs to encompass both public activities at national, regional and local level, as well as activities within the private sector. Security of supply, transport, financial stability and preparedness are critical areas in order to build a strong economic defence.

The Defence Commission states that the responsibility for maintaining the necessary supply of critical goods and services needs to be clarified. In the current contingency structure, there are no contingency sectors for foreign trade and the supply of industrial goods, two societal functions that are crucial for maintaining a functioning economy in the event of war. The Commission is therefore of the opinion that foreign trade and the supply of industrial goods should be organised as separate contingency sectors. The Commission states that several government agencies and the private sector need to be involved in this work.

Cooperation between the state and the companies whose activities are important for total defence needs to be strengthened and formalised. The state must be able to rely on companies whose operations are important for total defence to be able to continue their operations in the event of a heightened state of alert and war. Other EU and NATO member states are also currently dependent on Swedish goods and services to be able to maintain their supply and production of goods and services that are crucial to their defence.

The Defence Commission states that Sweden should reestablish a system where the government identifies private companies that are important for war. The core of such a system should be to ensure that the companies that are designated as such have the prerequisites to carry out activities that are important for total defence in the event of a heightened state of alert and war. This may involve the companies' regular, modified or additional operations. This is an important part of the overall economic defence and security of supply. It is also important for the military defence's ability to carry out its tasks in times of heightened state of alert and war. The Commission therefore considers that a reestablishment of such a system is necessary for a credible total defence.

The companies that are designated as important during war can be companies with which the state, regions or municipalities currently have agreements for the delivery of goods or services, which will also be needed in the event of a heightened state of alert and war. It can also involve companies that the state, regions and municipalities do not have agreements with, but whose production needs to be able to continue even in the event of a heightened state of alert and war. The role of these companies should be regulated and formalised through framework agreements or more general requirements for actors in certain sectors.

Security of supply

Security of supply consists of the activities that aim to maintain the supply of goods and services that are necessary for the survival of the population in times of crisis and war, to ensure the most important functions of society and to contribute to the military defence capability, including support to the armed forces of Allies on Swedish territory. Effective security of supply is therefore an important part of a resilient economic defence.

Securing access to the goods and services that are necessary for the survival of the population and for society to function at a basic level needs to be a priority. The Defence Commission would like to emphasise that it is impossible to maintain the peacetime level of service in wartime.

The Defence Commission notes that Sweden's preparedness to maintain or convert production, as well as to protect and distribute goods and services that are essential to the population, is inadequate. In addition, there is a lack of necessary stockpiles. A large part of the production and distribution of important goods and services is also vulnerable to physical or digital attacks. The ability to maintain or convert production, as well as to secure and distribute important goods and services, must be strengthened.

In a sharply deteriorating security situation with a large-scale war raging in Europe, measures need to be taken as soon as possible to strengthen security of supply in a number of sectors.

Financial stability and preparedness

Household consumption, payments of wages, and payments between private individuals and companies and between companies are crucial for the functioning of the economy, and thus society as a whole. The Defence Commission states that the resilience of the financial sector must be strengthened.

One of the most important tasks is to ensure that the payment system works as far as possible, even during wartime. Other important functions are savings and financing, insurance and financial stability.

Cash payments constitute a limited part of all payments in today's financial environment. In order for payments to be made in the event of serious disruptions, such as interruptions in electronic communications or power outages, it is essential that there is redundancy in the payment system. Payments need to be made in a variety of ways and by means of different underlying infrastructure for clearing payments.

It is of great importance that the development of total defence planning and preparations to deal with heightened state of alert and war in the financial sector continue. Planning needs to include clearer requirements and contingency regulations for the actors in the financial system. Companies active in the financial sector must plan to handle problems regarding cash handling,

provision of card payments and online payments, as well as electricity supply and electronic communications during a heightened state of alert and war.

The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority the government agency tasked with monitoring the financial market and the Riksbank (central bank), have partly overlapping responsibilities in matters related to civil defence. It is important that there is a functioning structure for planning and preparing as well as management during wartime in the area of financial services. Parallel structures for identical tasks are not effective. The Defence Commission would like to emphasise the importance of a speedy solution to this issue.

Transportation

In times of war, the transport sector plays an important role in securing the most important total defence functions. The majority of vital societal functions are dependent on transport infrastructure and means of transports. The sector will play a central role in maintaining the Swedish economy in times of heightened state of alert and war.

The transport sector is vital in the context of a strong economic defence. The transport of personnel and goods is also a prerequisite for the Swedish Armed Forces' mobilisation, security of supply and ability to operate. In addition, it is a sector whose functionality is of great importance for the supply of Allied states, especially Allies in the Nordic and Baltic countries. Transport is also crucial to the conduct of NATO military operations in our part of Europe.

The lessons from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine point to the need for repair resources and spare parts to uphold the transport infrastructure, but also to the importance of a flexible approach to meet transport needs even when roads or modes of transport are inaccessible.

The Swedish Transport Administration has pointed out that preparedness for construction, repairs, evacuation and clearance is a crucial part of the agency's ability to repair and maintain transport infrastructure and transport resources in the event of a heightened state of alert and war.

Total defence planning in the transport sector should aim to identify which critical parts of the transport infrastructure are necessary to uphold in times of war and thereafter plan for alternative modes of operation, modes of transport and transport routes.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of the total defence planning in the transport sector including concrete planning for the direction and implementation of transport of large military units.

Total defence planning must cover all parts of the transport system, i.e. transport infrastructure, transport and logistics. Today, however, private operators providing essential transport services by land, air and sea are only involved to a very limited extent. The Defence Commission believes that these actors need to be better involved in the planning for heightened state of

alert and war than is currently the case. The Commission also wishes to emphasise the need for total defence planning and capability-enhancing measures for public transport systems.

During heightened state of alert and war, there will be a need to prioritise transport resources. Such prioritisations may be subject to difficult trade-offs between different societal needs, such as military needs versus civilian needs. In the event of a heightened state of alert and war, the civil defence regions will be pivotal for these prioritisations.

The Defence Commission emphasises the need to, at an early stage in the coming defence bill period, remove all uncertainties regarding the responsibilities for preparations and planning of passenger and freight transport that is critical for total defence in the event of a heightened state of alert and war.

The Defence Commission is therefore of the opinion that the Swedish Transport Administration should carry out supply analyses for transport that includes both infrastructure and transport services, such as carriers and logistics centres. The Commission also emphasises the importance of exercising the plans.

The Defence Commission notes that the transport sector, due to its importance for other sectors and military defence, should be given high priority in a balanced development of the overall total defence capability within the framework of the overall resources. However, the needs and conditions for transport differ between northern and southern Sweden, which must also be reflected in the planning.

In the event of a heightened state of alert, the Government may decide to apply the disposal act, which gives the Swedish Armed Forces and other government agencies the opportunity to dispose of private transport resources. The Defence Commission considers it important that the Armed Forces continue to prepare for the application of the disposal act in the transport sector.

Public order and security

Public order and security is a preparedness sector led by the Swedish Police Authority and that also includes Swedish Customs, the Swedish Security Service, the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish National Courts Administration, the Swedish Prosecution Agency, and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service. An overarching task is to maintain regular operations and to ensure that the entire judicial chain is functioning during all levels of crisis and war.

In the event of a war on Swedish territory, the demand on police activities will increase. Part of the civilian population might be forced leave their homes to escape acts of war. Crimes such as looting and violence against women may increase. The Swedish Police Authority also plays an important role in border surveillance in the event of war.

Today, this sector is designed for peacetime operations. There is a clear need for a substantial reinforcement of the police to carry out duties during wartime. This might involve procurement of vehicles with enforced protection for safe transportation, heavier armament, communication systems as well as protected premises where operations can continue, despite war conditions.

To strengthen the police in times of war, the Defence Commission considers that there is a need to develop a police personnel reinforcement resource in the form of a police reserve unit.

Cyber security and digitalisation

Cyber security is an important part of total defence. Sweden's digital capability must be robust in peacetime as well as during heightened state of alert and in war. In international comparison, Sweden is a highly digitalised country. Information and cyber security thus become an issue of importance for the entire total defence and society. It must not be possible for Sweden's digital assets to be destroyed or manipulated, or to end up in the hands of an attacker.

According to NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, a single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Experiences from Ukraine show the importance of systematic information, cyber security work and a strong cyber defence, as well as the importance of robustness in electronic communications, good repair readiness and cooperation between private and public actors.

Sweden's digital infrastructure for vital societal functions must be robust enough to function across the entire spectrum of conflict. Efforts on information and cyber security need to go hand-in-hand with the further development of digitalisation, in order to create the necessary security and robustness in the systems while at the same time enabling the continued digitalisation of society to produce positive effects. In the preparations for heightened state of alert and war, plans also need to be made for how information assets of fundamental importance to society are ultimately to be protected by removal or destruction.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of a clear set of requirements regarding information and cyber security for all actors and functions vital to the Swedish total defence, both private and public, and the need for proper IT incident reporting.

The Defence Commission notes that the National Defence Radio Establishment's responsibility for the Swedish National Cyber Security Centre (*Nationellt cybersäkerhetscenter*, NCSC) is currently being evaluated. In this context, the Commission would like to emphasise the question of whether the current Swedish agency structure is appropriate for achieving comprehensive and coordinated governance of information and cyber security. Moving the responsibility for cyber and information security, which is currently under the responsibility of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and organising it in the form of a new governmental

agency may be considered. In this context, the Estonian Information System Authority (RIA) and its mandate are particularly interesting to analyse.

In addition, the Defence Commission considers that the cooperation between government agencies and the business sector in the area of cyber security needs to be strengthened. Cyber security is the responsibility of both public and private actors at national, regional and local level. The NCSC has a key role to play in strengthening private-public partnerships.

Currently, various forms of antagonistic cyber activities must be considered as a normality. Responding to these attacks is therefore part of the normal, peacetime operations of the concerned actors in Sweden.

In the event of war, antagonistic cyber activities and attacks may be further intensified and carried out differently. The level of cyber security protection considered sufficient in peacetime may therefore be assessed differently in times of heightened state of alert and war. In the run-up to and during war, weaknesses and dependencies in the cyber domain may bring matters to a head, and it is highly likely that antagonistic cyber activities and attacks will be of a more destructive nature.

The Defence Commission states that further measures are required to secure the competence and human resources needed for Sweden's cyber security and information security in times of heightened state of alert and war. Sweden has a large IT sector and many citizens with expertise in this area. The Commission emphasises the importance of involving them in Sweden's total defence, which should be considered a priority.

Resilience, will to defend and psychological defence

A population's will to defend itself, resilience and ability to deal with a war situation are all crucial factors to achieving a credible total defence. In light of the sharply deteriorated security situation, Sweden's will to defend itself needs to be strengthened and the population's crisis awareness supplemented with war awareness. Ukraine and its citizens have clearly demonstrated the importance of the population's resilience and will to defend itself in order to resist an attack.

The population's sense of belonging to and its participation in society is of great importance for the will to defend the country and the will to participate and invest in total defence. As an Ally, Sweden's will to defend will form part of NATO's overall will to defend. It will thereby be based not only on Sweden's, but also on NATO's, overall ability to create and maintain the will to defend within the Alliance.

Psychological defence is operational in peacetime, heightened state of alert and war. It contributes to society's resilience and our overall ability to defend the country against an armed attack. Ensuring and maintaining the population's will to defend itself is at the core of the psychological defence. As an important component of a strong total defence, psychological

defence aims, as far as possible in times of heightened state of alert and war, to ensure an open and democratic society with freedom of opinion and free media. In peacetime as well as in times of heightened state of alert and war, safeguarding these fundamental values helps to maintain and strengthen the population's resilience and will to defend itself. This improves society's ability to resist and ward off external pressure.

The Defence Commission states that the psychological defence will face new challenges in the coming years because of the rapid technological development, especially with regard to artificial intelligence (AI), and the continued evolution of the information landscape, not least with regard to digital platforms with user-generated content. The psychological defence must keep pace with these developments in order to remain effective.

The psychological defence builds on Sweden's free, independent media, a well-informed and well-educated population, and trust between people, in public institutions and in our democratic state governed by the rule of law. The Defence Commission notes that the will to defend the country and the resilience of the population, as well as the level of public trust in our society, require continuous work to be safeguarded and strengthened. Our open, democratic society and our social contract are being challenged from several directions.

The establishment of The Swedish Psychological Defence Agency was an important step in developing Sweden's psychological defence capability. The Defence Commission states that the sharply deteriorated security situation, the technological developments and changing media habits require Sweden to continue to develop its psychological defence. First and foremost, it is a matter of more systematic efforts to safeguard and strengthen the will to defend the country. In order to create a credible capability within the psychological defence, it is also important to prepare, plan for and exercise the psychological defence in heightened state of alert.

The Defence Commission is of the opinion that the tasks relating to psychological defence that are currently organised within the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency should be transferred to the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency.

The will of the population to defend itself must already be established in peacetime, in order to be maintained and effective in war. A strong will to defend has its foundation in the understanding of what is to be defended, the value of one's own contribution, and the courage and ability to carry out this effort even when it is based on personal risks and the aggressor is perceived as overpowering. If the population feels that fundamental values are being threatened, that their own contribution is of significance and that there is a broader societal resilience to the effects of war, there are conditions for a strong will to defend the country.

In light of the deteriorated security situation and the foreign malign information influence activities and other disinformation that Sweden and Swedish actors are already exposed to, the Defence Commission sees the establishment of the Psychological Defence Agency as an important step in increasing the capabilities of Swedish actors in this area. Despite the fact that

knowledge, preparedness, capability and interest in foreign malign information influence activities and other disinformation among Swedish actors have increased, the Commission assesses the general level of capacity as low, especially with regard to the actors' capability in times of heightened state of alert and war.

Communicating and disseminating objective public information quickly and efficiently during a state of heightened state of alert and war is a key task for psychological defence actors. Another important component is active strategic communication towards a potential adversary about the resilience of society. This is in order to deter an aggressor by making it clear that an attack on Sweden or other Allies would entail high costs.

In addition to a collective ability to resist an armed attack, the government, together with other public actors, must also have the ability to communicate effectively, quickly and in a coordinated manner. This is in order to maintain the population's trust, resilience and will to defend the country during heightened state of alert and war, as well as to gain international support.

In the event of a heightened state of alert, the Defence Commission anticipates that the public strategic communication, both to the population and to the outside world, will need to be subsumed directly under the government.

Media play an important role in society's ability to manage crises and heightened state of alert. Swedish public service broadcasters play a special role due to their broad public service missions, their stable funding, the high standards of accessibility and the high level of public trust in their activities. A strong public service in peacetime, with a high level of public confidence and a broad geographical spread, lays the foundation for the role of the public service broadcasters in times of heightened state of alert. The high level of trust is an important part of the public service value of Sweden's total defence.

Rescue service and civil protection

Protecting the civilian population in the event of an armed attack is an important task in civil defence. This helps to maintain the population's will to defend itself and its resilience, and enables other activities and functions that are important for the total defence to be maintained. Civil protection enables the survival of the civilian population.

Civil protection refers to measures to protect the population and civilian property from the effects of war. To achieve this, it is necessary to have early warning and alert systems, the provision and preparation of shelters and other protected spaces, evacuation and accommodation plans, information on self-protection and additional measures necessary for the protection of the civilian population to be carried out. In addition, a functioning civil protection system is dependent on a trained, educated and well-staffed municipal rescue service organisation to address and resolve damage, as well as an ability to deal with war's broader effects on the civilian population at the local level.

Civil protection also contributes to the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to conduct combat, for example by enabling evacuation of civilians from combat areas, securing functions and operations in other parts of the total defence, for example by enabling people to stay where they are and continue working. This reduces the burden on other parts of the total defence, such as health care and rescue services, and helps to maintain the will to defend the country. Civil protection enables Sweden to live up to the requirements of international law during war.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of functionality in all parts constituting the civil protection; from early warning and alerting to sheltering, evacuation and accommodation, rescue services and other necessary assistance. Contingency preparation, planning and exercises should be in place for all of the above so that they can be put in to practice individually or in combination with each other.

The Defence Commission proposes that priority should be given to the measures that will have the greatest capability-enhancing effect in the short term. This includes the renovation of existing shelters, an inventory of other protected spaces, reinforcement of the emergency services for a heightened state of alert and war, preparations and plans for evacuation from areas that are likely to be affected by acts of war and areas in the vicinity of facilities and locations of importance for the total defence, as well as ensuring good capability and redundancy in warning systems and information to the public.

The Defence Commission supports the Inquiry's proposal that the county administrative boards, following a decision by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, should develop a framework for planning evacuation or accommodation in the event of a heightened state of alert or war in the county. The Commission states that this planning should cover areas that are highly likely to be affected by acts of war and areas in the vicinity of facilities and places of importance for the total defence.

The Defence Commission notes that the tasks and responsibilities of municipalities in civil protection may require a lot of personnel. It is therefore of utmost importance that the municipalities plan for relocation of staff to be able to strengthen the areas where the staffing needs are greatest, at least for limited periods. There must also be basic preparations to be able to handle spontaneous evacuation.

The Defence Commission states that the ability of the rescue services in wartime must be strengthened. Upgrading of skills as well as personnel and material resource reinforcements are needed for heightened state of alert. The Commission takes note of the proposal being prepared within the Government Offices on the activation of civilian conscription in order to urgently enrol and deploy previously trained personnel in the municipal rescue services and in the area of electricity supply. In addition, the Commission proposes to, as soon as possible, muster and provide basic training to civilian conscripts for the needs of the rescue services and parts of the repair readiness.

According to the Defence Commission, additional measures can be considered to strengthen the municipal rescue service's capability, such as a special reinforcement resource. Such a reinforcement resource for rescue services in times of heightened state of alert and war should be organised at a higher regional level under the civil defence regions and, in the event of a heightened state of alert or war, be subordinated to municipal rescue services. For this reinforcement resource, basic civilian service training should be applied.

Efficient and effective civil protection also requires an efficient, robust and secure public warning and information system. Safe, prompt and reliable access to the general public with warnings and information is central to the effective protection of the civilian population in both peace and war.

Migration and major displacement

In the event of war, large-scale migration and major displacements are to be expected. This may take place both within countries and across national borders.

In the event of war, the total defence must support NATO's joint military operations, including providing necessary support to Allied and Swedish Armed Forces that are based on, transported through or supplied via Swedish territory. Sweden is expected to constitute an important base, logistics and deployment area for NATO. In parallel, large number of refugees from war-torn areas should be expected to come to Sweden. Wounded and injured people, both military personnel and civilians, are expected to enter or pass through Swedish territory. Similarly, planned evacuations of certain affected areas in Sweden may be carried out as well as unplanned 'spontaneous' evacuations. All in all, this will place great demands on capacity to coordinate transports and transport routes, accommodation, food supply, medical care and more.

Large, spontaneous population displacements across land borders to Sweden in the event of war underline the importance of having the ability to register and accommodate people, and to handle large traffic flows. This also requires increased capacity for border control as well as capacity for fast and accurate information provision to both those arriving in Sweden and to the Swedish population.

The Swedish Police Authority's disaster registration system could also be used for large-scale planned evacuations. This could be done by the police setting up stations for ID checks and registration at evacuation points where people subject to evacuation gather for transport.

In the case of spontaneous evacuations, it will be much more difficult to identify people evacuating an area. Since many individuals in such a situation will not pass through an evacuation point, it would be an advantage to enable remote registration, by encouraging residents, for example, to call a phone number or use a temporary internet site. Early provision of such formats by the authorities will create better opportunities for follow-up.

The Defence Commission states that technical solutions need to be developed to enable registering individuals who, during a period of heightened state of alert and war, move within the country without having been registered, for example in the event of major spontaneous evacuations.

Depending on the reason for and the design of the reintroduction of internal border control measures, significant human resources may be required. As the Defence Commission has previously noted, police resources available to carry out such measures in heightened state of alert or war are limited. In order to strengthen the police in case of heightened state of alert or war, the Commission considers that the former reserve police for heightened state of alert must be reestablished.

Health care

It is of great importance that there is capacity to take care of the injured and dead in the event of a war. First and foremost, it is important for the protection of the civilian population and for saving lives, but it is also important for the public's trust in government and authorities, as well as for the will to defend the country. Also, it is crucial for maintaining the will to fight among the military personnel. The Defence Commission therefore believes that the Swedish health care system's capacity to restructure operations in order to handle a large number of injured people must be furthered strengthened.

Both military personnel and the civilian population will be affected in the event of war. To a large extent, this will involve serious, severe or critical trauma injuries. Injuries or illnesses resulting from epidemics or the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons may also occur, as well as severe psychological trauma.

The Defence Commission believes that the assessments made in the previous report, *Motståndskraft* (2017:66), that fighting on Swedish territory for several weeks could result in 20 000 to 30 000 dead and injured civilians and soldiers, is still relevant as a planning input.

As a NATO member, Sweden must also prepare for major casualties to Swedish personnel outside Sweden's borders. NATO membership also means that the Swedish health care chain needs to be able to take care of injured soldiers from Allied states' units.

The Defence Commission notes that difficult prioritisation of patients will be required in times of war when the urgent need for care exceeds the capacity of the health care system, which employees must be prepared for.

Even though the general quality of care often cannot be the same in times of heightened state of alert and war, the medical treatment results for the vast majority of patients should, as far as possible, correspond to the levels in a normal situation in peacetime.

Increasing the number of hospital beds in the event of war, especially for emergency surgery and intensive care, places great demands on access to personnel, premises, medicines, medical supplies and medical equipment, but also on the ability to direct, coordinate and make decisions. The system must be based on plans being developed and other preparations carried out, as well as the system being exercised. The Defence Commission considers that the ability to sustainably increase the number of hospital beds, especially for emergency surgery and intensive care, is the single most important task for the health care system in the event of a heightened state of alert and war.

The Defence Commission states that the regions should have the ability to double the number of hospital beds compared to peacetime, with the staffing and access to medicines and medical equipment possible under such conditions. At the same time, the Commission notes that in the geographical areas that will be hit the hardest, the need for care will be significantly higher, which will place great demands on even bigger increases of capacity, cooperation between regions and priorities between patients, as well as well-functioning governance.

The Defence Commission states that preparations for heightened state of alert and war in the health care sector should include plans for the redistribution necessary to meet the need for hospital beds for a larger number of injured people. This reallocation work will require prioritisation of, among other things, hospital beds and intensive care resources. The possibility of converting care facilities for the care of trauma patients should also be considered and planned. This may concern, for example, health care centres and veterinary clinics. The plans should also include private health care providers.

The Defence Commission believes that a prerequisite for implementing relevant preparations and plans for heightened state of alert and war in the health care sector is that municipalities and regions are included in the Government's planning instructions for civil defence.

The Defence Commission believes that there is a need for special emergency hospitals, meaning emergency hospitals that have a specific ability to increase the number of beds, especially for the treatment of trauma and other war injuries. They should have an established war organisation with personnel, premises, equipment and the ability to provide adequate leadership, coordination and decision-making.

The Defence Commission also notes that there may be a need to plan and otherwise prepare for reserve hospitals. This could entail schools and larger community centres that can be converted into hospitals, for example.

The Defence Commission welcomes the ongoing development to improve the security of supply of medicines and medical supplies. The Commission wishes to emphasise the importance of ensuring that this security of supply is prepared for at least three months of disruptions in deliveries and the effects of war. Planning must also take into account the need for life-sustaining medicines, for example for the chronically ill.

Funeral services and pastoral care

Religious communities contribute to the total defence with pastoral care, counselling and ceremonies, including funerals.

Funeral services in Sweden are run by the Church of Sweden's parishes and pastorates, with the exception of the municipalities of Stockholm and Tranås, where each municipality is the principal. The Church of Sweden thus plays an important role in total defence through statutory emergency preparedness obligations, but also through support for the Swedish Armed Forces personnel in wartime.

The Defence Commission states that funeral directors must be prepared to deal with the number of casualties to be buried in the event of war. It will not be possible to maintain the same extent of current burial routines in peacetime.

The fact that funerals can be carried out in war, and with respect for people's different beliefs, contributes to people's grieving process and ability to endure severe hardship.

The Church of Sweden advises parishes to spare land corresponding to coffin graves for five per cent of the population in the parish.

Cultural life and the management of cultural heritage

It is important to maintain cultural activities as far as possible in the event of war. This applies to both historical heritage and contemporary culture. Digital information is now a significant part of cultural heritage and must also be protected, just like physical cultural heritage.

The Defence Commission notes that there is no designated preparedness agency for issues dealing with cultural heritage. The Defence Commission states that it should be clarified as soon as possible which agencies are to be responsible authorities in matters relating to cultural heritage in the event of war.

Schools and preschools

The Defence Commission notes that schools and preschools are vital societal functions that need to function as far as possible even in the event of a heightened state of alert and in war. Maintaining high-quality educational activities during a state of heightened state of alert and war is pivotal to ensure that children and young people do not miss out on basic knowledge and skills. In addition to teaching, school is a social institution that offers social interaction and education that is important for the well-being, learning and personal development of children and young people. For a country at war, children have a special significance in that they are bearers of the future.

The Defence Commission states that measures should be taken to ensure that the need for schools and preschools is met, including with independent schools, in the event of a heightened state of alert or war. The responsibilities of the owners of independent schools must be clarified.

Training and Exercises

Training and exercises are important tools for building real total defence capability. The organisations and personnel of total defence actors must have relevant training for their tasks in the event of a heightened state of alert and in war. The public must be educated in what total defence is, what demands it places on society and citizens, and what NATO membership means.

The Defence Commission believes that training and exercise activities at all levels must be further intensified in the coming years. This must include general total defence training, in-service training, training in leadership in the event of a heightened state of alert or war, as well as exercises based on the total defence planning. In addition to contributing to capability development, training and exercises can then help to highlight total defence issues and increase the will to defend the country, both in general and in specific operations that are important for the total defence.

Total defence training must begin in school. The Defence Commission believes that total defence should be taught in primary and secondary schools as well as municipal adult education, where it should be outlined in the relevant curricula, courses and subject plans.

Both public and private operations that are expected to continue to function during a heightened state of alert or war have a responsibility to train their staff. This applies to personnel who have positions in a war organisation, but also to other personnel who, on the basis of the compulsory general national service, are expected to continue to work during a period of heightened state of alert or war.

In addition, specific job training is required for the roles, tasks and conditions that personnel can expect in the event of a heightened state of alert or war. Each actor with a role during a period of heightened state of alert or war must therefore develop its own training package, based on current plans and the tasks that the actor is supposed to handle.

For some staff, additional in-depth education and training is required. In this regard, the Defence Commission considers that the Swedish Defence University should be the primary training provider. The Swedish Defence University has the necessary teaching infrastructure, as well as teachers, contact networks and research activities. In the total defence system, there is also a great deal of confidence in the University's teaching. The Commission sees a need for total defence training for managers in the total defence in order to prepare leadership for the event of a heightened state of alert or war.

In order to exercise the ability to switch to a war organisation, the Defence Commission believes that the civil defence should also carry out preparedness and alarm exercises.

The Defence Commission believes that an overall responsibility for exercise activities should remain at the national level. The new agency for support to the Government's coordination of civil defence, with responsibility for a new preparedness sector for planning, command and control, and coordination, should have this role.

Research, development and innovation

Research and development (R&D) is crucial for systematically raising the level of our total defence capability in both the short and long term. In addition, the ability to rapidly translate R&D results into defence innovations is crucial for defence capabilities.

The Defence Commission considers it important for the state to ensure needs-driven R&D in support of knowledge-based development of the total defence. This R&D must be conducted in such a way that knowledge is available over time and results are available in time to be used in the development of the total defence. It must also be possible to use the R&D in ongoing decision-making and development processes. R&D for the needs of the total defence must be conducted with relevant protection for security-sensitive activities and classified information. This also requires a good understanding of the threats, knowledge of the needs and planning assumptions of the total defence, as well as the requirements of war. Parts of the R&D are integrity-critical, i.e. the knowledge is sensitive and therefore cannot be retrieved from outside or shared with others. In the event of a heightened state of alert or war, it must be possible to convert the knowledge into support of total defence activities. R&D should also be able to contribute to early warning of new threats.

Given these special conditions, the Defence Commission assesses that significant parts of this R&D are less suitable for traditional research funding through open calls for proposals and that Sweden must continue to have special R&D environments available for the needs of total defence. These should primarily be the Swedish Defence Research Agency and the Swedish Defence University.

With their own research and technical expertise, defence companies operating in Sweden are important players and links between the total defence and the civilian and international R&D environments. The self-financed research conducted by defence companies is about four times larger than the state-funded defence research.

International research cooperation is important for Sweden, as it generates and allows access to relevant knowledge on the topic of total defence through exchange and in collaboration with others. It also plays an important role in building cooperation and trust between Sweden and other important actors.

Sweden's NATO membership entails increased expectations from Allies that Sweden, as a prominent research nation, will participate in NATO's knowledge development. This can be achieved through increased and deepened participation in the work of NATO's research organisation, but also through the contribution of national research and research facilities as well as various forms of operational expert support to the Alliance.

A new funding framework for civil defence

The Defence Commission states that the deteriorated security situation has necessitated strengthening the funding of civil defence measures. The Riksdag and the Government should establish a long-term ambition for civil defence objectives and funding.

The large number of actors in civil defence and the scattering of these actors across various sectors of society make resource allocation and follow-up complex.

A financial planning framework creates predictability, long-term perspective and transparency in the governance of civil defence and provides increased opportunities to prioritise and follow up the results of measures taken.

As part of establishing a new funding framework, financing expenditures such as investments, maintenance of investments, grants and transfers to local governments should be gathered in one – or a limited number of – expenditure appropriations within the expenditure area 6 - Defence and contingency measures.